THE   GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 


THE    GOVERNMENT 


OF 


BY 


DORMAN   B.    EATON 


A^^L<^^|       - 


PUBLISHED  FOR  THE  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  PRESS  BY 

THE   MACMILLAN    COMPANY 

LONDON:  MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  LTD. 
1899 

All  rights  reserved 


CorrmioHT,  1899, 
BT  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPACT. 


NortoooO  13rr«« 

J.  8.  Cubing  ft  Co.  -  Berwick  *  Smith 
Norwood  HtM.  U.S.A. 


LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFOR 
SANTA  BARBARA 


PREFACE 

THE  main  topics  treated  in  this  volume  and  the  reasons 
for  the  order  of  their  presentation  are  so  fully  explained 
in  the  introductory  chapter  that  few  words  are  needed  here. 
The  lack  of  any  generally  accepted  municipal  system  in  the 
United  States  and  the  contrariety  of  opinion  concerning 
the  most  important  methods  of  municipal  government  are 
recognized  facts,  —  and  they  must  largely  affect  the  treat- 
ment of  our  subject.  Conflicts  of  opinion  and  serious  dis- 
putes about  theories  and  methods  would  be  unavoidable 
even  if  nothing  further  should  be  attempted  than  a  plan 
of  city  government  formed  by  compilation  and  deductions 
from  American  precedents  and  experience  alone. 

I  must  think  that  such  a  treatment  of  the  matters  we  are 
to  deal  with  would  be  quite  inadequate  ;  for  very  instructive 
lessons  in  municipal  government  can  be  best  studied  in  the 
practical  methods,  and  the  results  of  administration  in  the 
leading  cities  of  Europe,  where  municipal  experience  has 
been  much  longer  and  more  varied  than  in  the  United 
States.  Nevertheless,  our  municipal  system  must  be  framed 
in  harmony  with  our  constitutional  principles  and  social 
life  ;  so  that,  while  nothing  intrinsically  good  should  be 
rejected  merely  because  of  its  foreign  origin,  nothing  can 
be  adopted  unless  compatible  with  the  fundamental  theories 
of  republican  government. 

Despite  the  fact  that  no  view  of  city  governments  is  so 
uniform  and  pervading  in  the  United  States  as  the  opinion 


Ti  PREFACE 

that  they  are  unsatisfactory,  if  not  discreditable,  there  will 
doubtless  be  readers  who  will  shrink  from  any  attempt  to 
improve  them  from  a  study  of  the  enlightened  experience 
of  the  older  nations. 

It  seems  inevitable  that  the  treatment  of  the  subject  before 
us  should  be  controversial  as  to  some  important  points, — 
especially  as  to  nominations,  minority  representation,  the 
choice  of  mayors,  the  composition  of  city  councils,  and  the 
relation  of  parties  to  city  government,  —  but  I  have  sought 
to  avoid  all  merely  theoretical  discussions.  Municipal  gov- 
ernment is  a  very  practical  affair,  which  should  be  based  on 
constitutional  principles,  and  the  well-tested  facts  of  expe- 
rience—  and  not  on  parties.  Nevertheless,  there  are  some 
matters  as  to  which  a  sound  theory  is  so  important  as  to  be 
worth  all  its  vindication  may  cost. 

The  difficulty  of  establishing  a  sound  municipal  system  in 
the  United  States  is,  I  think,  much  greater  than  it  is  sup- 
posed to  be  by  those  who  seem  to  regard  separate  city  elec- 
tions and  Home  Rule  as  sufficient  in  themselves  for  the 
purpose,  though  I  regard  these  measures  as  highly  useful. 
Yet,  I  am  convinced  that  far  more  drastic  and  comprehensive 
remedies  are  needed,  —  remedies  some  of  which  are  prac- 
ticable in  this  decade,  at  the  present  stage  of  civic  instruc- 
tion,—  without  waiting  for  that  more  thorough  municipal 
education  which  the  recently  aroused  municipal  sentiment 
of  the  country  seems  sure  to  supply. 

I  have  ventured  to  suggest  several  remedial  measures, 
some  of  which  I  hope  may  be  found  available,  in  the  near 
future,  in  aid  of  the  municipal  reform  we  so  greatly  need. 

In  going  over  the  earlier  parts  of  this  volume  the  reader 
may  regard  it  as  being  in  considerable  measure  historical 
and  critical,  but,  before  he  has  completed  it,  he  may  perhaps 
think  it  to  be  in  yet  larger  part  constructive  and  practical. 


PREFACE  Vii 

In  the  midst  of  the  vast  contrariety  and  confusion  of  our 
hastily  devised  municipal  constructions,  I  have  felt  the  need 
of  a  definite  plan  and  theory  of  city  government,  —  carefully 
considered  on  the  basis  both  of  principle  and  experience,  — 
and  I  have  therefore  presented  such  a  plan,  well  knowing, 
however,  that  it  would  encounter  fewer  objections  if  it  were 
less  definite  and  therefore  less  useful  for  its  purpose.  Be- 
sides, it  seems  to  be  essential  for  our  municipal  betterment, 
to  bring  our  indefinite  municipal  thinking  —  or  lack  of 
thought  —  and  our  manifold  partisan  schemes,  of  city  domi- 
nation for  party  and  sectarian  advantage,  to  the  test  of  a 
definite  kind,  and  organization  of  city  government,  having  its 
principles  defined  and  its  methods  organized  in  the  interests 
of  the  people  and  not  of  any  party  or  sect. 

Being  much  indebted  to  several  gentlemen  for  valuable 
information  and  suggestions,  I  wish  to  make  some  acknowl- 
edgments here.  Ex-Mayor  Hewitt  had  the  kindness  to  read 
the  first  six  chapters  of  this  volume  before  they  were  sent 
to  the  press.  President  Low  and  Professor  Goodnow,  of 
Columbia  University,  obligingly  read  the  first  seventeen  chap- 
ters in  manuscript,  and  I  am  indebted  to  them  for  valuable 
suggestions,  and  for  opportunities  for  discussing  municipal 
subjects.  To  Dr.  Albert  Shaw,  I  am  indebted  much  beyond 
my  obligation  from  a  study  and  large  use  of  his  volumes  on 
municipal  subjects.1  Ex-Mayor  Strong,  of  New  York,  has 
given  me  very  useful  information  from  his  experience. 
Judge  Wheeler  and  Judge  Brown  —  of  the  United  States 
District  Court  —  have  placed  me  under  obligations  by  their 
kindness, — the  former  having  read  Chapter  XVII  before  it 
went  to  the  printer.8  Mr.  Andrew  H.  Green  did  me  the 
favor  of  reading  Chapter  XVIII,  and  Mr.  Horace  E.  Dem- 

1  See  pp.  58,  322.  «  See  p.  450. 


viii  PREFACE 

ing  the  favor  of  reading  several  chapters,  and  gave  me  the 
opportunity  of  much  useful  discussion  of  municipal  princi- 
ples, before  these  chapters  took  their  final  form.  I  am  under 
obligations  to  Mr.  Richard  H.  Dana,  of  Boston,  for  useful 
information  very  kindly  supplied.  It  should  be  said  that  in 
no  case  are  these  readings  referred  to  as  evidence  of  an 
assent  to  the  views  advanced  in  the  chapters  read,  but  only 
as  some  assurance  of  my  wish  to  have  advice  from  those 
most  competent  to  give  it. 

I  may  add  that  it  has  been  many  years  since  I  first  gave 
some  study  to  city  affairs,  and  had  a  practical  part  in  their 
administration,1  —  facts  which  may  be  some  excuse  for  offer- 
ing this  treatise  to  the  public,  but  cannot  justify  its 
defects. 

DORMAN  B.  EATON. 

New  YORK  CITY,  June  1, 


i  Notes,  pp.  60, 411,  441. 


CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTORY  CHAPTER 

PAOB 

*      How  and  why  we  have  reached  the  present  municipal  condition 
w  in  the  United  States,  and  the  problems  we  must  solve  to 

improve  it 3 

CHAPTER  n 

The  nature  of  the  evils  in  American  municipal  government,  and 

separate  elections  and  Home  Rule  as  remedies  .        .        .        .19 

CHAPTER  m 

The  relation  of  political  parties  to  Home  Rule  and  municipal 

administration 57 

CHAPTER  IV 

Municipal  government  by  party  as  illustrated  by  the  Tammany 

Democracy 89 

CHAPTER  V 

Municipal  government  by  party  as  illustrated  by  the  Tammany 

Democracy  (continued') Ill 

CHAPTER  VI 

Municipal  government  by  party  as  illustrated  by  the  Tammany 

Democracy  (concluded) 135 

CHAPTER  VH 

Several  vicious  conditions  and  practices  considered  and  remedies 
*  for  them  proposed.    The  Merit  —  or  Civil  Service  Reform — 

System  as  a  remedy 158 

CHAPTER  Vm 

The  same  subject  concluded.     Evil  effects  of  too  short  terms  of 
^              office  and  too  many  elections.     How  to  insure  a  salutary  pub- 
licity of  official  action 189 

iz 


X  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  IX 

PAOB 

Concerning  Free  Nominations  and  Free  Voting;  minority  repre- 
sentation       209 

CHAPTER  X 
Concerning  the  functions  and  relations  of  city  councils  and  mayors    246 

CHAPTER  XI 
Concerning  the  constitution  and  membership  of  a  city  council         .    276 

CHAPTER  XII 

The  methods  and  practical  results  of  municipal  government  in 

Great  Britain  ,       v       * 309 

CHAPTER  XIII 

The  methods  and  practical  results  of  municipal  government  in 

Continental  Europe 337 

CHAPTER  XIV 
/      Concerning  the  election  of  mayors  and  their  powers  and  functions    368 

CHAPTER  XV 

Concerning  school  administration  and  sanitary  administration        .    398 

CHAPTER  XVI 

Concerning  police  administration       . 415 

CHAPTER  XVn 
Concerning  judicial  administration  in  municipalities       .        .        .    436 

CHAPTER  XVm 

The  charter  of  the  Greater  New  York  as  an  admonition  in  city 

extension  and  a  lesson  in  city-party  government        .        .        .    461 

APPENDIX 

The  neglected  need  of  minority  representation,  and  the  threatened 

rtate-police  despotism,  in  New  York    ...,.,        1 


THE   GOVEKNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 


THE  GOVEKNMENT   OF   MUNICIPALITIES 


INTRODUCTORY  CHAPTER.  —  HOW  AND  WHY  WE  HAVE 
REACHED  THE  PRESENT  MUNICIPAL  CONDITION  IN  THE 
UNITED  STATES,  AND  THE  PROBLEMS  WE  MUST  SOLVE  TO 
IMPROVE  IT 

The  dissatisfaction  with  our  municipal  governments.  Why  and  how  they  have 
been  neglected.  Why  they  are  now  receiving  more  attention.  Municipal  laws 
diverse  and  hastily  enacted.  Municipal  experience  not  studied  until  lately. 
Crude  opinions  and  false  theories.  Why  early  statesmen  and  constitutions  did 
not  deal  with  city  affairs.  In  their  time,  no  city  problems  or  municipal  system 
existed,  or  was  needed.  When  those  problems  arose.  Instructive  lessons  from 
the  making  of  those  constitutions.  A  charter  is  a  city  constitution.  Why  our 
charters,  in  broad  contrast  with  our  constitutions,  are  failures.  Why  the  muni- 
cipal question  has  been  treated  as  a  party  issue.  Its  importance  much  under- 
estimated. Why  we  have  to  create  a  municipal  system.  Relations  of  municipal 
affairs  to  parties.  Why  city  affairs  are  no  proper  sphere  for  parties.  How  parties 
became  despotic  before  the  need  of  a  municipal  system  was  developed.  How,  why, 
and  when  parties  got  control  of  cities.  Meaning  of  city-party  system.  Incom- 
patibility of  the  party  system  with  a  true  municipal  system.  When  a  municipal 
system  was  first  needed.  The  great  fundamental  truth  of  a  true  municipal  sys- 
tem. As  to  parties  in  city  affairs.  How  and  why  parties  sought  to  make  their 
system  absolute.  When  a  mayor  may  be  said  to  be  autocratic.  Relations  of  the 
party  boss  to  the  autocratic  mayor.  Both  first  developed  in  New  York  City  and 
Brooklyn.  Why  to  increase  the  power  of  the  mayor  is  to  increase  party  despotism 
in  cities.  Why  city  party  managers  desire  both.  Great  power  of  the  supporters 
of  the  party  system  for  cities.  Order  of  subjects  to  be  discussed  in  this  treatise. 
Diversity  of  opinion  as  to  what  are  the  great  municipal  problems.  These  prob- 
lems explained,  and  how  their  solution  may  be  most  easily  accomplished. 

AMONG  the  most  intelligent  people  of  the  United  States 
there  is  a  pervading  feeling  of  profound  dissatisfaction  with 
the  governments  of  their  cities  and  villages.  They  think 
these  governments  unworthy  of  the  citizens  who  live  under 
them,  and  they  contemplate  with  solicitude  their  prospective 
condition.  To  see  clearly  how  and  why  we  have  got  into  a 
bad  situation  may  greatly  aid  us  in  getting  out  of  it. 

3 


4  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

I.  During  many  years  the  dissatisfaction  and  anxiety  on 
these  subjects  have  led  to  numerous  experiments  in  munic- 
ipal construction,  and  to  the  enactment  of  multifarious 
municipal  laws.  In  the  main  both  the  laws  and  the  con- 
structive methods  have  been  hastily  devised  according  to 
theories  inconsiderately  accepted,  and  there  has  been  no 
adequate  investigation  of  the  history  or  nature  of  the  great 
municipal  problems  which  they  involve.  With  rare  excep- 
tions, American  statesmen  have  not,  until  very  recently, 
given  thoughtful  attention  to  municipal  affairs  —  these 
affairs  not  having  been  regarded  as  within  the  function  or 
sphere  of  statesmanship.  There  have  been  but  very  rare 
attempts  in  our  schools  for  teaching  governmental  science 
to  give  any  instruction  as  to  the  true  principles  or  methods 
of  municipal  government;  and  these  matters  have  had  no 
place  in  our  political  platforms.  The  activity  concerning 
them  has  been  rather  on  the  part  of  the  local  politicians 
and  a  few  advanced  reformers,  than  on  the  part  of  the 
thoughtful  and  patriotic  people  generally. 

Within  the  present  decade,  however,  these  people  —  justly 
alarmed  at  the  growing  municipal  evils  —  have  become  much 
interested  in  the  municipal  question,  the  gravity  of  which 
they  are  beginning  to  appreciate.  Within  this  period  they 
have  created  multitudinous  organizations,  extending  to  all 
the  large  and  many  of  the  small  cities  and  villages  of  the 
Union,  for  dealing  with  these  subjects.  A  National  Munic- 
ipal League  and  a  National  Conference  have  also  been 
created,  at  whose  meetings  this  question  and  the  ominous 
significance  of  our  municipal  condition  have  been  consid- 
ered. Within  the  same  period  several  able  writers  to  whom 
we  shall  refer  have  treated  these  subjects  with  ability  and 
learning. 

If  these  organizations  seemed,  at  first,  to  regard  the 
problems  to  be  solved  as  requiring  little  more  than  a  selec- 
tion from  the  miscellaneous  municipal  devices  which  Amer- 
ican legislation  can  supply,  —  their  proceedings  hardly 
presenting  the  need  of  a  study  of  municipal  history  and 
principles,  —  it  is  yet  true  that  a  more  comprehensive  and 


INTRODUCTORY  5 

adequate  view  of  the  subject  is  now  being  taken  and  seems 
likely  to  be  vigorously  urged  upon  the  attention  of  the 
people.  Nevertheless,  these  organizations  and  authors,  we 
must  think,  have  rendered  a  very  valuable  public  service. 
They  have  awakened  public  attention  ;  they  have  done 
much  to  make  it  plain  that  no  superficial  or  merely  empir- 
ical dealing  with  our  municipal  affairs  will  give  us  toler- 
able city  government ;  they  have  made  it  clear  that  great 
questions  of  principle  are  involved  which  require  a  careful 
consideration  both  of  our  constitutional  system  and  our 
party  system ;  they  have  shown  that  there  are  instructive 
lessons  of  municipal  history  and  experience,  both  in  this 
country  and  in  Europe,  the  study  of  which  —  lamentably 
neglected  as  they  have  been  in  the  United  States  —  would 
elevate  our  ideals  and  enlighten  our  efforts  in  aid  of  our 
municipal  betterment. 

II.  The  light  thrown  upon  these  matters  has  not  only 
made  it  appear  that  we  have,  in  the  United  States,  no 
original  or  generally  accepted  municipal  system,  but  that 
we  have  no  practical  methods  generally  accepted  by  our 
cities  from  the  enforcement  of  which  competent  judges 
expect  satisfactory  results  in  the  future.  We  not  only 
have  no  city  government  which  —  even  in  leading  outline 
—  can  be  taken  as  a  model,  but  we  have  no  theory,  concern- 
ing the  appropriate  powers  of  the  great  city  departments 
or  officers,  which  finds  general  acceptance.  Even  upon  such 
vital  and  fundamental  questions  as  these  :  What  are  the 
just  relations  of  the  city  to  the  state  ?  Whether  the  mayor 
should  be  an  autocrat  and  dominate  the  city  legislature? 
What  is  the  proper  extent  of  Home  Rule  in  cities  ?  Whether 
tests  of  party  opinion  should  be  applied  in  the  choice  of  city 
officers  and  employes  ?  Whether  party  government  is  desir- 
able for  cities  and  villages  ?  —  there  is  a  stubborn,  belligerent, 
and  pervading  diversity  of  opinion  among  the  great  body  of 
intelligent  people.  If  thoughtful  citizens  generally  are  now 
ready  to  read  and  think  about  city  affairs, — and  many  of 
them  seem  ready  to  study  their  problems,  —  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted that  in  the  past,  most  of  these  people  have  done  little 


6  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

more  than  glance  and  grieve  over  municipal  affairs  —  leaving 
them,  all  the  while,  mainly  to  the  politicians.  Such  abuses, 
dissatisfaction,  and  contrariety  of  opinion  as  have  prevailed 
have  caused  much  discouragement  as  to  the  possibility  of 
good  municipal  government  in  this  country.  They  have 
also  facilitated  the  adoption  of  crude  and  hasty  experiments 
—  there  having  often  been  a  desperate  feeling  in  cities  that 
there  can  hardly  be  any  city  government  worse  than  they 
now  have,  and  a  vague  hope  that  any  radical  change  may 
prove  to  be  a  reform. 

III.  It  has  been  sometimes   said,  with  something  like 
despair,  that  our  early  statesmen  who  framed  our  national 
and  state  governments  —  in  which  we  all  have  confidence 
and  to  which  the  world  more  and  more  inclines  —  failed  to 
devise  a  municipal  system,  perhaps  feeling  that  they  could 
not,  and  possibly  fearing  that  such  a  system  is  unattainable 
under  a  republic.     Such   inferences,   we  must  think,   are 
quite  unwarranted,  and  the  facts  by  which  they  are  con- 
futed deserve  our  attention  at  the  outset. 

IV.  At  the  time  of  our  original  national  and  state  con- 
stitutions were  formed  —  or  even  as  late  as  1790  —  neither 
large  cities,  nor  the  characteristic  evils  which  such  cities 
or  bad  municipal  systems  most  develop,   existed  in  this 
country.     The  population  of  Philadelphia,  at  that  time,  was 
about  42,000,  that  of  New  York  City  was  about  33,000,  and 
that  of  Boston  was  about  18,000  —  only  93,000  residents, 
therefore,  in  the  three  foremost  cities  of  the  nation.     The 
urban  residents  of  the  state  of  New  York,  which  were  then 
less  than  ten  per  cent  of  its  people,  are  now  more  than  fifty- 
eight  per  cent  of  its  inhabitants.     Neither  the  Declaration 
of  Independence  nor  the  Articles  of  Confederation  refers  to 
any  evils  in  connection  with  city  government.    The  national 
constitution  says  nothing  in  regard  to  it.     The  first  consti- 
tution of  New  York,  adopted  in  1777,  makes  no  mention  of 
municipal  government  or  affairs,  except  to  declare,  in  sub- 
stance, that  this  constitution  shall  not  annul  any  charters 
granted  in  England.     It  was  not  until  1821  that  any  con- 
stitutional provision,  in  the  state  of  New  York,  took  any 


INTRODUCTORY  7 

other  notice  of  municipal  government,  and  such  were  the 
facts,  generally,  in  other  states. 

Up  to  this  time,  apparently,  there  were  no  municipal 
problems ;  there  were  no  municipal  evils  —  certainly  none 
which  had  arrested  the  attention  of  people ;  not  even  in  the 
imagination  of  the  thoughtful  was  there  a  conception  of 
the  great  fact  that  there  was  a  whole  department  of  govern- 
ment—  that  of  municipal  affairs  —  of  which  our  funda- 
mental constitutions  and  early  statesmen  had  taken  no 
notice,  —  a  department  nevertheless  soon  to  become  so  poten- 
tial and  ominous  as  to  make  statesmen  anxious,  as  to  impair 
the  independence  of  legislatures,  as  to  cause  those  who 
should  control  it  to  grasp  at  the  nominations  of  senators, 
governors,  and  presidents.  We  are,  therefore,  to  deal  with 
new  evils  —  against  which  the  fathers  attempted  no  provi- 
sions—  evils  which  the  most  recent  generations,  and  the 
vast  growth  of  city  life,  have  developed,  —  evils  which  we 
of  this  generation  have  allowed  to  originate  and  grow  before 
our  own  eyes. 

V.  The  national  constitution,  and  the  first  constitutions 
of  the  states,  —  nobly  original  and  wise  in  their  provisions,  — 
were  so  admirably  framed  as  to  make  them  models.  They 
need  no  change  in  their  general  structure  by  reason  of  the 
new  municipal  developments.  They  deal  adequately  with 
the  needs  and  evils  that  existed.  There  is  no  ground,  there- 
fore, for  discouragement  because  they  did  not  provide  for 
needs  and  evils  which  would  arise  only  in  a  subsequent 
generation,  which  only  the  growth  of  great  and  numerous 
cities,  and  their  control  by  political  parties  would  develop. 

Yet  the  method  of  making  these  constitutions  has  an 
important  lesson  for  us  in  the  discharge  of  our  duty  of 
creating  a  municipal  system  —  of  supplying  that  department 
of  government  which  the  great  authors  of  our  constitutions 
did  not  undertake.  They  made  a  careful  study  of  liberal 
government  in  other  countries  and  times,  and  availed  them- 
selves of  the  wisest  lessons  of  history.  The  Federalist  is  a 
striking  illustration  of  their  comprehensive  investigations, 
which  extended  to  all  former  governments  likely  to  supply 


8  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

useful  instruction.  They  were  not  too  proud  to  learn  from 
every  source  of  wisdom.  The  ablest  statesmen  were  selected 
for  the  creative  work  of  these  constitutions,  and  they  engaged 
in  it  during  the  long  sessions  of  formal  conventions,  taking 
ample  time  for  their  work. 

Now,  what  a  constitution  is  for  a  nation  or  a  state,  a 
charter  should  be  for  a  city.  It  should  be  a  definite,  delib- 
erately matured,  general  statement  of  its  powers  and  func- 
tions, making  it  clear  upon  what  subjects  it  may  act  and  the 
extent  of  such  action  ;  and  there  is  no  intrinsic  impropriety 
in  designating  the  charter  of  a  city  as  its  constitution. 

The  American  people  are  only  beginning  to  comprehend 
the  dignity  and  functions  of  a  good  city  charter  or  constitu- 
tion, and  the  vastness  and  variety  of  the  interests  it  may 
affect.  They  are  beginning  to  see  clearly  that  to  make  such 
an  instrument  requires  as  much  investigation,  wisdom,  and 
deliberate  action  as  are  required  to  make  a  state  constitu- 
tion ;  for  if  the  latter  is  more  comprehensive,  the  charter 
must  be  an  original  creation  in  this  country,  and  must  be 
achieved  under  very  great  difficulties,  as  we  shall  soon  see. 
The  people  have  hardly  yet  imagined  what  will  be  the 
gravity  of  the  situation,  if  our  city  governments  be  not 
much  improved,  when,  in  the  not  remote  future,  a  majority 
of  the  American  voters,  in  many  states,  will  dwell  in  cities. 
They  are  convinced  that,  to  treat  the  making  of  a  national 
or  a  state  constitution  as  a  proper  work  for  a  party  majority 
acting  hastily  for  party  ends,  would  be  a  grave  perversion 
and  calamity  ;  but  a  majority  of  them  do  not  yet  see  that  to 
make  a  city  charter  in  the  same  way  and  for  the  same  pur- 
pose, would  be  not  less  indefensible  and  disastrous. 

VI.  There  can  hardly  be  found  a  more  striking  contrast, 
connected  with  similar  subjects,  than  is  presented  between 
the  results  of  our  framing  of  national  and  state  constitutions 
and  of  our  attempts  to  frame  city  constitutions  or  charters  — 
the  grand  success  of  the  former  and  the  humiliating  failure 
of  the  latter  —  unless  it  be  found  in  the  different  means  by 
which  we  have  attempted  to  accomplish  these  objects.  Yet, 
all  the  mystery  of  the  contrast  disappears  when  we  consider 


INTRODUCTORY  9 

the  facts.  Instead  of  acting  in  regard  to  charters  thought- 
fully, deliberately,  and  in  a  non-partisan  spirit  —  enlightened 
by  the  experience  of  the  past,  as  we  have  in  regard  to  con- 
stitutions, we  have  considered  the  municipal  problems  in  a 
partisan  spirit  in  the  main,  leaving  them  to  be  dealt  with 
crudely  and  summarily  by,  and  in  the  interest  of,  party  majori- 
ties and  party  leaders.  We  have  acted  as  if  a  city  charter 
were  only  an  ordinary  party  measure  of  mere  local  lawmaking 
about  which  statesmen,  the  great  body  of  the  legislators,  and 
the  people  generally  need  not  much  concern  themselves.1 

This  habitual  underestimate  of  the  dignity,  importance, 
and  significance  of  municipal  problems  has  naturally  re- 
sulted in  many  crude  and  mischievous  laws  and  in  that 
party  despotism  in  city  affairs  which  is  a  main  cause  of  the 
greatest  municipal  evils.2 

VII.  It  is  impossible  intelligently  to  consider  the  great 
city  problems  before  us  without  a  clear  view,  at  the  outset, 
of  their  relations  to  parties,  and  of  the  extent  to  which 
parties  are  responsible  for  them. 

The  nation  and  the  states,  by  reason  of  their  broad  geo- 
graphical limits  —  yielding  many  productions  which  compete 
with  each  other,  and  naturally  developing  diverse,  conflict- 
ing interests  —  present  legitimate  spheres  for  parties  and 
competing  party  principles  and  policies  in  the  field  of  legisla- 
tion. Our  national  and  state  constitutions  allow  the  free 
action  of  parties  within  such  spheres.  These  spheres  of 
party  action  are  independent  of  mere  city  affairs  —  having 
existed  before  cities  arose.  Parties  were  organized  and  had 

1  The  new  charter  for  the  Greater  New  York  enacted  in  1897,  after  most  of 
this  treatise  had  heen  written,  was  a  party  enactment,  very  hastily  and  crudely 
put  together.    It  was  never  read,  nor  were  its  provisions  ever  debated,  save  in  a 
technical,  useless  way,  before  the  legislature.    We  have  not  been  insisting  that 
the  granting  of  every  city  charter  should  require  deliberate  proceedings  analo- 
gous to  those  needed  for  framing  a  state  constitution,  but  only  that  the  devising 
of  a  good  municipal  system,  the  framing  of  a  state  municipal  code,  which  should 
set  forth  the  general  provisions  subject  to  which  all  charters  should  be  granted, 
and  which  should  constitute  the  main  features  of  all  charters,  requires  this  delib- 
eration, as  we  shall  more  fully  show. 

2  There  is  one  instructive  example  of  the  deliberate  making  of  a  city  charter, 
by  a  city  convention  in  New  York  City  in  1830,  before  party  despotism  had  become 
irresistible.    Mun.  Prob.,  3. 


10  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

developed  their  useful  methods  of  influence  before  cities  of 
political  importance  existed  in  the  United  States  —  and  long 
before  cities  became  a  distinct  or  effective  political  power. 
State  and  national  parties  would  continue  with  all  their  use- 
fulness if  all  the  cities  were  destroyed. 

Parties,  unless  strongly  restrained,  constantly  tend  to 
transgress  their  legitimate  and  useful  methods  and  sphere 
of  activity  —  continually  endeavoring  to  enforce  their  irrel- 
evant tests  of  opinion,  and  to  dictate  action  in  their  own 
interest,  in  the  domain  of  mere  administration  and  govern- 
mental business.  They  constantly  treat  all  the  small  offices 
and  the  extortion  of  political  assessments  as  a  means  of  gain- 
ing party  spoils  and  despotic  power.  American  parties  had 
notoriously  done  this  before  1833,  when  Senator  Marcy  de- 
clared, in  the  national  Senate,  that  "  to  the  victors  belong 
the  spoils."  At  that  time  a  stupendous  and  growing  spoils 
system  had  been  developed  —  a  system  springing  from  party 
usurpation  and  despotism,  which  continued  to  increase  until 
1883,  when  the  national  civil  service  law  curtailed  it  by  re- 
quiring non-partisan  examinations  of  merit  and  character  for 
appointments  to  about  14,000  official  places  —  examinations 
which  have  been  since  extended  under  this  law  by  reason  of 
their  salutary  effects,  —  so  that  they  are  now  applied  to 
more  than  87,000  places.  Here  is  an  immense  restraint 
upon  party  usurpation,  despotism,  and  corruption,  which  is 
sure  to  be  soon  extended  to  all  positions  —  including  city 
administration  —  for  which  it  is  appropriate. 

VIII.  Before  1833,  the  number,  population,  and  wealth  — 
and  consequently  the  political  influence — of  cities  had  vastly 
increased.  But  no  good  municipal  system  had  been  devel- 
oped, and  no  carefully  matured  municipal  methods  had 
found  general  acceptance  in  the  United  States.  Party  gov- 
ernment in  national  and  state  affairs  —  not  only  within  its 
legitimate  sphere,  but  within  the  usurped  spheres  of  mere 
administration  and  governmental  business  —  had  become  ag- 
gressively potential,  and  had  secured  general  acceptance  — 
the  remedy  of  civil  service  reform  not  having  been  then 
even  imagined.  The  teaching  of  municipal  science  was  un- 


INTRODUCTORY  11 

known,  and  a  thoughtful  consideration  of  municipal  govern- 
ment hardly  existed,  even  on  the  part  of  the  most  advanced 
thinkers.  Even  enlightened  voters  had  no  conception  of 
the  nature  or  significance  of  the  municipal  problem.  Per- 
haps no  one  had  asked  the  question  whether  parties  could 
properly  govern  in  the  local  affairs  of  cities.  The  theory  of 
municipal  Home  Rule  was  not  merely  unevolved ;  both  the 
phase  and  the  conception  were  unknown. 

It  was  natural  and  inevitable,  under  such  conditions,  that 
political  parties  should  grasp  for  the  control  of  cities  and 
villages  and  extend  their  party  tests  and  spoils  system 
methods  over  them.  Nowhere  else  could  parties  so  effec- 
tively organize,  find  so  many  subservient  voters,  grasp  so 
much  patronage,  or  so  easily  extort  large  sums  of  money  and 
other  spoils  —  in  a  space  so  small  and  easily  dominated  —  as 
in  cities.  City  party  government  which  enforced  party  tests 
of  opinion  for  all  offices  and  places  in  the  city  service,  was, 
therefore,  quickly  extended  to  every  city  and  village, 
equally  without  consideration  of  its  fitness  and  without  re- 
sistance. The  true  municipal  reformer,  the  civil  service  re- 
former, —  or  any  body  of  independent,  enlightened  thinkers 
on  the  subject,  —  had  not  appeared.  If  some  managers,  in 
cities,  could  see  that  their  party  system  had  no  fit  place  in 
city  affairs,  it  was  too  much  to  expect  that  they  would  ad- 
vance a  theory  to  that  effect,  for  it  would  not  only  defeat 
their  own  advancement  in  their  party,  but  if  accepted,  would 
deprive  it  of  a  large  part  of  its  power  and  patronage. 

IX.  Few  things  are  more  indisputable,  among  the  ele- 
mentary facts  of  government,  than  this :  that  the  party 
system  and  a  true  municipal  system  are  repugnant  and  irrec- 
oncilable. Parties,  whether  formed  in  the  sphere  of  the 
nation  or  in  that  of  a  state,  claim  jurisdiction  to  the  borders 
and  in  every  local  jurisdiction.  They  insist  that  all  local 
interests  must  be  conformed  to  the  general  party  policy, 
and  that  their  platforms  and  principles  must  be  accepted  in 
every  locality  and  by  every  officer  ;  they  conduct  public  affairs 
through  officers  and  agents  who  must  conform  to  the  tests 
of  opinion  and  policy  which  the  central  party  organization 


12  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

has  established  ; '  they  carry  on  administration  according  to 
theories  and  methods  which  must  be  enforced  in  all  political 
divisions,  —  in  every  city  and  village,  —  every  one  of  which 
must  subordinate  its  own  interests  and  affairs  to  the  policy 
of  the  nation,  or  the  state,  as  the  central  party  —  or  its  man- 
agers—  shall  define  them.  The  theory  that  a  city  may  have 
local  affairs  which  should  be  managed  in  reference  to  its  own 
interests,  irrespective  of  mere  party  interests  or  divisions,  is 
obviously  repugnant  to  all  this,  and  is  sure  to  arouse  party 
antagonism. 

The  party  system  may  naturally  arise  as  soon  as  broad 
territories  have  come  under  established  government ;  but  the 
municipal  system  can  naturally  arise  only  after  dense  city 
populations  have  discovered  the  inadequacy  of  general  laws 
and  the  party  system  for  the  protection  and  advancement  of 
their  local  interests  and  needs.  Therefore,  a  true  municipal 
system  is  necessary  —  and  is  likely  to  be  developed — only 
after  some  of  the  cities  have  disclosed  local  needs  so  great, 
arid  local  abuses  so  grave,  under  party  government,  as  to 
make  such  a  municipal  system  indispensable.  It  seems  plain 
that  a  true  municipal  system  would  require  officers  and  em- 
ployees for  its  administration  who  should  disregard  mere 
party  opinions,  and  constantly  strive  to  promote  the  interests 
of  the  city  rather  than  those  of  any  party. 

City  party  government,  on  the  contrary,  is  one  based  on 
the  theory  that  state  or  national  parties  may  properly  con- 
trol the  affairs  of  cities  —  may  appoint  their  officers  and 
employees  —  by  reason  of  their  party  opinions;  and  may 
manage  city  affairs  in  paramount  reference  to  party  princi- 
ples and  interests.  City  party  government,  therefore,  is  an 
obvious  and  utter  repudiation  of  the  fundamental  theory  of 
civil  service  reform,  which,  disregarding  mere  party  opinions 
and  favoritism,  puts  men  into  office  solely  by  reason  of 
superior  merit. 

X.  The  development  of  cities  obviously  has  not  created 
additional  party  principles,  or  a  need  for  new  parties ;  nor 
has  it  created  new  party  politics  to  be  managed.  What  has 
been  created  by  the  development  of  the  great  city  is  new 


INTRODUCTORY  13 

perils  for  life  and  property  resulting  from  greater  density 
of  population,  more  local  complications  and  relations  between 
citizens,  more  local  administration  and  governmental  busi- 
ness, which  should  be  conducted  and  regulated  according  to 
sound  business  methods.  If  the  great  cities  should  all  be 
burned,  or  their  residents  should  make  their  homes  in  ham- 
lets, parties  and  their  functions  would  remain  as  complete 
and  useful  as  they  had  been  before  such  cities  existed.  No- 
where are  party  contests  more  salutary  or  their  principles 
better  defined  than  in  Vermont,  which  has  never  had  a  large 
city  or  any  municipal  evils.  Elsewhere  we  shall  make  it 
very  clear  that  no  particular  party  opinions  are  any  part  of 
the  qualification  needed  by  city  officers  or  employees,  and 
that  all  citizens  should  join,  irrespective  of  their  party  affilia- 
tion, in  securing  good  government  for  municipal  corpora- 
tions, as  they  do  for  securing  it  for  other  corporations  in 
which  they  are  interested. 

XI.  The  great  central,  fundamental  truth,  at  the  basis  of 
the  municipal  problem,  is  this :  that  a  municipal  system  — 
reasonable  city  Home  Rule  —  is  needed  at  all  only  because 
the  state  and  national  governments,  almost  invariably  con- 
trolled by  parties,  have,  in  city  affairs,  been  found  inade- 
quate and  intolerable;  the  new  developments  of  interests 
and  needs  in  municipalities  having  created  a  necessity  for 
additional  and  peculiar  government  for  their  affairs.  There- 
fore, to  say,  when  a  charter  is  to  be  granted  to  a  city,  that 
it  should  be  in  its  organization,  or  methods,  according  to 
the  former  party  system,  should  apply  party  tests  for  office-, 
is  quite  preposterous.  It  is,  in  fact,  to  repudiate  the  new 
necessity  which  has  made  true  Home  Rule  indispensable. 
Therefore,  we  repeat  that  the  simple,  vital  fact  is  that  the 
governmental  powers  which  city  governments  need  to  pos- 
sess are  the  precise  powers  which  ought  to  be  exercised  in 
cities  regardless  of  mere  party  interests,  and  in  primary 
reference  to  the  cities'  own  needs  and  welfare.1  Therefore, 

1  Some  explanation  may  be  needed  here.  The  state  may  for  convenience,  and 
often  does,  allow  officers  elected  or  appointed  under  the  city  government  to  exer- 
cise important  state  authority  strictly  in  the  state's  behalf  and  as  its  agent. 


14  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

worthy  men  of  whatever  party  may  officially  exercise,  side  by 
side,  any  of  these  Home  Rule  powers,  —  administering  the 
city  government  in  reference  to  its  own  advantage,  irrespec- 
tive of  state  or  national  politics.1 

XII.  When  the  party  system  had  been  thus  extended  over 
all  city  governments,  nothing  was  more  natural  than  that  its 
managers  should  seek  to  make  it  absolute  and  irresistible, 
especially  after  the  party  spoils  system  had  been  established. 
Every  advocate  of  non-partisan  municipal  government,  or 
true  city  Home  Rule,  was  especially  obnoxious  to  these  man- 
agers. The  issue  between  the  supporters  of  such  a  govern- 
ment, on  one  side,  and  the  city-party  system,  on  the  other, 
more  and  more  tended  to  become,  what  it  now  is,  the  great- 
est and  most  fundamental  of  all  the  issues  of  city  government 
in  the  United  States.  Party  obstruction  is  now  —  with  the 
party  spirit  it  develops  —  the  most  formidable  obstacle  in 
the  way  of  rational  Home  Rule  and  good  government  in 
American  cities. 

The  more  party  government  in  cities  has  been  threatened  by 
the  independent  public  opinion,  which  demands  Home  Rule, 
the  more  the  party  managers  have  insisted  upon  such  an  or- 
ganization of  city  government  and  such  restrictions  upon 
the  right  of  nominations  as  will  be  most  favorable  to  their 
supremacy,  and  make  the  spoils  system  most  profitable  to 
them.  When,  therefore,  the  control  of  parties  had  become 
despotic  in  a  few  persons  under  that  system,  and  especially 
after  the  power  of  the  party  boss  had  become  autocratic,  it 
was  natural  for  scheming  politicians  to  see  that  cities  might 
as  easily  be  governed  by  an  autocratic  mayor,  whom  the  city 

General  powers  thus  conferred  require  peculiar  responsibility  to  the  state,  and 
involve  peculiar  relations  to  parties,  which  will  be  considered  in  the  next  chapter. 
1  It  is  not  intended  to  say  that  under  a  true,  non-partisan  municipal  system 
no  divisions  among  the  voters  should,  or  can  properly,  arise  as  to  city  policy  or 
methods ;  but  merely  to  say  that  these  divisions  of  opinion  can  properly  arise  only 
in  relation  to  city  affairs  —  and  not  in  relation  to  national  or  state  affairs  —  which 
are  not  legitimately  involved  in  city  administration ;  in  other  words,  we  say  that 
city  voters,  in  city  elections,  should  not  take  sides,  or  fall  into  divisions,  as  state 
or  national  party  men.  They  may,  however,  divide,  independently  of  state  and 
national  politics,  in  reference  to  city  interests  and  policy  so  far  as  they  differ  in 
opinion  on  these  subjects.  This  matter  will  be  more  fully  treated  elsewhere. 


INTRODUCTORY  15 

party  majority  should  elect,  as  a  party  could  be  governed  by 
an  autocratic  boss,  whom  party  managers  should  elect.1  The 
step  from  one  to  the  other  therefore  is  naturally  and  easily 
taken.  The  powers  of  the  mayor  were  rapidly  increased 
until  he  was  made  as  autocratic  in  the  government  of  the 
city  as  the  boss  was  in  the  government  of  the  party.  In  the 
cities  of  New  York  and  Brooklyn,  where  the  party  boss  sys- 
tem was  first  developed,  the  autocratic  mayoralty  system  was 
also  first  established.  In  fact,  an  autocratic  mayor  —  a 
sort  of  official  city  boss  —  is  hardly  possible  until  after  the 
unofficial  party  boss  of  the  city  has  been  developed  ;  and  the 
latter  seems  sure  to  dominate  the  former.  The  autocratic 
mayoralty  inevitably  caused  the  city  council  to  become  little 
more  than  a  useless  subordinate  of  the  mayor,  and  led  to 
constant  state  intermeddling  in  city  affairs,  —  for  we  have 
not  yet  dared  to  confer  full  power  for  city  legislation  upon 
mayors. 

Mayors  have  naturally  become  most  autocratic  where  bosses 
have  been  made  most  despotic.  Every  boss  and  party  man- 
ager could  see  that  the  more  the  authority  of  the  mayor 
should  be  enlarged  the  more  absolute  would  become  the 
power  of  the  party  majority  by  which  both  the  boss  and  the 
mayor  would  be  chosen.  In  this  way  the  question  "  Whether 
jvve  desire  city  governmentBy  parties  ?  "  and  the  question^ 
we  desire  an  autocratic  mayor?"  have  become 


^substantially  identical.     They  are,  in  fact,  about  the  most 
fundamental  and  important  questions  which  can  arise  con- 
^  cerning  city  government. 

XIII.  The  supporters  of  party  government  for  cities  are  a 
mighty  power,  backed  as  they  are  by  the  unworthy  managers, 
—  the  machines  and  selfish  interests  of  all  parties,  —  who 

/**^    1  The  meaning  and  consequences  of  an  autocratic  mayoralty  will  be  considered 

1  elsewhere.    It  is  enough  to  say  here  that  a  mayor  is  autocratic  when  he  has,  in 

/  general,  an  absolute  power  of  appointment  and  removal,  city  councils  being  de- 

|  prived  of  their  legitimate  powers  to  augment  those  of  the  mayor,  or  that  of  the 

N  commissions  whose  members  he  appoints.    The  City  Council  is  thus  degraded  in 

/  the  degree  that  the  mayor  is  exalted  —  or  made  a  city-party  despot.    The  new 

f  charter  for  the  Greater  New  York  presents  the  most  conspicuous  and  disastrous 

\  illustration  of  such  a  mayoralty. 

I* 


16  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

make  their  greatest  profits  from  controlling  city  party  politics 
and  elections  under  that  kind  of  government,  and  boss  despot- 
ism, as  the  Tammany  democracy  has  long  since  shown  us. 
We  shall  find  it  necessary  to  deal,  in  some  detail,  with  the 
vicious  and  plausible  theories  and  methods  in  which  their 
system  finds  its  chief  support.1 

XIV.  This  review  of  municipal  progress,  and  of  the  pres- 
ent situation  in  the  United  States,  seems  to  make  clear  the 
order  in  which  we  should  consider  the  subjects  to  be  treated. 

(1)  That  habitual  underestimation  of  the  character  and 
difficulties  of  our  municipal  problems,   which  has  caused 
many  persons  to  think  they  can  be  solved  by  mere  separate 
city  elections  and  by  the  easy  remedy  of  conferring  large  and 
absolute  powers  for  city  Home  Rule,  requires  us  to  test,  in 
the  outset,  the  value  of  these  remedies.     We  shall,  there- 
fore, consider  them  in  the  next  chapter. 

(2)  The  legitimate  relations  of  parties  to  Home  Rule  and 
to  city  administration  are  so  fundamental   and   important 
that  we  shall  deal  with  these  subjects  in  the  next  succeeding 
chapter. 

(3)  As  many  of  the  existing  charters  and  municipal  laws 
—  which  have  been  largely  framed  in  the  interest  of  city- 
party  supremacy  —  as  well  as  the  party  methods  and  theories 
which  are  generally  accepted  by  voters,  are  among  the  seri- 
ous obstacles  in  the  way  of  a  good  municipal  system,  we 
shall  give  the  three  succeeding  chapters  to  these  matters  — 
taking  and  dissecting  the  party  system  of  the  Tammany 
democracy  of  New  York  City  as  being  the  most  conspicuous 
and  characteristic  example  of  them  —  toward  which  vicious 
party  politics  in  many  American  municipalities  seem  to  have 
been  tending.     We  shall  try  and  make  plain  —  irrespective 
of  any  particular  party  —  the  true  character  of  the  city-party 
system  and  its  effects  upon  the  government  of  cities. 

(  l  The  need  of  this  is  made  more  imperative  by  the  fact  that,  since  all  bat  the 
/  last  chapter  of  this  treatise  was  drafted  these  supporters  have  caused  a  more 
(  absolute  system  of  party  government  to  be  imposed  upon  the  Greater  New  York 
)  City— with  more  autocratic  power  in  the  mayor  than  has  ever  before  been  im- 
s  posed  upon  any  enlightened  city  of  the  world — a  subject  which  will  be  considered 
V.  in  our  final  chapter. 


INTRODUCTORY  17 

(4)  Hoping  we  shall  be  able  to  clear  the  field  of  various 
obstructions,  and  to  reach  some  just  conclusions,  we  shall 
next  enter  upon  the  constructive  and  remedial  parts  of  our 
undertaking,  to  which  many  chapters  will  be  given. 

XV.  There  is  doubtless  a  wide  diversity  of  opinion  as  to 
what  are  the  principal  problems  of  city  governments  in  this 
country.     If  these  governments  generally  secured  officers  and 
employees  competent  for  their  higher  functions,  the  great  and 
primary  city  problems  would  directly  relate  —  as  in  a  certain 
sense  they  do  even  now  —  to  the  proper  action  of  such  officials 
for  causing  better  city  morals,  schools,  courts,  and  police, 
improved    health    administration    and    more     enlightened 
charity,  better  city  transit,  lighting  and  architecture,  the 
best  methods  of  doing  the  public  work,  and  whatever  tends 
to  make  cities  beautiful  and  attractive.1     But  such  achieve- 
ments, in  any  high  measure,  will  remain  impossible  until  we 
shall  be  able  habitually  to  bring  citizens  of  high  character  and 
capacity  into  the  official  leadership  of  our  municipal  affairs. 
To  do  this,  therefore,  is  the  foremost  and  most  vital  problem 
—  after  which  the  solution  of  every  other  will  be  both  possible 
and  easy. 

Those  who  favor  the  government  of  municipalities  through 
party  action  and  majorities  will  give  precedence  to  very  dif- 
ferent problems.  Among  them  will  be  the  proper  method 
of  making  nominations  only  by  city  parties ;  regulating  the 
primaries,  and  managing  city-party  politics  and  elections; 
effective  devices  for  apportioning  city  officers  and  laborers 
as  patronage  among  small  city  districts;  increasing  the 
powers  of  the  mayor,  and  keeping  city  governments  in  strict 
subordination  to  party  interests  in  state  and  national  poli- 
tics. We  hope  to  show  that  the  establishment  of  a  sound 
municipal  system  will  destroy  most  of  the  basis  of  fact  and 
assumption  out  of  which  these  problems  arise. 

XVI.  In  aid  of  solving  the  supreme  problem  of  bringing 
competent  men  into  the  official  leadership  of  American  cities, 

1  What  is  possible  in  these  particulars  is  illustrated  in  the  chapters  on  English 
and  European  Continental  cities,  in  which  superior  officers,  and  consequently 
much  better  city  governments,  than  those  in  the  United  States  have  been  secured, 
c 


18  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

we  must  solve  these,  among  other,  minor  problems :  How  to 

/  increase  the  dignity  and  importance  of  good  municipal  gov- 
ernment in  the  estimation  of  the  people;  how  to  separate 

j,  our  municipal  affairs  from  party  politics;  what  is  the  proper 
measure  of  powers  for  Home  Rule  which  should  be  conceded 

3  to  cities  and  villages;  how  to  frame  city  laws,  codes,  and 
charters  which  will  clearly  define  these  powers  and  avoid 
needless  and  vicious  appeals  to  the  state  legislatures ;  how 
to  constitute  truly  representative,  non-partisan  city  councils 
with  adequate  authority;  how  mayors  should  be  elected, 
and  what  powers  they  should  have  in  order  to  make  them 
competent  executives  without  being  partisan  despots;  in 
what  way  the  police  force  and  the  municipal  justices  may 
be  made  free  from  party  domination ;  how  to  cause  a  repre- 

y  sentation  of  the  whole  people,  instead  of  mere  party  majori- 
ties, by  providing  for  Free  Nominations  and  Free  Voting  in 
city  elections;  how  so  to  diminish  the  number  of  elected 

£  city  officers  and  so  to  extend  their  official  terms  —  and  pro- 
motions for  merit  —  that  there  will  not  be  a  needless  num- 
ber of  city  elections,  while  the  people  will  none  the  less 
control  their  city  governments,  and  the  city  partisan  man- 
agers will  lose  much  both  of  their  vicious  occupation  and  of 
their  needless  power  for  mischief. 


THE  NATURE  OF  THE  EVILS  19 


CHAPTER  II.  —  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  EVILS  IN  AMERI- 
CAN MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT,  AND  SEPARATE  ELECTIONS 
AND  HOME  RULE  AS  REMEDIES 

Evils  in  city  government  growing  more  serious.  Their  nature  stated.  Our 
inferior  city  officials  are  a  condemnation  of  our  city  system.  We  are  to  deal 
mainly  with  the  structure  and  administration  of  city  government.  City  parties  a 
main  source  of  abuses.  Separate  elections  as  remedies.  Nature  of  Home  Rule. 
Duty  of  allowing  it.  Basis  for  claiming  it.  Not  an  absolute  right.  Dangerous 
and  false  claims  made  in  its  name.  Theory  of  state  interference.  Relative  rights 
and  duties  of  city  and  state.  How  far  state  and  nation  govern  in  cities.  When  a 
city  may  fairly  claim  larger  powers  for  Home  Rule.  Cities  send  unworthy  mem- 
bers to  legislatures.  Cities  cannot  reform  themselves  under  party  government. 
Wise  conditions  of  conceding  Home  Rule.  Evil  effects  of  false  theories  on  the 
subject.  Legislators  from  cities  not  competent.  Theory  of  making  cities  free. 
Theory  that  interests  of  state  and  city  are  opposed.  Danger  that  cities  may  con- 
spire to  rule  state.  Theory  that  greater  Home  Rule  power  would  cause  cities  to 
do  better.  How  far  cities  act  as  state  agents,  and  need  state  inspection.  Utility 
of  such  inspection,  and  of  requiring  reports  to  state  from  cities.  Reports  would 
not  restrict  Home  Rule,  but  would  make  it  safe  to  enlarge  it,  and  would  diminish 
need  of  special  legislation.  Experience  of  England  on  these  subjects.  Need  of  a 
State  Municipal  Bureau  or  department.  The  state  inspections  we  now  enforce 
justify  a  state  inspection  system  for  cities,  with  authority  to  investigate  abuses. 
State  inspections  and  reports  from  cities  would  enlighten  the  legislature. 

No  department  of  government  in  the  United  States  is  so 
inadequate,  none  has  been  the  subject  of  so  much  dissatis- 
faction and  solicitude  on  the  part  of  their  people,  and  none  has 
been  so  severely  criticised  by  candid  writers  from  abroad, 
as  that  which  relates  to  municipalities.  The  larger  the  city 
or  village,  the  more  unsatisfactory,  as  a  rule,  has  been  its 
government,  and  the  greater  its  administrative  abuses;  so 
that,  from  the  smallest,  each  can  see  in  those  of  a  larger 
population  the  greater  evils  it  may  soon  have  to  encounter. 

The  importance  of  the  subject  is  enhanced  by  the  facts 
that  the  facility  of  intercourse  between  the  city  and  the 
country,  the  influence  of  city  life,  the  proportion  of  the  whole 
people  who  reside  in  municipalities,  and  the  political  power 
of  their  residents,  are  rapidly  increasing;  while  more  and 
more  territory  is  being  added  to  cities.  City  standards  and 


20  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

vices,  city  theories  and  usages,  city  fashions  and  literature, 
not  less  than  the  methods  and  corruptions  of  city  adminis- 
tration, are  becoming  more  and  more  potential  and  pervad- 
ing. The  power  of  the  cities  seems  likely  to  become  almost 
supreme  in  no  very  remote  future.1  It  is  hardly  too  much 
to  say  that  the  character  —  if  not  the  fate  —  of  republican 
government  in  the  United  States  depends  upon  the  ability 
of  their  people  to  provide  a  good  municipal  system. 


There  is  no  need  of  setting  forth  in  much  detail  the  evils 
connected  with  our  municipal  affairs,  for  they  are  both  well 
known  and  undeniable.  The  problem  of  municipal  govern- 
ment is  by  common  consent  the  most  serious  and  difficult  in 
our  politics.  It  is  enough  to  say  that  the  municipal  govern- 
ment which  prevails  is  needlessly  expensive  and  generally 
condemned;  it  is  inefficient;  its  methods  bring  the  worst 
voters  to  the  polls  and  largely  repel  the  most  worthy ;  it  has 
caused  city  administration  to  be  generally  regarded  as  dis- 
creditable to  the  American  people  and  a  scandal  to  our  re- 
publican system;  it  stimulates  intense  and  needless  partisan 
contentions  in  municipalities;  it  has  caused  excessive  and 
mischievous  special  legislation  for  cities  and  villages  and 
prevented  the  enactment  of  wise,  general  laws  for  their  gov- 
ernment;2 it  discourages  unselfish  devotion  to  the  public 

1  In  the  state  of  Xew  York  before  the  Greater  New  York  City  was  created, 
two  cities  elected  18  of  her  50  senators  and  56  of  her  150  assemblymen,  under  her 
amended  constitution  of  1895 ;  and  it  in  substance  provides  that  in  the  future  no 
city  shall  elect  more  than  one-half  of  them  —  so  great  is  thought  to  be  the  danger 
of  city  domination. 

2  It  seems  that  from  1884  to  1889  the  legislature  of  New  York  passed  1284  sepa- 
rate laws  relative  to  the  thirty  cities  of  the  state,  of  which  390  related  to  the  city 
of  New  York ;  and  that  in  1886, 280  of  the  681  acts  passed  related  to  some  particu- 
lar subdivision  of  the  state.    (Qoodnow's  Municipal  Home  Rule,  23, 24.)    A  New 
York  statute  known  as  the  consolidation  act  of  1882,  made  up  of  laws  applicable 
to  New  York  City,  contains  2143  sections,  yet  falls  far  short  of  containing  all  such 
laws.    In  the  period  from  1890  to  1897,  inclusive,  there  were  27!i3  special  laws 
passed  relating  to  the  cities  of  the  state  of  New  York  —664  of  them  related  to  the 
city  of  Brooklyn  and  1399  of  them  related  to  the  city  of  New  York.    The  year  in 
which  the  least  number  was  enacted  as  to  the  latter  city  was  1891,  when  there 


THE  NATURE  OF  THE  EVILS  21 

interests  ,•  it  causes  and  condones  bribery  at  the  elections ;  it 
has  constantly  brought  inferior  and  unworthy  men  into  the 
municipal  service ;  it  has  made  official  malfeasance  a  com- 
mon offence  in  cities,  and  has  familiarized  the  people  with 
official  connivance  at  the  levying  of  blackmail;  it  has  pro- 
vided too  short  terms  of  office  and  made  too  many  offices 
elective  largely  to  serve  party  ends;  it  has  caused  many 
citizens  and  corporations  to  corruptly  employ  party  leaders 
to  protect  their  rights  instead  of  discharging  their  duty  to 
defend  them ;  it  has  developed  a  demoralization  and  corrup- 
tion in  municipal  politics,  which  the  persistent  efforts  of  the 
most  unselfish  and  patriotic  citizens  can  hardly  hold  in  check ; 
it  habitually  subordinates  municipal  interests  and  duties  to 
the  advancement  of  mere  party  ends  in  state  and  national 
politics ;  it  has  made  the  management  of  municipal  politics 
and  elections  a  degrading  business  by  which  a  class  of  useless 
and  vicious  politicians  prosper;  it  has  divided  the  natural 
friends  of  good  municipal  government  between  the  ranks  of 
hostile  parties,  which,  in  the  main,  contend  over  issues  ir- 
relevant to  municipal  affairs ;  it  has  developed  a  degrading 
and  corrupt  system  of  city  boss-rule;  it  has  established  an 
autocratic  mayoralty  which  favors  despotic  party  domination ; 
it  has  caused  the  moral  standards  of  official  life  in  our  mu- 
nicipalities to  fall  below  the  moral  standards  in  private  busi- 
ness—  causing  municipal  officers,  generally,  to  think  it  a 
less  crime  to  defraud  the  whole  city  than  to  defraud  a  single 
citizen ;  it  has  caused  city  and  village  politics  and  admin- 
istration to  become,  to  a  large  extent,  sources  of  vice  and 
corruption,  which  are  diffused  through  the  country;  it 
habitually  uses  official  power  and  public  offices  to  gain  party 
votes  and  private  advantage;  it  has  caused  many  citizens 
and  corporations,  not  otherwise  corrupt,  to  pay  blackmail  to 
partisan  officials  both  from  fear  of  oppression  and  hopes  of 
favors ;  it  quite  generally  brings  into  municipal  offices  and 
employments  men  of  a  lower  moral  character  and  business 

were  only  95,  but  in  1893  there  were  288  of  these  special  laws,  and  in  1892  there 
were  259.  The  New  York  charter  of  1897  contains  1620  sections,  filling  599  pages 
of  the  statute. 


22  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF   MUNICIPALITIES 

capacity  than  could  gain  analogous  positions  in  private  af- 
fairs ;  it  has  not  only  degraded  the  ideal  of  what  municipal 
government  may  be,  and  should  be,  but  it  has  made  its  re- 
form seem  to  many  hopeless ; 1  it  has  caused  elections  in  cities 
and  villages  to  be  regarded  by  many  voters  as  little  more 
than  contests  for  selfish  and  partisan  ends,  in  which  it  is 
almost  useless  for  disinterested  and  patriotic  men  to  take  any 
part.  Speaking  generally,  it  may  be  said  that  the  leading 
American  writers  on  our  municipal  affairs  treat  them  as  pre- 
senting the  most  serious  failure  and  problem  under  our  gov- 
ernment, and  the  ablest  and  most  friendly  of  foreign  critics 
—  the  author  of  the  "  American  Commonwealth  "  —  has  just 
declared  "the  government  of  cities  to  be  the  blackest  spot 
in  American  politics."2 

2.  To  justify  a  condemnation  of  our  municipal  system, 
if  indeed  we  have  such  a  system  in  the  United  States,  we 
hardly  need  look  beyond  the  simple  facts  that  it  is  not  the 
gifted,  the  noble,  or  the  honored  men  who  generally  hold  the 
highest  municipal  offices,  but  scheming  politicians,  selfish, 
adroit  party  managers,  or  men  of  very  moderate  capacity  and 
often  of  not  very  enviable  reputation,  who  would  not  be  de- 
sired at  the  head  of  a  large  private  business.     When  men  of 
a  higher  order  are  made  mayors,  they  have  not  infrequently 
got  their  places  under  commitments  to  degrading  influences 
by  which  they  are  much  trammelled. 

3.  Municipal  corporations  are  in  their  nature  the  most 
honorable,  dignified,  and  powerful  corporations  known  to  our 
laws,  and,  if  fitly  appreciated  and  governed,  they  would  easily 
command  for  their  official  service  the  worthiest  and  ablest 
citizens.     But  there  are  in  fact,  on  every  hand,  corporations 
of  various  kinds  which  have  officers  quite  superior  to  those 
who  generally  manage   the   affairs   of   our   municipalities. 
Until  we  shall,  habitually,  bring  such  able  and  worthy  men 


1  Professor  Goodnow  says  the  ordinary  American  municipal  officer  does  not  re- 
gard it  as  his  duty  to  see  that  the  laws  are  observed,  but  merely  to  see  that  the 
complaints  of  individuals,  if  sufficiently  persistent,  are  examined,  and  "  if  consid- 
ered advisable,  attended  to."  Man.  Prob.,  301. 

8  Contemporary  Review,  November,  1897,  p.  768. 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   EVILS  23 

into  the  high  offices  of  our  cities,  our  methods  of  governing 
them  will  stand  self-condemned.  Until  we  shall  feel  per- 
sonally disgraced  by  their  absence,  and  they  shall  feel  per- 
sonally honored  by  their  selection  for  municipal  offices,  we 
shall,  as  a  people,  proclaim  ourselves  before  the  world  as 
apparently  incompetent  for  good,  municipal  self-government. 
4.  The  primary  problem  of  such  government  —  the  funda- 
mental condition  of  good  city  administration  —  is  that  of 
bringing  such  men  into  the  municipal  offices.  It  cannot  be 
too  emphatically  declared  that  among  a  free  people  no  other 
evidence  should  ever  be  thought  necessary  to  condemn  their 
municipal  methods  and  condition  than  the  simple  fact  that 
they  allow  inferior,  unscrupulous  men  —  mere  politicians  and 
partisans  —  to  hold  the  leading  offices. 

II 

An  adequate  treatment  of  our  municipal  problems  would 
include,  on  the  one  extreme,  a  presentation  of  the  edu- 
cational, moral,  and  religious  forces  —  and  of  the  means 
of  making  them  effective  —  in  which  better  municipal  gov- 
ernment must  find  its  ultimate  strength,  and  in  behalf  of 
which  the  preacher,  the  teacher,  and  the  patriot  must  unite 
their  potential  voices ;  and,  on  the  other,  the  consideration 
of  many  questions  of  detailed  methods  and  business  manage- 
ment upon  which  the  efficiency  and  utility  of  municipal  gov- 
ernment largely  depend.  But  from  both  these  fields  we  are, 
to  a  considerable  extent,  excluded  by  the  limitations  of  our 
subject,  which  is  the  structural  and  administrative  problems 
of  such  government.  Yet,  these  problems  will  draw  into 
the  discussion  by  far  the  most  potential  and  vicious  forces, 
—  the  forces  of  party,  of  faction,  and  of  selfish  and  corrupt 
interests,  which,  in  the  main,  have  made  these  governments 
what  they  are  for  evil. 

All  well-informed  persons,  in  pondering  the  evils  referred 
to,  will  take  notice  of  the  facts  that  among  the  most  direct 
forces  in  their  development  have  been  parties,  factions,  and 
their  managers,  bosses,  and  minions.  Parties  have  brought 


24  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

the  most  degraded  voters  to  the  polls,  and  have  done  most  to 
coerce  and  bribe  their  use  of  the  ballot.  They  have  controlled 
the  patronage  and  spoils  in  city  affairs  which  have  been  most 
degrading,  and  have  given  the  worst  municipal  servants  their 
places.  They  have  caused  fraudulent  naturalizations  and 
registrations,  and  have  profited  by  blackmail.  They  have 
raised,  and  their  agents  have  disbursed,  most  of  the  money 
which  has  been  effective  for  bribery  and  other  municipal  cor- 
ruption. The  persons,  for  example,  who  have  been  most 
directly  concerned  in  the  notorious  prostitution  of  municipal 
affaire  in  the  city  of  New  York  have  been  the  managers  of 
one  of  the  great  parties,  —  often  in  conspiracy  with  the 
leaders  of  the  other,  —  while  in  Philadelphia  the  other  party 
has  had  the  lead  in  a  similar  prostitution. 

These  facts  certainly  do  not  prove  that  parties  and  their 
contests  are  the  primary  cause  of  the  grave  evils  in  our  mu- 
nicipal affairs,  for  it  may  be  declared  with  much  truth,  and 
often  is  declared,  that  the  selfishness,  the  ignorance,  and  cor- 
ruption of  the  people  individually  are  their  primary  sources, 
to  which  parties  have  but  given  an  intense  and  conspicuous 
expression.  Here  a  great  problem  is  involved:  the  question 
how  far  party,  and  how  far  the  individual,  is  responsible  for 
our  municipal  condition.  The  declaration  just  referred  to 
tends  to  the  conclusion  that  our  municipal  party  system  and 
methods  are  as  good  as  the  people  deserve,  or  are  capable  of 
supporting,  and  that,  consequently,  no  great  reforms  are 
possible,  save  at  the  hands  of  a  purer  and  better  —  and  hence 
a  future  —  generation,  more  nobly  instructed  and  inspired 
for  the  duties  of  citizenship. 

We  cannot  accept  this  pessimistic  and  discouraging  view 
of  the  matter,  though  it  contains  some  truth.  It  omits,  and 
refuses  to  recognize,  the  vicious  effects  of  governing  cities  by 
national  and  state  parties,  —  the  false  and  irrelevant  issues 
they  present,  the  corrupt  methods  they  devise  and  employ, 
the  besotted  party  spirit  they  develop,  —  as  being  in  them- 
selves constant  and  potential  forces  in  causing  such  evils. 
These  are  forces  which  city  parties,  in  the  main,  originate, 
and  they  would  cease  to  be  effective  if  party  organization  and 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   EVILS  25 

methods  for  ruling  cities  in  subordination  to  national  and 
state  party  interests  were  abandoned  —  as  we  think  they 
should  be.  It  is  our  view  that  the  present  generation,  even 
within  this  decade,  is  able  to  devise  and  support  a  much 
better  municipal  system  than  we  possess,  vast  and  difficult 
as  the  undertaking  certainly  is. 

While  much  that  is  evil  in  our  municipal  affairs  is  the 
direct  and  inevitable  consequence  of  the  pervading  selfish- 
ness, ignorance,  and  low  moral  tone  of  many  of  the  people, 
we  shall  nevertheless  endeavor  to  show  that  much  more  of 
it  is  the  result  of  bad  municipal  theories  and  methods,  of 
blind,  misleading  party  passions,  of  needless  and  demoraliz- 
ing party  action.  If  to  develop  loftier  ideals  and  a  higher 
sense  of  duty  is  the  greatest  endeavor,  it  is  yet  worthy  the 
efforts  of  statesmen  to  secure  greater  blessings  from  better 
methods  of  governments  during  the  generation  in  which  they 
live. 

To  justify  these  views  as  to  present  possibilities,  we  shall 
need  to  carefully  dissect  the  prevailing  party  system  and  to 
point  out  the  manner  in  which  many  existing  evils  have  been 
developed  by  it.  It  will  not  only  be  necessary  to  call  atten- 
tion to  the  nature  and  tendencies  of  city  parties  themselves, 
but  to  challenge  the  soundness  of  various  accepted  theories 
concerning  both  parties  and  municipal  government. 

It  will  be  best  to  deal  with  two  of  these  theories  at  the 
outset,  —  that  of  separate  elections  and  Home  Rule,  — 
because  they  are  fundamental,  involve  some  unwarranted 
assumptions,  and  propose  only  superficial  measures  when 
far  more  comprehensive  and  radical  remedies  are  essential. 

Ill 

Separate  elections  for  municipal  officers  are  urged  by 
many  persons  as  if  they  would,  in  themselves,  insure  a  suf- 
ficient remedy  for  municipal  evils.  Such  elections  we  must 
think  are  very  desirable  for  these  reasons :  (1)  they  recognize 
the  great  truth  that  municipal  candidates  and  policy  should 
be  treated  separately  upon  their  own  merits  without  control- 


26  TIIK   GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

ling  regard  for  external  party  issues;  (2)  they  would  facili- 
tate the  citizen's  voting  independently  as  to  municipal 
matters ;  but  they  do  not  insure  him  a  real  liberty  to  do  so, 
or  materially  weaken  the  partisan  bias,  coercion,  or  passions 
which  now  control  so  many  voters ;  (3)  they  would  render  it 
somewhat  more  difficult  to  make  effective  bargains  and  deals 
between  the  managers  of  city  factions  and  the  managers  of 
state  and  national  parties ;  yet,  they  would  but  little  affect 
any  of  the  sources  from  which  such  abuses  spring.  At  most, 
separate  elections  would  do  little  more  than  bring  voters 
into  a  better  position  for  using  appropriate  forces  for  the  more 
difficult  work  of  reform,  — for  after  such  elections  shall  be 
established,  this  work  would  remain  to  be  done, — as  the 
battle  remains  to  be  fought  after  the  best  positions  are  selected 
by  the  opposing  forces. 

On  the  other  hand,  parties  and  their  managers  are  always 
ready  for  the  most  numerous  elections ;  for,  through  them, 
they  gain  both  their  power  and  their  profits.  Their  elec- 
tioneering forces  and  machinery  are  always  ready;  and  very 
likely  they  might  not  oppose  separate  election  days  for  every 
separate  class  of  officers.  Everywhere,  party  despotism  in 
cities  has  tended  to  increase  the  number  and  frequency  of 
city  elections,  —  as  we  shall  have  occasion  to  show.  Besides, 
experience  in  the  state  of  New  York  and  elsewhere  seems  to 
have  shown  that  the  separation  of  state  elections  from  mu- 
nicipal elections  has  not  been  followed  by  any  very  salutary 
results ;  nevertheless,  we  think  the  decided  balance  of  reasons 
is  in  favor  of  separated  elections,  especially  if  we  do  not  ex- 
pect too  much  from  them,  or  allow  them  to  prevent  the  mak- 
ing of  more  adequate  efforts  for  municipal  reform.1 

1  Mr.  Conkling  tells  us  that  New  York  has  twice  had  separate  elections  for 
city  officers  and  has  once  abandoned  them ;  that  all  the  cities  in  the  state  of  New 
York  except  three  now  (1897)  have  such  elections,  and  that  they  are  provided  for 
all  other  large  American  cities  except  Baltimore.  (Conkling's  City  Government, 
103.)  He  calls  attention  to  their  great  cost,  but  we  cannot  regard  this  as  a  deci- 
sive objection.  Professor  Goodnow  has  presented  a  view  of  separate  elections 
hardly  more  favorable  than  that  expressed  in  the  text.  (Municipal  Problems, 
210.)  The  New  York  Amended  Constitution  of  1894  has  provided  for  separate 
city  elections. 


THE  NATURE   OF   THE   EVILS  27 


IV 

The  subject  of  Home  Rule  for  municipalities  —  the 
question  how  far  their  residents  should  be  allowed  to  control 
their  local  affairs  —  is  one  of  great  importance,  as  to  which 
there  seems  to  be  much  confusion  of  thought.  A  broad 
division  of  opinion  on  this  subject  greatly  complicates  the 
whole  municipal  problem.  We  believe  in  a  much  larger 
authority  for  municipal  Home  Rule  than  is  generally  con- 
ceded to  American  cities,  and  shall  endeavor  to  show  on 
what  conditions  it  may  be  safely  conceded. 

It  is  quite  in  harmony  with  our  republican  system,  and 
highly  desirable,  that  public  authority  should  not  be  need- 
lessly centralized,  —  that  it  should  be  as  directly  and  largely 
exercised  by  bodies  and  officers  of  local  jurisdiction  as  is 
compatible  with  just  and  efficient  government  for  the  nation 
and  the  states.  Indeed,  one  of  the  paramount  objects  in  the 
creation  of  cities  and  villages  —  as  in  the  creation  of  towns, 
counties,  and  even  of  states  —  is  to  facilitate  the  local  con- 
trol of  their  truly  local  affairs.  The  government  of  each  of 
these  jurisdictions  involves  a  common  principle  and  policy. 

The  problem  of  Home  Rule,  as  we  ought  to  clearly  see  at 
the  outset,  raises  not  only  a  question  between  cities  and 
states,  but  one  between  the  states  and  the  nation;  for  the 
pretended  right  of  secession  was  but  a  phase  of  the  question 
of  Home  Rule.  The  subject  needs  to  be  considered  on  the 
basis  both  of  principle  and  of  policy.  We  ought  to  clearly 
see  at  the  start  that  if  a  city  has  an  absolute  right  to  control 
what  it  may  be  pleased  to  call  its  own  affairs,  a  village,  a 
town,  and  a  county  have  the  same  right.  These  principles 
are  indisputable! 

(1)  Subject  to  the  paramount  power  of  the  national  govern- 
ment, each  state,  under  our  constitutional  system,  is  supreme 
and  sovereign  throughout  its  own  borders,  —  as  well  within 
cities  and  villages  as  within  rural  counties,  towns,  and 
school  divisions.  No  one  of  these  divisions,  as  a  rule,  has 
any  political  rights  or  authority  save  that  which  the  state 


28  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

concedes  and  recognizes.1  Within  all  parts  of  its  jurisdic- 
tion there  is  both  an  authority  and  a  duty  on  the  part  of  every 
state  —  and  also  an  obligation  on  the  part  of  all  of  its  citi- 
zens —  to  take  care  that  the  enforcement  of  its  constitution 
and  laws  are  such  as  will  most  contribute  to  the  welfare  of 
the  whole  people  of  the  state,  without  discriminating  locally 
in  favor  of  any  portion  of  them  at  the  cost  of  the  others, 
whether  they  reside  in  cities,  villages,  or  towns.  For  the 
state  to  neglect  its  duty,  or  to  surrender  such  authority, 
would  be  treason  to  itself  and  disastrous  to  the  well-being  of 
its  people. 

(2)  Morally  considered,    no   local   divisions   of  a  state, 
whether  it  be  a  city  or  a  town,  can  have  any  right  to  special 
authority  or  exemption,  for  its  own  peculiar  advantage,  in 
derogation  of  the  general  welfare,  nor  can  any  state  justify 
itself  in  granting  or  allowing  either.     Nor,  on  the  other 
hand,  can  any  state  rightfully  refuse  to  a  city  or  village,  any 
more  than  to  a  town,  any  special  authority  for  regulating  its 
local  affairs  which  will  be  most  to  its  own  advantage,  pro- 
vided it  be  not  at  the  same  time  a  detriment  to  the  people  of 
the  state  as  a  whole. 

(3)  Legally  considered,  the  claim  of  right,  on  the  part  of 
every  city,  village,  or  town,  to  regulate  its  own  affairs  is  a 
mere  question  —  to  be  decided  by  the  proper  courts  —  as  to 
the  true  interpretation  of  the  constitution  and  laws  appli- 
cable to  them.     It  hardly  need  be  said  that  on  every  basis  of 
justice  and  law  according  to  which  a  city  or  village  may 
claim  a  right  to  Home  Rule,  a  county  and  a  town  may  make 
a  like  claim.     The  state,  in  short,  has  a  duty  to  govern  every 
part  of  its   people  and  territory  —  the  city  and  the  forest 
equally  —  in  the  way  that  will  be  the  best  for  the  whole  of 
them. 

The  state  legislature  may,  as  national  and  state  constitu- 
tions allow,  properly  create,  amend,  and  repeal  all  charters 

*  Dillon's  Mun.  Corp.,  145 ;  Goodnow's  Mun.  Home  Rule,  Chs.  IV.  and  V. ; 
Goodnow's  Mun.  Prob.,  Chs.  III.  and  IV.  Professor  Goodnow's  timely  and  in- 
structive  volumes  may  be  read  with  great  advantage  by  those  who  have  indefinite 
notions  as  to  the  nature  and  limitations  of  admissible  Home  Rule. 


THE  NATURE  OF  THE  EVILS  29 

and  laws  applicable  to  cities,  villages,  towns,  and  counties, 
for  the  simple  reason  that  the  state  is  greater  than  any  of  its 
parts,  and  the  whole  of  its  people  have  rights  and  interests 
paramount  to  those  of  any  portion  of  them.  The  whole  ques- 
tion, we  repeat,  as  to  this  alleged  right  of  a  city,  town,  vil- 
lage, or  county  to  govern  itself  in  any  particular  is,  in  a 
moral  sense,  only  this :  Will  such  self-government  most  con- 
tribute to  that  general  welfare  of  all  the  people  of  the  state 
which  the  state  has  a  supreme  duty  to  promote  ? 1  and,  in  a 
legal  sense,  is  no  more  than  this:  Will  the  courts  decide 
that  the  laws  confer  the  right  claimed?  And  it  is  the  opinion 
of  the  state  and  its  courts,  and  not  the  opinion  of  the  city, 
village,  town,  or  county,  or  its  courts,  which  must  finally 
decide  both  these  questions.  Any  theory  of  Home  Rule 
incompatible  with  these  conditions  is  false  in  principle 
and  tends  to  insubordination,  to  internal  conflicts,  to 
disintegration  and  rebellion.2 

(4)  The  pretended  claim  of  right  in  a  moral  sense  to 
govern  themselves,  made  in  behalf  of  cities  or  other  local 
divisions,  and  also  the  alleged  duty  of  the  state  to  concede 
it,  are  strong  in  the  precise  degree  that  they  have  shown,  or 
actually  have,  a  greater  ability  and  disposition  than  the  state 
to  govern  well  within  their  local  limits.  If  the  state  could 
and  would,  through  its  own  officials,  govern  cities  and  vil- 
lages better  than  they  can,  or  would,  govern  themselves,  who 
will  claim  that  any  authority  for  local  self-government  should 
be  conceded  ?  If,  on  the  other  hand,  larger  powers  for  local 
self-control  than  American  cities  now  have  would  result  in 
better  local  government,  who  would  justify  their  refusal  ? 

2.  It  should  be  regarded  as  fundamental  that  authority  for 
Home  Rule  is  one  to  be  conceded  for  improving  and  not  for 
degrading  local  government,  or  morality.  Therefore,  if  a 
city  or  a  village,  by  its  own  local  vote,  asks  for  authority  to 
close  its  grog-shops,  its  gambling  haunts,  or  its  dens  of  in- 


1  In  using  the  words  "  people  "  and  "  state,"  here  and  in  similar  connections, 
we  of  course  include  the  parts  of  them  within  cities. 

2  If  a  city  may,  at  pleasure,  have  larger  powers  as  against  the  state,  why  may 
not  the  ward,  at  pleasure,  have  them  as  against  the  city? 


80  THE   GOVERNMENT  OF   MUNICIPALITIES 

famy,  apparently,  the  state  should  grant  it.  But  suppose 
they  are  closed  under  state  laws,  and  such  a  vote,  the  ex- 
pression of  the  most  degraded  city  majority,  asks  authority 
to  open  them  and  make  them  free  to  all,  who  will  say  that 
such  a  vote  is  a  good  reason  for  granting  larger  power  for  so 
vile  a  Home  Rule?  Who  can  maintain  a  right  to  Home 
Rule  authority  for  making  things  worse?  The  state  has  a 
duty  to  aid  the  most  moral  and  patriotic  of  its  citizens  in 
their  best  endeavors.  But  it  has,  morally,  no  right  to  con- 
fer legal  authority  upon  the  citizens  of  its  most  degraded 
sections  or  cities,  though  they  be  in  majority,  to  do  worse 
things  than  the  vote  of  the  whole  people  of  the  state  would 
tolerate.  Civilization  would  speedily  decay  under  a  state 
government  which  allowed  the  depraved  and  partisan,  merely 
because  in  majority  in  a  city,  to  govern  it  corruptly  and 
despotically.  If  the  gamblers  and  the  thieves  shall  gain  the 
majority  in  a  town  or  a  city,  will  it  be  the  duty  of  the  state 
to  repeal  the  laws  against  their  crimes,  or  to  allow  those  who 
violate  them  to  go  unpunished?1 

It  is  significant  of  the  thoughtless  facility  with  which  false 
and  dangerous  theories  of  Home  Rule  have  lately  found  ac- 
ceptance that  the  vital  distinction  here  pointed  out  —  the 
duty  of  the  state  to  confer  local  power  for  improving  and 
not  for  degrading  local  government  —  has  not  been  noticed, 
and  that  unscrupulous  party  majorities  in  great  cities,  shout- 
ing for  larger  Home  Rule  for  degrading  and  partisan  ends, 
have  been,  in  substance,  taught  that  they  have  a  right  to  it, 
irrespective  of  consequences,  merely  because  such  a  majority 
demands  it. 

Some  readers  may  regard  these  elementary  statements  as 
being  such  mere  truisms  as  might  have  been  omitted.  We 
are  sorry  to  be  compelled  to  think  otherwise,  and  to  find  evi- 

1  Where  the  moral  and  religions  tone  of  the  people  of  the  state,  as  a  whole,  is 
higher  than  that  of  some  of  its  cities,  so  that  for  example  the  Sunday  closing  of 
the  saloons  cannot  be  enforced  within  them,  the  difficulty  must  be  met  by  the  most 
effective  provisions  practicable  for  good  government.  We  cannot  enter  into  details. 
Bnt  surely  unlimited  liquor  sales  all  day  and  night,  or  on  Sunday,  are  not  any 
more  than  gambling  and  prize-fighting  and  bawdy-house  keeping  to  be  allowed 
merely  because  the  vilest  city  majority  favors  them. 


THE  NATURE  OF  THE  EVILS  31 

dence  of  the  vicious  effects  of  the  false  theories  they  expose, 
—  theories  which  have  caused  tens  of  thousands  of  city  voters 
to  think  they  have  been  wronged  in  not  being  allowed  to 
have  their  own  way  in  wrongdoing  in  city  affairs.  These 
theories  have  supplied  partisan  demagogues  with  specious 
and  vicious  arguments.  And,  besides,  if  we  concede  that 
the  part  of  the  state  called  a  city  has  a  right  to  have  as  many 
grog-shops,  lottery  offices,  and  gambling-haunts  as  its  ma- 
jority desires,  why  must  we  not  allow  that  part  of  a  city 
called  a  ward,  or  a  district,  the  same  privilege,  whenever  its 
majority  demands  it? 

3.  The  doctrine  of  Home  Rule,  as  often  presented,  is  not 
only  one  tending  to  disintegration,  insubordination,  and 
anarchy,  but  is  one  which  enfeebles  the  state  and  degrades 
it  in  the  estimate  of  the  people,  in  the  same  degree  that  it 
stimulates  selfishness,  arrogance,  and  partisan  domination  on 
the  part  of  cities.  When  several  states  made  war  on  the 
Union  in  the  name  of  false  theories  as  to  the  right  of  Home 
Rule,  a  mayor  of  New  York,  Fernando  Wood,  rightly  inter- 
preted their  example  when  he  proclaimed  the  right  of  the 
city  of  New  York  "to  be  a  free  city."  Some  of  the  cham- 
pions of  unrestrained  Home  Rule  for  cities  seem  to  go  quite 
as  far  as  that  notorious  mayor,  when  they  declare  that  "  our 
large  cities  must  stand  in  the  same  relation  to  the  national 
government  that  states  do,"  and  that  it  is  necessary  that 
"  our  large  cities  should  be  free  cities. " 1  We  must  think  that 
the  cause  of  municipal  reform  will  be  brought  into  peril  if 
such  views  shall  find  large  acceptance.  The  policy  of 
making  the  city  of  New  York  a  free  city  found  support  in 
several  Bills  in  the  New  York  legislature  of  1897.  Imagine 
the  helpless  condition  of  the  state  of  New  York  with  thirty- 
six  free  cities,  or  the  national  government  degraded  to  feeble- 
ness and  contempt,  among  the  great  powers  of  the  world,  by 
the  rival  claims  of  hundreds  of  such  cities ! 2 


1  See  Annals  Am.  Acad.  Pol.  and  Soc.  Sci.,  May,  1893,  p.  95. 

2  In  the  states  of  Missouri,  California,  and  Washington,  cities  of  a  certain  size 
seem  to  be  allowed  considerable  powers  as  to  framing  their  own  charters,  subject 
to  limited  provisions  as  to  approval  by  the  state.     (Pol.  Sci.  Quarterly,  March, 


82  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

The  excessive  claims  of  power  for  cities,  when  not  so 
radical,  are  expressed  in  various  forms.  Sometimes  it  is 
said,  generally,  that  they  have  a  right  to  make  their  own 
charters ;  sometimes  that  they  may  refuse  to  accept  any  part 
of  a  charter  they  do  not  like;  sometimes,  that  no  city  char- 
ter can  be  amended  by  a  special  law,  or  without  the  consent 
of  the  city.  None  of  these  theories  are  tenable ;  though  the 
duty  of  the  legislature  to  understand  and  properly  respect 
the  interests  and  conveniences  of  cities  is  indisputable  and 
fundamental.  They  ought,  as  we  shall  more  largely  insist, 
to  enact  wise,  general  statutes,  and  to  avoid  to  the  utmost 
the  passage  of  special  city  laws;  but  whether  the  state  or 
the  cities  themselves  are  most  responsible  for  failure  in 
these  particulars  is  quite  another  question,  which  we  shall 
soon  consider. 

4.  The  facts  that  cities,  and  many  municipal  reformers, 
usually  demand  larger  powers  of  Home  Rule  in  the  name  of 
a  false  claim  of  "right  of  cities  to  govern  themselves,"  and 
that  the  enactment  of  laws  for  their  government  is  generally 
declared  to  be  "state  interference,"  illustrates  the  blinding 
and  distorting  effects  of  false  and  largely  accepted  theories 
on  the  subject.  It  is  exceedingly  desirable  that  more  just 
views  of  the  matter  should  prevail.  Government  is  the 
aggregate  and  supreme  authority  by  which  the  public  affairs 
of  a  people  are  controlled.  In  the  United  States,  it  every- 
where involves,  (1)  the  national  constitution,  laws,  and 
officers ;  (2)  the  state  constitution,  laws,  and  officers ;  and 
(3)  municipal  charters,  ordinances,  and  officers ;  of  which  the 
latter,  highly  important  as  they  are,  are  by  no  means  the 
most  important. 

Most  of  our  municipal  literature,  before  the  recent  volumes 
by  Dr.  Shaw  and  Professor  Goodnow  were  published,  seems 
as  if  written  in  the  special  interest  of  cities,  and  it  is  rare 
to  find  in  it  any  impartial  presentation  of  the  true  relations, 


18ft5,p.  3;  Annals  Am.  ^ead.,etc.,  May,  1896,  p.  38.)  If  New  York  City  and  Phila- 
delphia, one  being  Republican  and  the  other  Democratic,  were  allowed  respectively 
such  powers  as  they  should  demand,  we  think  a  new  era  would  be  opened  in  both 
municipal  and  party  despotism  and  corruption. 


THE  NATURE   OF   THE   EVILS  33 

rights,  and  duties  as  between  the  cities  and  the  states,  or  any 
clear  view  of  the  extent  to  which  the  nation,  the  state,  and 
city,  respectively,  directly  govern  within  the  limits  of  the 
latter. 

The  extent  of  governing  carried  on  by  cities  is  greatly  ex- 
aggerated. The  part  of  governing,  at  the  city  of  New  York, 
for  example,  which  is  carried  on  by  the  nation  requires  more 
than  six  thousand  Federal  civil  officials.  The  national  part 
of  its  government  extends  to  the  most  important  matters.  It 
regulates  commerce  and  protects  those  who  engage  in  it;  it 
preserves  the  inviolability  of  contracts ;  it  defends  the  city 
against  foreign  foes  and  domestic  insurrection ;  it  is  supreme 
over  peace  and  war ;  it  guarantees  not  only  freedom  of  speech 
and  religious  opinions,  but  the  republican  form  of  govern- 
ment ;  it  delivers  the  mails,  controls  banks,  maintains  courts, 
provides  and  regulates  the  currency. 

Subject  to  national  authority,  the  state  is  supreme  through- 
out its  borders,  over  all  private  rights  and  duties.  It  makes 
laws  for  the  protection  of  property,  person,  and  character;  it 
defines  crimes  and  inflicts  punishments;  it  regulates  elec- 
tions and  creates  and  controls  courts ;  it  has  authority  over 
lands,  franchises,  and  all  personal  and  domestic  relations; 
its  laws  govern  all  partnerships  and  associations,  as  well  as 
all  corporations,  of  which  municipal  corporations  are  but  a 
single  class ;  it  enforces  all  contracts  and  business  obligations ; 
it  guarantees  justice  and  insures  freedom  of  religion,  of  de- 
bate, and  of  the  press.  Home  Rule  can  be  allowed  to  control 
none  of  these  greater  things  of  life,  and  it  can  even  regulate 
them  only  in  the  subordinate  sphere  of  ordinance-making,  — 
and  that  in  no  way  save  in  conformity  to  law. 

Home  Rule  authority  must,  in  the  nature  of  American 
governments,  be  everywhere  below  the  sphere  of  the  law  as 
well  as  that  of  the  constitutions.  To  call  the  exercise  of  this 
limited  authority,  highly  important  as  it  is,  "  the  governing 
of  a  city,"  is  quite  unwarranted  and  an  evidence  of  super- 
ficial thought  and  delusive  conceptions.  We  do  not  mention 
these  matters  to  belittle  the  importance  of  this  ordinance- 
making  authority,  the  exercise  of  which  may  profoundly 


84  THE   GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

affect  the  morality,  the  health,  and  the  prosperity  of  the 
people,  but  to  bring  to  the  test  of  fact  and  reason  that  arro- 
gance and  those  unfounded  and  misleading  claims  which 
we  fear  may  misdirect  and  delay  municipal  reform. 

5.  To  deal  wisely  with  the  forces  which  affect  municipal 
reform,  we  must  comprehend  their  real  nature  and  propor- 
tions. Cities  should  have  much  larger  powers  for  Home 
Rule  just  as  soon  as  they  show  a  capacity  for  using  it  wisely, 
and  an  intention  to  do  so.  They  should  see,  however,  that 
by  far  the  most  important  part  of  their  government  must 
always  be  carried  on  by  the  state.  Failing  to  comprehend 
this  truth,  they  are  likely,  in  the  future  as  has  been  the  case 
in  the  past,  to  fall  far  short  of  their  duty  to  send  able  and 
trustworthy  men  to  represent  them  in  the  legislature,  —  are 
likely  also  to  continue  to  blame  the  states  for  evils  for  which 
they  are  themselves  largely,  if  not  mainly,  responsible. 

The  first  practical  step  toward  larger  authority  for  Home 
Rule,  so  far  as  mere  legislation  is  concerned,  is  the  enact- 
ment of  a  general  municipal  law,  —  a  municipal  state  code, 
—  giving  adequate  powers  for  the  government  of  cities  and 
villages.  It  should  give  authority  to  make  all  needed  ordi- 
nances and  to  carry  on  local  administration  under  it. 

Such  a  law  can  be  enacted  only  by  superior  men  in  the 
legislature,  —  men  who,  rising  above  mere  partisan  politics, 
comprehend  what  is  due  to  the  whole  people,  as  well  to 
those  residing  in  cities  as  those  residing  in  the  country. 
Whose  special  duty  is  it  to  send  such  men  to  the  legislature, 
and  whose  special  interest  is  it  to  frame  and  propose  such  a 
law,  if  it  be  not  that  of  city  residents  who  are  dissatisfied 
with  their  condition  ?  Will  any  one  say  that  our  cities  have, 
generally,  sent  men  to  the  legislature  who  have  had  superior 
competency  for  such  a  work — even  men  whom  the  cities  them- 
selves would  trust  to  make  their  own  charters  ?  Would  the 
men  who  claim  the  most  absolute  right  of  Home  Rule, 
unless  mere  partisans  and  politicians,  agree  to  accept  such  a 
charter  for  their  city  as  its  own  members  of  the  legislature 
would  frame  for  it?  If  not,  with  what  justice  can  cities 
blame  the  state  more  than  they  blame  themselves  by  reason 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   EVILS  35 

of  bad  city  laws  ?  Why  has  no  city  officially  asked  some  of 
its  ablest  and  noblest  men  to  frame,  at  its  expense,  a  good 
charter  for  its  government,  and  to  urge  its  adoption  before 
the  legislature?1 

Most  well-informed  persons  will  perhaps  admit  that  the 
members  of  our  legislatures  from  the  great  cities  have  not 
exhibited  distinguished  competency  for  framing  good  munici- 
pal laws.  We  can  say  that  the  general  inferiority,  despite 
numerous  exceptions,  of  the  members  from  the  city  of  New 
York  for  such  a  duty  has  been  notorious.  Yet  these  mem- 
bers have  been  the  representatives  of  the  city  majority, 
chosen  in  the  exercise  of  as  absolute  a  Home  Rule  freedom 
in  elections  as  it  is  possible  to  confer.  While  these  pages 
are  being  written  (November,  1895),  we  have  a  striking 
example  of  what  would  be  the  practical  consequences  of  such 
a  freedom  if  made  universal.  While  the  disgraceful  results 
of  the  partisan  domination  of  Tammany  —  just  disclosed  — 
were  fresh  in  the  minds  of  the  people  of  the  city,  a  large 
majority  of  its  voters,  in  substance,  voted  to  reestablish 
this  domination.2 

The  soundness  of  the  views  we  have  expressed  as  to  the 
prospect  of  improving  city  government  through  the  action  of 
the  city  party  majority  is  illustrated  by  every  great  reform 
made  within  a  generation  in  the  city  of  New  York.  The 
police  reform  law  of  1857,  the  admirable  improvement  in  the 
health  laws  made  in  1866,  the  excellent  laws  regulating  reg- 
istration and  voting  in  New  York  City,  the  salutary  police 
justice  act  of  1873,  the  civil  service  reform  laws  applicable 
to  the  city,  and  the  ballot  reform  laws  more  recently  enacted, 
were  not  one  of  them  proposed,  but  were  all  resisted,  or 
made  inefficient,  by  a  majority  of  the  representatives  of  that 
city  in  the  legislature. 

1  The  city  of  St.  Louis,  whose  municipal  policy  has  been  unusually  enlightened, 
seems  in  substance  to  have  done  this  in  1876,  and  thus  secured  a  very  good 
charter.    A  promising  movement  in  the  interest  of  improved  local  government  in 
Indiana  is  now  active  under  the  leadership  of  Hon.  W.  D.  Foulke  of  that  state. 

2  Since  the  text  was  written  this  anticipated  danger  has  been  made  a  fact  by 
the  results  of  the  Greater  New  York  City  election  of  November,  1897,  in  which 
Tammany  triumphed. 


86  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

So  far,  therefore,  from  being  able  to  accept  the  doctrine 
that  the  majority  in  a  city,  irrespective  of  its  character  and 
purpose,  has  a  right  to  govern  it,  or  can  safely  be  allowed  to 
do  so,  we  see  that  the  welfare  both  of  the  city  and  of  the 
state  are  likely  to  require  the  exercise  of  the  powers  of  the 
latter  in  aid  of  good  municipal  government. 

6.  A  true  comprehension  of  the  salutary  limits  of  Home 
Rule  involves  two  distinct  conceptions :  (1)  What  degree  of 
independence  in  local  affairs,  of  power  over  them,  is  intrin- 
sically desirable  on  the  part  of  cities  and  villages,  provided 
they  are  competent  to  use  it?    (2)  How  much  of  this  power 
may  be  wisely  intrusted  to  any  particular  city  at  any  given 
time  ?    The  proper  rule  on  the  first  point  may  be  clearly  set 
forth  in  such  a  municipal  code  as  is  greatly  needed.     But  as 
to  the  second,  it  is  hardly  possible  to  have  more  than  a  tem- 
porary standard. 

7.  Another  view  of  the  practical  results  of  the  theory  we 
may  adopt  is  important.     If  the  state  should,  in  substance, 
say  to  cities,  "  We  will  give  you  whatever  power  over  your 
affairs  your  voting  majority  may  demand,"  —  this  being  in 
New  York  what  the  Tammany  Democrats  may  ask  for,  and 
in  Philadelphia  what  the  Republicans  may  ask  for,  —  new 
inducements   to  party  bribery  and  despotism,   and  richer 
rewards  for  the  victors  in  party  contests,  would  be  created 
by  which  the  worst  kind  of  party  government  would  be  per- 
petuated.    Not  merely  the  usual  offices  and  spoils  would  be 
secured  by  a  party  triumph,  but  also  larger  powers  for  gov- 
erning the  city  upon  the  mere  demand  of  the  victorious 
party. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  law  and  the  state  should  say  to 
every  city  and  village,  "  The  mere  request  of  your  majority 
will  not  insure  you  larger  powers;  it  must  appear  that  you 
seek  to  improve  your  local  affairs,  and  are  likely  to  do  so  by 
the  use  of  these  powers;  and  that  your  purpose  is  to  take 
your  administration  out  of  partisan  politics  and  to  select  your 
municipal  servants  for  merit,  irrespective  of  party  opinions," 
who  can  doubt  that  such  conditions  imposed  by  the  state 
would  tend  to  the  improvement  of  municipal  government? 


THE  NATURE  OF  THE  EVILS  37 

As  the  wisest  friends  of  municipal  reform  regard  it  as  an 
essential  that  party  control  and  contention  shall  be  suppressed 
to  the  utmost  in  municipal  affairs,  all  concessions  of  larger 
powers  for  Home  Rule  should  be  made  subject  to  conditions 
which  will  tend  to  such  a  suppression.  If,  for  example,  a 
city  is  to  be  allowed  greater  power  over  the  police,  the  fire, 
the  prison,  or  the  excise  administration,  it  should  be  provided 
that  no  party  tests  shall  be  applied  to  the  appointments  or 
removals  of  the  officers  or  employees  connected  with  them, 
that  they  shall  not  engage  in  partisan  strife,  and  that  no 
party  assessment  shall  be  received  from  them. 

8.  It  is  unfortunate  that  the  specious  reasons  on  which 
some  friends  of  reform  are  basing  their  claim  of  right  on 
the  part  of  cities  to  govern  themselves  absolutely,  are  just 
those  which  all  debased  city  parties  and  unscrupulous  poli- 
ticians can  effectively  use  for  their  own  purposes.  They 
naturally  claim  more  power  for  ruling  whenever  they  are  in 
control.  They  plausibly  denounce  the  most  patriotic  efforts 
of  the  state  for  improving  city  affairs  as  an  interference  and 
a  wrong,  save  when  the  same  party  rules  both  the  state  and 
the  city. 

A  sound  doctrine  of  Home  Rule  would,  practically,  say  to 
the  voters  of  a  city,  irrespective  of  their  party  affiliations, 
, "  If  you  desire  larger  powers  of  municipal  control,  make  it 
appear  that  the  non-partisan  public  opinion  of  the  city  de- 
mands, and  intends  to  use,  them  for  the  benefit  of  the  city, 
and  not  for  the  advantage  of  any  party  or  faction.  Such  a 
doctrine  would  practically  say  to  these  voters  that  one  of  the 
first  things  to  be  done  to  secure  larger  powers  is  to  convince 
the  worthy  men  of  all  parties  that  it  is  their  duty  to  unite 
their  endeavors,  irrespective  of  all  mere  party  interest,  for 
good  municipal  government;  it  would  suggest  to  them  that 
no  city  deserves  to  have,  or  is  likely  to  secure,  much  larger 
powers,  save  through  corruption,  until  its  inhabitants  shall 
have  wisdom  and  patriotism  enough  to  unite  ,in  such 
endeavors.1 

1  It  would,  perhaps,  set  the  city  friends  of  municipal  reform  to  thinking  whether 
a  larger  share  of  their  efforts  might  not  with  advantage  be  devoted  to  causing 


::s  HIE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

9.  The  extent  to  which  the  corruption  of  cities  and  their 
abuse  of  their  powers  have  contributed  to  our  bad  municipal 
condition  has  never  been  adequately  set  forth.  No  adequate 
reform  is  possible  save  by  cooperation  between  the  repre- 
sentatives from  both  the  city  and  the  country  in  our  legis- 
latures. We  must,  therefore,  think  it  unfortunate  that  so 
much  of  our  municipal  literature  has  been  written  in  a  spirit 
of  partisanship  for  the  city.  By  developing  a  false  and  mis- 
chievous conviction  that  there  is  an  inherent  antagonism 
between  cities  and  other  parts  of  the  state,  a  feeling  has  been 
developed  which  may  be  very  unfavorable  to  an  early  tri- 
umph of  municipal  reform.  Such  a  theory  directly  tends  to 
jealousies  and  hostilities  between  them.  One  writer,  for 
example,  tells  us  "  there  can  no  good  come  of  a  system  which 
.  .  .  makes  New  York  and  Brooklyn  a  part  of  New  York  state, 
.  .  .  dependent  upon  the  country  members  of  the  legislature," 
that  the  interests  of  all  "our  large  cities  are  totally  diverse 
from  the  interests  of  the  remaining  sections  of  the  state  in 
which  they  are  placed,"  and  "that  it  is  necessary  that  our 
large  cities  should  be  free  cities."1  The  distrust  and  fears 
in  the  minds  of  legislators  from  the  country,  which  such 
views  tend  to  develop,  might  well  be  regretted  even  if  it 
were  not  necessary  to  secure  their  votes  for  any  large  meas- 
ure of  Home  Rule.  Will  they  vote  to  give  larger  powers  to 
cities  if  they  regard  their  interests  as  hostile  to  those  of  the 
rest  of  the  state,  and  as  likely  to  be  used  to  establish 

city  residents  to  better  comprehend  their  own  duties  and  shortcomings,  and  to 
bringing  these  residents  into  cooperation  —  while  less  might  be  said  about  the 
shortcomings  and  incompetency  of  state  legislatures  —  at  least  until  cities  shall 
cease  to  be  the  largest  contributors  to  the  most  unworthy  members  of  these  bodies. 

Much  has  been  said  as  to  the  comparative  morality  and  patriotism  of  the 
residents  of  the  city  and  residents  of  the  country.  We  need  make  no  assumptions 
on  this  point,  for  we  have  to  consider  only  the  kind  of  men  that  each  sends  to 
the  legislatures.  Cities  certainly  have  no  lack  of  highly  worthy  and  gifted  men, 
but  how  many  of  them  are  sent  to  our  legislatures  ?  Who  will  claim  that  city- 
elected  members  are  generally  superior  ?  Who  will  say  that  a  city,  not  generally 
represented  by  members  competent  and  disposed  to  frame  the  laws  it  needs,  can 
very  consistently  complain  of  the  laws  by  which  it  is  governed  ?  Should  it  not 
even  be  ashamed  to  do  so?  These  suggestions  will  not  be  acceptable  to  city  resi- 
dents, —  will  even  offend  some  persons  who  are  active  in  their  alleged  interest, 
—  but  the  subject  is  too  serious  to  allow  such  important  truths  to  be  ignored. 

1  Annals  Am.  Acad.  P.  and  S.  Science,  May,  1893,  p.  96. 


THE  NATURE  OF  THE  EVILS  39 

independent  governments  and  to  foster  hostile  municipal 
interests  ? 

We  must  regard  the  theory  that  the  true  interests  of  cities 
and  states  are  opposed  as  being  not  only  false  and  indefen- 
sible, but  as  tending  to  hostility  and  disintegration.  It 
seems  too  plain  for  argument  that  the  business  prosperity  of 
the  city  and  the  country  are  mutually  dependent,  that 
whatever  imperils  the  health  or  degrades  the  morals  of  one 
hardly  less  involves  the  safety  and  character  of  the  other. 
If  vice,  corruption,  or  crime  are  tolerated  in  great  cities  —  if 
the  dens  of  the  harlot,  drunkard,  and  gambler  are  open  along 
the  street,  — •  does  it  need  argument  to  show  that  the  state  and 
the  nation  are  in  peril  ?  The  homes  of  the  country  will  be 
in  danger  from  every  low  sort  of  administration  for  which 
city  Home  Rule  may  be  responsible,  if  conceded  to  a  vile 
city  majority.  This  is  the  answer  to  the  theory  that  cities 
should  be  allowed  to  do  as  badly  as  their  majority  pleases, 
that  the  state  is  unreasonable  in  exacting  conditions  in  aid 
of  purity,  morality,  and  efficiency  when  conceding  larger 
municipal  powers. 

10.  Another  view  of  Home  Rule  should  be  noticed  here. 
Greater  municipal  powers  may  be  sought  when  the  city  and 
the  state  are  dominated  by  the  same  party.  In  this  event, 
they  would  but  too  surely  be  granted  and  be  used  for  party 
advantage.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  party  dominating  the 
city  were  not  in  control  of  the  state,  the  larger  powers  de- 
sired, however  reasonable,  would  very  likely  be  refused. 
Both  parts  of  this  wrongdoing  would  be  greatly  diminished 
if  city  government  were,  as  it  should  be,  truly  non-partisan. 

Yet  another  great  evil  is  possible.  The  residents  of  dif- 
ferent cities,  impelled  by  party  spirit,  and  acting  under  false 
views  of  their  interest  and  rights,  may  combine  into  a  great 
municipal  party  to  carry  elections  and  to  bribe  and  coerce 
legislatures,  even  in  different  states.1  Three  or  four  cities, 

1  Since  the  text  was  written,  nearly  three  hundred  city  politicians  have  come 
on  from  Chicago  to  New  York  City  in  semi-military  array,  with  Chicago's  mayor 
at  their  head,  to  help  Tammany  carry  the  New  York  municipal  election  of  1897. 
They  seem  to  have  been  the  guests  of  Tammany,  and  the  event  is  ominous  in  its 
suggestions. 


40  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

in  each  of  several  states,  will  soon  elect  the  majority  of  the 
members  of  their  legislatures.  No  statesman,  so  long  as 
existing  city  methods  prevail,  can  look  upon  such  a  develop- 
ment without  anxiety.  In  such  possibilities,  we  find  ad- 
ditional reasons  for  taking  city  government  out  of  partisan 
politics  in  a  way  compatible  with  the  dignity  and  duty  of 
the  state,  and  not  especially  advantageous  to  any  party. 

11.  The  plausible  theory  has  been  advanced  that  if  cities 
and  villages  were  intrusted  with  largely  increased  powers, 
they  would  be  much  more  used  in  the  public  interest  than 
their  present  powers  have  been.  Indeed,  the  partisan,  mu- 
nicipal literature  referred  to  charges  that,  because  the  states 
have  not  conceded  such  powers,  they  have  made  themselves 
responsible  for  the  prostitution  for  corrupt  purposes  of  the 
authority  which  cities  have  in  fact  possessed. 

Such  a  theory  is  certain  to  be  very  acceptable  not  only  to 
every  debased  city  party  and  its  boss,  but  to  all  those  who 
live  by  the  trade  of  city  politics.  Besides,  many  better  citi- 
zens, who  seek  an  excuse  for  the  bad  government  of  their 
city  which  they  have  neglected,  will  naturally  find  it  more 
agreeable  to  blame  legislatures  than  to  confess  their  own 
faults,  or  better  discharge  their  own  duties. 

It  has  generally  been  thought  to  be  a  rule  of  wisdom  and 
justice  to  give  the  charge  of  many  things  to  those  who  have 
been  faithful  over  a  few  things,  and  we  agree  with  Ex-Mayor 
Low  in  thinking  this  rule  should  be  accepted  in  city  affairs. 

It  is  not  to  be  doubted  that  in  rare  and  peculiar  crises, 
like  that  in  New  York  City  in  1895,  when  public  feeling  is 
deeply  stirred  and  a  profound  sense  of  peril  makes  adherents 
of  opposite  parties  ready  to  cooperate  in  the  public  interest, 
larger  powers  for  Home  Rule  would  be  patriotically  used. 
Indeed,  it  may  be  admitted  that,  under  favoring  conditions, 
an  increased  responsibility  may  cause  more  prudence  and 
awaken  a  higher  sense  of  duty.  Yet,  let  us  not  forget  the 
fact  that  within  the  same  year,  when  municipal  interests 
were  still  seriously  threatened  in  New  York  City,  more  than 
thirty  thousand  registered  electors  failed  to  vote,  and  that 
the  authors  of  the  old  abuses  triumphed  in  its  local  elections. 


THE  NATURE  OF  THE  EVILS          41 

We  must  judge  of  the  influence  of  great  and  absolute 
powers  by  the  results  of  experience  through  a  series  of  years. 
Let  us  glance  at  some  examples.  No  greater  legal  powers 
can  be  conferred  upon  cities  than  they  now  have  for  choosing 
able,  patriotic,  and  worthy  men  to  represent  them  in  the 
state  legislatures  ?  Why  have  not  such  men  been  generally 
chosen  ?  The  New  York  legislature,  a  few  years  ago,  gave 
the  mayor  of  New  York  absolute  power  and  responsibility  for 
appointing  worthy  police  justices,  and  every  conceivable 
appeal  was  made  to  him  to  do  so.  Why  have  scheming  poli- 
ticians and  unscrupulous  party  leaders  ignorant  of  the  law 
been  generally  appointed  by  him  ?  Acting,  apparently,  on 
the  theory  that  an  increase  of  powers  would  increase  the 
sense  of  public  duty,  the  legislature  recently  gave  the  mayor 
of  New  York  City  almost  unlimited  power  over  the  appoint- 
ment of  heads  of  city  departments,  with  the  results  that, 
prior  to  the  non-partisan  victory  of  1895,  he  filled  these 
offices  with  unscrupulous  politicians,  who  prostituted  their 
authority  for  the  benefit  of  their  party  and  faction.  The 
power  of  cities  over  their  public  schools  has  generally  been 
ample,  especially  in  New  York  City,  yet  this  power  has  been 
lamentably  used  for  partisan  and  sectarian  advantage. 

The  stupendous  frauds,  the  flagrant  abuses  of  judicial 
power,  and  the  plundering  of  the  city  treasury,  which  took 
place  in  New  York  City  about  1870,  under  the  lead  of  the 
notorious  Tweed  and  Barnard,  and  the  wholesale  bribery, 
subsequently,  in  the  Board  of  Aldermen  in  connection  with 
the  sale  of  city  franchises,  were  examples  of  the  exercise  of 
ample  powers  for  Home  Rule.  Nevertheless,  we  think  cities 
should  be  given  larger  powers,  but  under  safeguards  and  con- 
ditions we  shall  soon  explain. 

12.  The  demand  of  an  unrestrained  power  for  cities  not 
only  exhibits  a  strange  disregard  of  the  admonitions  of  re- 
cent history,  but  condemns  precautions  against  abuses  of 
municipal  authority  which  have  long  existed  —  the  abandon- 
ment of  which  would  constitute  a  revolution  in  the  constitu- 
tional relation  between  states  and  municipalities.  The 
constitution  of  New  York  will  supply  illustrations.  It 


42  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

declares  ]  (1)  that  neither  cities  nor  villages  shall  use  their 
money  or  credit  in  the  aid  of  any  corporation,  association,  or 
individual-,  (2)  that  they  shall  not  be  allowed  to  incur  any 
indebtedness  except  for  city  or  village  purposes,  save  in 
support  of  their  poor;  (3)  that  no  city  shall,  save  upon  speci- 
fied conditions,  become  indebted  for  any  purpose  in  an  amount 
exceeding  ten  per  centum  of  the  assessed  value  of  its  real 
estate  subject  to  taxation-,  and  (4)  that  the  amount  to  be 
raised  for  city  purposes,  aside  from  interest  and  debts,  in  a 
city  of  over  one  hundred  thousand  inhabitants  shall  not  in 
the  aggregate  in  any  year  exceed  two  per  centum  of  the 
assessed  valuation  of  its  real  and  personal  property. 

These  restrictions  rest  on  the  theory  that  cities,  under  such 
officers  as  they  freely  select  for  themselves,  cannot  be  trusted 
with  unlimited  powers  as  to  matters  of  common  prudence, 
justice,  and  honesty,  even  to  keep  clear  of  ruinous  debts  and 
gross  extravagance.  Do  those  who  demand  an  absolute  right 
of  Home  Rule  for  cities  —  who  count  on  increasing  official 
virtue  by  merely  enlarging  official  power  —  propose  to  remove 
these  restrictions?  If  they  do  not,  is  it  not  a  duty  to  the 
people,  who  are  misled  by  their  unqualified  and  specious 
demands,  to  define  their  meaning  and  purpose  ? 

V.    Need  of  State  Inspection  and  of  Reports  from  Cities 

The  evils  threatened  from  false  theories  concerning  the 
relations  between  the  state  and  the  municipalities  are  so 
serious  that  we  shall  go  a  little  beyond  the  strict  limits  of  our 
subject  in  dealing  with  them.2  The  prevailing  practice  in 
the  United  States  —  a  practice  which  city  parties,  politicians, 
and  bosses  favor,  and  by  which  they  have  prospered  —  has  been 
to  permit  whatever  authority  is  allowed  to  a  municipality  to 
be  exercised  arbitrarily,  without  adequate  publicity,  or  a  de- 
clared duty  of  making  reports  to  the  state.  There  should 
undoubtedly  be  certain  limits  and  subjects  —  to  be  clearly 

l  New  York  Constitution,  Art.  VIII.  Sec.  10. 

3  Professor  Goodnow  has  largely  considered  this  subject.  Mun.  Prob.,  Chs.  IV., 
V.,  and  VI. 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   EVILS  43 

defined  in  a  general  law,  or  municipal  code  —  within  and  as 
to  which  a  municipality  should  be  allowed  to  act,  generally, 
in  its  discretion,  and  without  a  duty  of  making  any  report 
to  the  state.  But  we  think  it  a  grave  error  to  assume  that 
these  limits  and  subjects  should  embrace  all  the  matters  as 
to  which  the  city  may  act  at  all.  Outside  the  sphere  of  this 
absolute  authority,  it  should  be  allowed  to  take  action  mainly 
discretionary,  yet  in  various  particulars  subject  to  the  duty 
of  making  reports  to  the  state.  These  subjects,  and  the  con- 
ditions of  city  action  upon  them,  should  be  clearly  denned. 
The  reports  to  the  state  should  show  conformity  to  such  con- 
ditions and  the  practical  effects  of  what  the  city  has  done 
under  such  qualified  authority.1 

Let  us  illustrate  these  different  spheres  of  city  action: 
(1)  In  the  first  sphere,  among  the  subjects  as  to  which  abso- 
lute powers  may  be  given,  —  though  some  exceptions  must 
be  made,  —  we  may  place  the  care  of  streets,  parks,  sewerage, 
city  lighting,  water  supply,  the  fire  extinguishment  system, 
and  many  details  connected  with  sanitary  and  police  and 
school  administration.  But  no  city  should  be  allowed  to 
enforce  a  political  or  religious  test  for  being  in  any  part  of 
its  service,  or  to  discriminate  in  favor  of  its  own  residents 
to  the  detriment  of  the  rights  of  the  other  citizens  of  the 
state. 

(2)  Among  the  conditioned  powers  —  as  to  the  exercise  of 
which  the  state  should  require  reports  —  are  those  relating  to 
the  main  parts  of  the  health,  police,  excise,  dock,  and  school 
administration,  to  the  proceedings  of  the  police  and  justice 
courts,  to  the  action  of  prosecuting  attorneys,  and  to  all  parts 
of  the  city  government  affected  by  the  conditions  and  limita- 

1  When  we  come  to  consider  foreign  cities,  which  have  much  larger  powers  for 
home  rule  than  American  cities  possess,  we  shall  find  that  these  powers  are  safe  to 
give  only  by  reason  of  such  conditions  and  required  reports.  Professor  Goodnow 
seems  to  refer  to  this  first  or  absolute  sphere  when  he  speaks  of  the  "  failure  of 
the  legislature  to  delimit  a  sphere  of  municipal  autonomy,"  but  we  do  not  see 
that  he  refers  to  the  need  of  a  second  sphere  of  conditioned  control  Mun,  Home 
Rule,  pp.  108,  260.  In  his  later  work  (Mun.  Prob.,  Chs.  III.,  IV.,  and  V.)  he  enters 
more  largely  into  the  subject,  and  justly  regards  the  action  of  cities  in  various 
aspects  as  being  in  the  capacity  of  agents  of  the  state,  and  therefore  as  justly 
subject  to  the  duty  of  making  reports  to  the  state. 


44  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

tions  which  the  state  constitution  or  the  laws  impose  upon 
its  action.  Its  expenditures  upon  all  important  subjects 
should  also  be  so  far  shown  as  to  make  comparisons  of  the 
cost  of  governing  different  cities  and  departments  possible. 

It  may  be  added  that,  as  the  police,  police  justices,  coro- 
ners, prosecuting  attorneys,  and  sheriffs  are  not  mere  city 
officers,  but  represent  state  authority,  there  is  a  peculiar  fit- 
ness in  requiring  annual  reports  to  the  state  which  shall 
show  how  this  authority  is  being  exercised.  Many  advan- 
tages would  result  from  such  reports  from  different  parts  of 
a  state.1 

1.  Professor  Commons,  in  the  article  cited  in  the  last  note, 
explains  the  recent  tendency  in  the  United  States  toward 
bringing  municipal  and  other  local  administration  under  an 
appropriate  responsibility  to  the  state,  and  gives  several  in- 
teresting examples  of  the  way  in  which  it  is  being  done.  He 
says  that  a  law  of  Iowa,  enacted  in  1880,  creates  a  State 
Board  of  Health,  with  authority  to  make  sanitary  rules  and 
regulations,  which  the  mayors  and  aldermen  of  cities,  acting 
as  local  boards  of  health,  are  required  to  enforce ;  and  that 
in  Indiana  the  State  Board  of  Health,  in  case  of  epidemics, 
may  take  entire  charge  of  local  health  administration.2  He 
tells  us  that  State  Boards  of  Charities  and  Correction  have 
been  established  in  eighteen  states  "  to  overcome  the  indif- 
ference, ignorance,  corruption,  and  brutality  of  local  officers," 
—  those  of  cities  and  villages  among  them,  —  and  that  great 
reforms  of  abuses  have  resulted  from  their  establishment. 
Many  of  the  evils  which  these  boards  have  investigated  and 
exposed  would  probably  have  been  avoided  if  municipalities 
had  been  required  to  make  adequate  reports  to  the  state. 
We  may  add  that,  in  the  state  of  New  York,  very  salutary 
results  —  nowhere  more  striking  than  in  cities  —  have  sprung 
from  the  action  of  the  State  Boards  of  Charity  established 
many  years  ago,  and  that  the  greatest  obstructions  in  the 

1  Professor  J.  R.  Commons  has  shown  the  need  that  the  state  should  insist  on 
the  authority  for  local  administration  being  more  justly  exercised.  See  Annals 
of  Am.  Acad.  Pol.  Sci.,  May,  1896,  p.  37. 

4  See  as  to  same  tendency,  Qoodnows  Home  Rule,  p.  268. 


THE  NATURE  OF   THE  EVILS  45 

way  of  their  usefulness  have  been  the  party  majority  in  cities, 
and  the  incompetent  and  corrupt  officials  it  has  put  into 
office.1 

2.  It  is  an  instructive  fact  that  these  boards  had  their 
origin  mainly  in  an  uprising  of  public  opinion  by  reason  of 
the  intolerable  evils  connected  with  poorhouses,  asylums, 
jails,  prisons,  and  other  branches  of  local  administration,  in 
respect  to  which  an  unrestricted  and  unreported  Home  Rule 
management  in  cities  and  other  localities  had  been  as  corrupt 
and  cruel  as  it  had  been  partisan  and  despotic.  The  main 
purpose  in  creating  these  boards  has  been  not  to  limit  the 
legitimate  power  of  the  local  authorities,  —  nor  did  they  do 
this,  —  but  to  provide  for  such  supervision  by  the  state,  and 
for  such  publicity  as  to  the  use  of  Home  Rule  power  as 
would  compel  its  exercise  in  the  public  interest. 

The  judgment  of  the  people  of  New  York  as  to  the  effects 
of  such  state  inspection,  and  of  the  salutary  publicity  it  gives 
to  the  abuse  of  municipal  discretion,  is  strikingly  shown  in 
the  fact  that  in  their  amended  constitution  of  1894  the  crea- 
tion of  a  new  State  Board  of  Charities  with  greatly  enlarged 
powers  is  provided  for.2  It  is  made  its  duty  to  visit  and 
inspect  all  municipal  and  county  institutions,  save  those 
made  subject  to  inspection  by  other  state  officers.  The  con- 
stitution also  provides  not  only  for  a  state  commission  in 
lunacy,  whose  duty  it  is  to  inspect  all  institutions  for  the 
care  of  the  insane,  but  for  a  state  commission  of  prisons, 
whose  duty  it  is  to  visit  and  inspect  all  institutions  having 
custody  of  sane  adults  charged  with  or  convicted  of  crime,  or 
persons  detained  as  witnesses  or  debtors.  Full  reports  are  to 
be  made  to  the  state  concerning  these  matters.  It  is  not  easy 
to  overestimate  the  significance  of  these  provisions  as  bearing 
upon  the  theory  of  absolute,  uninspected  municipal  Home 
Rule  administration,  which  they  both  condemn  and  prevent 
as  unsafe. 

1  These  State  Boards  of  Charity  hare  for  several  years  been  in  the  habit  of 
holding  national  conventions ;  and  they  have,  through  their  non-partisan  and 
enlightened  activity,  become  a  salutary  power  in  aid  of  just  and  beneficent  admin- 
istration in  cities  and  villages. 

2  Constitution,  Art.  VIII.  Sec.  11. 


46  THE   GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

3.  More  than  this,  the  people  of  the  state  of  New  York 
have   in   other  ways  recently  expressed  their  sense  of  the 
need  and  utility  of  state  inspection  of  local  administration. 
A  law  of  New  York,  under  which  a  corporation  known  as 
the  State  Charities  Aid  Association  was  organized  a  few 
years  ago,  authorizes  its  agents  to  enter  and  inspect  public 
institutions  under  the  charge  of  cities,  towns,  and  counties, 
and  to  make  reports  concerning  their  condition.     Its  vigor- 
ous action  in  this  regard  has  resulted  in  the  removal  or  miti- 
gation of  many  grave  abuses  which  the  municipal  authorities 
had  tolerated.     In  the  same  spirit,  after  it  had  been  demon- 
strated in  the  state  of  New  York  that  the  management  of 
institutions  for  the  care  of  the  insane  under  the  control  of 
the  state  was  much  better  than  that  of  such  institutions 
under  the  control  of  cities  or  counties,  it  was  required  by  law 
that  the  inmates  of  the  latter  institutions  should  be  —  and 
they  have  been  —  transferred  to  institutions  under  state  care. 
It  was  not  lack  of  Home  Rule  authority,  but  the  abuse  of  it, 
which  made  these  reforms  essential.     Do  those  who  assert 
the  right  of  every  city  to  govern  itself  as  it  pleases  seek  the 
repeal  of  these  legal  and  constitutional  provisions  —  the  re- 
versal of  this  policy  of  publicity  and  state  inspection  ? 

4.  State  Civil  Service  Commissions  must  not  be  over- 
looked, for  they  are,  so  far  as  municipalities  are  concerned, 
little  more  than  methods  of  putting  effective  restraints  upon 
the  abuse  of  Home  Rule  authority  in  the  matters  of  appoint- 
ments, removals,  and  political  assessments.     Every  law  pro- 
viding for  a  state  civil  service  system  to  be  enforced  in  cities 
not  only  aims  to  suppress  city  party  favoritism  and  to  compel 
party  majorities  to  regard  the  public  interest,  but  is,  in  sub- 
stance, a  declaration  that  such  majorities  cannot  be  trusted  to 
select  policemen,  firemen,  clerks,  or  even  city  laborers,  with 
paramount  reference  to  the  general  welfare,  though  they  have 
the  most  absolute  liberty  and  duty  to  do  so.     No  man,  there- 
fore, who  insists  on  unrestrained  Home  Rule,  or  denies  the 
right  of  the  state  to  demand  reports  concerning  city  adminis- 
tration, such  as  these  commissions  make,  can  consistently 
support  a  civil  service  reform  policy. 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   EVILS  47 

The  disgraceful  character  of  the  municipal  administration 
to  which  such  state  inspection  has  now  been  extended  had 
long  been  notorious.  Patronage-mongering  and  partisan 
favoritism  and  corruption  —  resulting  in  ignorant  and  un- 
faithful officers  and  employees,  in  violations  of  humanity, 
justice,  and  decency,  in  extravagant  expenditures,  and  in 
the  neglect  of  sanitary  precautions  essential  to  the  public 
health  —  had  been  a  part  of  the  abuses  of  such  adminis- 
tration. 

5.  An  important  fact  should  be  here  noticed.     The  con- 
stitutional and  legal  requirements  we  have  referred  to  are 
not  denials  of  power  for  legitimate  Home  Rule,  nor  do  they 
question  its  salutary  influence  when  honestly  exercised  in  a 
non-partisan  spirit.     They  are  not  restrictions  of  municipal 
power,  but  of  liberty  and  opportunity  to  abuse  it. 

There  have,  beyond  question,  been  very  many  cases  in  which 
state  legislatures,  mainly  for  party  reasons,  have  improperly 
enacted  laws  for  the  regulation  of  city  affairs  —  have  need- 
lessly intermeddled  with  their  just  liberty,  and  we  shall 
propose  safeguards  against  such  wrongs.  The  states  have 
failed  to  enact  good  municipal  codes  and  have  passed  need- 
less special  city  laws.  Yet,  in  a  large  way,  state  interven- 
tion has  been  necessary.  "The  inhabitants  of  the  cities, 
plundered  without  limit  by  their  own  legislative  bodies,  have 
been  compelled  to  fly  to  the  state  for  relief."1 

6.  Yet  more  significant  of  the  tendency  of  public  opinion 
as  to  the  need  of  state  inspection  of  local  administration  is 
the  fact  that  three  states,  as  Professor  Commons  tells  us, 
"have  provided  an  officer  —  the   public   examiner  —  whose 
duty  is  the  direct  supervision  of  certain  local  authorities, 
mainly  those  of  counties."     "The  experiment  .   .   .  ,"  he 
declares,  "shows  decidedly  good  results."     This  examiner, 
he  says,  can  enforce  a  correct  and  uniform  method  of  book- 
keeping, ascertain  the  character  and  financial  standing  of 
bondsmen,  and  he  must  visit  offices  once  a  year  without 
notice  and  make  a  thorough  examination  of   their  books, 

1  James  C.  Carter,  President  Nat.  Conf .  for  Good  City  Government,  Proceed- 
ings, 1895,  p.  302. 


48  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

accounts,1  papers,  and  securities.  He  makes  reports  to  the 
governor. 

Professor  Commons  states  that  in  1891  a  law  for  such  ex- 
aminations was  made  applicable  to  the  financial  offices  of 
the  city  of  St.  Paul,  and  that  irregular  methods  prevailing 
therein,  which  the  examiner  exposed,  have  been  corrected. 
The  state  examiner  of  South  Dakota,  where,  as  well  as  in 
North  Dakota,  the  new  method  has  been  applied,  shows 
that  its  effects  have  been  salutary,  and  he  thinks  it  should 
be  extended  to  towns  as  well  as  to  the  cities  and  counties.2 

7.  Professor  Goodnow  says  that,  within  very  recent  years, 
seven  states  —  Massachusetts,  Minnesota,  Mississippi,  North 
Dakota,  South  Dakota,  Texas,  and  Wyoming  —  have  passed 
laws  requiring  a  central  audit  of  the  accounts  of  counties, 
and  in  some  cases  of  municipal  corporations,  —  an  audit  re- 
quired, he  says,  by  reason  of  our  "  becoming  convinced  ...  of 
bad  results  from  'our  historic  theory  of  local  government.'  "8 

The  examiners  of  these  local  accounts  make  annual  reports 
to  the  governor.  In  these  facts  we  may  perhaps  see  the 
beginning  of  effective  checks  upon  the  abuses  of  local 
authority,  which  may  in  a  few  years,  if  wisely  extended, 
become  so  salutary  as  to  make  it  safe  to  very  greatly  enlarge 
municipal  powers  for  Home  Rule.  The  salutary  results  of 
these  inspections  and  reports  in  Massachusetts  and  their  ex- 
posure of  abuses,  as  set  forth  by  Mr.  Witten,  cannot  fail  to 
strongly  impress  the  reader.* 

This  new  and  developing  policy  we  shall  soon  find  to  be 
quite  in  harmony  with  that  which  has  long  prevailed  in  the 
most  enlightened  countries  of  Europe,  whose  cities  have 
much  larger  powers  for  Home  Rule  than  those  of  the  United 

1  Mr.  Colliding  tells  us  that  each  of  the  cities  in  the  state  of  New  York  has  a 
different  method  of  bookkeeping.    Consequently  no  useful  comparisons  of  expen- 
ditures are  possible.    City  Government,  p.  18. 

2  Annals  Am.  Acad.  Pol.  Sci.,  May,  1896,  pp.  46-48;  Goodnow's  Mun.  Home 
Rule,  pp.  269,  270.    As  further  showing  existing  tendencies,  we  may  say  that  the 
Fassett  investigation  committee  of  the  legislature  of  New  York  prepared  a  bill, 
a  few  years  ago,  which  provided  for  uniform  methods  of  keeping  accounts  by 
cities  and  for  the  filing  of  summaries  of  them  annually  with  the  governor. 

•  Home  Rule,  pp.  2G9,  270. 

4  Public  Administration  in  Massachusetts,  Chap.  XI. 


THE  NATURE  OF  THE  EVILS  49 

States.  Dr.  Shaw  has  pointed  out  the  great  advantages 
which  have  resulted  from  this  policy  to  municipal  admin- 
istration in  England.1 

8.  Professor  Goodnow  shows  that  in  the  period  just  prior 
to  1834  —  when  we  may  say  that  English  city  government 
was  perhaps  as  corrupt  and  inefficient  as  that  in  the  United 
States  has  ever  been  —  "  the  English  local  government  system 
was  similar  to  our  present  American  system  "  in  important 
particulars,  which  he  names ;  and  he  adds  these  highly  sig- 
nificant statements:  (1)  "that  local  offices  were  practically 
independent  of  all  central  administrative  control ;  "  (2)  that 
"each  locality,  moved  by  its  own  selfish  ends,  administered 
the  law  in  such  a  way  that  its  own  local  interests  alone  were 
considered,  and  the  interest  of  the  state  as  a  whole,  and 
society  in  general,  were  almost  completely  disregarded.     The 
remedy  for  these  evils  was  found  in  a  resumption  by  the  cen- 
tral government  of  the  powers  which  it  had  abdicated."2 
Here  seems  to  be  a  solution  of  one  of  the  great  problems  now 
before  us.     English  cities  are  now  required  to  make  reports 
to  the  central  governments  in  order  to  avoid  a  repetition  of  the 
evils  from  which  her  cities  suffered  when  their  governments 
were  so  much  like  the  governments  of  American  cities  at 
the  present  time.3 

9.  It  may  be  said  that  the  existing  municipal  methods  of 
England  are  too  much  centralized  for  our  governmental  sys- 
tem, and  are  the  natural  result  of  a  monarchy  or  aristocracy 
which  does  not  favor  municipal  liberty.     The  facts  as  to 
restriction  are  the  very  reverse.     Before  1834,   when  the 
royal  and  aristocratic  elements  were  much  stronger  in  Eng- 
land than  they  are  now,  her  cities  had  all  the  disastrous 
liberties  of  acting  independently,  foolishly,  and  corruptly 
which  ours  now  possess.     The  present  English  condition  is 
the  result  of  very  recent  methods,  which,  as  we  have  seen, 
several  American  states  have  been  repeating  —  apparently 

1  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  p.  68.  2  Mun.  Home  Rule,  pp.  234,  235. 

3  Professor  Goodnow  says  that  England  has  never  forgotten  the  lesson  of  that 
disastrous  period,  and  she  has,  in  many  ways,  continually  since  insisted  on  effi- 
cient state  supervision  of  the  exercise  of  municipal  authority.    Mun.  Home  Rule, 
pp.  234  to  248. 
E 


50  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

without  knowing  it.  We  wish  to  repeat  that  this  central 
inspection  and  supervision  have  been  enlarged  in  England 
in  the  very  period  in  which  the  Home  Rule  authority  of  her 
cities  and  the  general  liberty  and  elective  franchises  of  her 
people  have  been  greatly  increased,  until  that  authority,  as 
we  shall  soon  see,  now  far  exceeds  such  authority  in  American 
cities.1 

It  is  impossible  to  read  Professor  Goodnow's  instructive 
pages  without  astonishment  that  sensible  men  can  think  that 
more  arbitrary  power  conferred  on  cities,  to  be  exercised 
without  state  inspection  or  responsibility  to  make  reports  to 
the  state,  can  be  either  wise  or  safe.  He  calls  attention  to 
the  fact  that  we  have  so  far  apparently  learned  little  from  the 
instructive  experience  of  foreign  countries  in  the  matter  of 
municipal  government,2  —  a  fact  all  the  more  remarkable, 
we  may  add,  in  view  of  our  readiness  to  copy  European 
fashions,  amusements,  and  manners,  to  import  all  the  best 
breeds  of  European  cattle,  horses,  hogs,  and  hens,  to  repro- 
duce all  valuable  European  methods  in  art  and  industry,  to 
say  nothing  of  our  importation  of  European  games,  follies, 
and  vices.8 

Professor  Goodnow  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  we  have 
been  "  unmindful  of  the  dangers  of  uncontrolled  local  manage- 
ment of  general,  and  even  of  municipal,  affairs  .  .  .  ,"  but  he 
tells  us  that  now  "  there  is  a  tendency  toward  the  correction 
of  this  evil."  He  says  that  we  are  becoming  convinced  that 
our  "  historic  theory  of  local  government  is  leading  to  bad  re- 
sults in  the  case  of  our  local  municipal  corporations,  .  .  .  and 

1  See  on  these  points  an  excellent  paper,  by  Mr.  Frank  M.  Loomis,  read  at 
Louisville  Municipal  Conference,  etc.,  May,  1897. 

2  Mun.  Home  Rule,  pp.  269,  260. 

8  Nothing  was  more  remarkable  —  and  perhaps  we  should  say  'more  discour- 
aging—  to  thoughtful  minds  in  connection  with  the  patriotic  uprising  for  better 
municipal  government  in  New  York  City  in  1894-95,  than  the  fact  that  its  public- 
spirited  leaders  made  almost  no  use  of  —  or  even  reference  to  —  the  invaluable 
lessons  of  municipal  wisdom  which  the  governmental  system  of  European  cities, 
and  especially  that  of  England,  could  have  supplied.  In  dealing  with  the  dis- 
graceful condition  of  our  police  system  hardly  any  effort  was  made  to  bring  the 
admirable  police  system  of  England  to  the  attention  of  the  citizens  of  New  York. 
These  facts  are  not  recalled  in  the  way  of  reproach,  but  to  show  how  superficially 
grave  municipal  problems  have  been  treated  in  the  United  States. 


THE  NATURE  OF  THE  EVILS          51 

that  we  are  justified  in  expecting  that  this  central  adminis- 
trative control  over  municipal  corporations  will  be  given 
much  wider  development."1 

We  regret  to  have  to  add  that,  in  our  view,  one  obstacle 
in  the  way  of  early  realizing  these  expectations  is  the  blind- 
ing zeal  of  many  sincere  and  patriotic  reformers  for  that 
absolute  Home  Rule  for  cities  under  autocratic  mayors 
which  would  degrade  the  states  and  dangerously  increase 
the  influence  of  city  parties,  factions,  and  bosses. 

10.  Nevertheless,  we  must  think  that  we  are  at  the 
beginning  of  a  larger  and  more  salutary  inspection  by  the 
state,  not  merely  of  municipal  administration,  but  of  local 
administration  generally,  —  not  an  inspection  which  will 
withdraw  any  legitimate  powers  for  Home  Rule,  but  one 
which  will  secure  their  legitimate  exercise,  and  thus  make 
it  safe  to  greatly  enlarge  them. 

We  are  not  unmindful  of  the  unsatisfactory  character  of 
many  of  our  legislatures,  —  a  subject  to  be  considered  else- 
where, —  but  whatever  shall  improve  our  municipal  govern- 
ments will  cause  our  cities  to  send  better  members  to  make 
laws  for  them.  As  to  whether  the  agencies  for  carrying  for- 
ward inspections  should  be  state  boards,  analogous  to  State 
Boards  of  Charity,  as  Professor  Commons  has  suggested, 
or  they  should  be  conducted  under  the  supervision  of  a  state 
municipal  bureau  with  a  single  head,  analogous  to  the  bureaus 
which  inspect  banks,  insurance  companies,  and  prisons,  there 
may  be  a  difference  of  opinion.  If  the  state  may  legitimately 
create  such  boards,  or  a  single  officer,  to  aid  in  checking 
evils  which  unfaithful  city  officials  and  corrupt  city  parties 
cause,  it  may  certainly  deal  directly  with  municipal  corpora- 
tions themselves  when  they  connive  at,  rather  than  suppress, 
these  evils. 

When  the  states  by  their  superintendents  and  inspectors 

1  Mun.  Home  Rule,  pp.  242,  243,  260,  268-272.  In  illustration  of  this  tendency 
and  expectation  we  may  cite  the  work  of  Mr.  Wilcox,  just  published,  which  sus- 
tains the  views  of  Professor  Goodnow,  Study  City  Government,  113;  and  the 
fact  that  a  New  York  law  of  1898  gave  the  state  engineer  considerable  control  in 
regard  to  roads  which  the  state  is  to  aid,  Centralization,  etc.,  in  New  York,  by 
Fairlie,  p.  14. 


62  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

investigate  not  only  schools  and  prisons,  but  such  semi- 
private  organizations  as  savings  banks,  insurance  companies, 
and  private  asylums,  and  especially  when  state  officials 
regularly  go  about  both  inquiring  into  the  diseases  of  cattle, 
the  substitutes  for  butter,  and  the  qualities  of  meats,  cheese, 
and  milk,1 — and  even  supervise  the  hatching  of  fish  spawn,  the 
production  of  oysters,  lobsters,  and  clams,  —  there  obviously 
can  be  no  objection,  on  the  score  of  principle  or  importance, 
to  provisions  for  some  kind  of  systematic  scrutiny  of  the 
accounts  and  doings  of  those  vast  municipal  corporations 
which  expend  enormous  sums  of  money,  and  select  and  con- 
trol the  police  and  sanitary  officers  upon  which  the  state 
must  rely  for  the  execution  of  its  laws  and  the  protection  of 
the  public  health  and  morals.  What  can  be  more  natural 
and  just  than  that  the  state  should  insist  on  knowing,  and 
provide  the  means  of  knowing,  whether  such  large  govern- 
mental powers  as  are  intrusted  to  municipal  corporations 
are  being  prostituted  for  illegal  and  partisan  purposes.  The 
state  of  New  York  provides  for  examinations,  through  a  state 
commission,  of  the  books  and  accounts  of  its  railroad  cor- 
porations, and  causes  reports  concerning  them  to  be  annually 
laid  before  the  legislature.2  Can  there  be  any  doubt  that  an 
analogous  system  of  inspection  and  reporting  extended  to 
municipal  corporations  would  be  of  great  public  advantage, 
both  in  restraining  abuses  and  in  making  more  intelligent 
legislation  possible? 

11.  It  seems  to  us  that  the  most  natural  and  effective 
agency  for  the  inspections  and  reports  suggested  would  be  a 
non-partisan  Bureau  of  Municipal  Affairs  in  some  executive 
department  of  the  states.3  The  information  which  the  annual 
reports  of  cities  would  give  to  the  bureau  as  to  the  cost, 
character,  and  efficiency  of  their  governments  would  be  of 
great  value  for  preventing  and  exposing  abuses.  It  would 
involve  but  small  expense,  and  would  supply  authentic  and 
invaluable  facts  for  intelligent  legislation. 

i  Few  York  Legislative  Manual,  1897,  pp.  366,  367,  371. 
»  New  York  State  Manual,  1897,  p.  360. 

*  Such  a  bureau  has  been  proposed  by  a  New  York  state  commission.  See 
Fairlie  on  Cent.  Administration  in  New  York,  p.  190. 


THE  NATURE  OF  THE  EVILS  58 

The  functions  of  the  bureau  should  be  neither  administra- 
tive nor  legislative,  but  educational  and  supervisory,  with  an 
authority  for  inspection  and  a  duty  analogous  to  those  of  a 
bank  or  prison  superintendent,  or  to  an  officer  of  the  United 
States  treasury  or  post-office  department,  to  investigate  and 
make  public  all  false  methods,  frauds,  and  maladministration 
in  cities  according  to  the  provisions  of  general  laws  or  a 
state  municipal  code.  New  York  is  said  to  now  have  forty 
separate  bureaus  and  commissions  independent  of  each  other 
for  various  kinds  of  inspection.  They  might  be  brought 
largely  under  one  department  with  great  apparent  advantage. 

Cities  would  continue  to  have  the  same  powers  they  now 
have,  or  greater,  —  being  deprived  of  nothing  but  the  power 
to  practise  corruption  or  partisan  favoritism  in  secrecy,  and 
to  do  foolish  and  extravagant  things  without  reporting  them 
for  public  censure  or  for  comparison  with  the  better  doings  of 
other  cities. 

12.  The  proof  of  the  utility  of  such  inspection  and  reports 
is  not  confined  to  the  experience  of  the  few  states  to  which 
we  have  referred ;  it  has  been  demonstrated  on  a  vast  scale 
and  through  a  long  period  in  the  more  than  three  hundred 
cities  of  England.  Dr.  Shaw  shows  that  the  making  of 
reports  does  not  hamper  the  cities,  but  is  an  advantage  to 
them.1  Professor  Goodnow  sets  forth  their  advantages  in 
great  and  convincing  detail.  There  has  been  no  undue  cen- 
tralization, and  no  diminution  of  civic  spirit;  on  the  con- 
trary, legislative  interference  with  local  control  has  been 
diminished,  Home  Rule  authority  has  been  enlarged,  and 
municipal  administration  has  been  vastly  improved.2 

Mr.  Fairlie  has  shown  the  great  advantages  which  have 
resulted  in  the  state  of  New  York  from  the  more  thorough 
inspection  by  the  state  of  the  local  schools.3  Who  can  doubt 
if  such  provisions  for  state  and  national  inspection  and  re- 
ports as  now  exist  were  abolished  that  our  state  banks  and 
insurance  companies,  as  well  as  our  national  custom-houses 

1  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  p.  68. 

2  Mun.  Prob.,  Chap.  VI.,  and  see  pp.  Ill,  143,  144. 
8  Cent,  Administration  in  New  York,  Chap.  II. 


54  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

and  post-offices,  would  soon  be  as  fruitful  of  scandals  and 
corruption  as  our  city  administrations  now  are  ?  Under  the 
plan  proposed,  experienced  state  officers,  at  all  times  ready 
to  make  investigations,  would  not  only  be  the  constant  dread 
of  municipal  malefactors,  but  would  be  a  far  less  expensive 
and  a  far  more  effective  agency  than  our  legislative  com- 
mittees are  for  exposing  and  arresting  maladministration. 
These  committees  are  generally  composed  of  active  party 
members,  many  of  whom  are  too  much  biassed  by  party  spirit 
and  trammelled  by  party  interests  and  coercions  to  act  effec- 
tively for  the  general  welfare.  There  should  be,  under  a 
new  system,  provision  for  prompt  investigations  not  merely 
on  the  request  of  local  officers,  —  for  they  might  connive  at 
the  concealment  of  abuses,  —  but,  under  carefully  guarded 
conditions,  on  the  request  of  private  city  residents.1 

13.  Another  view  of  such  a  central  bureau  is  worthy  of 
notice.  So  long  as  American  cities  are  without  city  councils 
which  can  be  trusted  to  exercise  much  larger  powers  for 
Home  Rule,  it  will  be  necessary  that  frequent  appeals  should 
be  made  to  the  state  legislature,  or  to  some  state  authority, 
for  special  interposition  in  municipal  affairs.  Hence  springs 
the  evil  of  our  too  numerous  special  city  laws.  The  attempt 
to  suppress  this  evil  by  constitutional  prohibition  has  in  the 
main  failed  in  practice.  It  often  happens  that  much  of  the 
inducement  for  seeking  a  special  law  is  the  illegitimate  gain 
expected  from  its  execution  without  inspection,  and  without 
the  need  of  making  a  report  to  the  state  on  the  subject,  or  of 
conforming  to  any  salutary  bureau  regulations.  The  large 
experience  we  have  cited  is  uniform  in  showing  that  all  city 
laws  are  better  executed  when  the  state  requires  reports  to  a 
central  body  concerning  the  manner  and  expense  of  their 
execution.  A  permanent  state  bureau  is  a  far  better  body 
than  a  legislature,  with  its  transitory,  inexperienced  mem- 
bership, for  dealing  with  the  needs  and  duties  of  municipali- 
ties. More  than  this,  it  has  been  shown  that  the  requirement 
of  such  reports  as  we  propose  would  not  only  reduce  the  evil 

1  See  as  to  investigations  at  the  request  of  private  citizens,  Chap.  VIII. 


THE   NATURE   OF   THE   EVILS  55 

of  excessive  special  legislation  for  cities,  but  would  improve 
such  as  should  be  enacted  by  causing  the  drafts  of  laws  to  be 
more  intelligently  prepared.1     Professor  Goodnow,  speaking 
of  reports  from  English  cities,  says  "the  result  has  been  to 
reduce  legislative  interference  in  local  government  to  a  mini- 
mum, to  increase  enormously  the  efficiency  of  local  govern- 
ment."    He  says  our  American  experience  teaches  us  that 
"  in  order  to  do  away  with  special  legislation  we  must  have 
some  central  control  beside  that  of  the  legislature ;  "  and  he 
expresses  the  opinion  —  in  which  we  concur  —  that  the  new 
policy  of  supervision  and  reports,  which  has  worked  so  well 
wherever  tried,  would  be  followed  by  the  same  results  if 
generally  adopted  in  the  United  States.2     A  little  reflection 
would  lead  us  to  anticipate  such  results.     The  members  of  a 
legislature  —  generally  elected  from  party  considerations  — 
will  only  in  rare  cases  have  had  much  experience  in  city  ad- 
ministration.    Almost  of  necessity  they  must  generally  act 
hastily.    The  head  of  an  administrative  bureau  for  city  affairs 
will  be  selected  for  his  competency  for  dealing  with  them 
and  will  gain  wisdom  from  long  experience.     There  will  be 
under  him  subordinates,  who  will  soon  become  well  informed 
as  to  such  matters,  and  familiar  with  the  practical  results 
reached  in  different  cities.     He  will  make  annual  reports  to 
the  governor,  in  which  administration  in  cities  will  be  ex- 
plained and  compared.     There  seems  to  be  no  reason  why  he 
may  not  become  an  officer  as  useful  and  as  much  respected 
as  the  comptroller  of  the  currency  or  the  superintendent  of 
the  schools.     Unless  mere  selfish  and  partisan  interests  shall 
disastrously  dominate,  the  information  which  such  a  bureau 
would  collect  and  supply  to  the  legislature  and  governor 
would  exert  an  enlightening  influence  upon  municipal  legis- 
lation and  all  city  affairs. 

These  suggestions  of  reports  from  cities  have  not  been 
made  without  a  painful  sense  of  the  unfitness  of  many  mem- 
bers of  American  legislatures  for  dealing  with  cities,  either 
in  a  non-partisan  spirit  or  in  the  light  of  sound  principles 

iMun.  Gov.  G.B.,p.G8. 

2  Mun.  Prob.,  pp.  80,  143, 144. 


66  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

and  the  world's  best  experience.  Nor  have  they  been  sub- 
mitted with  much  confidence  that  such  reports  will  be  re- 
quired until  considerable  modifications  shall  take  place  in 
some  of  the  theories  of  municipal  government  which  now  find 
a  large,  but  we  think  a  decreasing,  acceptance  among  the 
people.  Nevertheless,  it  has  not  seemed  too  soon  to  consider 
methods  and  ideals  which  seem  to  deserve  the  serious  con- 
sideration of  all  friends  of  municipal  reform,  and  without  the 
acceptance  of  which  we  must  think  really  good  municipal 
government  is  impossible. 


RELATION  OF  POLITICAL  PARTIES  TO  HOME  RULE      57 


CHAPTER    III.  —  THE  RELATION   OF   POLITICAL  PARTIES   TO 
HOME   RULE  AND   MUNICIPAL   ADMINISTRATION 

Relative  responsibility  of  persons  and  parties  for  municipal  evils.  Our  early 
municipal  methods  borrowed  from  England,  and  their  nature.  How  we  have 
neglected  city  affairs  and  allowed  parties  to  usurp  their  control.  Need  of  a  sound 
theory  as  to  parties.  Why  parties  will  not  reform  city  abuses.  How  far  parties 
can  properly  exist  in  city  affairs.  Our  constitutional  system  and  our  city-party 
system  compared.  City-party  methods  and  interests  opposed  to  our  constitutional 
system.  Parties  defeat  true  Home  Rule.  Why  parties  not  desirable  in  city 
affairs.  Relation  of  our  constitutions  to  municipal  government  and  true  Home 
Rule.  Nation  and  state  affairs  and  not  city  affairs  the  sphere  of  parties.  Moral 
tone  of  city  parties  lower  than  that  of  state  parties.  City  parties  most  corrupt 
and  despotic,  and  why.  City  government  mainly  involves  business  and  adminis- 
tration, and  not  principles  fit  for  parties  to  contend  over.  Parties  rarely  contend 
about  any  principle  arising  from  city  affairs.  Party  opinions  no  fit  test  for  hold- 
ing city  offices.  Party  issues  irrelevant  in  city  administration.  Why  party 
government  in  cities  is  vicious.  The  bad  and  the  good  voters  in  city  parties. 
The  theories  of  city-party  managers.  Duty  of  the  worthy  voters  of  all  parties  to 
stand  together  in  city  affairs.  Duty  of  choosing  best  men  for  city  office,  regard- 
less of  party.  Benefits  which  will  result  from  having  non-partisan  city  officers. 

PERSONAL  self-seeking,  fraud,  and  corruption  on  the  part 
of  individuals,  and  their  neglect  of  the  duties  of  good  citi- 
zenship, are  certainly  among  the  chief  causes  of  our  munici- 
pal degradation.  Yet  most  of  it  is  so  intimately  connected 
with  party  methods  and  party  managers  as  to  strongly  sug- 
gest causal  relations  between  them,  and  to  make  the  truth 
on  the  subject  very  interesting  and  important. 

Political  parties  and  factions,  and  the  spirit  and  methods 
they  develop,  are  certainly  among  the  most  potential  forces 
in  our  municipal  life.  If  they  are  not  among  the  chief  causes 
of  our  bad  municipal  condition,  what  is  their  relation  to  it  ? 
Is  it  desirable  to  increase,  or  would  it  be  better  to  diminish, 
party  power  and  party  spirit  in  city  affairs  ?  Are  political 
parties  so  far  essential  agencies  for  carrying  on  municipal 
government  that,  in  our  efforts  for  its  improvement,  we 
should  count  on  them  as  potential  and  continuing  forces? 
What  legitimate  function,  if  any,  has  a  political  party  in 


58  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF   MUNICIPALITIES 

connection  with  such  government?  Should  party  opinions 
be  treated  as  tests  for  holding  municipal  office?  If  it  were 
possible  to  suppress  parties  altogether,  or  to  a  large  extent, 
in  municipal  affairs,  would  it  be  wise  to  do  so?  Is  such  sup- 
pression possible,  and,  if  so,  by  what  means?  These  are  fun- 
damental questions,  obviously  of  vital  importance,  which 
we  shall  attempt  to  answer. 

It  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  parties  here  referred  to 
are  national  and  state  parties  and  their  issues  —  primarily  the 
former  —  though  we  shall  find  that  there  may  be  a  legitimate 
city-party  issue  over  a  question  of  municipal  policy,  rarely 
as  it  is  likely  to  arise. 

No  adequate  answer  can  be  made  to  these  questions  save 
on  the  basis  (1)  of  sound  views  concerning  the  nature,  func- 
tions, and  tendencies  of  political  parties,  and  (2)  of  a  com- 
prehensive conception  both  of  our  constitutional  system  and 
of  a  sound  municipal  system. 

1.  The  science  of  municipal  government  is  yet  to  be  created 
in  this  country.     Needing,  as  it  does,  the  most  careful  study 
of  our  thinkers  and  statesmen,  it  is  only  beginning  to  arrest 
their  serious  attention.     We  have  neither  a  municipal  science 
of  our  own,  nor  any  comprehensive  work  on  the  subject.     We 
have  not  had  even  an  exposition  of  the  municipal  system  of 
the  leading  nations,  until  the  publication,  during  the  present 
year  (1895),  of  the  two  instructive  volumes  of  Dr.  Albert 
Shaw.1 

2.  We  have  seen  that  when  our  original  constitutional 
systems  state  and  national  were  created  there  were  no  large 


1  Municipal  Government  in  Great  Britain,  and  Municipal  Government  in 
Continental  Europe.  These  are  works  of  great  value,  and  every  friend  of  good 
government  in  the  United  States  should  feel  indebted  to  their  author.  These 
volumes,  and  those  of  Professor  Goodnow  and  Professor  Commons,  cited  in  the  last 
chapter,  may  be  said  to  have  laid  some  of  the  foundations  of  municipal  science  in 
the  United  States.  There  are  many  local  organizations,  already  combined  into  a 
National  Conference  for  Good  City  Government  —  from  which  a  powerful  and 
salutary  influence  is  now  going  forth  which  promises  much  for  the  future.  But 
the  Conference  has  hardly  entered  upon  the  solution  of  the  most  difficult  problem 
—  that  of  the  proper  construction  of  municipal  governments.  The  City  Club  of 
New  York  City  and  similar  organizations  in  many  cities  have  done  much  useful 
work  in  aid  of  the  solution  of  municipal  problems. 


RELATION  OF  POLITICAL  PARTIES  TO  HOME  RULE      59 

cities  in  the  United  States,  and  there  was  little  conception 
of  the  serious  questions  which  the  governments  of  such  cities 
would  develop.  The  wisdom  of  our  early  statesmen  was 
never  given  to  such  subjects.1  In  the  main,  our  early  state 
constitutions  allowed  old  English  municipal  charters  and 
most  city  affairs  to  remain  undisturbed.  We  may  feel  the 
more  confidence  in  our  ability  to  remove  the  evils  in  our 
municipal  governments  because  they  are  more  the  results  of 
our  neglect  than  of  the  incompetency  of  our  statesmanship. 
We  have  failed  in  no  comprehensive  attempt  at  municipal 
reform,  for  we  have  made  none,  though  we  have  made  many 
spasmodic  efforts  based  on  inadequate  investigations  and 
false  theories. 

It  is  well  known  how  our  party  system,  through  usurpa- 
tion, aided  by  false  theories,  first  became  despotic  in  New 
York  and  Pennsylvania,  and  afterwards  in  the  national  ad- 
ministration, developing  a  spoils  system  under  President 
Jackson  which  became  more  and  more  despotic  and  corrupt, 
until  effective  restraints  were  imposed  upon  it  by  the  civil 
service  examinations  established  under  the  national  civil  ser- 
vice reform  law  of  1883.  We  have  seen  that  nothing  was 
more  natural,  when  large  cities  arose,  than  that  parties  should 
grasp  the  control  of  their  affairs  and  rule  them  according  to 
party  theories.2  The  question  whether  party  government 
was  suitable  for  cities  probably  rarely  occurred  in  those  times, 
even  to  statesmen,  and  it  was  not  considered  at  all  by  the 
people  at  large.  It  is,  in  fact,  a  question  of  this  generation, 
—  not  even  largely  considered  until  within  this  decade. 
The  most  diverse  theories  seem  to  have  been  accepted  by  the 
same  local  communities.  St.  Paul  and  Minneapolis,  for 
example,  with  homogeneous  populations  side  by  side  in  the 
same  state,  have  city  governments  fundamentally  unlike.3 

1  The  original  charter  of  Boston  and  the  first  English  charter  of  New  York 
City,  for  example,  were  modelled  closely  upon  contemporaneous  English  charters. 
Mun.  Prob.,  p.  1.    See  Introductory  Chapter. 

2  See  Introductory  Chapter. 

8  Nat.  Conf.for  Good  City  Govt.,  1895,  p.  105.  Mr.  Conkling  says  that  each  of 
the  thirty-two  cities  in  the  state  of  New  York  (1895)  has  a  charter  unlike  that  of 
each  of  the  others,  and  that  every  one  of  them  has  a  different  method  of  book- 


60  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

Many  people  will  tell  us  that  theories  about  city  govern- 
ment may  be  well  enough  for  philosophers,  but  are  useless 
for  all  practical  purposes.  With  little  respect  for  the  higher 
public  opinion  they  and  the  whole  class  of  politicians  declare 
that  one  or  another  of  the  great  national  parties  now  poten- 
tial in  our  cities  will  continue  to  be  so,  unless  some  new 
party  shall  be  victorious  in  a  national  election,  when  it  will 
succeed  to  municipal  domination.  Men  of  this  stamp  can 
hardly  comprehend  the  nature  of  municipal  government;  they 
do  not  understand  the  power  of  public  opinion;  they  can 
never  have  an  important  part  in  municipal  or  any  other  great 
reform.  They  seem  to  have  no  conception  of  the  immense 
influence  of  mere  conventional  theories,  —  thories  often  which 
have  no  basis  in  sound  reasoning  and  are  sure  to  fall  before 
the  first  well-directed  assault. 

Some  new  party  may  possibly  need  to  be  formed  and  to 
prevail  before  a  great  municipal  reform  can  be  achieved,  but 
it  is  of  immense  importance  whether  it  be  formed  on  the 
theory  of  perpetuating  party  government  in  cities,  or  for  the 
purpose  of  suppressing  it.  Though  it  should  be  conceded 
that  the  next  decisive  effort  required  for  better  municipal 
government  must  be  made  with  the  aid  of  some  party,  yet 
these  questions  will  remain  of  fundamental  importance :  For 
what  purpose  should  that  effort  be  made  ?  Should  it  be  for 
the  exclusion  of  national  and  state  parties  from  municipal 
affairs,  or  should  it  be  for  making  their  domination  continu- 
ous and  absolute  ?  The  answer  must  obviously  depend  on  the 
theory  we  have  previously  adopted  as  to  the  utility  of  parties 
in  city  affairs.1 

keeping.  Conkling's  City  Govt.,  18.  The  governor  of  the  state  of  New  York, 
in  1895,  appointed  two  state  commissions  for  framing  city  charters,  and  two 
schemes  fundamentally  unlike  were  the  result. 

1  During  the  last  few  years,  there  have  been  movements  of  rapidly  increasing 
power  in  the  city  of  New  York  —  supported  by  the  City  Club,  the  Good  Govern- 
ment Clubs,  the  Chamber  of  Commerce,  and  other  bodies — for  non-partisan  govern- 
ment in  the  city.  The  sentiment  in  the  city  which  favored  it  made  the  election  of 
Mayor  Strong  possible  in  181H,  and  gave  more  than  75,000  votes  to  Mr.  Low  for 
mayor  in  1897.  This  sentiment  has  been  slowly  developed.  The  author  read  a 
paper  —  perhaps  among  the  first  of  its  kind  —  in  May,  1873,  before  the  American 
Social  Science  Association, — which  was  published  in  its  proceedings, — in  which  he 


RELATION  OF  POLITICAL  PARTIES  TO  HOME  RULE       61 

3.  Though  the  aid  of  a  party  may  be  needed  for  the  im- 
provement of  municipal  government,  it  by  no  means  follows 
that  any  new  party  is  essential  for  the  purpose.  An  existing 
party  of  the  old  sort,  either  through  fear  or  hope,  may  be  in- 
duced to  support  non-partisan  principles  on  the  subject,  — 
even  principles  which  it  dislikes.  No  party  will  voluntarily 
surrender  patronage,  yet  any  party  will  do  so  to  gain  a  victory 
or  avoid  a  defeat.  Therefore,  if  a  considerable  number  of 
intelligent  and  patriotic  men  of  either  of  the  great  parties 
shall  accept  the  theory  which  condemns  party  government  for 
municipalities,  and  shall  stand  resolutely  and  independently 
together  for  their  convictions,  the  first  time  a  contest  of  doubt- 
ful issues  shall  arise  between  the  two  great  parties,  these 
independent  members  may  feel  almost  certain  that  one  or 
both  of  these  parties  will  accept  a  non-partisan  municipal 
policy  rather  than  take  serious  chances  of  a  defeat  by  losing 
the  votes  of  the  independent  members. 

It  has  been  mainly  by  such  means  that  not  only  civil  ser- 
vice reform,  but  ballot  reform  and  corrupt  practice  reform, 
have  been  carried,  both  in  England  and  in  this  country,  both 
in  Congress  and  in  state  legislatures,  without  creating  any 
new  party,  but  by  the  union  of  patriotic  and  disinterested 
men  in  both  parties.1 

This  method  of  uniting  the  most  unselfish  and  patriotic 
citizens, — of  using  the  highest  public  opinion  combined  from 
all  parties, —  to  compel  parties  in  power  to  act  in  the  public 
interest,  despite  the  hostility  of  their  majority,  may  be  made 
a  salutary  and  potential  force  for  good  municipal  government 
in  the  future.  Faithful  to  their  convictions,  a  minority 
standing  for  a  righteous  cause  and  supported  by  a  high  sense 
of  duty,  may  defeat  the  numerical  majority.  Nor  is  it  in 
the  sphere  of  politics  alone,  but  in  that  of  morals  and  reli- 

presented,  on  the  basis  both  of  principle  and  experience,  the  need  of  excluding 
parties  from  the  control  of  municipal  affairs.  Two  years  before  he  had  published 
anonymously  a  little  volume,  The  Great  City  Problem,  in  which  similar  views 
were  presented. 

1  The  doing  of  noble  things  through  a  union  of  the  best  men  in  different  parties 
is  not  of  recent  origin.  Magna  Charta  and  the  English  Revolution  of  1688  were 
thus  achieved. 


62  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

gion  as  well,  that  the  minority  having  conscientious  convic- 
tions, high  intelligence,  and  sound  principles  on  its  side 
may  become  a  greater  power  than  the  mere  superiority  of 
numbers.  Governmental  methods  can  be  and  should  be  so 
framed  as  to  favor  such  results.  The  art  of  securing  good 
laws  through  a  noble  minority, — by  a  high  public  opinion 
against  a  low  party  opinion,  —  is  yet  undeveloped  and  has  vast 
possibilities  in  the  future. 

4.  Now,  whether  the  solution  of  the  municipal  problem  is 
to  be  made  by  the  aid  of  a  new  party,  or  largely  through  the 
coercion  of  the  old  ones,  it  is  essential,  in  either  case,  to 
have  at  the  outset  a  definite  theory  and  policy  as  to  the  kind 
of  city  government  we  wish  to  establish,  —  whether  it  should 
be  a  partisan  government  or  a  non-partisan  government, 
whether  public  opinion  or  party  opinion  should  be  relied 
upon  as  its  dominating  force.1  We  are  far  from  intending 
to  suggest  that  nothing  effective  can  be  done  to  improve  our 
municipal  affairs  until  a  non-partisan  theory  of  city  govern- 
ment has  been  accepted,  or  public  opinion  has  triumphed 
over  party  opinion.  On  the  contrary,  much  good  can  be 
done  even  under  our  party  system.  Citizens  may  be  per- 
suaded to  better  discharge  their  municipal  duties ;  unfaithful 
officers  may  be  exposed  to  public  indignation  and  brought 
before  the  courts ;  partisan  bribery,  extortion,  and  corruption 
may  be  brought  to  light  and  made  more  odious ;  the  elections 
may  be  more  carefully  watched ;  patriotic  clubs,  composed  of 
members  of  either  sex,  may  make  their  salutary  influence 
highly  effective ;  instruction  in  sound  principles  of  munici- 
pal government  may  be  provided  in  public  schools,  in  the 

1  By  public  opinion,  as  to  city  affairs,  we  mean  that  view  of  them  which  would 
prevail  among  the  intelligent  and  reputable  citizens  if  there  was  no  overpowering 
or  misleading  party  bias,  interest,  or  passion  by  which  they  were  controlled,  — 
if  they  acted  for  the  cities'  welfare  irrespective  of  national  and  state  parties.  If 
cities  were  truly  independent  governments,  or  if  such  parties  should  all  dissolve, 
or  cease  to  give  attention  to  city  affairs,  it  is  obvious  there  would  none  the  less 
be  a  definite  public  opinion  among  the  people  of  cities  by  which  they,  and  the  city 
as  well,  would  be  governed.  Party  opinion  is  that  opinion,  as  to  city  affairs, 
which  regards  the  interest  of  such  parties  as  paramount  to  mere  city  interests, 
an  opinion  often  so  strong  and  perverted  as  to  cause  adherents  of  different  parties 
to  conspire  in  resisting  the  true  public  opinion  of  a  city. 


RELATION  OF  POLITICAL  PARTIES  TO  HOME  RULE       63 

higher  institutions  of  learning,  and  in  associations  of  patri- 
otic citizens. 

II 

Let  us  now  consider  some  of  the  reasons  which  seem  to 
answer  the  questions,  whether  parties  are  desirable  forces  in 
municipal  affairs,  and  whether  party  government  can  ever  be 
tolerable  in  cities  and  villages.1 

1.  There  is  in  the  constitutional  conception  of  cities  and 
villages  nothing  incompatible  with  parties  in  reference  to 
their  affairs,  provided  these  parties  be  such  as  arise  out  of 
and  are  limited  to  the  principles  and  interests  involved  in 
municipal  government  itself.  They  should  have  a  real  liberty 
and  purpose  to  act  in  paramount  reference  to  the  well-being 
of  the  municipality  in  which  they  are  developed.  Such 
municipal  parties  would  be  genuine ;  they  would  not  be  ser- 
vile to  state  or  national  parties,  or  enforce  their  tests  for  office ; 
members  of  different  state  or  national  parties  could  consis- 
tently belong  to  the  same  city  party.  The  paramount  aim  of 
a  true  city  party  should  be  to  gain  a  victory  in  city  elections, 
not  in  aid  of  a  national  or  state  issue  or  party,  but  for  some 
large  principle  or  issue  which  occasionally  arises  out  of  city 
affairs  and  directly  concerns  their  prosperity  or  good  govern- 
ment. Such  a  party  would  resist  all  attempted  dictation  on 
the  part  of  a  state  or  national  party.2 

It  is  a  fact  of  profound  significance,  in  support  of  this 

1  The  government  of  cities  must  be  designated  party  government,  (1)  whenever 
it  insists  on  national  or  state  party  tests  for  city  offices ;  (2)  when  it  holds  that 
city  interests  may  properly  be  subordinated  to  the  interests  of  national  or  state 
parties ;  (3)  when  it  relies  on  party  opinion  and  interests  and  a  continuous  series 
of  party  contests,  rather  than  on  public  opinion  and  a  sense  of  duty  to  promote 
the  municipal  welfare,  irrespective  of  state  or  national  parties,  as  the  paramount 
forces  for  its  support. 

2  Two  causes  are  pretty  sure  to  prevent  a  continuous  fidelity  and  usefulness 
on  the  part  of  real  city  parties ;  first,  the  seductive  and  overawing  power  of  the 
larger  parties  of  the  nation  and  the  states,  and  second,  the  lack  of  any  continuous 
principles  or  interest  about  which  true  city-party  divisions  can  be  maintained, 
after  a  good  municipal  system  has  been  once  established.    For  city  government 
is  in  very  large  part  the  doing  of  city  work  and  the  conducting  of  administra- 
tion according  to  uniform  methods.    We  can,  therefore,  hardly  desire  or  expect 
continuous  city  parties. 


64  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

theory,  that  hardly  an  example  of  a  true  city  party  can  be 
found  in  our  municipal  history.  Only  the  rarest  instances 
can  be  cited  in  which  a  party  issue  in  a  city  election  has  been 
over  any  principle  of  city  government  or  any  definite  mu- 
nicipal interest,  —  over  anything,  in  fact,  higher  than  patron- 
age and  spoils,  or  hopes  of  benefiting  some  national  or  state 
party.  We  have  had  many  city  factions  as  the  results  of 
partisan  conspiracies  or  of  temporary  ruptures  of  national 
and  state  parties.  We  have  had  many  non-partisan  and  use- 
ful associations  for  suppressing  a  particular  evil, — party 
despotism  and  corruption  among  them,  —  but  hardly  any- 
where have  there  been  city  parties  which,  confining  their 
sphere  of  action  to  city  affairs,  have  proposed  a  series  of  party 
contests  for  their  improvement. 

2.  The  false  theory  which  prevails  as  to  the  relations 
between  parties  and  city  government  is  largely  due  to  erro- 
neous conceptions  of  the  relations  between  parties  and  city 
voters.  Before  the  New  York  mayoralty  election  of  1894, 
it  had  been  generally  taken  for  granted  that  these  voters 
were  divided  according  to  state-party  lines,  and  that  they 
would,  in  mayoralty  elections,  vote  according  to  these 
divisions.  The  election  of  Mayor  Strong  of  New  York  City 
in  that  year  largely  dispelled  this  illusion,  —  a  great  body  of 
non-partisan  voters  from  all  parties  in  the  city  having  stood 
independently  together  for  his  nomination  and  election, 
which  they  practically  controlled.  This  independent,  non- 
partisan  sentiment  had  by  1897  grown  so  strong  —  and  largely 
by  reason  of  the  demonstrated  superiority  of  a  non-partisan 
administration  under  him  —  that  the  independent  vote  was 
vastly  greater  than  in  1894.  Mr.  Low,  a  Republican,  whom 
it  supported  in  1897,  received  in  the  Greater  New  York  more 
than  151,000  votes, —10,000  to  20,000  doubtless  cast  by 
Democrats,  —  while  Tracy,  the  regular  Republican  nominee, 
received  only  100,000,  and  the  Tammany  candidate  was 
elected  by  only  a  minority  of  all  the  voters.  More  than 
77,000  of  Mr.  Low's  votes  were  from  the  former  city  of  New 
York. 

These  facts  are  not  only  interesting  as  showing  the  rapid 


RELATION  OF  POLITICAL  PARTIES  TO  HOME  RULE      65 

growth  of  a  non-partisan,  independent  sentiment  as  to  the  city 
government,  but  as  apparently  showing  that  city  voters  are 
much  less  rigidly  held  in  party  lines  than  has  been  generally 
supposed.  They  may  well  lead  us  to  ask  what  would  be  the 
natural  and  actual  divisions  —  or  classifications  —  of  city 
voters,  if  they  should  be  arranged  according  to  their  natural 
standing  and  division  as  to  city  affairs,  rather  than  accord- 
ing to  the  arbitrary  assumptions  and  selfish  interests  of  party 
managers.  We  think  the  following  might  be  an  approxi- 
mation to  these  natural  divisions,  —  though  they  would  vary 
greatly  in  different  cities  according  to  their  enlightenment, 

—  our  estimate  being  made  in  reference   to  the  most  en- 
lightened communities. 

(1)  Fifty  per  cent  or  more  —  the  most  intelligent  —  of 
city  voters  have  come  to  believe  that  state  and  national  par- 
ties would  be  more  salutary  and  prosperous,  and  that  cities 
would  be  much  better  governed,  if  they  did  not  extend  party 
divisions  or  party  tests  of  opinion  to  city  elections  for  city 
officers,  but  instead  regarded  these  affairs  in  reference  to 
city  interests,  irrespective  of  all  mere  party  considerations. 
This  is  the  true,  non-partisan,  independent  city  vote. 

(2)  Probably  about  fifty  per  cent  of  the  city  voters  will 
vote  in  city  elections  with  their  party,  adhering  unhesitat- 
ingly to  the  party  ranks,  —  regarding  its  issues  as  appropriate 
for  city  elections,   and   supporting   its   candidates   largely 
because  they  are   regularly  nominated  according   to  party 
methods;  most  of  these  voters  really  think  it  to  be  essential 

—  so  far  as  they  have  thought  at  all  on  the  subject  —  to  keep 
up  party  distinctions  in  city  elections  of  city  officers.      This 
is  the  honest  party  vote  in  cities. 

(3)  Of  this  fifty  per  cent  of  voters,  perhaps  one-third  are 
intense  partisans,  who  instinctively  believe  in  party  conten- 
tion, even  in  city  affairs,  as  being  a  salutary  activity,  and 
most  of  them  are  too  prejudiced  to  consider  both  sides  of  the 
question.     They  can  see  nothing  but  truth  and  patriotism  on 
their  own  side,  and  nothing  but  selfish  passion  and  error  on 
the  other  side.      This  is  the  partisan  city  vote. 

(4)  Among  the  base  voters  of  a  city,  there  are  many  — 


66  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

perhaps  one  in  twenty  of  the  whole  —  too  selfish  to  support  a 
party  on  the  score  of  principle,  and  too  venial  and  base  to  be 
independents,  —  who  vote  and  act  in  city  affairs  only  for  self- 
ish advantage.  They  are  often  bright  men.  This  is  the 
mercenary  city  vote. 

(5)  Below  these  four  classes,  at  least  in  the  social  scale, 
there  are  many  voters  —  three  thousand  to  five  thousand  or 
more  in  each  of  our  largest  cities  —  who  are  supremely  vile; 
they  are  utterly  without  qualifications  for  the  franchise ;  they 
are  regardless  alike  of  duty,  principles,  or  public  interests ; 
they  care  nothing  for  voting,  save  as  it  brings  a  corrupt  gain 
to  themselves;  they  are,  in  the  main,  the  measure  of  our 
vicious  and  indefensible  bestowal  of  the  franchise;  their 
votes  and  those  of  Class  4  are  the  prizes  for  which  low  party 
managers  most  contend  in  city  elections ;  they  are  the  voters 
who,  under  a  good  municipal  system,  would  be  denied  the 
franchise.  This  is  the  vile  city  vote. 

These  vile  voters  would  not  go  to  the  polls  if  they  were 
not  bribed  to  do  so  —  and  generally  by  city-party  leaders 
and  managers.  If  city  voters  were  generally  contemplated 
as  being  under  such  classifications,  and  not  as  all  divided 
according  to  party  convictions,  perhaps  more  rational  views 
might  prevail  as  to  the  best  way  of  dealing  with  them. 

3.  It  is  further  significant  that  nearly  all  our  great  mu- 
nicipal reforms  have  originated  outside  the  lines  of  party 
control,  and  that  they  have  been  carried,  if  not  against  party 
opposition,  yet  by  coercing  parties  through  the  power  of 
public  opinion.  Such  have  been  the  facts  in  regard  to  civil 
service  reform,  ballot  reform,  and  corrupt  practice  reform. 
If  state  and  national  party  organizations  and  contentions  are 
legitimate  in  city  affairs,  and  are  salutary  for  preventing 
grave  municipal  evils,  or  for  developing  good  municipal 
methods,  why  have  we  had,  why  have  we  now,  no  parties  in 
cities  for  any  such  purposes?1  Why,  on  the  other  hand,  do 

1  The  Citizens'  Union  of  New  York  City,  formed  since  these  pages  were  written, 
was  composed  of  adherents  of  all  parties,  and  expressly  excluded  a  purpose  of 
favoring  any  party,  confining  its  action  to  New  York  City  affairs  and  leaving  its 
members  untrammelled  in  their  party  relations.  All  parties  opposed  it.  Yet  its 


RELATION  OF  POLITICAL  PARTIES  TO  HOME  RULE      67 

our  parties,  though  potential  in  municipal  affairs,  make 
almost  no  issues  in  their  platforms  concerning  these  affairs, 
but  instead  habitually  prostitute  their  power  in  cities  to  the 
purposes  of  state  and  national  elections?  The  Tammany 
Democracy  —  the  oldest  and  strongest  city  faction  in  the 
Union  —  has  never  initiated  any  large  policy  of  municipal 
reform,  and  has  habitually  used  its  power  for  party  ends. 
The  Republican  party  in  New  York  City  has  not  generally 
done  much  better  in  these  particulars.  There  seems  to  be  no 
answer  to  these  questions,  no  explanation  of  such  facts,  save 
this:  that  parties  in  cities  and  villages,  from  their  very 
nature,  have  neither  the  capacity  nor  the  inclination  for  re- 
moving abuses  or  for  elevating  the  moral  tone  of  municipal 
politics  or  administration. 

Parties,  taking  as  they  do  into  their  ranks  the  vilest 
voters,  regardless  of  their  character,  can  hardly  be  in  a  moral 
sense  an  elevating  force  in  cities.  Only  the  superior  citi- 
zens can,  by  uniting  their  exertions  regardless  of  party, 
become  a  potential  force  for  uplifting  city  administration. 


Ill 

Let  us  now  turn  to  what  is  fundamental  in  American  con- 
stitutions as  bearing  upon  the  city-party  problem.  There 
are  in  the  United  States  three  separate  spheres  of  government, 
—  national,  state,  and  municipal.1  Though  by  no  means 
independent  of  each  other,  yet  each  of  these  spheres  requires 


vote  exceeded  by  a  third  that  of  the  Republicans.  The  thoughtful  friends  of  non- 
partisan  city  government  have  claimed  that  a  mere  municipal  organization  for  its 
improvement  should  not  be  regarded  as  a  party,  nor  should  its  members  be  treated 
as  having  been  unfaithful  to  their  parties  by  joining  and  working  with  it.  This 
important  claim  has  been,  in  the  main,  conceded  by  the  last  New  York  election 
law  (Laws  N.  T.  1898,  Chap.  179),  the  law  declaring  that  no  organization  or 
association  for  the  election  of  city  officers  "  shall  be  a  political  party  within  the 
meaning  of  the  act,"  and  that  membership  in  such  organizations  shall  not  prevent 
their  members  enrolling  themselves  in  a  party.  This  is  obviously  an  important 
step  toward  treating  city  government  as  non-partisan. 

1  Town  governments  under  which  the  people  act  directly,  and  county  govern- 
ments whose  functions  are  very  limited,  —  save  in  a  few  states,  —  hardly  require 
special  notice. 


68  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

under  our  constitutional  system1  separate  laws,  elections, 
officers,  and  courts,  especially  adapted  to  its  own  affairs. 

It  cannot  be  too  emphatically  declared  that  the  necessity 
and  justification  for  having  our  local  administrations  at  all, 
whether  they  be  those  of  states  or  those  of  cities,  are  that  the 
laws,  and  the  agencies  for  their  execution,  may  be  especially 
adapted  to  their  local  needs  and  interests  and  may  most  tend 
to  promote  them.  Were  there  not  such  peculiar  local  needs 
and  interests,  there  should  be  neither  peculiar  state  or  mu- 
nicipal laws,  officers,  or  administrations,  but  all  alike  should 
be  national.  Nor  is  this  all ;  it  is  an  important  part  of  the 
constitutional  purpose  in  providing  for  those  local  jurisdic- 
tions, both  state  and  municipal,  that  the  officers  whom  the 
local  voters  are  authorized  to  select  should  not  only  be  their 
free  choice,  —  free,  especially,  from  central  and  party  con- 
straint, —  but  that  these  officers,  after  their  election,  should 
continue  to  be  free  to  carry  forward  the  local  administration 
in  the  interest  of  the  jurisdictions  which  they  were  selected 
to  serve,  —  always,  of  course,  subject  to  their  duties  to  the 
paramount  government  over  them. 

It  is  therefore  a  part  of  our  constitutional  system  itself  — 
alike  that  for  states  and  that  for  municipalities  —  that  there 
shall  not  be  a  merely  nominal  Home  Rule,  but  a  real  and 
appropriate  Home  Rule,  within  each  of  these  separate  juris- 
dictions. Hence  for  political  parties  to  invade  the  freedom 
of  this  Home  Rule  —  to  enforce  its  party  tests  therein  —  is 
to  make  war  upon  our  American,  constitutional  system  and  to 
commit  treason  against  its  spirit  and  purpose.2  To  do  that 
which  tends  to  uphold  the  constitutional  counterpoise  between 

1  In  speaking  here,  as  often  elsewhere,  of  our  constitutional  system,  reference 
is  made  to  the  constitutions  of  the  states  as  well  as  to  that  of  the  nation. 

2  This  is  not  the  place  for  considering  what  officers  are  merely  local.    The  sub- 
ject is  complicated  and  will  be  treated  elsewhere.    Many  city  officers  discharge 
some  functions  which  are  merely  local  and  others  which  are  not  —  functions  in 
the  discharge  of  which  they  act  as  agents  of  the  state.    Professor  Goodnow  baa 
set  these  matters  in  a  clear  light,  so  far  as  his  plan  called  for  their  treatment. 
Man.  Home  Rule,  pp.  134-141,  224,  239,  240;  Mun.  Prob.,  Chaps.  III.  and  VIII. 
His  subjects  did  not  call  for  a  consideration  of  the  inherent  tendency  of  political 
parties,  or  the  incompatibility  of  their  fundamental  methods  with  city  govern- 
ment on  the  theory  of  American  constitutions. 


RELATION  OF  POLITICAL  PARTIES  TO  HOME  RULE       69 

the  three  separate  spheres  of  government,  —  national,  state, 
and  municipal,  —  and  to  preserve  that  independence  within 
each  which  our  constitutions  contemplate,  are  obviously  a 
part  of  the  duty  of  every  party,  as  well  as  of  every  officer 
and  citizen.  No  party  can  have  any  more  right  than  a  citi- 
zen to  obstruct  true  local  self-government,  whether  in  a  state 
or  in  a  municipality.  Parties  are  legitimate,  both  in  the 
sphere  of  the  nation  and  of  the  states,  but  a  party  of  either 
class  is  guilty  of  rebellion  and  usurpation  when  it  invades 
the  constitutional  freedom  of  the  state  or  the  city. 

Nevertheless,  parties  systematically  do  this.  They  con- 
stantly obstruct  true  Home  Rule  in  the  state  and  the  city, 
thus  seeking  their  own  selfish  advantage  by  opposing  the 
fundamental  policy  of  our  constitutional  system.  The  facts 
are  familiar  that  parties  formed  in  the  sphere  of  the  nation 
have  habitually  and  aggressively  interfered  with  true  Home 
Rule  in  the  states  by  using  their  power  and  patronage  to 
coerce  state  governments,  to  control  the  action  of  state 
officers,  to  bribe  them  with  federal  offices  or  the  promise  of 
them,  to  make  state  legislatures  compliant  to  national  party 
purposes,  and  thus  impair  true  state  independence.  Hence 
those  parties  have  in  a  large  way  practically  repudiated  their 
duties  to  state  constitutions,  and  have  become  the  most 
powerful  forces  for  impairing  the  just  freedom  of  state  elec- 
tions and  legislation.  National  parties  have  also  used  their 
powers  to  coerce  and  bribe  state  parties,  so  far  as  these  parties 
have  had  any  distinct,  independent  policy.  In  these  facts  we 
find  some  of  the  causes  of  the  unsatisfactory  condition  of 
our  state  legislatures. 

4.  Worse  still,  so  far  as  municipalities  are  concerned, 
both  national  and  state  parties  and  their  managers,  conspir- 
ing together,  constantly  insist  on  their  party  tests  and  policy 
being  accepted  and  enforced  by  the  officers  and  party  organ- 
izations of  our  cities  and  villages,  in  flagrant  disregard  of 
municipal  interests  and  true  Home  Rule.  These  conspiring 
parties  and  their  leaders  do  their  utmost  to  compel  municipal 
voters  and  candidates  to  accept  their  platforms,  to  conform 
to  their  demands,  to  contribute  to  their  treasury,  to  elec- 


70  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

tioneer  for  their  candidates.  They  exert  all  their  powers  in 
rebellion  against  the  decentralizing  policy  of  American  con- 
stitutions, and  do  their  utmost  to  defeat  the  main  purposes 
in  providing  for  municipal  self-government  at  all.  A  real 
liberty  of  making  a  free  choice  between  various  municipal 
policies  and  candidates,  in  paramount  reference  to  municipal 
interests,  rarely  exists  in  an  American  city. 

Thus  party  government  in  cities  begins  in  party  warfare 
on  our  constitutional  system,  and  is  carried  on  by  usurpa- 
tion, prostitution,  and  coercion.  Yet  so  blinding  is  party 
spirit  that  vast  numbers  of  active  party  men  —  worthy  and 
patriotic  as  they  generally  are  — support  this  usurpation  and 
prostitution  in  apparent  unconsciousness  of  their  sources 
and  disastrous  effects,  and  without  any  apparent  sense  of 
their  own  guilty  infidelity  to  the  constitutional  policy  of 
their  country. 

5.  All  other  forces  which  tend  to  defeat  true  Home  Rule 
in  cities  are  insignificant  compared  with  that  of  parties  and 
their  managers.  They  say,  in  substance,  to  every  city,  "  We 
are  your  feudal  superiors,  and  you  must  conform  to  our  de- 
mands. We  acknowledge  no  duty  to  the  policy  of  our  con- 
stitutions. Despite  their  provisions,  you  who  reside  in 
cities  and  villages  must  conduct  your  local  affairs  in  a  way 
that  will  serve  our  party  purposes.  Your  officers  must  be 
effective  electioneers  for  us.  They  must  accept  our  party 
tests;  they  must  give  us  the  patronage  we  demand;  they 
must  vote  for  our  candidates ;  they  must  contribute  to  our 
treasury;  there  is  no  such  right  or  liberty  as  that  of  a  city  to 
freely  manage  its  own  local  affairs  for  its  own  benefit.  Your 
city  officers  must  give  as  much  of  their  time  as  we  demand 
for  carrying  our  elections ;  we  must  be  allowed  to  dictate  all 
municipal  legislation."  In  short,  while  our  state  constitu- 
tions, in  substance,  declare  that  cities  should  regulate  their 
mere  local  affairs  as  their  own  local  needs  and  interests 
require,  our  parties  declare  directly  the  contraiy. 

Parties,  we  repeat,  are  the  most  potential  forces  for  bring- 
ing vile  voters  to  the  polls  and  controlling  city  elections ; 
they  habitually  sacrifice  municipal  interests  to  party  interests 


RELATION  OF  POLITICAL  PARTIES  TO  HOME  RULE       71 

as  defined  by  their  managers;  they  systematically  treat  cities 
as  if  they  were  a  part  of  their  feudal  domain  and  were  without 
any  right  to  have  their  peculiar  local  interests  protected. 

6.  National  and  state  parties  could  far  better  discharge 
their  legitimate  and  useful  functions  of  supporting  great 
principles  and  interests  in  the  sphere  of  national  and  state 
governments,  if  they  would  not  interfere  with  the  true 
autonomy  of  municipal  elections  and  administration.  This 
autonomy  relates  to  local  matters  not  within  the  sphere  of 
party  functions  and  not  legitimately  the  subjects  of  party 
contentions.  If  national  and  state  parties  could  make  no 
illegitimate  gains  by  intermeddling  with  true  municipal  free- 
dom, they  would  cease  to  do  so ;  for  no  reasons  of  duty  or 
patriotism  would  call  for  such  interference.  Their  inter- 
meddling with  city  affairs  has  been  a  fruitful  source  of  party 
demoralization  and  corruption,  and,  if  it  were  arrested,  we 
may  be  sure  that  the  moral  tone  both  of  parties  and  municipal 
administration  would  be  speedily  elevated. 

The  truth  on  these  points  is  doubtless  as  unimaginable 
by  professional  politicians  and  patronage-mongers  as  it  was 
unimaginable  by  them,  a  few  years  ago,  that  the  selection  of 
officials  in  the  customs  offices  and  post-offices  in  great  cities 
could  be  controlled  by  competitive  examinations,  regardless 
of  party  leaders  or  party  opinions.  The  methods  of  civil 
service  reform  have  already  taught  valuable  lessons  con- 
cerning municipal  reform.  It  has  been  made  plain,  in  the 
civil  service  of  the  nation  and  in  that  of  several  states  and 
cities,  that  when  city  officials  are  selected  for  merit,  and  are 
not  left  dangerously  dependent  upon  official  and  partisan 
favoritism,  they  will  speedily  become  independent  voters, 
servile  to  no  party,  faction,  or  boss,  but  efficient  in  the  ser- 
vice of  the  city.  They  no  longer  intermeddle  with  elections, 
and  parties  soon  cease  to  care  much  for  their  political  views. 
To  reach  this  condition,  through  the  methods  of  the  civil 
service  examinations,  is  naturally  the  first,  as  it  is  the  easi- 
est, of  all  practical  methods  for  suppressing  a  large  part  of 
the  evils  of  party  government  in  cities  and  making  such 
government  impossible. 


72  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 


IV 

The  habit  of  subordinating  municipal  interests  to  national 
and  state  party  interests  has  not  only  caused  the  importance 
of  the  former  to  be  greatly  underestimated  and  the  sense  of 
duty  to  promote  them  to  be  enfeebled,  but  has  degraded  the 
moral  standards  of  politics  and  official  life  in  cities.  More 
than  this,  the  individual  sense  of  duty  and  responsibility  to 
their  city  on  the  part  of  vast  numbers  of  citizens  has  been 
so  debased  that  they  are  hardly  conscious  of  their  own  dis- 
grace when  they  supinely  tolerate  a  city  government  which 
they  both  distrust  and  despise.  City  authority,  like  every- 
thing else  which  has  been  prostituted,  ceases  to  be  respected. 
No  city  community  which  has  for  a  long  time  allowed  its 
criminal  courts,  its  police  force,  its  school  system,  and  its 
whole  municipal  patronage  to  be  used  for  the  benefit  of  a 
despotic  party  and  its  managers  can  retain  a  high  sense  of 
duty  to  exert  itself  for  good  local  government,  or  feel  any  fit 
measure  of  shame  when  such  government  is  disgraceful. 
American  municipal  methods  have  long  practically  taught 
the  lesson  that  a  city  has  no  interests  that  may  not  be  both 
surrendered  and  prostituted  for  party  advantage. 

The  greatest  difficulty,  therefore,  in  solving  our  municipal 
problems  —  far  greater,  perhaps,  than  most  people  imagine  — 
does  not  consist  in  arresting  flagrant  abuses  or  in  suppress- 
ing gross  corruption.  There  is  a  grave  need  of  correcting 
false  and  demoralizing  theories  of  party,  of  comprehending 
our  constitutional  system  and  obligations,  of  supplying  better 
constructive  methods,  which  shall  make  mere  city-party 
domination  impossible;  and  above  all  of  developing  a  higher 
ideal  as  to  what  municipal  government  can  and  should  be, 

—  methods  and  ideals  without  which,  we  must  think,   it 
will  long  remain  unworthy  of  the  people.     In  this  sphere  of 
effort,  the  pulpit,  the  press,  the  teachers,  and  all  leaders  of 
the  moral  forces  of  city  life  have  a  great  duty  to  perform, 

—  a  duty  in  the  discharge  of  which  women  may  play  an 
effective  and  noble  part, — to  make  Americans  ashamed  of 


RELATION  OF  POLITICAL  PARTIES  TO  HOME  RULE       73 

having  cities  inferior  in  beauty,  in  cleanliness,1  or  in  any 
form  of  good  administration,  to  the  most  enlightened  cities 
of  Europe. 


All  experience  has  shown,  on  the  one  hand,  that  parties 
are  useful  and  escape  degradation  in  the  degree  that  their 
issues  involve  great  principles  and  that  their  truly  repre- 
sentative elements  prevail;  and,  on  the  other,  that  they  tend 
to  debasement  and  despotism  in  the  degree  that  their  conten- 
tions are  about  officers,  patronage,  spoils,  and  the  mere  de- 
tails of  administrations,  —  that  is,  in  the  degree  that  their 
autocratic  and  patronage-mongering  powers  prevail.  No- 
where are  elevating  policies  and  great  principles  so  largely 
involved,  or  are  mere  administrative  details  of  so  small  rela- 
tive importance,  as  in  national  affairs.  The  vast,  diverse 
interest  of  great  sections  of  the  Union  and  of  different  states 
give  dignity  to  national  politics,  and  tend  to  dwarf  the  rela- 
tive influence  of  mere  patronage,  organization,  and  manage- 
ment. National  parties  formed  in  reference  to  these  large 
matters  are  constrained  to  fidelity  by  the  noblest  principles 
and  the  most  dignified  interests  known  to  human  government. 

1.  Next  in  the  variety  and  dignity  of  the  subjects  involved 
in  American  party  action  are  those  which  arise  in  the  affairs 
of  the  states.  Some  of  these  subjects  are  intrinsically  of 
very  high  importance,  and  involve  issues  and  a  sphere  of 
action  fit  for  salutary  party  contests.  Yet,  in  the  main,  there 
are  in  states  only  inferior  interests.  They  must  act  a  subor- 
dinate part,  for  the  nation  has  taken  the  great  things  to  itself. 
It  admits  states  to  the  Union ;  it  declares  war  and  peace ;  it 
protects  states  against  invasion ,  it  guarantees  them  a  repub- 
lican form  of  government ;  it  regulates  commerce ;  it  estab- 
lishes the  fundamental  principles  of  justice  and  liberty;  it 
maintains  courts  largely  paramount  over  those  of  the  states. 

1  Since  this  was  written,  the  dirty  streets  of  New  York  City  have  been  made 
clean  —  a  result  mainly  due  to  Colonel  George  E.  Waring,  and  made  possible  by 
the  exclusion  of  party  interference. 


74  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

Besides,  there  is  in  state  government,  as  compared  with 
the  national  government,  more  patronage,  more  administra- 
tion, more  elections  and  voting,  more  mere  business,  and 
consequently  larger  opportunities  for  party  bribery,  coercion, 
patronage-mongering,  and  administrative  corruption.  The 
state  charity  and  state  school  administration,  the  prison  and 
jail  administration,  the  lunatic,  poor  law,  and  police  admin- 
istration, and  the  vastness  of  municipal  affairs,  in  the  main 
unknown  in  the  national  government,  are  prolific  sources  of 
partisan  patronage,  prostitution,  and  vicious  party  contests 
in  state  politics. 

2.  It  has  been  a  natural  result  from  such  conditions  that 
state  parties  —  though  many  of  their  members   have  been 
faithful  to  state  interests  and  duties  —  have  generally  been 
subservient  to  national  parties.     State  parties  have  been  less 
controlled  by  principle  than  national  parties,  have  naturally 
accepted  lower  moral  standards,  have  consequently  become 
involved  in  more  corruption,  and  have  more  basely  surren- 
dered to  boss  rule,  than  national  parties,  —  of  which  they  are 
largely  mere  satellites.     State  parties  can  only  in  a  limited 
sense  be  said  to  have  any  distinctive  principles  to  which 
they  recognize  a  paramount  allegiance.     They  are  largely 
controlled  by  the  commitments  of  their  adherents  to  national 
parties,  — by  the  hopes  of  offices  and  spoils  which  national 
parties  dispense,  and  by  the  promptings  of  ambition  and 
party  spirit  connected  with  national  affairs.1 

3.  When  we  pass  from  the  sphere  of  state  action  to  the 
municipal  sphere  we  make  an  immense  descent,  — a  descent 

1  Such  extravagance  and  other  abases  as  have  attended  the  construction  of 
public  buildings  by  the  states  —  for  example  the  New  York  State  House — have 
hardly  been  known  under  the  general  government.  State  bosses,  the  significant 
fact  that  there  has  never  been  a  national  boss,  the  disgraceful  partisan  intrigues 
and  corruption  sometimes  connected  with  the  election  of  United  States  senators, 
and  the  degradation  of  our  municipal  affairs  — all  these  things,  to  a  large  extent, 
find  a  common  explanation  in  the  facts  presented.  National  politics  would  need 
to  be  much  more  degraded  before  a  national  boss  would  be  possible.  The  debase- 
ment and  despotism  of  state  parties  have  of  late  caused  inferior  men  to  be  made 
United  States  senators.  When  we  shall  elect  worthy  members  of  the  legisla- 
tures, they  will  elect  worthy  United  States  senators.  Relief  is  not  to  be  found  in 
the  election  of  such  senators  by  the  people,  but  in  making  members  of  legisla- 
tures more  independent  of  party  despotism. 


RELATION  OF  POLITICAL  PARTIES  TO  HOME  RULE      75 

from  the  domain  of  constitutions  and  laws  to  that  of  mere 
ordinances  and  regulations,  from  the  jurisdiction  which 
everywhere  dominates  to  that  which  must  everywhere  con- 
form and  submit.  Though  municipalities  may  make  ordi- 
nances which  to  a  large  extent  affect  conduct,  duties,  and 
rights,  they  must  everywhere  conform  to  the  principles, 
limits,  and  purposes  which  the  nation  and  the  state  have 
prescribed  for  them.  Looking  at  the  government  of  cities 
and  villages,  we  can  clearly  see  that  there  is  no  part  of  gov- 
ernment in  which  so  few  great  principles  and  interests  are 
involved,  none  in  which  the  management  of  mere  business 
and  administration  are  so  large  a  part  of  everything  to  be 
done,  none  in  which  contests  for  offices,  spoils,  and  patron- 
age, and  the  expenditure  of  money,  are  so  largely  the  subjects 
of  all  official  action.  Several  of  the  nobler  elements  which 
tend  to  make  parties  useful,  honest,  and  pure  in  broader 
spheres  are  wanting,  while  all  the  elements  of  party  de- 
moralization and  corruption  most  abound,  in  cities.  Party 
managers  and  bosses  keep  up  a  demoralizing  activity  about 
appointments,  removals,  the  granting  of  favors,  the  manage- 
ment of  primaries,  in  which  the  true  interests  of  the  people 
are  disregarded. 

It  may  be  accepted  as  a  rule  that  in  whatever  governmental 
sphere  political  authority  is  below  the  grade  of  the  law- 
making  power  —  is  confined  to  the  sphere  of  mere  ordinance- 
making  and  administrative  details  —  there  cannot  be  enough 
of  principle  or  large  policy  involved  in  the  local  issues  to 
keep  parties  from  sinking  into  corruption.  That  the  control 
by  a  party  of  city  administration  degrades  its  moral  tone 
below  that  of  the  people  generally  is  made  clear  by  the  fact 
that  a  party  will  select  for  a  boss  to  rule  itself  such  a  man 
as  it  would  not  venture,  for  fear  of  public  opinion,  to  propose 
for  mayor,  —  a  fact  as  to  which  Tweed,  Kelly,  and  the  present 
boss  of  New  York  City  —  and  similar  bosses  in  Philadelphia, 
Chicago,  and  Cincinnati  —  are  illustrative.  For,  surely,  if 
city  parties  were  not  more  unscrupulous  than  city  people  gen- 
erally, they  would  tolerate  no  man  for  their  own  chief  whom 
they  would  fear  to  nominate  as  chief  of  the  whole  city. 


76  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

We  should  therefore  naturally  expect  to  find  the  moral  tone 
of  city  parties  as  much  lower  than  the  moral  tone  of  state 
parties  as  that  of  the  latter  is  below  the  moral  tone  of  national 
parties.  And  as  the  functions  of  party-elected  city  aldermen 
are  the  narrowest  and  lowest  possessed  by  any  legislative, 
party-elected  officers,  we  should  logically  expect  their  action 
to  be  on  a  moral  plane  even  below  that  of  the  members  of 
state  legislatures.  Few  people,  perhaps,  will  deny  that  the 
results  of  experience  have  confirmed  our  deductions  from 
sound  principles.  In  such  facts,  therefore,  we  can  see  that 
it  by  no  means  follows  that  party  government  is  appropriate 
in  cities  because  it  is  legitimate  and  useful  in  national 
or  state  affairs. 

VI 

Experience  has  shown  not  merely  that  party  rule  has  been 
more  corrupt  in  cities  than  elsewhere,  but  that  it  has  been 
more  despotic,  and  more  destructive  of  manly  independence 
in  the  whole  range  of  citizenship,  from  the  laborer  to  the 
great  merchant.  We  shall  show  that  such  results  are  the 
natural  outcome  from  enforcing  party  methods  and  tests  in 
cities.  Government  in  the  domain  of  the  nation  and  the 
states  is  separated  into  three  largely  independent  branches, 
—  the  judicial,  the  executive,  and  the  legislative,  —  the 
officers  of  the  last  two  branches  being  elected  by  different 
local  constituencies  and  majorities.  The  executive  and 
each  house  of  Congress  or  of  the  legislature  —  in  which  the 
same  party  may  not  prevail  —  must  concur  in  making  every 
law  and  appropriation.  These  requirements  put  much  salu- 
tary restraint  upon  despotic  party  action ;  in  fact,  often  make 
real  party  rule  impossible.  Besides  these  constitutional 
checks,  the  diverse  interests  and  jealousies  of  the  various 
geographical  sections  and  of  different  states  and  congres- 
sional districts  add  much  to  such  restraints. 

2.  Each  town  and  county  represented  in  a  state  legisla- 
ture has  local  interests  and  needs,  for  the  protection  of 
which,  despite  the  coercive  force  of  party  discipline,  its  in- 
habitants are  accustomed  to  act  together  in  their  corporate 


RELATION  OF  POLITICAL  PARTIES  TO  HOME  RULE       77 

capacity  with  some  degree  of  independence.  To  a  large 
extent  they  know  each  other,  are  in  the  habit  of  meeting  to 
express  their  opinions  and  defend  their  local  interests. 

3.  Turning  next  to  cities,   we   do  not  find   legislative 
officers   representing   different  geographical   interests,   and 
organized   constituencies   analogous   to   those   which    exist 
under  the  national  and  state  governments.    Districts  in  cities 
for  the  election  of  the  members  of  the  city  council  and  state 
legislature  are  not  corporate  organizations,  and  have  no  con- 
trolling geographical  interests.      The  city  election  divisions 
are,  in  the  main,  made  by  mere  arbitrary  lines  among  blocks 
of  houses  and  shops,  enclosing  persons  generally  strangers 
to  each  other,   unaccustomed  to  act  together,  and  without 
peculiar  interests  to  be  represented.     The  voters  often  reside 
in  one  district  and  do  business  in  another.     Under  such  con- 
ditions there  can  hardly  be  any  salutary  sense  of  responsi- 
bility on  the  part  of  the  so-called  representatives   to   the 
district  which  elected  him,  even  if  it  has  any  peculiar  inter- 
ests to  be  represented.     The  lines  of  his  district  are  generally 
drawn,  if  not  gerrymandered,  by  the  majority  of  the  domi- 
nant city  party  or  faction.     This  party  is  organized  as  a  whole 
throughout  the  city ;  its  concentrated,  arbitrary  power  is  ready 
to  be  instantly  brought  to  bear  upon  every  district  which 
shall  dare  to  assert  any  independence,  and  it  is  generally 
sufficient  to  crush  all  candidates  who  shall  attempt  to  with- 
stand any  requirement  of  that  pervading  power.     Hence  we 
find  that,  in  great  cities,  every  representative  may  belong  to 
the  strongest  party  and  faction,  though   two-fifths  of  the 
voters  may  belong  to  an  opposing  party. 

4.  This  same  omnipresent  city  party,  which  elects  the 
mayor,  —  and  through  him  controls  all  administration,  — 
makes  all  appointments  and  removals.     It  dictates  all  ap- 
propriations, makes  all  ordinances,  dominates  all  city  policy. 
The  party  managers  and  leaders  in  every  section  of  a  city 
are  disciplined  together,  and  they  readily  act  as  a  unit  under 
common  orders  and  a  single  boss.     All  city  officials  and  em- 
ployees —  where  civil  sevice  reform  methods  are  not  enforced 
—  are  adherents  of  the  same  party  and  faction.     They  are 


78  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

under  pledges  to  support  it.  Party  spirit  makes  them  in- 
tolerant toward  their  opponents,  and  the  fear  of  removal 
makes  them  servile  toward  their  superiors  and  silent  con- 
cerning maladministration.  This  vicious  party  system, 
facilitated  by  the  complexity  of  city  affairs,  leads  to  bribery, 
fraudulent  naturalizations  and  registrations,  cheating  in 
elections,  and  all  the  manifold  forms  of  despotism  and  mal- 
versation, for  which  great  party-governed  cities  are  notorious. 
Here  is  a  party  despotism  quite  impossible  outside  the  city. 
It  directly  tends  to  boss  rule  and  to  the  prostitution  of 
municipal  power  for  personal  gain. 

In  such  facts  we  may  find  the  explanation  of  the  ominous 
condition  which  has  caused  so  many  business  men  and  cor- 
porations to  basely  pay  money  to  bosses  and  party  managers 
for  their  protection,  rather  than  appeal  to  party-elected  dis- 
trict attorneys  and  justices  for  the  vindication  of  their  rights. 

The  reader  has  very  likely  reached  the  conclusion  that 
there  is  a  grave  need  of  making  city  government  more  inde- 
pendent of  party  control,  and  that  consequently  the  theory, 
so  generally  accepted,  that  party  divisions  in  city  affairs  are 
as  appropriate  as  in  national  and  state  affairs,  is  quite  inde- 
fensible. The  same  conclusion  is  suggested  by  the  notorious 
facts  that  in  most  cases  of  malversation  or  corruption  in 
American  cities  the  offenders  most  responsible  for  it  have 
been  party  managers  —  not  always  of  the  same  party  —  who 
have  conspired  for  common  plunder  —  and  have  been  most 
successful  where  party  rule  has  been  most  absolute. 


VII 

1.  It  is  not  only  true  that  questions  of  principle  fit  for 
party  divisions  seldom  arise  in  our  city  affaire,  but  that  no 
party  has  ever  grown  out  of  such  questions,  and  that  they  have 
very  rarely  been  controlling  in  any  city  election.1 

1  The  important  elections  in  the  cities  of  New  York  and  Brooklyn  in  1894,  in 
which  the  before  dominant  parties  were  defeated,  were  not  mere  party  contests. 
More  than  twenty  thousand  voters  of  the  ruling  party  in  New  York  City,  —  and  a 
bimilar  proportion  of  the  voters  in  Brooklyn,  —  rejecting  the  candidates  of  their 


It  is  also  true  that  most  matters  connected  with  city  ad- 
ministration are  of  a  kind  which  should  be  managed  accord- 
ing to  business  principles  and  by  officers  and  employees  who 
are  as  free  as  possible  from  party  bias.  They  should  be  in- 
dependent of  party  dictation,  for  their  party  opinions  are 
intrinsically  immaterial. 

We  have  seen  that  so-called  city  government,  though 
exercising  various  governmental  functions,  consists  in  the 
main  of  work  to  be  done  and  of  administration  to  be  carried 
on,  which  would  be  all  the  more  successful  if  conducted 
according  to  uniform  methods  and  quite  irrespective  of  mere 
party  interests  and  opinions.  There  is  no  Democratic  way, 
no  Republican  way,  and  no  need  for  considering  political 
parties,  for  the  well-doing  of  these  things.  So  far  as  such 
government  consists  of  making  ordinances,  of  assessing 
taxes,  and  of  collecting  and  expending  moneys,  —  the  most 
governmental  of  its  functions,  —  it  should  certainly  make 
no  party  discrimination.  Municipal  officers  and  employees, 
if  persons  of  good  character  and  ability,  would  be  none  the 
less  useful  if  their  political  and  religious  opinions  were  un- 
known both  to  party  managers  and  to  every  voter.  To  be 
faithful  to  the  cause  of  good  city  government,  irrespective 
of  its  effects  upon  any  party,  is  to  attain  the  true  ideal  of  a 
municipal  officer. 

2.  Save  for  the  fact  that  vast  numbers  of  very  worthy  and 
patriotic  citizens,  as  well  as  all  politicians  and  mere  parti- 
sans, in  the  cities  and  villages  of  the  Union,  are  exerting 
themselves  for  party  victories  and  party  advantage  in  city 
affairs,  we  should  not  have  taken  space  for  illustrating  truths 
so  nearly  obvious.  The  great  bulk  of  the  work  which  a  city 
has  to  do  —  to  supply  water  and  gas,  to  provide  sewers,  to 
make  and  clean  streets,  to  erect  and  repair  public  buildings 
and  works,  to  take  care  of  parks  —  is  so  completely  matters 
of  mere  business,  skill,  and  taste,  and  is  so  foreign  to  all 

respective  parties,  united  in  favor  of  a  non-partisan  reform  policy,  which  tri- 
umphed. Since  this  note  was  written,  the  New  York  City  election  of  1897  has 
occurred,  in  which  the  Citizens'  Union  —  a  body  composed  of  adherents  of  different 
parties  —  cast  a  much  larger  vote  than  the  Republican  party.  See  last  chapter. 


80  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

party  issues,  that  it  might  be  well  done  through  mere  private 
contractors,  —  probably  more  economically  and  much  better 
done  by  them  than  through  city  officials  selected  according 
to  party  methods.  Even  city-party  leaders  and  zealots  can 
see  that  for  city  contractors  to  apply  party  tests  for  the  selec- 
tion of  their  employees  would  be  equally  absurd  and  dis- 
astrous. 

No  man  of  candor  and  sense  will  claim  that  particular 
opinions  about  national-party  issues  —  for  example,  the  tariff, 
the  silver  controversy,  the  Venezuela  question,  the  annexa- 
tion of  the  Sandwich  Islands  —  are  in  the  least  a  qualifica- 
tion for  such  work,  or  for  being  a  city  clerk,  fireman,  or 
policeman.  Policemen,  coroners,  and  police  and  civil  jus- 
tices, being  under  the  highest  legal  and  moral  obligation  to 
be  absolutely  impartial  toward  all  citizens,  are  unfit  for  their 
places  in  the  degree  that  they  are  affected  by  party  spirit,  are 
active  party  men,  or  have  any  wish  to  officially  aid  one  party 
or  faction  rather  than  another.  Yet,  in  many  of  the  cities 
and  villages  of  the  Union,  their  city-party  governments  — 
and  hordes  of  scheming  partisans  and  criminals  behind  it  — 
exert  their  powers  to  the  utmost  for  forcing  into  these  offices 
besotted  politicians  for  party  advantage — men  whose  presence 
there  is  a  scandal  to  common  justice,  a  reproach  to  political 
decency,  and  a  dishonor  to  Republican  government  itself.  It 
is  not  easy  to  say  which  is  most  disgraced  by  this  practice, 
our  parties  or  our  municipalities. 

3.  There  is  no  Republican  way  and  no  Democratic  way, 
which  is  either  honest  or  tolerable,  of  managing  prisons,  jails, 
asylums,  or  poorhouses;  of  keeping  city  accounts,  governing 
a  city  police,  or  carrying  a  municipal  school  system  into 
effect;  but,  instead,  one  non-partisan,  sensible,  honest 
method,  irrespective  of  mere  party  considerations.  The  vast 
amount  of  time,  manipulation,  and  corrupt  intrigue  devoted 
to  the  nomination,  selection,  coercion,  and  discharge  of 
municipal  officials  and  employees  on  party  grounds  or  for 
party  ends  has  been  not  only  a  needless  waste,  but  a  cause 
of  demoralization  and  corruption  which  has  degraded  mu- 
nicipal government. 


RELATION  OF  POLITICAL  PARTIES  TO  HOME  RULE       81 

Our  municipal  degradation  is  perhaps  not  so  much  the  re- 
sult of  false  reasoning  as  of  a  passionate,  impetuous  party 
spirit,  which  is  blind  alike  to  all  reasoning  relating  either 
as  to  causes  or  consequences.  Not  a  few  of  our  partisan 
zealots  doubtless  think  party  tests  for  municipal  servants  to 
be  in  the  public  interest.  Yet  many  of  them,  blind  to  the 
facts  before  their  own  eyes,  would  read  with  surprise  and 
condemnation  those  English  laws  of  the  last  century  which 
required  all  city  officers  to  take  an  oath  declaring  their  belief 
in  the  doctrines  of  the  national  church,  and  those  still  older 
laws  of  continental  Europe  which  made  it  necessary  for  such 
officers  to  have  the  approval  of  a  bishop.  Yet  we  fear  it  may 
be  a  considerable  time  before  all  of  these  partisans  will  think 
it  not  less  absurd  and  uncivilized  to  require  such  officers  to 
accept  a  platform  instead  of  a  creed,  and  to  get  the  approval 
of  a  party  and  a  boss  rather  than  of  a  church  and  a  bishop. 

VIII 

4.  Another  view  of  party  government  in  cities  is  too  impor- 
tant to  be  omitted.  Vast  numbers  of  men  are  drawn  into 
parties  for  reasons  which  are  independent  of  moral  or  patri- 
otic considerations, — many  of  them  for  reasons  which  are 
wholly  selfish,  if  not  corrupt.  Mere  inherited  prepossessions, 
local  influences,  and  peculiar  mental  traits  are  decisive  with 
great  numbers  of  voters.  On  the  other  hand,  the  most  patri- 
otic and  worthy  citizens  are  not  generally  very  unequally 
divided  between  the  great  parties.  City  parties  impose  no 
tests  of  either  character  or  intelligence  for  admission  to  their 
membership.  They  even  compete  against  each  other  for  the 
support  of  the  vilest  and  must  brutish  knaves  and  criminals 
which  they  can  bring  to  the  polls.  In  cities,  more  than  else- 
where, the  greatest  issues  concerning  government  relate 
quite  as  much  to  moral  as  to  political  principles.  They  are 
issues  as  to  which,  aside  from  the  dominating  effects  of  party 
bias  and  hate,  the  best  citizens  would  naturally  be  on  one 
side,  and  the  worst  on  the  other.  But  party  spirit  and  in- 
terests divide  them.  The  gamblers,  and  the  low  grog-shop 


82  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF   MUNICIPALITIES 

keepers,  the  malefactors,  corrupt  politicians,  and  the  whole 
criminal  class  are  faithful  to  parties  only  in  so  far  as  parties 
favor  their  corrupt  and  lawless  purposes  —  for  which  these 
vile  voters  are  always  ready  to  unite.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  best  class  of  city  residents  stand  over  against  each  other 
in  hostile  party  lines,  held  there  by  party  spirit,  external 
party  issues,  and  false  theories  of  party  obligations.  Thus 
party  government  in  cities  enables  the  worst  enemies  of  order 
and  morality  to  combine,  while  it  causes  and  commends  a 
constant  division  among  the  natural  friends  of  good  govern- 
ment. If  party  opinions  were  ignored  in  city  affairs,  these 
natural  friends  would  unite  for  municipal  reform. 

We  have  seen  that  the  higher  class  of  voters  who  would 
naturally  stand  resolutely  together  for  good  city  government 
are  too  few,  in  any  party,  to  succeed  without  the  aid  of  their 
natural  friends  in  the  opposing  party.  Municipal  reform 
can  therefore  be  brought  about  when,  and  only  when,  this 
class  of  voters  shall  have  patriotism,  independence,  and  self- 
denial  enough  to  unite  for  its  achievement.  The  formation 
of  such  a  union  is  therefore  the  first  essential  advance  toward 
our  municipal  regeneration.  Each  good  citizen  must  first 
subdue  his  own  party  spirit. 

City  partisans  habitually  act  on  these  indefensible  theories : 
(1)  that  it  is  only  through  party  action,  as  we  now  have  it, 
that  good  municipal  government  is  possible;  (2)  that  city 
interests  must  be  subordinated  to  national  and  state  party 
interests ;  (3)  that  it  would  be  a  breach  of  one's  duty  to  one's 
party  to  diminish  its  city  patronage ;  and  (4)  that  no  party 
man  should  support  the  best  candidate  fora  city  office  unless 
he  be  an  adherent  of  his  own  party.  While  such  theories 
prevail  the  residents  of  a  city  do  not  deserve  a  good  city 
government,  and  they  are  not  likely  to  have  it.  Party  gov- 
ernment in  a  city  is  a  demonstration  that  their  inhabitants 
care  more  for  the  triumph  of  their  parties  than  for  the  bless- 
ings of  good  city  administrations. 

Let  us  not  blink  the  serious,  humiliating  facts.  The 
great  body  of  the  best  citizens  who  ought  to  stand  together 
for  municipal  reform  frown  at  each  other  from  the  ranks  of 


RELATION  OF  POLITICAL  PARTIES  TO  HOME  RULE      83 

opposing  parties  and  defeat  each  other's  efforts  for  achieving 
it.  Their  party  zeal  is  too  great  to  allow  them  to  see  that  if 
party  distinctions  were  disregarded  in  city  affairs,  the  relative 
strength  of  each  party  would  not  be  changed;  parties  would 
have  few  effective  motives  left  for  meddling  with  city  admin- 
istration. The  political  opinions  of  municipal  servants 
would  be  of  hardly  more  consequence  to  parties  than  the 
party  views  of  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  regular  army  now 
are.  A  short  period  of  true,  non-partisan  city  administra- 
tion would  cause  these  servants  to  take  no  active  part  in 
city  politics,  as  the  experience  of  the  best-governed  cities  of 
the  world  will  show  us. 

5.  The  party  opinions  of  city  officers  being  intrinsically 
unimportant,   it  is  false  and  demoralizing  to   make   these 
opinions,  and  not  their  personal  merits  or  the  interests  of  the 
city,  the  controlling  standards  for  their  selection.     If  the 
appointing  officer,  or  the  voter,  is  not  bound  in  honor  and 
duty  to  select  the  fittest  persons  for  serving  the  city,  regard- 
less of  party  opinions,  but  may  betray  the  city's  interest  to 
aid  his  party,  what  municipal  duty  or  interest  may  he  not 
neglect,   repudiate,   and  betray  for  party  purposes?     How 
can  we  expect  any  city  servant  to  be  faithful  to  his  municipal 
duties,  if  his  party  requires  him  to  betray  them  for  its  own 
advantage  ?     If  he  may  betray  his  village  or  city  for  party 
gain,  why  may  he  not  do  the  same  for  personal  gain  ?     The 
very  sense  of  civic  duty  is  thus  enfeebled  and  perverted  by 
the  party  system. 

6.  The  most  intelligent  men  in  a  party,  who  for  party 
reasons  decline  to  cooperate  with  similar  members  of  other 
parties  to  promote  good  city  government,  are  most  responsible 
for  our  bad  municipal  condition.     They,  above  all  others, 
know  better.    It  is  a  shallow  view,  a  specious  excuse,  for  such 
citizens  to  denounce  the  ignorant  and  scheming  politicians 
and  the  corrupt  classes  as  being  mainly  responsible.     How 
can  really  good  citizens  ready  to  unite,  or  already  joined,  in 
business  partnerships  or  corporations,  — perhaps  members  of 
the  same  club,  co-trustees  in  the  same  society  or  church  with 
party  opponents,  —  justify  themselves  in  refusing  to  cooper- 


84  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF   MUNICIPALITIES 

ate  with  them  in  the  business  and  duty  of  improving  city 
affairs  ? 

If  the  familiar  justification  that  party  opponents  cannot  be 
trusted  were  true,  each  side  saying  this  of  the  other,  the  ob- 
vious conclusion  would  be  that  no  active  party  men  should 
be  given  a  city  office.  The  facts  are  that  blind,  unpatriotic, 
half-civilized  party  intolerance  is  yet  a  potential  force  in 
the  politics  of  many  American  cities.  In  despotic  times  men 
who  dissented  from  the  religion  of  the  majority  were  not 
only  excluded  from  office  but  were  disfranchised  and  perse- 
cuted by  the  ruling  parties.  But  now  such  parties,  forced 
by  public  opinion  and  constitutional  prohibitions  to  tolerate 
religious  difference,  can  only  exclude  from  office  those  who 
dissent  from  their  creed  in  civil  affairs.  Men  who  would  be 
ashamed  to  justify,  even  theoretically,  the  intolerance  of 
their  great-grandfathers  in  matters  of  religion  now  uphold 
without  shame  and  with  apparently  no  sense  of  its  absurdity, 
an  equal  intolerance  in  matters  of  party  politics.  It  is  by 
no  means  easy  to  say  which  commits  the  graver  offence,  the 
intelligent,  reputable  citizen  who,  knowing  better,  violates 
his  duty  to  his  city  in  order  to  aid  his  party,  or  the  gamblers 
and  the  low  politicians  who,  under  degrading  influences,  vio- 
late the  same  duty  in  order  to  benefit  both  themselves  and 
their  class. 

We  need  not  stop  to  consider  the  objection  sure  to  be  made 
by  partisans  and  pessimists,  that  it  is  chimerical  to  expect 
that  party  men  will  ever  be  faithful  to  municipal  interests  as 
long  as  they  think  the  city  vote  will  materially  affect  national 
party  majorities;  for  it  has  been  explained,  and  will  else- 
where be  demonstrated,  that  under  a  sound  municipal  system 
neither  party  will  either  gain  or  lose  any  large  advantage. 
Let  personal  character  and  capacity  —  to  be  shown  by  the 
civil  service  examinations,  irrespective  of  political  or  reli- 
gious opinions  —  be  made  the  conditions  of  entering  the  mu- 
nicipal service,  and  the  adherents  of  parties  will  be  fairly 
represented  there,  working  side  by  side.  These  men  will 
not  be  party  electioneers.  They  will  neither  pay  party 
assessments  nor  be  servile  to  party  managers  or  bosses.  It 


RELATION  OF  POLITICAL  PARTIES  TO  HOME  RULE       85 

may  soon  become  the  fact  in  the  United  States,  as  it  is  now 
the  fact  in  the  enlightened  cities  of  Europe,  that  the  politics 
of  the  municipal  servants  will  be  regarded  as  unimportant. 

IX 

There  are  doubtless  many  citizens  who,  while  admitting 
that  these  objections  to  party  government  in  cities  are  un- 
answerable, will,  nevertheless,  say  that  it  will  be  in  vain 
that  we  may  attempt  to  arrest  it.  This  is  the  view  of  men 
who  lack  moral  courage  and  that  high  sense  of  civic  duty 
which  are  the  source  and  potency  of  all  municipal  reform. 
Many  such  persons  welcome  any  specious  excuse  for  neglect- 
ing sacrifice  and  labor  for  the  suppression  of  city-party  des- 
potism. But  their  pretext  has  not  even  the  merit  of  fact  or 
probability.  In  the  many  offices  —  municipal,  state,  and  na- 
tional—  where  the  methods  of  civil  service  reform  have  put 
superior  persons  into  the  public  service,  irrespective  of  party 
^pinions,  we  have  a  demonstration  of  what  may  be  surely  done 
in  every  department  of  city  affairs  if  we  will  only  have  faith, 
and  resolutely  strive  for  the  general  welfare  instead  of  parti- 
san advantage.  So  much  has  public  enlightenment  recently 
advanced,  that  many  men  who,  a  generation  ago,  would 
brazenly  insist  that  all  policemen,  firemen,  justices,  and 
school  officers  —  and  a  century  ago,  that  all  military  and 
naval  officers  —  should  be  of  their  own  party,  would  now  be 
ashamed  to  make  such  claims,  save  in  the  presence  of  mere 
politicians  and  partisans.  Public  opinion  is  rapidly  be- 
coming a  power  which  is  compelling  intelligent  men  who 
seek  social  respect  to  act  more  in  reference  to  the  public 
welfare  and  less  in  reference  to  party  gain.  Only  audacious 
politicians  now  insist  that  policemen,  school-teachers,  and 
justices  should  be  appointed  or  removed  for  party  reasons. 
There  is  no  really  better  reason  why  a  city  clerk  or  laborer, 
than  why  a  city  school-teacher,  street  sweeper,  or  police- 
man should  be  selected  by  reason  of  his  party  opinions  or 
services. 

There  is  a  grave  misconception  and  underestimation  with 


si,  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

many  both  as  to  the  power  of  public  opinion  and  as  to  the 
part  it  has  played,  and  is  likely  to  play,  in  the  government 
of  cities.  They  say  that  the  contests  of  city  parties  over  city 
affairs  are  the  great  sources  of  health  and  purity  without 
which  there  would  be  stagnation,  indifference,  and  decay. 
This  whole  theory  is  false.  Public  opinion  is  a  constant,  ac- 
tive, elevating,  and  potential  force  in  municipal  government 
far  beyond  anything  which  springs  from  mere  party  action. 

The  conscience  and  higher  thought  of  the  people,  speaking 
through  the  press,  public  meetings,  and  innumerable  non- 
partisan  associations,  make  public  opinion  and  that  opinion 
is  a  force  which  no  city  party  or  faction  dares  to  much  offend. 
Even  Tammany  has  not  dared  to  disregard  the  new  public 
opinion  which  requires  clean  streets.  If  Tammany  and 
every  faction  and  party  in  the  city  of  New  York  should  be 
dissolved,  if  all  their  bosses,  managers,  and  leaders  should  be 
banished,  this  force  of  public  opinion  would  at  once  become 
supreme  in  the  city,  and  would  fill  the  offices  and  carry  on 
the  administration  according  to  its  own  high  standards. 
Those  who  vote  from  a  sense  of  duty  and  who  labor  to  ele- 
vate city  life,  regardless  of  party  politics,  would  go  to  the 
polls,  but  the  vile  and  mercenary  voters  would  not  go  there. 
The  constant  issue  as  to  voting  would  be  between  those  who 
vote  patriotically  on  one  side  and  those  who  vote  selfishly  or 
for  party  advantage  on  the  other. 

Public  opinion  constantly  holds  Tammany,  and  every  city 
party,  in  restraint;  it  prevents  it  from  doing  what  it  wishes 
to  do,  and  would  do,  but  for  the  fear  of  this  opinion.  Tam- 
many, and  any  ruling  city  party,  prefers  a  man  like  Tweed 
or  Kelly  for  its  boss,  to  rule  itself,  and  longs  to  make  him 
mayor,  but  from  fear  of  public  opinion  dares  not  do  so. 

Public  opinion,  in  cities  as  everywhere  else,  favors  the 
higher  sentiments,  better  administration,  and  the  noblest 
ideals  of  the  people.  It  maintains  a  perpetual  conflict  with 
party  opinion  and  interests.  Weaken  the  power  of  public 
opinion  but  a  little,  and,  we  repeat,  the  administration  of  the 
city  would  sink  to  the  level  of  her  partisan  politics. 

Party  activity,  as  to  city  affairs,  relates  mainly  to  naturali- 


RELATION  OF  POLITICAL  PARTIES  TO  HOME  RULE       87 

zations,  registration,  party  enrolment,  primary-district  man- 
agement, the  bringing  out  of  the  party  vote,  the  control  of  the 
election  machinery,  with  but  limited  appeals  to  public  duty 
or  the  higher  intelligence.  But  the  great  and  elevating  sub- 
jects, as  to  which  the  people  are  not  divided  by  party  lines, 
in  cities,  have  reference  to  moral,  educational,  humane,  and 
altruistic  affairs  and  standards  of  duty.  Nowhere  else  are 
the  great  questions  of  charity,  morality,  philanthropy,  and 
religion  more  nobly  treated  than  in  cities;  but  all  of  these 
things  are  far  above  the  sphere  of  city  politics.  Nowhere 
else  is  there  so  much  poverty  and  ignorance,  so  much  degra- 
dation and  vice,  so  frequent  injustice,  lawlessness,  and 
crime,  as  in  municipalities;  and,  happily,  nowhere  else  is 
there  so  much  self-sacrifice  and  generosity,  such  noble  and 
abundant  charities,  hospitals,  and  asylums  for  dealing  with 
them. 

But  concerning  these  matters,  city  parties  have  no  part 
and  recognize  no  duties.  Schools  and  colleges  for  the 
education  of  the  people,  journals  in  which  the  higher  public 
opinion  is  powerfully  expressed,  societies  and  associations 
innumerable  which  are  effective  for  expounding  and  enforc- 
ing the  moral  and  patriotic  obligations  of  men,  and  churches 
in  which  the  duties  of  religion,  benevolence,  and  humanity 
are  ably  presented,  —  every  one  of  them  non-partisan  forces, 
—  are  most  abundant  and  effective  in  cities,  but  parties  and 
their  managers  have  very  little  to  do  with  these  things,  and 
perhaps  as  often  harm  as  help  them.  Through  such  agencies, 
self-sacrificing,  altruistic,  and  patriotic  devotion  to  the  gen- 
eral welfare  engages  in  stern,  conscientious  conflict  and  com- 
petition with  all  the  lower  forces  of  life  in  every  city  to  an 
extent  which  is  tenfold  greater  than  everything  of  the  kind 
which  is  illustrated  in  the  contests  of  parties  over  city  affairs. 
To  call  party  action  in  cities  the  great  saving  force  is  mani- 
festly absurd.  Thus,  in  that  very  sphere  of  city  government 
where  there  are  the  fewest  elements  for  useful  party  action, 
and  where  the  domination  of  party  opinion  is  most  to  be  re- 
gretted, the  higher  public  opinion  has  its  best  expression  and 
all  noble  minds  have  their  grandest  opportunities  for  salutary 


88  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF   MUNICIPALITIES 

contests  and  competitions.  Yet,  with  an  assumption  of  wis- 
dom, we  are  told  by  city  politicians  that  conflict  and  com- 
petition are  the  conditions  of  progress,  and  that  the  fittest 
survive;  as  if  the  maxim  applied  only,  or  mainly,  to  parties, 
rather  than  to  the  salutary  conflicts  of  social,  moral,  and  re- 
ligious forces  which  develop  the  noblest  men  and  women  of 
the  nation. 

A  glance  at  the  activities  of  a  great  city,  at  the  time  of 
municipal  elections,  will  illustrate  the  relative  character  of 
its  partisan  and  non-partisan  forces.  In  the  garrets  and  cel- 
lars of  crime  and  debauchery,  the  messengers  of  religion  and 
humanity  are  as  usual  about  their  elevating  work,  but  the 
agents  of  bosses  and  factions  are  there  also,  seeking  the 
votes  of  the  vile  by  means  which  yet  more  degrade  them. 
The  grog-shops  are  crowded  with  depraved  men  whose  drinks 
are  paid  for  by  the  money  supplied  by  the  partisan  agents 
who  have  caused  their  fraudulent  registration  and  their 
coming  to  the  polls.  While  the  children  of  the  degraded 
emigrants  are  being  instructed  in  the  schools  of  some  noble 
charities,  the  votes  of  these  emigrants  are  the  subject  of  a 
corrupt  competition  between  the  electioneering  and  bribing 
agents  of  rival  parties  and  factions.  The  exertions  of 
churches,  noble  societies,  and  citizens  do  much  to  advance 
the  cause  of  temperance,  but  can  we  be  sure  that  the  elec- 
tioneering solicitation  and  bribery  of  partisan  managers,  in 
aid  of  securing  the  vote  of  the  liquor  interest,  do  not  counter- 
balance such  noble  efforts  ?  At  the  prisons,  poorhouses,  and 
asylums  where  good  men  and  women  are  doing  the  work  of 
self-sacrifice  and  humanity  may  be  also  found  on  city  elec- 
tion days  the  partisan  henchmen  and  bullies  who  go  there  to 
bring  the  most  depraved  voters  to  the  polls. 

Whatever  may  be  the  reader's  views  on  some  of  these  sub- 
jects, this  at  least  seems  very  clear:  that  cities  will  never 
lose  their  most  salutary  competitions,  or  their  great  and  ele- 
vating forces,  because  city  politicians  have  less  inducements 
for  their  vicious  activity,  or  because  public  opinion,  rather 
than  party  opinion,  shall  become  the  dominating  force  in 
municipal  affairs. 


MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT  BY  PARTY  89 


CHAPTER     IV.  —  MUNICIPAL     GOVERNMENT     BY    PARTY    AS 
ILLUSTRATED   BY  THE  TAMMANY  DEMOCRACY 

Reasons  for  discussing  Tammany.  Its  origin  and  original  character.  Its 
transformation  from  charity  to  partisan  politics.  Its  present  character  and  its 
officers.  It  insists  on  party  government,  applies  party  tests  for  office,  and  enforces 
the  spoils  system.  It  holds  city  affairs  to  be  a  mass  of  politics  and  not  of  busi- 
ness. Insists  that  Tammany  always  promotes  the  public  interests.  Holds  non- 
partisan  city  government  to  be  chimerical.  Whether  its  theories  can  be  justified. 
The  incompatible  and  demoralizing  relations  of  Tammany.  Its  opposition  to  all 
reform.  Its  attempts  to  influence  national  and  state  government.  It  is  impos- 
sible to  defend  the  Tammany  system.  Its  system  worse  than  most  of  its  sup- 
porters. We  must  appeal  to  facts  to  test  the  system.  Tammany's  position 
untenable  and  hostile  to  Home  Rule.  Vicious  teaching  and  practices  of  Tam- 
many. How  it  appeals  to  the  worst  voters  and  uses  offices  to  bribe  them.  The 
Tammany  system  aggravates  party  greed  and  animosity.  It  facilitates  con- 
spiracy and  degrades  civic  ideals.  Power  of  appointment  and  removal  used  to 
bribe  and  coerce  voters.  Political  assessments  begin  with  Tammany ;  they  in- 
crease its  vicious  power  and  degrade  the  municipal  servants.  Tammany  sells 
offices  for  money.  The  sale  of  judicial  offices  especially  vicious  —  debasing  the 
bench,  demoralizing  the  bar,  and  preventing  the  noblest  lawyers  becoming 
judges. 

FROM  the  relation  of  parties  to  municipal  government  on 
the  basis  of  principle,  we  turn  to  experience  on  the  subject. 
A  definite  analysis  and  exposition  of  the  theories  and  doings 
of  a  particular  city  party  in  a  single  city  seems  likely  to 
be  more  interesting  and  useful  than  less  definite  statements 
concerning  various  parties  and  cities.  For  this  purpose  we 
select  the  Tammany  Democracy  of  the  city  of  New  York, — 
which  for  brevity  we  may  call  Tammany, — because  it  is  the 
oldest,  the  most  highly  organized,  and  the  most  characteristic 
and  powerful  partisan  organization  which  has  ever  existed  in 
an  American  city.  As  its  theories  and  methods  and  their 
practical  effects  are  those  toward  which  the  less  developed 
city  parties  seem  to  be  tending  in  American  municipalities, 
their  study  is  one  of  great  interest  and  universal  importance. 

We  desire  it  should  be  understood  at  the  outset  that  we 
do  not  propose  to  sketch  the  history  of  Tammany,  or  to  pre- 
sent its  wrong-doings,  as  if  they  were  unique  or  especially 


90  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

reprehensible,  but  rather  to  show  to  what  extent  its  practices 
have  been  the  natural  outcome  of  vicious  theories  and 
methods,  and  to  enable  the  reader  to  decide  how  far  the  evils 
of  Tammany  rule  have  been  the  legitimate  and  necessary 
effects  of  party  government  in  a  great  city. 

We  shall  often  have  occasion  to  refer  to  the  fact  that  the 
city  party  and  faction  1  in  New  York  City,  which  has  gener- 
ally opposed  Tammany,  has  acted  largely  according  to  the 
theories  and  methods  of  Tammany  itself,  and  we  trust  the 
fact  will  be  apparent  that  we  seek  no  advantage  for  either 
of  these  organizations  over  the  other.  We  hope  the  reader 
will  understand  from  the  start  that  it  is  not  our  chief  purpose 
to  have  him  pass  judgment  upon  the  officers  and  administra- 
tion which  Tammany  has  supplied,  but  that  he  should  decide 
whether  its  theories,  methods,  and  system  —  whether  party 
government  in  cities  which  they  illustrate  —  will  or  will  not 
inevitably  lead  to  municipal  degradation  wherever  applied. 
This  is  a  foremost  and  fundamental  municipal  problem  in 
the  United  States. 

1.  The  present  system  of  the  Tammany  Democracy  — 
which  has  never  been  authorized  by  law  —  has  been  slowly 
and  aggressively  developed  out  of  an  obscure  humane  or 
charitable  association,  designated  "  The  Society  of  Tammany, 
or  the  Columbian  Order,"  —  Tammany  being  the  name  of  an 
Indian  chief  of  fabulous  virtues,  who  seems  to  have  been 
selected  as  a  sort  of  patron  saint.  The  society  appears  to 
have  been  organized  in  1789,  mainly  through  the  influence 
of  a  respectable  artisan  by  the  name  of  William  Mooney. 
It  was  first  incorporated  in  1805,  under  a  special  law  of 
New  York, —  the  sole  authority  for  its  corporate  existence, 
—  which  declares  its  object  in  these  words :  "  For  the  purposes 
of  affording  relief  to  the  indigent  and  distressed  members  of 
said  association,  their  widows  and  orphans  and  others,  who 

1  We  need  not  nicely  consider  whether  the  Tammany  Democracy  is  more  fitly 
called  a  party  rather  than  a  faction.  It  certainly  has  some  of  the  elements  of 
both,  and  we  shall  refer  to  it  under  either  name  since  it  sometimes  acts  the  part 
of  one  and  sometimes  that  of  the  other.  As  it  has  no  fixed  principles  to  which  it 
is  faithful,  it  is  not  in  the  strict  and  best  sense  entitled  to  the  honorable  name  of 
party. 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT  BY   PARTY  91 

may  be  found  proper  objects  of  their  charity. " l  This  purpose 
has  never  been  changed  by  law,  and  the  Tammany  Society 
still  exists  under  this  statute,  —  so  far  as  it  is  not  an  illegal 
organization,  —  the  evolution  under  it  from  the  purposes  of 
charity  to  those  of  mere  politics  and  municipal  domination 
being  but  a  part  of  that  steady  degeneration  which  has  made 
the  political  action  of  the  Tammany  Democrats  a  synonym 
for  partisan  despotism  and  corruption  the  world  over. 

Prior  to  1805,  the  society  was  composed  of  men  of  diverse 
political  opinions,  and  it  hardly  took  any  part  in  politics  — 
having  been  merely  an  honest,  reputable,  and  modest  society 
largely  devoted  to  social  intercourse  and  benevolent  useful- 
ness in  a  small  way.  After  it  had  become  political,  and  be- 
fore it  had  become  partisan,  it  had  some  eminent  men  among 
its  members,  and  its  history  was  identified  with  various 
patriotic  public  services.  Yet  its  early  doings,  over  which 
some  of  its  adherents  of  the  present  day  are  in  the  habit  of 
indulging  in  unwarranted  and  nauseating  laudation,  were 
too  unimportant  to  be  of  interest  now,  save  as  showing  how 
readily  partisan  leaders  can  make  the  methods  of  charity 
useful  for  party  purposes. 

In  recent  years  the  society  has  had  for  its  legitimate  ends 
little  more  than  a  perfunctory  existence  and  a  nearly  useless 
activity.  But  it  has  erected  a  great  building,  which  con- 
tains an  ample  hall  —  besides  space  for  a  theatre  —  which  is 
the  headquarters  of  the  Tammany  Democracy.  This  Democ- 
racy has  dominated  the  municipal  politics  of  New  York  by 
methods  which  the  founders  of  Tammany  and  its  eminent 
members  of  early  days  apparently  never  imagined. 

The  Tammany  managers  arid  chiefs  are  designated  sachems, 
and  one  of  them  is  called  the  Grand  Sachem,  who  dispense 
such  charity  as  survives.  But  their  most  active  efforts  are 
given  to  party  management,  to  making  nominations  and  con- 
trolling elections,  to  carrying  on  the  trade  of  party  politics, 
to  patronage-mongering,  to  the  control  of  city  administra- 
tion, to  the  barter  and  sale  of  offices,  to  persuading  and 

1  New  York  Laws,  1805,  Ch.  115.  The  title  of  the  act  gives  the  name  of  the 
organization  to  be  formed  as  "  The  Society  of  Tammany,  or  Columbian  Order." 


92  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

coercing  voters  to  support  Tammany,  to  the  manipulation  of 
city  primaries,  to  the  securing  of  such  laws  as  Tammany 
desires  and  defeating  the  bills  it  dislikes. 

In  the  official,  serai-savage  nomenclature  of  the  Tammany 
Society  one  of  its  principal  officers  is  designated  a  Wis- 
kinkie,  another  a  Sagamore,  another  a  Scribe,  and  its  great 
hall  is  called  a  Wigwam.  A  more  grotesque  combination 
of  incongruous  elements  —  of  charity  and  partisan  politics, 
of  Indian  names  and  civilized  designations,  of  feudal  des- 
potism and  nominal  democracy  —  than  Tammany  presents 
has  perhaps  never  existed.1 

2.  Out  of  and  around  this  original  corporate  body  the 
Tammany  Democracy  has  developed  the  ordinary  representa- 
tive organizations  and  machinery  of  party  action,  which  un- 
doubtedly are  very  good  of  their  kind  and  highly  effective 
for  their  purpose.  We  shall  have  no  need  for  details  on 
these  points  save  as  they  will  incidentally  appear  as  we 
proceed. 

Tammany  insists  on  absolute  party  government  in  cities ; 
it  enforces  its  partisan  tests  in  the  selection  of  city  officers 
and  laborers,  all  of  them,  unless  for  peculiar  reasons,  being 
required  to  be  its  supporters ;  it  expects  all  such  persons  to 
so  use  their  power  and  activity  that  they  may  be  beneficial  to 
Tammany ;  it  utterly  repudiates  the  non-partisan  principles 
and  business  methods  through  which  every  considerable  re- 
form has  thus  far  been  made  in  American  cities.  Its  theories 
and  methods  are  as  essentially  partisan  as  they  are  selfish  and 
merciless.  Its  great  reliance  is  on  semi-military  organiza- 
tion, party  discipline  and  patronage,  political  assessments, 
adroit  management,  and  despotic  control  under  the  supreme 
leadership  of  a  boss.  It  regards  municipal  party  contests  as 
sources  of  municipal  virtue;  it  insists  on  universal,  prescrip- 
tive, and  merciless  party  methods  in  municipal  administra- 
tion; it  favors  an  endless  series  of  partisan  battles  as  the 
essential  means  of  good  municipal  government  for  all  cities 

1  Tammany  Hall,  pp.  20,  34,  38,  87.  This  unique  and  interesting  pamphlet  of 
about  150  pages,  issued  in  1893,  —  apparently  by  the  Tammany  organization  itself, 
—  will  repay  a  perusal.  It  has  a  huge  tiger  on  its  title-page. 


MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT   BY   PARTY  93 

and  villages.  It  holds  that  city  government  should  be  so 
managed  by  a  party  as  to  pay  the  expenses  of  this  manage- 
ment and  to  reward  those  who  have  charge  of  it.  It  rejects 
the  methods  of  civil  service  reform  and  ballot  reform  as 
false  and  abominable ;  it  insists  that  all  measures,  nomina- 
tions, and  official  changes  should  originate  inside  the  party 
lines  and  be  under  the  control  of  the  party  leaders. 

Denying  that  municipal  affairs  are  in  the  main  a  mass  of 
work  to  be  done,  of  business  to  be  transacted,  or  of  adminis- 
tration to  be  carried  on,  irrespective  of  the  political  or  reli- 
gious opinions  of  the  municipal  servants,  Tammany  largely 
treats  them  as  a  mass  of  politics  to  be  managed,  of  patronage 
to  be  divided,  of  spoils  to  be  shared,  according  to  party 
theories  and  for  party  advantage. 

It  does  not  say  that  the  city  interests  should  be  disregarded, 
but  it  assumes  that  the  Tammany  majority  always  represents 
these  interests,  and  that  the  Tammany  system  is  the  best 
for  their  promotion.  It  claims  that  Tammany  men  alone 
should  hold  city  office  or  be  employed  to  do  the  city  work. 
Tammany  does  not  merely  declare  that  there  should  be  an 
endless  and  multitudinous  series  of  partisan  conflicts  and 
elections  in  cities  and  villages,  as  fountains  of  public  virtue, 
but  further  says  that  there  should  be  short  terms  of  office 
and  many  elected  officers,  in  order  to  keep  these  sources  of 
virtue  perpetually  active  and  prolific.  It  declares  that  the 
places  in  the  municipal  service  should  be  the  prizes  of 
the  victorious  party  or  faction,  to  be  distributed  by  their 
leaders  among  their  obedient  adherents  in  the  main  as  re- 
wards for  votes  and  other  party  services ;  it  holds  that  city 
and  village  officers  and  employees  may  be  rightfully,  and 
should  be,  selected  and  discharged  for  party  advantage  —  at 
the  discretion  of  party  managers. 

Tammany  insists  that  all  municipal  servants  shall  not 
only  work  for  the  party,  but  that  they  should  be  ready  to  pay 
assessments  to  meet  its  expenses,  and  that  failing  in  these 
duties  they  should  be  removed  as  these  managers  may  see 
fit.  In  short,  Tammany  claims  that  the  dominant  municipal 
party  may  use  its  power,  as  it  may  think  best,  to  perpetuate 


94  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

its  own  supremacy,  to  fill  its  own  treasury,  to  reward  its  own 
adherents, —  always,  however,  within  the  restrictions  imposed 
by  law ;  for  the  Tammany  system  does  not  in  theory  justify 
either  fraud  or  corruption,  however  much  it  may  tend  to 
produce  them. 

In  the  view  of  Tammany,  non-partisan  city  government  is 
chimerical,  and  the  cooperation  of  the  adherents  of  different 
parties  for  securing  it  is  undesirable  and  impracticable,  save 
as  the  result  of  a  bargain  between  party  managers. 

8.  According  to  the  Tammany  theory,  the  will  of  a  city- 
party  majority  should  be  its  own  moral  law,  and  the  policy 
of  that  majority  is  certain  to  promote  the  general  welfare. 
An  independent  or  non-partisan  in  city  affairs  is  an  eccentric, 
impracticable,  useless  person,  sure  to  obstruct  good  govern- 
ment, and  a  fit  subject  of  dislike  and  suspicion.  These  are 
the  most  developed  theories  of  all  supporters  of  party  govern- 
ment for  great  cities,  and  we  shall  find  that  it  has  required 
but  little  compromise  of  theory  to  enable  Tammany  partisans 
and  many  Republican  partisans  to  habitually  conspire  and 
cooperate  together  for  power  and  spoils  in  New  York  City.1 


II 

1.  These  important  questions  here  present  themselves: 
Does  the  Tammany  system  provide  for  fit  relations  between 
political  parties  and  municipal  governments?  Should  it 
be  commended  for  general  adoption  ?  Or  should  it  be  con- 
demned and  excluded  to  the  utmost?  These  questions  are 
of  practical  importance  in  every  city  and  village  of  the  Union. 
In  attempting  to  answer  them,  let  us  keep  in  mind  the  fact 

1  We  are  far  from  assuming  that  Tammany  men  are  generally  unpatriotic,  or 
regardless  of  the  general  welfare.  The  vast  majority  of  the  adherents  of  Tam- 
many unquestionably  give  its  system  an  honest  and  patriotic  support.  But  a 
large  proportion  of  them  are  the  victims  of  a  party  spirit  so  intense  and  perverting 
that  they  are  unable  to  accept  a  sound  view  of  municipal  interests.  Great  num- 
bers of  them,  who  condemn  many  of  the  evils  incident  to  their  system,  neverthe- 
less support  it  because  they  think  nothing  better  is  possible.  They  have  no 
conception  of  any  kind  of  city  government  save  party  government.  Below  all 
these  adherents  are  a  large  body  of  mercenary  and  vile  voters  which  the  Tam- 
many system  is  most  effective  for  bringing  to  the  polls. 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT  BY  PARTY  95 

that  the  question  is  not  whether  the  Tammany  Democrats 
have  been  corrupt  or  intrinsically  unworthy,  but  whether  the 
Tammany  system  should  be  condemned  and  suppressed  as 
false,  demoralizing,  and  intolerable. 

Some  explanations  are  required  for  avoiding  misconceptions 
and  confusion  of  thought :  (1)  The  fact  that  Tammany  ad- 
ministration has  been  infamous  is  not  a  decisive  reason  why 
the  Tammany  system  should  be  condemned,  for  the  fault  may 
be  in  its  managers  rather  than  in  the  system  itself.  (2)  A 
large  part  of  what  we  shall  say  of  Tammany  will  be,  in  sub- 
stance, applicable  to  the  prevailing  faction  of  the  Republican 
party  in  New  York  City,  the  leaders  of  which  are  generally 
more  or  less  in  conspiracy  with  the  Tammany  leaders,  and 
they  have  largely  adopted  Tammany  methods.  (3)  The 
Tammany  Democracy  has  these  three  distinct  relations  and 
spheres  of  action :  first,  it  is,  in  a  sense,  the  local  organiza- 
tion of  the  national  Democratic  party  in  the  city  and  county 
of  New  York ;  second,  it  is  a  local  organization  there  of  the 
Democratic  party  of  the  state  of  New  York ;  third,  it  is  also 
an  organization  in  the  city  of  New  York  for  the  purpose  of 
controlling  the  party  affairs  and  municipal  government  of 
the  city  in  the  interest  of  Tammany  itself  and  its  managers. 

We  are  to  deal  with  Tammany  only  in  its  latter,  or  mu- 
nicipal, relations,  save  as  its  other  relations  are  incidentally 
involved.  It  is  plain  that  if  Tammany's  connections  with 
the  national  and  state  Democracy  should  be  dissolved,  its 
organization  and  methods  for  dealing  with  city  affairs  might 
still  continue,  however  much  its  power  would  be  weakened. 
It  is  very  clear  that  these  threefold  relations,  quite  incom- 
patible with  each  other,  constantly  tend  to  conflicts  of  interest 
and  duty  as  well  as  to  demoralization  and  corruption.  But 
in  this  regard  the  relations  of  Tammany  are  not  radically 
different  from  those  of  any  party  organization  in  a  city  which 
mingles  municipal,  state,  and  national  issues,  and  supports 
or  sacrifices  such  parts  of  them  as  will  most  promote  its  own 
advantage  or  that  of  its  managers.  These  evils  are  incidents 
to  party  government  in  cities,  where  it  has  no  fit  place. 

We  shall  soon  find  that  Tammany  habitually  sacrifices,  on 


!••;  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MINK  Il'ALlTIES 

the  one  hand,  city  interests  to  those  of  the  state  and  national 
parties ;  and,  on  the  other,  that  it  uses  its  influence  with  state 
and  national  parties  to  gain  municipal  power,  patronage,  and 
spoils  for  itself  and  its  favorites.  It  is  obvious  that  such 
conflicting  relations  are  incompatible  with  any  definite  or 
avowed  principles,  save  those  of  the  spoils  system,  and  it  is 
notorious  that  Tammany  has  not  generally  been  faithful  to 
any  other. 

It  is  a  natural  result  from  the  nature  of  the  Tammany 
system  —  and  not  merely  from  the  character  of  its  managers 

—  that  Tammany  opposes  or  supports  national  or  state  issues 
according  to  its  own  views  of  its  own  advantage.     It  has 
not,  nor  has  any  one  of  the  conspiring  Republican  factions 
referred  to,  ever  devised  or  proposed  any  policy  of  municipal 
reform.     It  has  never  carried  a  municipal  election  on  the  basis 

—  or  in  the  interest  —  of  any  definite  municipal  principles, 
save  those  of  the  spoils  system  or  the  boss  system.     It  has 
never  scrupled  to  resort  to  any  policy  which  it  has  thought 
most  likely  to  catch  the  most  numerous  voters;  and,  as  a 
natural  result,  the  better  members  of  the  Democratic  party 
have  habitually  sought  to  excuse  themselves  from  responsi- 
bility for  such  conduct.     Having  had  a  longer  supremacy  in 
the  affairs  of  a  great  city  than  any  other  municipal  organi- 
zation in  the  United  States,  Tammany  has  never  during  this 
generation  elected  a  first-class  mayor  for  the  city  of  New 
York,  and  but  rarely  a  mayor  of  the  second  class.1 

2.  Tammany  has  opposed  the  best  measures  for  police 
reform,  sanitary  reform,  civil  service  reform,  excise  reform, 
ballot  reform,  and  corrupt  practice  reform.  The  most  noto- 
rious scandals  and  corruptions  which  have  arisen  out  of  mu- 
nicipal government  in  New  York  City  have,  in  nearly  every 
instance,  exhibited  leaders  of  Tammany  and  officers  selected 
by  it  —  Tweed,  McCunn,  Barnard,  Cardoza,  and  the  recently 
condemned  police  justices  and  police  commissioners  —  as 
most  intimately  connected  with  these  evils.  Public  opinion 
in  the  United  States  and  the  most  candid  and  competent  of 

1  Mayor  Hewitt  — far  above  the  moral  tone  of  Tammany  — justly  commanded 
a  vote  beyond  Its  ranks. 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT   BY   PARTY  97 

foreign  writers  regard  Tammany  and  its  managers  as  mainly 
responsible  for  the  degradation  of  the  municipal  government 
in  New  York  City.1 

What  has  made  this  Tammany  party  ominously  significant 
are  the  facts  that  it  is  the  first  example  of  the  evolution  of 
mere  municipal  patronage,  conspiracy,  and  spoils  into  a  power 
great  enough  to  almost  dominate  a  state  party  in  a  presiden- 
tial election,  —  it  having  become,  before  its  defeat  in  1894,  a 
controlling  influence  for  corruption  at  Albany  and  an  appre- 
ciable force  of  the  same  kind  at  Washington.  There  was 
only  needed  a  confederation  of  city  factions  organized  on  a 
Tammany  basis  in  a  few  of  our  largest  cities  —  a  confedera- 
tion which  the  acceptance  of  the  extravagant  Home  Rule 
theories  we  have  considered  would  soon  produce  —  to  con- 
stitute a  municipal  power  for  corrupt  partisan  domination 
potential  enough  to  degrade,  if  not  to  control,  both  state  and 
national  politics. 

3.  Until  quite  recently,  the  Tammany  system  has  hardly 
had  defenders  on  the  basis  of  principles,  but  it  has  now 
found  an  elaborate  justification  in  a  volume  by  a  well-known 
writer  who  seems  to  present  the  system  as  the  latest  stage 
of  a  natural  and  inevitable  municipal  development.  He  does 
not  attempt  to  prove  the  Tammany  system  to  be  compatible 
with  our  constitutional  system,  but  presents  it  as  the  out- 
come of  forces  to  which  the  latter  must  yield,  as  a  new  species 
of  municipal  government,  —  born  of  Tammany  and  quite  sure 
to  prevail, —  which  he  designates  "government  by  syndi- 
cate." This  author,  after  referring  approvingly  to  the  Tam- 
many system,  and  to  the  present  boss  of  Tammany  and  his 
associates,  declares  that  "the  respectable  public  at  large 
ought  to  be  grateful  for  the  perfection  of  that  despotic  system 
by  which  the  whole  body  is  controlled  by  a  few  leaders  "  — 
certainly  an  astounding  declaration.2 

1  2  Bryce's  American  Commomcealth,  pp.  339-353. 

2  Politics  in  a  Democracy,  by  Daniel  Greenleaf  Thompson,  Chap.  XII.  pp.  34, 
42,  63,  108,  121.    We  are  told  in  substance  by  this  writer  that  if  we  should  over- 
throw this  syndicate  system,  something  similar  or  worse  would  come  in  its  place. 
We  must  think  he  has  overlooked  a  whole  hemisphere  of  the  subject,  for  there 
are  forces  of  patriotic  and  altruistic  sentiment,  far  above  the  moral  tone  of  a 

H 


«.'S  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

We  cannot  think  it  quite  justifiable  to  assume  that  the 
foreshadowing  of  the  ideal  municipal  system  of  the  future 
is  to  be  found  in  the  vast  city  which  is  among  those  worst 
governed  among  the  enlightened  nations,  rather  than  among 
those  which  are  the  best  governed,  for  it  is  at  least  possible 
that  civilization  in  the  future  may  build  upon  the  best 
theories  rather  than  upon  the  most  vicious  which  the  world 
can  supply. 

4.  Before  considering  those  practical  methods  of  Tammany 
upon  which  our  final  judgment  concerning  it  must  be  based, 
reference  to  some  facts  will  be  useful.  It  has  been  generally 
assumed  that  the  majority  of  the  voters  for  Tammany  have 
been  peculiarly  wicked,  while  little  notice  has  been  taken  of 
the  blinding  and  vicious  effects  of  its  system;  and  thus  atten- 
tion has  been  concentrated  upon  the  evil  results,  while  their 
constant  causes  have  been  overlooked  and  misconceived. 
Such  an  assumption  gives  plausibility  to  the  theory  that  the 
many  incompetent  and  bad  men  whom  Tammany  elects  truly 
represent  all  its  voters.  We  think  that  its  system  is  much 
worse  than  the  majority  of  its  supporters, —  at  least  much 
worse  than  they  think  it  to  be.  If  not,  how  are  we  to  explain 
the  facts  that  great  numbers  of  worthy  and  patriotic  men, 
perhaps  a  majority  of  adherents  of  Tammany,  despite  all  the 
infamous  disclosures  made  of  late  (1895),  still  defend  it  with 
passionate  earnestness  ?  How  has  it  happened  that  a  party 
system,  identified  with  a  scandalous  history  for  more  than 
a  generation,  has  hardly  called  forth  any  philosophical  in- 
quiry, —  save  that  just  referred  to  —  concerning  its  theories, 
methods,  or  inherent  tendencies,  —  has  hardly  found  any  ex- 
planation of  the  depravity  and  corruption  in  the  midst  of 
which  its  power  has  increased,  save  in  a  mere  fortuitous 
succession  of  wicked  party  managers  and  corrupt  officers? 
Are  there  no  deeper  and  constant  causes  for  such  anomalies? 
When  it  is  notorious  that  many  good  citizens,  who  lament 
the  municipal  evils  before  them,  adhere  to  Tammany  not- 
withstanding its  manifold  corruptions  and  vicious  methods, 

Tammany  syndicate,  which  most  be  taken  into  account  in  interpreting  the 
municipal  tendencies  of  our  times. 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT   BY  PARTY  99 

we  feel  that  among  the  gravest  municipal  problems  to  be 
solved  are  these :  Why  are  such  facts  possible  ?  What  kind 
of  a  power  is  it  that  binds  such  men  to  the  continuing  sup- 
port of  such  an  organization  ?  Why  have  their  reason  and 
sense  of  duty  failed  ?  We  hope  to  offer  some  explanation  as 
to  these  ominous  facts. 

Ill 

Perhaps  a  majority  of  voters  in  all  parties  yet  think  that 
party  divisions  are  desirable  in  city  affairs  and  that  party 
government  for  cities  is  not  only  the  best  practicable,  but 
that  it  is  inevitable.  Something  more  than  theoretical  rea- 
soning will  be  necessary  to  change  these  convictions.  We 
must  dissect  city-party  government  and  examine  its  parts. 
We  must  show  the  relations  between  theories  and  facts, 
—  looking  into  the  practical  methods  and  mechanism  of  city- 
party  managers.  Tammany  can  supply  excellent  illustra- 
tions applicable  to  all  city-party  government. 

1.  We  have  considered  its  threefold  and  incompatible  rela- 
tions. These  conflicting  relations  not  only  involve  irrecon- 
cilable duties  and  interests,  but  strongly  tend  to  prevent  a 
just  regard  for  municipal  rights,  and  to  make  true  consti- 
tutional Home  Rule  impossible.  The  need  of  at  all  times 
considering  such  threefold  relations  almost  excludes  the  pos- 
sibility of  Tammany  being  truly  faithful  to  any  one  of  them, 
and  directly  leads  to  bargains,  betrayals,  and  corruptions. 
If  Home  Rule  and  state  intermeddling  are  incompatible,  how 
can  Tammany  act  in  the  interest  of  both  the  city  and  the 
state  ?  City  interests  are  unscrupulously  sacrificed,  and  city 
patronage  is  freely  used,  to  carry  state  and  national  elections 
for  the  advantage  of  Tammany,  its  boss  and  its  leaders.  In 
1892,  for  example,  they  audaciously  disclaimed  even  the  pre- 
tence of  treating  the  elections  for  the  city  on  the  basis  of  its 
interests,  and  declared  in  their  official  publication  "that 
Tammany  subordinated  everything  to  the  interest  of  the 
national  ticket.  There  was  practically  no  campaign  made 
so  far  as  the  local  ticket  was  concerned."1  When  such  a 

1  Note  Tammany  Hall,  pp.  100,  101. 


100  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

theory  of  infidelity  and  betrayal  has  been  accepted,  it  is  folly 
to  expect  a  city  party  will  ever  be  faithful  to  municipal 
interests.  Here  we  have  the  first  false,  corrupting  lesson 
which  Tammany  teaches  its  adherents, —  a  lesson  which  is 
taught  by  every  local  party  which,  in  governing  a  city,  also 
acts  on  the  behalf  of  a  state  and  a  national  party. 

2.  The  next  lesson  taught  by  the  theory  and  methods  of 
Tammany,  in  fact  by  all  party  government  in  municipalities, 
is  hardly  less  demoralizing.     From  the  fact  that  no  party 
principles  are  involved  in  city  administration,  it  results  that 
the  bonds  of  union  among  the  adherents  of  city  parties  and 
the  motives  of  their  exertions  are  mainly  the  hopes  of  offices 
and  the  profits  of  controlling  local  affairs  and  of  extorting 
bribes  and  assessments.     Not  only  are  the  nature  and  func- 
tions of  a  party  thus  degraded  in  the  eyes  of  the  people,  but 
they  are  taught  to  regard  it  as  an  agency  for  advancing  the 
selfish  interests  of  its  adherents. 

3.  The  managers  of  a  city  party  know  very  well  that, 
considered  in  reference  to  municipal  interests,  the  political 
opinions  of  city  policemen,  justices,  and  other  municipal 
officers  and  employees  are  utterly  unimportant;   yet  these 
managers  inculcate  the  false  and  demoralizing  doctrine  that 
such  opinions  are  material  to  the  general  welfare,  thus  pre- 
senting parties  and  their  leaders  before  the  people  as  un- 
scrupulous deceivers,  acting  under  false  pretences  for  personal 
or  partisan  advantage.     In  these  facts  we  find  some  of  the 
reasons  why  high-toned  men  are  repelled  from  city  offices 
and  low  politicians  are  able  to  grasp  them. 

City  parties  and  their  managers  teach  their  adherents  that 
party  control  of  city  affaire  is  a  blessing,  and  an  end  in  itself, 
for  the  attainment  of  which  every  municipal  servant  is  bound 
to  exert  himself.  They  insist  that  no  man  should  fill  a 
municipal  place  merely  because  he  is  the  most  competent  for 
it,  but  that  he  should  be  wholly  excluded  from  it  unless  he 
belongs  to  the  dominant  party.  The  present  boss  of  Tam- 
many (1895)  has  proclaimed  this  theory  in  these  words: 
"All  the  employees  of  the  city  government  from  the  mayor 
to  the  porter  who  makes  the  fire  in  his  office  should  be  mem- 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT   BY   PARTY  101 

bers  of  the  Tammany  organization ; "  and  Tammany  in  its 
official  organ  has  repeated  and  promulgated  this  half-civilized 
party  theory.1 

Over  against  such  claims,  we  declare  these  truths  to  be 
indisputable :  (1)  It  is  both  the  right  and  the  interest  of  the 
city  to  have  the  best  men  in  its  service,  irrespective  of  their 
political  and  religious  opinions ;  (2)  it  is,  in  a  moral  sense, 
the  right  of  the  fittest  citizens  —  regardless  of  such  opinions 

—  to  enter  this  service ;  (3)  that  it  is  both  the  moral  and 
legal  duty  of  the  appointing  officers  to  choose  such  men. 

4.  The  Tammany  system,  following  the  worst  methods 
of  the  spoils  system,  makes  the  hope  of  winning  offices  an 
incentive  to  degrading  partisan  and  official  servility  in 
municipal  politics.  It  keeps  out  the  worthiest  men,  who 
might  but  for  it  seek  offices,  and  gives  them  to  the  men 
who  are  servile  to  the  party,  its  managers  and  bosses.  It 
says,  in  substance,  to  every  citizen,  "If  you  want  offices, 
promotions,  licenses,  permits,  exemptions  from  arrest,  light 
sentences  in  the  courts,  easy  places  on  the  pay-rolls  of  labor, 
or  official  toleration  of  your  immoral  pursuits,  be  servile  to 
Tammany  and  its  boss ;  defend  its  vicious  methods ;  labor  to 
increase  its  majority;  serve  and  justify  its  leaders;  be  silent 
as  to  their  corruption ;  disclose  no  official  abuses ;  make  liberal 
contributions  to  the  Tammany  treasury;  join  its  processions ; 
cheer  at  its  meetings ;  give  money  to  its  leaders  and  clubs ; 
bring  the  vilest  voters  to  the  polls  and  make  them  vote  the 
Tammany  ticket."  It  says,  on  the  other  hand,  to  those  who 
with  manly  independence  and  self-respect  discharge  all  the 
duties  of  good  citizens  but  refuse  to  act  the  part  of  a  vassal 
to  a  feudal  lord :  "  There  are  neither  places  nor  honors  for  you 
under  this  government.  Let  them  go  to  our  party  opponents 

—  to  those  who  often  conspire  and  cooperate  with  Tammany 
leaders  —  rather  than  to  you." 

1  North  American  Review,  1892,  and  Tammany  Hall,  p.  69.  Apparently  for 
the  purpose  of  conciliating  public  opinion,  or  when  it  knows  its  interests  will  not 
suffer,  Tammany,  on  very  rare  occasions,  elects  an  officer  who  is  not  one  of  its 
adherents.  For  example,  in  the  municipal  election  of  1892,  it  nominated  a 
Republican  for  judge,  but  it  seems  to  have  secretly  received  $5000  for  the  nomi- 
nation. 


102  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

Tammany  and  its  managers  practically  say  to  its  adhe- 
rents, "If  you  will  give  us  a  majority  of  the  votes,  we  will 
give  you  the  monopoly  of  the  offices,  employments,  and  spoils 
which  our  common  victory  can  capture."  This,  we  aver, 
is  government  by  coercion,  conspiracy,  and  prostitution,  and 
not  "by  syndicate." 

The  patriotic  reader  has  doubtless  been  asking  himself 
what  good  comes  to  the  people  from  enforcing  these  partisan 
tests  for  office?  They  do  not  bring  the  best  men  into  the 
municipal  service.  They  are  needless,  because  cities  would 
be  better  off  if  they  had  not  a  mere  partisan  or  politician  in 
their  employment;  they  are  deceptive,  false,  and  despotic, 
because  there  is  not  a  position  in  the  municipal  service  for 
which  particular  opinions  about  party  politics  or  religion 
are  in  any  sense  a  qualification. 

5.  It  is  one  of  the  effects  of  the  Tammany  system  —  of  the 
party  system  everywhere  in  municipalities — that  it  aggra- 
vates party  animosities,  increases  party  spirit  and  conten- 
tion, and  more  and  more  separates  from  each  other  the  most 
patriotic  men  in  each  party,  whose  cooperation  is  the  funda- 
mental condition  of  good  city  government.  It  also  facilitates 
conspiracies  bet  ween  opposing  party  leaders  for  securing  offices 
and  spoils,  which,  as  we  shall  soon  see,  they  habitually  divide 
between  themselves.  It  degrades  our  civic  ideals  and  the 
whole  subject  of  city  government  in  the  eyes  of  the  people. 
It  publicly  violates  justice ;  it  makes  partisan  merchandise 
out  of  public  functions;  it  causes  selfish  politicians  and 
despotic  party  managers  to  be  feared  and  courted;  it  repels 
good  men  from  the  field  of  their  municipal  duties  and  fills 
them  with  despair;  it  causes  a  general  suspicion  as  to  the 
honesty  and  justice  of  all  municipal  administration ;  it  lays 
a  broad  foundation  for  partisan  despotism  and  corruption. 

Take  policemen  and  police  justices  as  illustrations.  Ob- 
viously no  party  can  gain  any  advantage  —  hardly  any  person 
but  a  brazen-faced  spoilsman  would  avow  a  purpose  to  do  so 
—  by  reason  of  the  party  or  religious  opinions  of  these  offi- 
cials, save  through  a  corrupt  prostitution  of  their  authority 
for  partisan  or  sectarian  ends.  If  these  officers  are  not  ex- 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT   BY   PARTY  103 

pected  to  take  sides  with  their  party  or  sect,  —  to  defer  to  and 
favor  Tammany  managers  and  bosses,  —  of  what  consequence 
are  their  political  opinions  ?  Why  such  desperate  contests 
over  their  selection,  if  they  are  expected  to  be  impartial? 
It  is  as  obvious  that  an  honest  exercise  of  their  authority 
would  not  regard  the  politics  of  offenders,  or  the  wishes  of 
the  party  leaders  or  boss,  as  it  is  that  a  prostitution  of  their 
authority  may  serve  the  purposes  of  both  personal  and  party 
corruption. 

6.  The  authority  for  removal  and  discharge  has  been  un- 
hesitatingly used  by  Tammany  —  and  according  to  the  city- 
party  theory  of  governing  cities  may  be  justly  used  —  to  gain 
the  support  of  voters  and  to  intimidate  opponents.  Every 
one  who  holds  a  place,  a  license,  or  a  permit  under  Tammany 
understands  he  must  vote  for  it,  and  work  for  it,  at  his  peril.1 

It  is  but  a  logical  deduction  from  the  conditions  upon 
which  Tammany  has  conferred  offices,  licenses,  and  permits, 
that  those  who  received  them  have  come  under  an  implied 
obligation  to  do  their  utmost  to  make  themselves  useful  to 
the  party  and  its  managers.  Offices  conferred  as  rewards  for 
party  work  are  to  be  held  subject  to  the  duty  of  continuing  it. 
Here,  in  large  part,  is  the  secret  of  the  vigorous  discipline 
and  cohesive  force  of  the  Tammany  organization  —  and,  we 
may  add,  of  all  city  parties  which  act  on  its  system.  This 
obligation  has  seriously  impaired  the  moral  tone  and  inde- 
pendence of  all  municipal  servants  who  came  under  it. 
Those  who  refuse  to  conform  to  it  have  been  regarded  not 
merely  as  traitors  to  their  party,  but  as  violators  of  an  implied 
contract  and  pledge  of  honor  and  duty.  A  besotted  partisan- 
ship and  a  spirit  of  feudal  servility,  blind  to  the  evils  of 
municipal  party  despotism,  have  been  thus  developed  by 
Tammany  by  which  many  even  of  its  worthy  adherents  have 
been  made  incapable  of  forming  any  just  estimate  of  its 
vicious  system. 

1  A  Tammany  member  of  the  New  York  Board  of  Police,  in  substance,  ad- 
mitted, before  an  investigating  committee  in  1894,  that  party  reasons  and  the 
influence  of  Tammany  generally  prevailed  in  appointing  policemen  —  if  not  in 
making  transfers  and  promotions  in  the  force. 


104  THE   GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 


IV 

When  such  feudal  relations  prevail,  it  is  natural  and  easy 
to  extort  political  assessments  from  the  salaries  and  wages 
of  the  municipal  servants  to  meet  the  expenses  of  Tammany 
and  keep  its  managers  in  power.  If  a  party  may  govern  a 
city  under  a  virtual  contract  that  its  adherents  are  to  have 
all  the  offices  and  spoils  on  condition  of  keeping  the  party 
in  power,  who  can  deny  the  right  of  collecting  from  those 
favored  adherents  the  money  needed  for  that  purpose  ?  The 
false  sense  of  honor  and  of  duty  to  a  party  thus  developed 
have  been  so  effective  that,  even  since  the  collection  of  such 
assessments  has  been  prohibited  by  law,  they  have  been  paid 
by  a  large  proportion  of  the  Tammany  officers.  The  danger 
of  being  removed  on  false  charges  and  of  being  scorned  by 
party  associates  has  powerfully  reenforced  this  perverted 
sense  of  duty.1  The  amount  of  the  assessment  usually  ex- 
torted— under  peril  of  removal — from  those  in  the  municipal 
service  —  including  even  the  school-teachers  —  has  been  five 
per  cent  annually  on  salaries  and  wages.  Tammany  assess- 
ment extortioners,  with  copies  of  the  city  pay-rolls  in  their 
hands,  challenged  the  city  clerks  at  their  desks,  confronted 
the  city  washerwomen  as  they  scrubbed  the  floors,  and  pur- 
sued the  poor  city  laborers  to  their  garrets  and  their  cellars, 
—  a  practice  which  can  only  befit  a  half-civilized  despotism.2 
It  would  seem  that  from  a  third  of  a  million  dollars  to  more 
than  double  that  sum  has  thus  been  extorted  in  a  year  by 
these  assessment  collection  pirates  to  be  used  about  managing 
city  politics,  carrying  elections,  and  paying  the  profits  of  city- 
party  managers  and  bosses.3  These  vast  sums  have  been 

1  The  New  York  civil  service  act,  Laws  1883,  Ch.  354,  prohibited  the  collec- 
tion of  political  assessments,  but  the  managers  of  both  parties  in  New  York  City 
have  exerted  themselves  to  defeat  its  purpose.  The  assessment  extortion  system 
seems  to  have  originated  with  Tammany  under  Jackson's  administration,  and  the 
Republican  party  in  New  York  City  apparently  adopted  it  from  Tammany.  Both 
parties  seem  to  have  sometimes  united  in  a  joint  assessment  robbery  of  the  police 
force,  the  fruits  of  which  they  shared  between  them.  Laylor's  Cyclo.  Pol.  Set., 
etc.,  p.  154. 

8  1  Lalor's  Cyclo.  Pol.  Set.,  etc.,  pp.  153,  154;  3  do.,  p.  786. 

•  There  were  in  1897  in  the  service  of  the  city  and  the  county  of  New  York  — 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT   BY  PARTY  105 

used  by  party  managers  and  bosses  in  their  discretion,  for 
purposes  however  degrading  and  corrupt,  under  no  liability 
to  account  before  any  court  or  to  make  any  public  explana- 
tion. How  much  of  this  money  has  been  used  to  procure 
illegal  naturalizations  and  registrations,  to  bribe  and  colonize 
voters,  to  fill  the  pockets  of  the  party  leaders  and  bosses,  who 
have  suddenly  grown  rich,  none  but  those  who  have  prospered 
by  such  corruption  and  despotism  can  tell. 

This  Tammany  practice  has  been  largely  imitated  in  many 
American  cities.  Is  it  any  wonder,  then,  that  the  trade  of 
managing  city-party  politics  has  been  profitable,  or  that  city 
government  has  been  degraded  in  the  United  States  ?  If  the 
compensations  of  these  municipal  servants  were  but  reason- 
able, this  extortion  was  in  substance  party  piracy  against 
them ;  if  their  compensations  were  made  too  high  by  partisan 
legislators  to  facilitate  the  extortion,  then  it  was  an  indirect 
party  robbery  of  the  taxpayers  and  the  city  treasury.1 

We  cannot  be  surprised  that  these  servants,  thus  unpro- 
tected and  plundered  by  the  government  they  were  serving, 
were  often  ready  to  compensate  their  losses  at  the  city's 
expense.  Why  should  they  think  the  city  which  failed  to 
protect  them  entitled  to  their  whole  time,  to  their  best  ser- 
vices, or  even  to  correct  accounts?  If  the  ruling  party  and 
its  agents  may  thus  cooperate  in  robbing  city  policemen  of 
their  earnings,  why  may  not  these  policemen  levy  blackmail 
upon  the  keepers  of  apple  stands,  market  stalls,  and  bawdy- 
houses?  In  fact,  the  fundamental  methods  of  Tammany, 
and  of  city  government  generally,  contain  the  suggestion 
and  the  justification  of  the  greatest  frauds  and  corruptions 
by  which  American  cities  have  been  degraded. 

It  hardly  need  be  said  that  this  assessment  extortion 
degrades  the  whole  municipal  service,  both  in  its  own  eyes 
and  the  eyes  of  the  people  generally.  It  inculcates  a  theory 

their  geographical  limits  being  the  same  — about  21,000  officers  and  employees, 
whose  annual  salaries  and  compensation  amount  to  about  $20,000,000.  An  assess- 
ment of  five  per  cent  on  this  sum  would  be  $1,000,000  annually. 

1  John  Kelly,  a  boss  of  Tammany,  seems  to  have  publicly  defended  excessive 
salaries  on  the  ground  that  the  servants  of  the  cities  should  be  reimbursed  for 
their  party  contributions.  1  Lalor's  Cyclo.Pol.  Sci.,  p.  154. 


106  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

of  universal  injustice,  servility,  and  despotism  to  which  only 
a  half-civilized  party  spirit  can  make  an  intelligent  city 
community  blind.  Were  any  citizens  or  any  party  to  pro- 
pose a  law  declaring  in  plain  words,  (1)  that  no  city  or  village 
shall  give  office  or  employment  to  any  save  adherents  of  the 
dominant  party,  (2)  that  all  city  officers  and  laborers  may  be 
assessed  or  taxed  at  the  pleasure  of  the  managers  of  this 
party,  and  (3)  that  the  money  thus  secured  may  be  used 
secretly  and  at  the  pleasure  of  those  who  have  extorted  it, 
to  carry  elections,  keep  themselves  in  power,  and  to  reward 
their  own  services,  the  proposed  law  would  not  only  be  re- 
jected and  execrated,  but  its  authors  would  be  regarded  as 
ridiculous  and  foolhardy  madmen.  Yet  such  a  law  would 
but  give  legal  sanction  to  the  Tammany  system,  which  pre- 
vails, in  substance,  in  many  American  cities. 


1.  Another  Tammany  way  of  getting  money  from  the  be- 
stowal of  offices — a  natural  outgrowth  of  the  city-party  assess- 
ment system  —  is  even  more  degrading  and  disgraceful.  In 
substance  Tammany  has  sold  many  of  the  offices  for  which 
its  conventions  or  managers  have  made  the  nominations.  It 
has  demanded  a  sum  of  money  in  hand,  or  assurance  of  its 
payment,  as  a  condition  of  making  nominations,  even  for 
the  office  of  judge  —  the  transactions  being  of  course  thinly 
disguised  as  a  supply  of  money  for  the  payment  of  election 
expenses.  A  nomination  by  Tammany  having  been  gener- 
ally equivalent  to  an  election,  and  the  sum  paid  for  it  having 
been  at  least  from  twenty  to  thirty  times  as  much  as  any 
expense  Tammany  would  incur  in  the  matter,  it  is  no  mis- 
representation of  the  transaction  to  call  it  a  sale.  There  are 
good  reasons  for  believing  that,  in  a  similar  manner,  Tam- 
many and  the  officers  it  has  selected  have  been  in  the  habit 
of  selling  appointments  to  various  grades  of  office.  If  the 
party  itself  may  take  money  for  nominations,  why  may  not 
its  boss,  its  managers,  and  leaders  follow  its  example? 
Ample  facts  will  appear  on  this  subject. 


MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT  BY  PARTY  107 

The  most  disgraceful  of  these  sales,  which  alone  will  be 
noticed  here,  have  been  sales  of  nominations  for  the  office  of 
judge  of  the  higher  courts  in  the  city  of  New  York.  The 
regular  price  of  a  nomination  for  the  office  seems  to  have 
been  from  $10,000  to  $15,000.! 

As  every  candidate  for  a  judgeship  must  know  that  the 
sum  he  pays  upon  a  nomination  vastly  exceeds  any  legiti- 
mate or  probable  expenses  incident  to  his  election,  he  appar- 
ently knows  that  the  claim  that  the  payment  is  made  to 
cover  these  expenses  is  an  audacious  pretext.2 

It  is  obvious  that  there  can  be  no  legal  or  moral  justifica- 
tion of  a  party  in  thus  selling  its  favor  and  influence  in  the 
corrupt  market  of  municipal  politics.  The  practice  strongly 
tends  to  the  degradation  of  the  judiciary  by  bringing  upon 
the  bench  lawyers  of  inferior  moral  tone  and  capacity.  Not 
the  noblest  lawyers,  but  the  most  unscrupulous  or  neces- 
sitous, who  seek  office  are  likely  to  be  the  highest  bidders 
for  the  judgeships  which  Tammany  puts  upon  the  judicial 
auction  market. 

2.  If  the  facts  could  be  disclosed  at  the  trial  of  a  prisoner 
charged  with  selling  his  vote,  the  judge  might  be  confronted 
with  proof  that  the  very  money  with  which  he  had  bought 
his  nomination  had  been  used  to  corrupt  the  prisoner,  —  if, 
indeed,  it  had  not  been  applied  by  the  city-party  boss  or 
managers  to  their  own  use.  It  hardly  need  be  said  that  it 
is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  judges  should  gain  their 
places  in  a  way  which  not  only  leaves  them  a  real  liberty  to 

1  Writers  worthy  of  credence  estimate  the  regular  price  at  about  $15,000,  and 
they  say  that  the  price  of  a  district  attorneyship  has  been  the  same.    1  Lalor's 
Cyclo.  Pol.  Sci.,  p.  154;   Ivin's  Machine  Politics  and  Money  in  Elections,  etc., 
pp.  56-59  and  84.    This  is  a  very  instructive  volume.    Its  author  had  been  cham- 
berlain of  the  city  of  New  York,  and  has,  therefore,  had  rare  opportunities  of 
knowing  the  secret  methods  of  Tammany. 

2  Honorable  men  have  publicly  refused  nominations  because  tendered  on  the 
condition  of  paying  money  for  them.    3  Lalor's  Cyclo.  Pol.  Sci.,  etc.,  p.  349. 
When  Tammany  triumphed  in  the  judicial  elections  of  1895,  it  demanded  its 
price  for  judicial  nominations,  —  one  candidate  paying  $5000  in  connection  with 
nomination  to  a  judgeship  in  an  inferior  court,  and  another  paying  $3500  in  con- 
nection with  nomination  of  yet  lower  grade,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that,  under 
the  new  ballot  law  of  New  York,  all  voting  papers  were  supplied  at  public  ex- 
pense.   N.  Y.  Evening  Post,  Nov.  12, 1895. 


108  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

be  impartial  but  allows  the  people  to  think  they  are  impar- 
tial. It  is  bad  enough  that  a  city  party  makes  the  acceptance 
of  its  platform  a  test  for  judicial  office,  but  it  is  far  worse 
when  it  prevents  any  lawyer  among  its  adherents  being  a 
judge  until  he  has  compromised  his  independence  by  pre- 
senting himself  as  the  highest  bidder  before  a  party  conven- 
tion, or  in  the  secret  council  of  its  managers  or  boss,  as  being 
ready  to  pay  the  auction  price  demanded. 

May  we  not  well  be  surprised  that  the  judiciary  in  New 
York  City  has  remained  so  largely  respectable  ?  It  is  plain 
that  under  such  conditions  a  noble  judicial  independence  is 
impossible.1  The  judicial  auction  system  practically  says  to 
every  lawyer,  "  If  you  would  reach  the  highest  honors  of  your 
profession,  accept  the  creed  of  the  ruling  party  —  or  falsely 
pretend  to  do  so  —  and  be  servile  to  its  boss  and  leaders  ;  for- 
bear to  expose  party  abuses  ;  take  no  case  against  the  interest 
of  your  party  ;  make  no  exposure  of  its  abuses,  and  then  you 
can  bid  with  hope  for  all  the  judgeships  you  can  pay  for." 

It  is  humiliating  to  be  compelled  to  think  that  the  servility 
and  hypocrisy  thus  induced  have  made  it  easier  for  unworthy 
lawyers  to  ascend  the  bench  and  have  dissuaded  the  noblest 
members  of  the  bar  from  attempting  to  do  so.2 

Such  facts  seem  to  go  far  toward  explaining  why  in  recent 
years  the  judiciary  in  New  York  City  has  been  inferior  to 
what  it  was  before  Tammany  sold  judgeships, — inferior  to 
that  of  the  other  parts  of  the  state  of  New  York,  —  and  they 
also  help  us  to  see  how  city-party  managers  and  bosses  have 
so  easily  grown  rich. 

1  "  The  son,  or  the  son-in-law,  of  a  judge  IB  sure  of  a  good  practice,  and  referees 
are  appointed  from  lists  which  are  largely  dictated  by  the  professional  politicians 
of  both  parties."    Atlantic  Monthly,  February,  1898,  p.  152. 

2  It  is  not  intended  to  say  that  the  lawyer  who  makes  the  highest  bid  will  cer- 
tainly get  the  nomination,  —  for  the  fear  of  public  opinion  may  exclude  the  basest 
bidder,  —  but  that  the  price  offered,  the  serrility  to  party  interests  tendered  with 
It,  as  well  as  past  services  for  the  party,  are  taken  into  account.    How  much 
ignorance,  how  much  professional  incapacity,  how  much  low  moral  tone  may  b« 
counterbalanced  by  an  extra  8500  or  $5000  offered  secretly— perhaps  to  a  boss  or 
to  a  clique  — for  the  nomination,  are  among  the  secrets  of  city-party  action 
which  have  been  as  carefully  guarded  as  were  the  secrets  of  the  Inquisition  or 
the  Star  Chamber. 


MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT  BY  PARTY  109 

This  judicial  auctioneering  is  said  to  have  exhibited  such 
disgraceful  spectacles  as  impecunious  partisan  lawyers  mort- 
gaging their  property,  and  even  their  judicial  salaries  in  ad- 
vance, and  "  giving  their  notes  to  bosses,"  for  securing  the 
payment  of  their  bids  for  a  nomination  to  a  judgeship.1  We 
repeat  that,  under  these  auction  sales,  lawyers  having  small 
practice,  low  standards  of  self-respect,  and  few  scruples,  are 
the  most  likely  to  be  the  highest  bidders,  while  lawyers  of 
the  higher  order  naturally  shrink  from  so  ignominious  a 
competition.  Many  lawyers  seem  to  have  become  so  famil- 
iarized with  these  scandalous  abuses  that  their  moral  stand- 
ards and  sense  of  professional  dignity  have  been  lamentably 
impaired.  The  extent  of  this  impairment  would  quickly 
appear  if  a  national  party  should  demand  $15,000,  or  any 
sum  whatever,  for  a  judicial  nomination  to  be  made  by  a 
President  it  had  elected.  Who  doubts  that  the  country 
would  be  shocked  by  such  a  scandal,  or  that  the  party 
approving  it  would  be  overwhelmed  and  disgraced?2 

In  these  facts  we  may  see  the  truth  we  have  before  stated, 
—  how  much  higher  is  the  moral  tone  of  national-party 
politics  than  that  of  city-party  politics.  Great  numbers  of 
worthy  men,  who  in  their  besotted  party  zeal  vote  for  judi- 
cial candidates  whose  nominations  have  been  thus  bought, 
would  indignantly  oppose  the  enactment  of  a  law  which 
should  declare  that  no  lawyer  should  be  a  judge  in  New 
York  City  until  he  had  paid  the  price  demanded  by  a  city 
party  for  his  nomination. 

Public  opinion  in  New  York  City  —  which  the  ruling 
party  always  fears  —  has  even  in  recent  years  caused  several 
excellent  judges  to  be  elected,  yet  it  is  true  that  the  judiciary 

1 1  Lalor's  Cyclo.  Pol.  Sci.,  p.  153 ;  Atlantic  Monthly,  February,  1898,  p. 
152. 

2  The  Bar  Association  of  the  city  of  New  York,  recognizing  its  duty,  has 
repeatedly  considered  the  means  of  making  its  influence  effective  against  such 
nominations.  (See  its  report  of  May  10,  1898.)  We  fear  the  Association  will 
accomplish  hut  little  until  it  boldly  proclaims  a  duty  and  purpose  on  its  part  to 
protect  the  interest  of  the  people  in  this  matter,  and  denounces  the  pretended 
right  of  parties  to  monopolize  judicial  nominations  in  order  to  make  spoils  and 
merchandise  for  rewarding  their  favorites  and  filling  their  treasuries.  When  it 
shall  do  this,  it  will  win  a  noble  victory,  and  these  abuses  will  cease. 


110  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

of  New  York  City  has  deteriorated  under  city-party  rule. 
Her  noblest  judges  belonged  to  a  past  generation.  It  is  for 
the  reader  to  decide  whether  a  judge  who  has  bought  his 
nomination  of  a  party  is  likely  —  is  free  —  to  adequately 
resist  its  requests  for  facile  naturalizations  or  for  lenient 
rulings  in  favor  of  culprits  from  its  own  ranks.  Criminals 
prefer  to  be  prosecuted  by  a  district  attorney,  and  to  be  tried 
by  a  judge,  who  have  bought  their  offices  of  the  party  to 
which  they  all  belong,  as  these  criminals  also  much  prefer  a 
jury  wholly  drawn  from  among  the  adherents  of  their  own 
party.  This  at  least  is  certain,  that  the  judges  of  New  York 
City  will  never  be  what  they  should  be  so  long  as  any  judge 
is  tolerated  among  them,  or  by  the  bar  of  the  city,  who  has 
bought  his  nomination  of  a  political  party. 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT  BY  PARTY  111 


CHAPTER  V. — MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT  BY  PARTY  AS  ILLUS- 
TRATED  BY   THE   TAMMANY   DEMOCRACY  (continued) 

Prices  paid  to  Tammany  for  various  offices.  Prices  paid  her  for  judgeships 
since  the  Greater  New  York  was  created.  The  police  courts  and  the  police  force 
as  sources  of  Tammany  income.  Party  theory  of  governing  cities.  Tammany's 
relation  to  the  liquor  and  lodging-house  interests.  Blackmailing  in  connection 
with  licenses  and  permits.  Tammany  extortion  and  intimidation  in  connection 
with  legislation.  Tammany  methods,  agents,  and  theories  for  making  city  con- 
trol absolute  and  profitable.  The  Tammany  organization,  districts  and  officers. 
Tammany  "  Leaders."  Patronage  apportioned  to  districts.  Laborers  made  sub- 
servient to  Tammany.  Tammany  captains  and  leaders  are  local  bosses.  Func- 
tions of  Assembly  district  leaders.  Gross  wrong  of  making  party  leaders  police 
justices.  How  leaders  of  different  parties  conspire  together  in  city  elections 
Why  city  parties  do  not  expose  abuses.  How  Tammany  and  the  city-party  system 
degrade  the  police  administration.  How  Tammany  has  prostituted  the  police 
courts.  Our  bad  police  justices  appointed  by  partisan  and  autocratic  mayors. 

1.  WHEN  a  city  party  can  exact  its  price  for  a  judgeship,  it 
can  easily  enforce  its  terms  for  lower  places.  No  one,  appar- 
ently, could  be  a  sheriff,  a  district  attorney,  a  police  justice, 
a  civil  justice,  a  coroner,  a  commissioner,  or  a  head  of  a 
bureau  under  Tammany  without  paying  its  price  either  in 
money  or  in  services  for  the  party  or  its  managers.1 

1  For  the  office  of  county  clerk,  or  register,  $15,000  or  more  seems  to  have 
been  paid ;  for  that  of  alderman,  $13,000 ;  for  that  of  sheriff,  $25,000 ;  for  that  of 
comptroller,  $10,000;  for  that  of  mayor,  $20,000.  Machine  Politics,  etc.,  pp.  50, 
56,  57,  67.  Tammany  has  been  so  rigid  in  exacting  a  money  price  for  its  favors 
that  it  requires  payments  even  from  the  members  of  the  committees  of  its  own 
party  organization,  thus  collecting  an  annual  income  of  many  thousands  of  dol- 
lars. Tammany  Hall,  p.  135.  Tammany,  according  to  the  journals,  has  con- 
tinued its  mercenary  methods  of  dealing  with  judicial  nominations  and  elections 
since  the  creation  of  the  Greater  New  York  in  1897,  though  the  uncertainty  of  its 
victory  in  the  election  of  this  year  apparently  caused  the  price  of  judicial  advance- 
ment to  fall  considerably  in  the  Tammany  market.  The  sum  thus  apparently 
shown  to  be  paid  to  its  finance  committee  in  1897  by  the  person  nominated  and 
elected  by  Tammany  to  a  judgeship  was  $5000 ;  the  sum  apparently  paid  by  the 
person  nominated  and  elected  by  it  to  a  justiceship  was  over  $850;  see  further  on 
this  subject  Ch.  XVIII. ;  the  person  nominated  on  the  Citizens'  Union  ticket  for 
district  attorney  in  the  election  of  1897  paid  nothing  either  for  his  nomination 
or  his  election  expenses.  All  ballots  at  this  time  were  prepared,  printed,  and 
supplied  at  the  public  expense.  N.  Y.  Times,  Nov.  8  and  10,  1897. 


112  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

2.  The  police  courts  of  New  York  City  have  furnished 
significant  illustrations  of  the  illegitimate  income  of  the  rul- 
ing city  party  and  its  managers.     In  1894  there  were  fifteen 
police  justices  in  the  city,  each  having  a  salary  of  88000  a 
year, —  a  sum-  sufficient  to  command  a  grade  of  justices  far 
superior  to  those  generally  in  office.     There  is  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  Tammany  has  exacted  a  sale  price  of  not  less  than 
$2500  for  the  original  appointment  of  a  justice  for  a  term 
of  ten  years,  or  $37,500  for  filling  these  fifteen  places,  to 
which  must  be  added  an  assessment  of  five  per  cent  on  their 
salaries  annually,  or  $6000  in  all,  thus  giving  an  annual 
income  from  these  justices  of  not  less  than  $10,000.     To  all 
this  the  assessments  upon  the  salaries  and  wages  of  other 
police  court  officials  and  employees  must  be  added.     We 
shall  soon  see  how  lamentably  this  city-party  system  has 
degraded  the  police  courts. 

The  police  force  may  supply  another  illustration.  There 
were  in  1896  about  5000  members  of  the  police  force  of  the 
city  of  New  York,  and  their  annual  salaries  amounted  to 
more  than  86,500,000,  upon  which  an  assessment  of  five  per 
cent  would  yield  $325,000  annually. 

There  are  reasons  for  believing  that  Tammany  and  its 
managers  have  received  from  $200  to  $300,  if  not  more,  for 
each  appointment  to  membership  of  this  force,  save  in  cases 
in  which  Republican  party  managers  in  conspiracy  with  Tam- 
many have  shared  in  the  spoils.  That  large  sums  of  money 
have  been  paid  for  police  promotions,  and  that  the  payment 
of  several  thousands  of  dollars  has  been  necessary  to  secure 
the  position  of  captain  in  the  police  force,  can  hardly  be 
doubted.1 

3.  It  is  a  significant  illustration  of  the  effects  of  city-party 
rule  that,  though  the  police  force  of  New  York  City  was  in 
1894  generally  believed  to  have  become  corrupt  through  par- 
tisan favoritism,  all  investigation  of  the  matter  was  opposed 
by  one  party,  while  the  sincerity  of  the  other  in  formally 
asking  it  was  so  much  distrusted  that  for  a  time  honorable 

1  See  farther  facts  in  this  chapter. 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT  BY  PARTY  113 

lawyers  seem  to  have  refused  a  retainer  from  a  legislative 
committee.  Nor  is  it  less  significant  that  this  investigation 
did  not  originate  with  any  party  or  party  leader,  but  had  its 
origin  and  strength  in  a  non-partisan  body, —  the  New  York 
Chamber  of  Commerce, —  and  that  it  was  made  effective  only 
because  a  powerful  non-partisan  public  opinion  overawed  the 
party  in  power  at  Albany. 

If  we  bear  in  mind  the  fact  that  a  party  governing  a  city 
as  a  rule  allows  no  man  to  be  a  judge,  district  attorney, 
sheriff,  justice,  coroner,  or  policeman  unless  (1)  he  is  one 
of  its  adherents,  (2)  has  paid  its  price  for  his  office,  (3)  has 
practically  pledged  himself  to  defend  its  action  and  that  of 
its  leaders,  and  (4)  has  engaged  to  electioneer  in  its  behalf, 
we  can  readily  understand  its  methods  of  dealing  with  grog- 
shops, bawdy-houses,  low  lodging-houses,  and  gambling-dens. 
Tammany  has  largely  dealt  with  them  on  the  theory  of  gain- 
ing the  most  votes  possible  through  appeals  to  their  hopes 
and  fears.  A  party  makes  no  moral  discriminations,  and 
the  vilest  voter's  ballot  counts  as  much  as  that  of  the  noblest 
citizen.  What  more  natural  than  that  the  proprietors  of  such 
places  should  seek  to  stand  well  with  the  ruling  city  party  ? 
A  New  York  City  police  commissioner  has  just  declared  in 
a  public  speech,1  made  after  investigating  liquor  saloons, 
"  that  every  saloon  has  been  the  caucus  room  for  ward  poli- 
tics." Mr.  Ivins  shows  that  out  of  eighty-one  conventions 
and  primary  meetings  held  by  Tammany  in  1884,  fifty-six 
were  held  at  liquor  saloons,2  and  it  is  familiar  knowledge 
that  of  her  delegates  to  conventions  and  her  members  elected 
to  the  legislature,  the  grog-shop  interests  have  supplied  an 
ominous  proportion.3 

Among  the  persons  appointed  as  police  justices  by  one  of 
the  Tammany  mayors  of  New  York  City  (before  1898)  there 
was  a  champion  of  the  grog-shop  interests  of  a  character  so 
notorious  as  to  cause  a  public  scandal,  and  a  vigorous  protest 


i  N.  Y.  Times,  July  13,  1895.  2  Mach.  Pol.,  pp.  20,  21,  26. 

8  Even  the  philosophical  defender  of  the  Tammany  system  whom  we  have 
cited  recognizes  the  liquor  dealers  as  being  generally  its  supporters.  Politics  in 
Democracy,  p.  76. 

i 


114  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

was  made  by  the  better  citizens  against  the  appointment,  —  a 
fact  of  great  importance  when  we  come  to  the  question  of 
reforming  city  government  by  giving  autocratic  power  to 
mayors. l 

4.  The  facts  are  familiar  that  the  grog-shops  and  the  low 
lodging-houses  are  the  chief  recruiting  places  —  the  shelters 
and  the  sally-ports  —  of  the  vilest  classes  of  voters.  There 
the  leaders,  the  captains,  the  lieutenants,  and  the  miscel- 
laneous minions  of  Tammany,  whom  we  are  soon  to  consider, 
find  the  chief  supply  of  human  depravity  which  they  gather, 
bribe,  and  coerce  for  false  registration  and  corrupt  voting. 
The  grog-shop  keepers  and  gamblers  can  supply  the  money, 
and  the  lodging-house  keepers  can  shelter  the  voters  needed 
by  a  ruling  city  party,  while  the  policemen,  the  district 
attorneys,  and  the  police  justices  it  controls  have  ample  means 
of  reciprocating  favors,  as  we  shall  soon  see.2 


II 

1.  The  system  of  extortion  and  blackmailing  to  which  we 
have  referred  has  prevailed  in  connection  with  a  long  series 
of  miscellaneous  licenses  and  permits,  from  those  of  theatres, 
halls,  dance  houses,  pawnbrokers'  shops,  stables,  vaults,  and 
junk-shops,  down  to  those  for  numberless  soda  fountains, 
apple  stands,  and  stations  for  peanut  roasting  and  newspaper 
sales.  Even  the  most  insignificant  of  these  may  secure  at 
least  one  vote  for  Tammany,  and  perhaps  prevent  several 
voters  opposing  it.  The  investigations  of  1895  made  it  clear 

1  The  report  of  the  excise  board  of  New  York  City  for  1893  shows  more  than 
nine  thousand  places  licensed  for  selling  liquors,  and  that  more  than  31,500,000 
were  collected  as  license  fees  during  the  year.  It  seems  to  be  the  fact  that  at 
least  five  persons  on  an  average  have  a  pecuniary  interest  in  each  of  these  grog- 
shops, —  forty-five  thousand  persons  in  all,  or  more  than  half  the  number  of  Tam- 
many's then  majority. 

s  The  short  residence  which  New  York  laws  have  required  for  voting  in  a  city 
district  has  greatly  facilitated  both  fraudulent  registration  and  corrupt  voting. 
Neither  party  has  been  willing  to  offend  a  class  of  low  voters  which  each  has 
hoped  to  control.  When  city-party  government  shall  have  been  suppressed,  we 
may  hope  to  have  the  residential  conditions  for  voting  framed  in  the  public  inter- 
est, and  not  as  now  mainly  in  the  interest  of  city  parties  and  their  managers. 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT  BY  PARTY  115 

that  New  York  policemen  had  robbed  the  occupants  of  these 
stands  with  as  little  scruple  as  their  official  superiors  had 
blackmailed  the  policemen  and  extorted  assessments  from 
city  salaries.  Can  any  one  be  quite  certain  that  both  classes 
of  robbers  were  not  emboldened  by  the  facts  —  the  natural 
outcome  of  city-party  government  —  that  their  arrest  could 
hardly  be  made  save  by  a  policeman  who  had  paid  Tammany 
for  his  appointment ;  could  hardly  be  brought  to  trial  save 
by  a  district  attorney  and  before  a  judge  each  of  whom  had 
paid  Tammany's  price  for  his  nomination  ?  Can  any  sensible 
man  think  that  so  vicious  a  system  can  be  suppressed  so  long 
as  our  laws  facilitate  party  domination  in  city  affairs  ? 

2.  If  the  exigency  would  permit,  we  would  gladly  exclude 
all  facts  disgraceful  to  New  York  City.  But  there  is  a  grave 
need  that  the  truth  should  be  known.  A  well-informed  in- 
quirer has  recently  set  forth  the  results  of  his  investigations 
of  New  York  City  government.1  Tammany,  he  says,  "raises 
immense  sums,  but  they  are  raised  by  contributions  and  by 
blackmail,  not  by  theft."2  "No  one,"  this  writer  further 
says,  "who  has  not  lived  in  New  York  can  imagine  the 
despotic  power  which  Tammany  Hall  exercises  there.  No 
citizen  is  too  humble  to  be  beneath  its  notice ;  no  citizen  is 
too  rich  or  too  powerful  to  be  safe  from  its  interference.  In 
many  districts  the  Republican  party  organization  is  a  sort  of 
annex  to  Tammany;  many  of  the  Republican  inspectors  of 
elections  are  in  the  pay  of  Tammany.  Rich  and  respectable 
Republicans  in  the  city  shrink  from  vigorous  warfare  against 
Tammany,  because  they  do  not  want  to  be  harassed  in  respect 
to  their  real  estate,  their  shops,  their  railroads,  their  tax 
returns."3 

1  Atlantic  Monthly,  February,  1894,  pp.  245-251. 

2  This  transition  from  theft  to  blackmail  which  has  been  made  since  Tweed's 
time  illustrates  Tammany's  fear  of  the  greatly  increased  power  of  public  opinion. 
It  has  probably  never  since  1870  got  more  money  by  indefensible  means  than  it 
was  getting  in  1894,  when  public  opinion  had  a  brief  triumph. 

8  The  belief  is  now  quite  general  among  the  best-informed  citizens  of  New 
York  that  many  of  the  Republicans  who  have  been  most  active  in  the  city  organi- 
zations of  their  party  have  been  guilty  of  conduct  about  as  difficult  to  justify  as 
that  of  the  managers  of  Tammany  itself.  At  this  time  (December,  1895)  a  major- 
ity of  these  Republicans  have  made  one  of  the  most  indefensible  party  enrolments 


116  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

After  referring  to  the  vast  sums  extorted  by  Tammany 
from  the  liquor  dealers,  the  same  writer  declares  that  "still 
another  and  perhaps  a  greater  source  of  revenue  is  found  in 
the  criminal  classes.  Every  gambling-house,  every  house  of 
prostitution,  pays  hush  money  through  the  police,  and,  it 
may  be  added,  to  the  police."  Referring  to  the  use  of  Tam- 
many power  for  extortion  iind  blackmail  in  the  sphere  of  street 
openings,  contracts,  and  legislation,  he  gives  his  own  expe- 
rience of  payments  (in  1893)  to  Tammany  in  these  words : 
"  I  know  of  one  case  where  $2500  were  paid  by  a  corporation 
for  a  small  piece  of  legislation.  I  know  of  another  case 
where  $15,000  were  demanded  for  similar  but  more  important 
service ; "  but  he  adds  that  after  the  demand  had  been  yielded 
to,  the  defeat  of  Tammany  in  the  last  November  (1893)  elec- 
tion emboldened  a  refusal  to  pay.  He  speaks  of  another  case, 
at  the  same  period,  in  which  Tammany  demanded  of  a  cor- 
poration $60,000  for  some  entirely  proper  legislation;  he  says 
"the  company  was  advised  by  its  counsel,  an  eminent  member 
of  the  bar,  to  hand  over  the  money; "  but  here  again  the  same 
election,  by  defeating  the  Tammany  part}',  relieved  its  victim. 

These  statements  —  so  far  as  the  author  is  aware  —  have 
remained  unanswered  by  Tammany's  supporters.  In  view 
of  such  facts,  can  it  be  any  longer  a  matter  of  surprise  that 
so  many  city -party  managers  get  rich?1 


Ill 

1.  From  what  Tammany  as  a  city  party  does,  let  us  turn  to 
its  methods  and  agents  for  doing  it.  It  is  not  to  the  credit 

to  which  party  debasement  has  ever  given  birth.  If  we  could  spare  the  space,  it 
might  be  easily  shown  that  as  early  as  the  second  term  of  President  Grant  the 
New  York  City  leaders  of  the  Republican  party  were  in  the  pay  of  Tammany,  and 
conspired  with  its  leaders  for  common  plunder  —  a  treachery  for  which  they  were 
denounced  by  the  Republican  governor  of  New  York.  See  3  Lalor's  Cyclo.  Pol. 
Set.,  etc.,  pp.  347,  348. 

1  We  have  no  space  for  the  definite  statements  of  this  writer  as  to  the  manner 
in  which  Tammany  minions  have  persecuted  stablemen,  junk  dealers,  under- 
takers, cigar  venders,  apple-stand  keepers,  and  other  permit  holders  who  have 
failed  to  pay  the  blackmail  demanded  of  them,  have  dared  to  refuse  to  work  for 
Tammany,  or  have  ventured  to  protest  against  its  extortions  —  statements  which 
we  shall  find  that  the  New  York  investigations  of  1895  have  largely  confirmed. 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT  BY  PARTY  117 

of  the  prevailing  discrimination  concerning  municipal  evils 
and  the  remedy  for  them,  that  while  the  so-called  "  admirable 
discipline  "  of  Tammany  has  been  greatly  praised,  its  ten- 
dency to  corruption  and  servility  have  been  much  less  noticed. 
We  have  seen  that  Tammany  insists  that  the  influence  of  the 
city  government  may  be  used  for  bringing  voters  to  its  sup- 
port, money  to  its  treasury,  and  patronage  and  power  to  its 
managers,  without  other  restraint  than  the  criminal  law.  It 
everywhere  appeals  to  party  zeal,  to  selfish  interests,  to  the 
ambition  and  prejudices  of  its  adherents.  It  never  calls  for 
sacrifices  of  party  interests  to  promote  the  general  interests, 
—  holding  him  to  be  most  useful  to  his  country  who  is 
most  useful  to  the  party  majority.  It  never  imperils  the 
loss  of  votes  by  a  policy  of  reform.  It  allows  no  one  to 
overbid  it  for  the  support  of  the  vilest  voters  it  needs. 
It  claims  a  right  to  seek  victory  by  whatever  means 
it  thinks  most  promising.  Mr.  Ivins  declares  that  "the 
entire  political  machinery  ...  is  incident  to  getting  in 
the  votes  on  election  day.  Every  part  of  the  machine," 
he  says,  "is  organized  with  this  object  in  view  and  no 
other."1 

2.  Let  us  consider  some  of  the  effective  parts  of  the  Tam- 
many organization.  The  city  of  New  York  is  by  law  (1894) 
divided  into  thirty  assembly  districts,  from  each  of  which  a 
member  of  the  state  legislature  is  annually  elected.  In  each 
assembly  district  Tammany  has  a  separate  organization,  at 
the  head  of  which  is  a  very  important  party  officer  or  agent, 
designated  "a  leader,"  —  a  sort  of  patronage  purveyor,  elec- 
tioneer-in-chief, and  feudal  lord  or  boss  of  assembly  district 

1  Machine  Politics,  pp.  45, 46 ;  and  even  Tammany's  official  publication  almost 
in  terms  admits  as  much.  Tammany  Hall,  pp.  106, 108.  By  the  word  "  machine  " 
is  meant  the  combination  of  despotic  organization,  coercive  party  action,  and 
vicious  methods,  through  which  the  managers  of  a  despotic  party  accomplish 
their  unworthy  purposes.  The  word  "  machine  "  suggests  a  reproof,  and  implies 
despotic  methods,  unpatriotic  action,  and  an  excess  of  organization  and  party 
coercion.  We  cannot  accept  Mr.  Ivins's  suggestion  that  the  organized  methods 
and  agencies  of  any  party  may  be  properly  called  its  machine.  It  seems  desirable 
that  this  reproachful  word  should  be  applied  only  in  the  sense  we  have  indicated, 
and  that  legitimate  party  organizations  and  methods  should  not  be  reproached 
and  discredited  by  its  application  to  them. 


118  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

politics.1  Each  leader  or  boss  of  an  assembly  district  is  held 
responsible,  at  the  peril  of  losing  his  place,  for  making  its 
Tammany  vote  as  large  as  possible,  by  whatever  means.  He 
is  given  every  power  thought  useful  for  this  purpose,  having 
patronage  to  dispense,  money  to  expend,  and  authority  for 
promising  offices,  as  well  as  places  in  the  labor  service,  for 
votes.2 

The  assembly  district  leader  may  call  on  officials  and  em- 
ployees selected  by  Tammany  to  aid  him  in  his  electioneer- 
ing schemes,  and  they  must  do  so.  These  assembly  districts 
are  divided  by  law  into  election  districts,  there  being  1137 
election  districts  in  the  city,  in  each  of  which  there  are 
about  300  voters.8  In  each  election  district  Tammany  has 
a  captain,  as  to  whose  selection  and  conduct  the  leader 
of  the  assembly  district  is  potential.  Each  captain  has 
under  him  from  ten  to  twenty-five  subordinates,  —  say 
an  average  of  twenty  to  an  election  district,  or  one  to 
every  fifteen  of  its  voters,  —  whom  Tammany  officially 
designates  "lieutenants  or  aides."*  This  semi-military 
organization  fitly  suggests  the  military  and  despotic  disci- 
pline and  feudal  subordination  upon  which  Tammany  relies. 
The  especial  duties  of  these  "  captains  and  aides  "  and  their 
henchmen  is  officially  declared  to  be  "the  management  of 
their  election  districts,"  and  "to  acquire  a  knowledge  of  all 
the  voters  in  their  election  districts,"  arid,  we  may  add,  to 
induce  as  many  of  them  as  possible  to  vote  the  Tammany 
ticket, — the  theory  being  apparently  that  of  the  celebrated 
division  into  "blocks  of  five."6  Thus  the  whole  power  of 
the  central  machine  is  brought  to  bear  upon  each  voter. 

1  In  1805  a  change  was  made  by  Tammany  under  which  there  were  two  lead- 
ers appointed  for  each  assembly  district,  and  the  amended  constitution  of  New 
York  which  then  went  into  effect  provided  for  thirty-five  assembly  districts  in 
New  York  City.    Since  this  was  written,  the  law  creating  the  Greater  New  York 
has  caused  changes  in  details  but  not  in  system  or  methods. 

2  The  Republican  party  in  the  city  has  had  au  analogous  organization,  — 
largely  modelled  after  that  of  Tammany,  —which,  however,  was  modified  in  1895. 

»  This  was  before  the  assembly  districts  were  increased  in  1895. 
4  Mr.  1  vins  thinks  that  one-fifth  of  New  York  City  electors  are  under  the  pay 
of  parties,  or  candidates,  on  election  days.    Machine  Politics,  p.  72. 
*  Tammany  Hall,  p.  63. 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT  BY   PARTY  119 

Every  Tammany-selected  officer,  and  especially  every  police- 
man and  police  justice,  is  expected  to  assist  these  leaders, 
captains,  and  aides.  To  threaten  Tammany's  frown  and  to 
promise  its  favor  —  the  favor  and  frown  as  well  of  at  least 
many  of  the  officers  Tammany  elects  or  appoints  —  are  the 
potential  arguments  of  this  vast  electioneering  force  —  a 
force  which  seems  to  be  equal  to  one  out  of  every  fifteen  or 
twenty  of  the  voters. 

Its  members  are  continually  stimulated  by  the  hope  of 
office  or  other  favors,  if  they  increase  the  Tammany  vote. 
They  dread  dismissal  and  disgrace  if  they  do  not.  They 
promise  offices  and  places  on  the  pay-rolls  of  labor;  they 
study  and  report  the  weak  side  of  every  voter's  character  and 
condition  ,  they  suggest  how  particular  voters  may  be  easiest 
cajoled,  coerced,  or  bribed ;  they  explain  how  the  wish  for  a 
license  or  a  permit,  or  the  fear  of  losing  one,  may  be  made  to 
control  the  most  votes.  Their  doings  altogether  constitute 
a  nefarious  and  despotic  kind  of  activity  as  discreditable  to 
those  who  engage  in  it  as  it  is  useless  for  any  good  purpose. 
It  degrades  all  municipal  politics.  There  have  probably 
been  more  than  ten  thousand  of  these  electioneerers,  bribers, 
and  intimidaters  in  the  service  of  Tammany  in  New  York 
City  at  the  same  time. 

3.  Under  the  city-party  system,  patronage  favors  and 
spoils  are  apportioned  among  the  districts,  and  the  head  of 
each  has  a  voice  in  awarding  them,  —  a  practice  which 
strongly  tends  to  bring  inferior  men  into  office.  The  elec- 
tion district  captain  has  much  of  the  duty  of  a  spy  and  an 
informer,  —  he  is  a  Lilliput  boss  under  the  leader  of  the 
assembly  district,  —  with  ample  means  of  making  his  in- 
fluence effective.  He  is  powerful  for  awarding  and  with- 
drawing permits  through  a  wide  range  —  from  those  for 
vaults  to  those  for  selling  peanuts,  apples,  and  soda.  He 
has  many  ways  of  harassing  independent  voters,  and  filling 
his  own  pockets  at  the  same  time.  He  can  easily  make 
himself  the  terror  or  the  efficient  champion  of  the  keepers  of 
lodging-houses,  bawdy  dens,  and  junk-shops,  for  he  can  in- 
voke the  aid  of  his  powerful  leader.  He  suggests  to  Tarn- 


120  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

many  policemen  and  police  justices  those  who  should  not 
be  arrested  at  all,  those  who  should  be  let  off  easily,  those 
who  should  feel  the  severities  of  the  law, —  and  especially 
when  a  Tammany  leader  —  his  direct  boss  —  may  be  presid- 
ing as  a  justice  in  a  police  court. 

4.  Before  a  laborer  could  get  employment  in  the  service 
of  the  city,  prior  to  the  reform  of  1895,  he  must  have  the 
approval  of  the  captain  of  his  district,  and  such  approval  was 
regarded  as  involving  a  pledge  to  vote  for  Tammany.  Thus 
many  voters  were  secured,  and  a  spirit  of  servility  was  de- 
veloped. Imitating  the  extortions  of  Tammany,  these  cap- 
tains seem  to  have  exacted  a  commission  from  the  laborers 
for  their  influence  in  securing  them  employment,  thus  giving 
a  practical  significance  to  the  boss's  declaration  we  have  cited 
from  the  North  American  Review,  which  declares  that  "all 
the  employees  of  the  city  government  .  .  .  should  be  mem- 
bers of  the  Tammany  organization," — a  method  of  dealing 
with  the  honest  laboring  classes  which  is  not  only  an  insult 
to  their  intelligence  but  an  outrageous  invasion  of  their 
liberty. 

In  these  facts  we  can  see  that  under  the  city-party  system 
the  captains  of  the  election  districts  are  their  local  bosses, 
much  as  the  leaders  are  the  local  bosses  of  the  assembly  dis- 
tricts, and  the  boss-in-chief  is  the  feudal  master  of  the  party- 
ruled  city.  Hence  to  eliminate  the  boss  system  from  Tam- 
many, or  from  any  city  governed  by  a  party,  its  primary  and 
fundamental  organization  must  be  framed  anew.  The  city- 
party  system  as  naturally  produces  new  bosses  as  the  hydra 
produces  new  heads. 

The  reader  has  doubtless  been  saying  to  himself  that  these 
captains  and  their  lieutenants  do  very  little  that  is  useful, 
and  that  their  activity  is  as  mischievous  and  degrading  as  it 
is  needless.  They  do  nothing  for  the  education  or  moral 
elevation  of  the  people;  they  appeal  mainly  to  their  greed, 
their  party  spirit,  and  their  fears.  They  cause  no  indepen- 
dent, worthy  citizens  to  vote.  It  would  be  far  better  if  there 
were  no  captains  or  aides,  so  that  the  people  could  freely 
vote  according  to  their  own  sense  of  duty.  The  vile  voters 


MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT  BY  PARTY  121 

would  not  in  that  event  be  hustled  to  the  polls,  and  most  of 
them  might  not  vote  at  all. 

IV 

1.  The  functions  of  the  assembly  district  leaders  —  inevi- 
table under  the  city-party  system  —  are  so  important  that  we 
should  get  a  clear  view  of  their  doings.     Offices,  patronage, 
and  spoils  —  save  the  smaller  allowed  to  the  captains,  and 
such  as  the  boss-in-chief  retains  for  himself  —  are  apportioned 
among  these  leaders  —  each  leader  being  the  local  party-pur- 
veyor and  boss  of  his  assembly  district.     He  is  regarded  as 
responsible  for  its  party  management.     To  him  all  party 
adherents  within  his  district  must  be  duly  obedient,  if  they 
would  have  any  favors  or  any  position  in  the  party. 

These  leaders  have  no  duties  connected  with  the  improve- 
ment of  city  government  or  with  the  education,  the  political 
principles,  or  moral  elevation  of  the  people.  The  assembly 
district  leaders,  to  whom  the  election  district  captains  owe 
a  feudal  allegiance,  are  in  theory  responsible  to  the  general 
committee  of  Tammany,  but  the  powers  of  this  committee 
are  in  practice  substantially  exercised  by  an  executive  com- 
mittee made  up  of  the  assembly  district  leaders  themselves 
and  the  chairmen  of  three  other  committees.1  These  leaders 
—  each  a  sort  of  feudal  lord  in  his  own  assembly  district  and 
selfishly  interested  in  the  increase  of  his  own  power  and  that 
of  his  associate  leaders  —  are  subject  to  the  boss-in-chief. 
They  are  otherwise  irresistible  under  Tammany,  and  the  city- 
party  system  generally.2 

2.  The  duties  of  leaders  require  adroit  men  of  a  partisan, 
proscriptive,  and  audacious  cast  of  mind,  undeterred  by  nice 

1  Machine  Politics,  pp.  16, 17 ;  Tammany  Hall,  pp.  63, 136. 

2  Mr.  Ivins  tells  us  that  "the  district  leader  ...  is  as  a  rule  chosen  by  the 
boss  of  the  party,  or  by  the  votes  of  the  majority  of  the  other  district  bosses," 
save  in  cases  where  a  leader  has  a  personal  following  strong  enough  to  compel 
his  selection.    He  further  says  that  in  practice  the  boss-in-chief,  and  the  few 
with  whom  he  advises,  give  general  directions  which  the  district  leaders  obey, 
and  that  each  of  them  is  able,  in  conformity  thereto,  to  govern  his  district. 
Mach.  Pol.,  pp.  8, 10,  46.    This  machinery  for  party  despotism  is  certainly  very 
ingeniously  contrived. 


122  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

scruples  as  to  the  methods  of  gaining  voters.  Their  primary 
and  paramount  duty  is  to  increase  the  vote  of  their  party  by 
every  possible  means,  and  we  have  seen  what  effective  forces 
for  the  purpose  are  at  their  command.  They  are  generally 
unscrupulously  active  in  discharging  it,  bringing  every  form 
of  human  depravity,  imbecility,  and  ignorance  to  the  polls. 
They  and  their  minions  search  the  garrets  and  the  cellars, 
the  prisons  and  the  asylums,  the  grog-shops  and  poorhouses ; 
they  lead  and  hustle  to  the  ballot  boxes  the  vilest  specimens 
of  humanity  which  can  be  made  to  cast  a  vote.  The  elec- 
torate of  New  York  City  is  thus  debased  by  thousands  of  vile 
voters,  who,  but  for  this  party-leader  solicitation,  coercion, 
and  activity,  would  probably  rarely  vote  at  all.1 

Yet  we  must  not  assume  all  these  leaders  to  be  wholly 
unpatriotic  or  consciously  corrupt.  Some  of  them  are  doubt- 
less patriotic  and  sincere;  some  of  them  have  so  idealized 
their  party  and  have  become  so  completely  the  victims  of  an 
intense  party  spirit  and  vicious  methods  as  to  have  no  just 
sense  of  their  pernicious  influence  as  leaders  or  of  their 
higher  duties  as  citizens.  The  fierce,  blind  partisans,  who 
think  everything  done  by  their  own  party  to  be  right,  and 
everything  done  by  their  opponents  to  be  wrong,  hardly  think 
it  wrong  to  serve  their  party  by  gaining  voters  by  means  how- 
ever reprehensible. 

3.  City-party  leaders  are  selected  because  they  are  be- 
lieved to  be  unembarrassed  by  very  serious  scruples  as  to  the 
means  of  gaining  voters.  Neither  the  managers  of  Tam- 
many, nor  of  its  city-party  opponents,  have  ever  been  known 
to  dismiss,  or  even  to  condemn,  a  leader  for  the  most  flagi- 
tious use  of  his  opportunities,  or  to  reject  a  vote  however 
corruptly  obtained  by  him.  To  know  well  the  haunts  of  the 


1  In  l&M  a  vain  effort  was  made  to  subject  to  some  form  of  punishment  the 
leaders  and  their  minions  who  attempted  to  secure  the  votes  of  inmates  of  a 
municipal  poorhouse.  Party  leaders  and  captains  have  insisted  that  idiots  shall 
be  allowed  to  vote.  In  February,  1894,  cases  were  before  a  criminal  court  of  New 
York  City  in  which  the  shameful  fact  was  established  that  the  inmates  of  the 
city  prison,  through  the  efforts  of  party  agents,  had  been  allowed  to  vote  in  the 
district  where  it  is  situated  on  the  ground  of  their  having  gained  a  residence  for 
voting  therein  by  living  in  the  prison  itself. 


MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT  BY  PARTY  123 

degraded  and  corrupt  voters  and  how  to  bring  them  to  the 
polls ;  to  be  apt  in  preventing  complaints  against  the  sup- 
porters of  Tammany  by  which  votes  would  be  lost;  to  be 
expert  in  procuring  lenient  treatment  for  Tammany  malefac- 
tors at  the  hands  of  policemen  and  police  justices;  to  be 
skilful  in  the  base  arts  of  naturalization,  registration,  and 
voting,  and  in  the  counting  of  votes ;  to  be  effective  in  pro- 
tecting the  officers  who  prostitute  their  authority  in  aid  of 
Tammany,  and  in  harassing  their  opponents;  to  be  expert  in 
all  the  diabolical  ways  of  increasing  the  vote  of  the  criminal 
and  depraved  classes ;  to  know  how  to  get  the  most  votes 
possible  in  return  for  offices,  labor-service  places,  licenses, 
permits,  and  money,  used  as  spoils,  —  these  are  important 
parts  of  the  qualifications  for  a  Tammany  leader.1 

4.  These  leaders  need  no  identification  with  the  higher 
interests  of  a  municipality,  no  ability  for  influencing  patriotic 
or  noble  minds,  no  inclination  to  take  part  in  the  religious, 
moral,  or  educational  efforts  by  which  municipal  life  is  puri- 
fied and  elevated.  They  have  no  functions  in  these  higher 
spheres.  They  would  not  be  less  effective  if  they  were 
pugilists,  gamblers,  or  horse-racing  politicians.  Most  of 
their  activity  is  in  the  sphere  of  base  motives  and  immoral 
life. 

It  would  be  far  better  for  a  city  if  most  of  the  voters  whom 
party  leaders,  aided  by  their  captains,  bring  to  the  polls  did 
not  vote  at  all,  and  probably  most  of  them  would  not  if  not 
corruptly  persuaded  or  frightened.  What  spectacle  could 
be  more  humiliating  to  an  American  patriot,  or  more  dis- 
graceful to  his  country,  than  those  often  presented  in  grog- 
shops, low  lodging-houses,  and  gambling-dens  when  party 
leaders  and  captains  of  different  parties,  cash  in  hand,  are 


1  Mr.  Ivins  gives  these  illustrations  of  the  doings  of  these  leaders:  "A  young 
man  is  arrested  for  fast  driving,  the  district  leader  must  visit  a  police  justice  and 
intercede  for  him.  ,  .  .  A  city  ordinance  has  been  violated, .  .  .  the  leader  must 
see  the  corporation  attorney  and  have  the  complaint  pigeonholed,  or  see  the  jus- 
tice and  have  it  dismissed  ...  If  a  liquor  dealer  is  arrested,  the  leader  must 
leave  no  stone  unturned  to  secure  his  escape  unpunished.  There  is  no  patron- 
age," says  Mr.  Ivins,  "which  a  leader  desires  so  much  ...  as  places  on  the 
police  force."  Much.  Pol.,  pp.  11,  12,  13. 


124  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

competing  for  the  support  not  only  of  the  most  vile  among 
their  own  native-born  citizens,  but  among  the  degraded  and 
criminal  emigrants,  as  ignorant  of  our  laws  and  language, 
perhaps,  as  they  were  regardless  of  the  laws  of  the  country 
from  which  they  have  fled.  In  such  scenes  of  party  election- 
eering, we  may  see  the  real  application  of  much  of  the  money 
contributed  by  respectable  party  zealots  or  cowardly  men  of 
business,  who  would  shrink  from  directly  authorizing  the 
use  which  these  party  leaders  make  of  it. 

The  power  of  the  Tammany  leaders  over  the  criminal  class 
has  been  immense.  Who  can  tell  how  heavy  blackmail  a 
gambler  or  a  burglar  must  pay,  or  how  many  votes  he  must 
provide,  to  make  it  certain  that  —  by  the  advice  of  a  leader  —  a 
policeman  will  not  arrest  him  or  a  police  justice  will  not  hold 
him  ?  The  influence  of  Tammany  leaders  and  captains  upon 
the  execution  of  contracts  and  the  enforcement  of  ordinances 
is  great  and  profitable.  Mr.  Ivins  makes  it  clear  that  if  a 
city  contractor  would  have  mild  inspections  and  favorable 
interpretations  of  their  contracts,  they  had  better  stand  well 
with  the  leader  of  the  district  where  their  work  is  done.  Is 
it  any  wonder  that  the  positions  of  leaders  should  be  earnestly 
sought,  as  well  for  profit  as  for  power,  or  that  those  who  fill 
them  should  —  like  bosses  of  a  higher  order  —  become  rapidly 
and  mysteriously  prosperous,  if  not  rich? 

5.  It  seems  almost  incredible  that  the  intelligent  popula- 
tion of  our  great  cities  have  not  been  aroused  to  the  peril  of 
so  flagitious  a  party  system,  in  respect  to  which  the  Repub- 
lican party  managers  of  New  York  City  have  been  less  guilty 
than  those  of  Tammany  largely  because  they  have  not  had 
so  much  power,  or  so  many  offices  and  places  to  fill.     If  the 
horde  of  these  vile  voters  —  probably  from  three  thousand  to 
six  thousand  in  number  in  the  old  New  York  City  —  whom 
this  system  brings  to  the  polls  could  be  gathered  in  a  public 
square,  possibly  even  those  leaders  and  captains  would  be 
abashed,  and  certainly  the  intelligent  and  patriotic  people  of 
the  city  would  be  appalled  at  so  ominous  a  suggestion  of  the 
impending  calamities  which  city-party  government  threatens. 

6.  Nothing  can  be  plainer  than  that  these  party  leaders 


MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT  BY  PARTY  125 

are  unfit  to  hold  office,  and  especially  any  office  of  a  judicial 
nature.  Yet  Mr.  Ivins  has  shown  that,  a  few  years  ago, 
when  Tammany  ruled  the  city,  its  assembly  district  leaders 
were  receiving  about  $119,000  annually  in  salaries  from  the 
city  treasury,  and  that  her  captains  were  as  liberally  provided 
for  in  the  same  way.  He  further  stated  that  the  leaders  of 
the  Republican  party  in  the  city  were  at  the  same  time  receiv- 
ing $32,000  annually  as  official  salaries  from  the  city.  The 
reader  must  decide  whether  these  facts  disclose  a  conspiracy. 
Obviously,  a  ruling  city  party  could  not  more  effectively 
silence  the  criticism  of  its  opponents  and  secure  impunity 
for  its  own  maladministration  than  by  bribing  the  leaders  of 
their  opponents. 

In  1894  the  leaders  and  captains  of  Tammany  were  receiv- 
ing still  larger  sums  as  city  officers.  Six  police  justices,  who 
were  among  its  leaders,  were  receiving  $48,000  in  annual  city 
salaries.1  Other  Tammany  leaders  were  also  receiving  large 
salaries  annually  from  the  city :  one  was  a  coroner,  for  whom 
Tammany  bruisers  would  naturally  be  grateful;  two  were 
police  commissioners,  and  another  was  an  excise  commis- 
sioner, positions  in  which  the  zeal  of  Tammany  partisanship 
and  the  spirit  of  a  leader  are  a  public  scandal  and  calamity ; 
another  was  a  fire  commissioner,  a  place  in  which  there  is 
the  amplest  opportunity  for  prostituting  power  for  party 
advantage.  In  every  one  of  these  places  a  decent  regard  for 
the  interests  of  the  people  imperatively  requires  candid  and 
impartial  officers,  utterly  unlike  the  district  leaders  whom 
a  ruling  city  party  selects  to  manage  its  elections.  To  all 
such  officers,  the  duties  of  a  party  leader  would  be  repulsive. 

It  should  not  be  assumed  that  there  is  anything  generically 
peculiar  and  bad  in  the  Tammany  leader  system,  it  being 
only  the  most  developed,  despotic,  and  degrading  result 
toward  which  the  city-party  system  is  everywhere  tending. 
The  Republican  party  in  the  city  of  New  York  had  its  organi- 
zation and  leaders,  much  like  those  of  Tammany,  in  each 

1  This  making  of  police  justices  out  of  party  leaders  is  so  gross  a  violation  of 
justice  and  decency  that  we  shall  treat  the  subject  in  another  chapter  in  the  light 
of  additional  facts. 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

assembly  district,  and  they  had,  before  1894,  become  intoler- 
able.1 


1.  Since  the  first  draft  of  this  chapter  was  made,  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  criminal  courts  of  New  York  City  have  strik- 
ingly confirmed  the  evidence  it  contains  of  the  common  guilt 
of  the  leaders  of  both  of  the  great  city  parties  and  of  their 
conspiracy  together  for  betraying  the  people  and  cheating  at 
elections.  Within  a  month  (March,  1894)  a  leader  and  other 
electioneering  agents  of  each  of  the  great  parties  have  been 
taken  to  state  prison  on  the  same  train  for  common  fraud  or 
conspiracy  in  the  same  New  York  City  elections.  These  pro- 
ceedings are  very  instructive.  They  were  not  taken  by  either 
party  or  its  managers,  neither  apparently  caring  for  self- vindi- 
cation or  to  bring  criminals  to  justice,  but  had  their  origin  in 
a  non-partisan  organization, —  the  New  York  City  Bar  Asso- 
ciation. A  committee  of  this  body,  made  up  of  adherents  of 
both  parties,  investigated  the  facts  and  caused  the  authorities 
to  bring  large  numbers  of  the  culprits  before  a  grand  jury. 
Though  the  investigation  was  of  necessity  limited,  the  as- 
tounding number  of  thirty-seven  distinct  crimes,  involving 
seventy-five  offenders,  were  found  to  have  been  committed 
almost  wholly  by  party  agents  in  a  single  election.  About 
forty  of  them  were  convicted. 

Though  the  larger  proportion  of  the  offenders  were  adhe- 
rents of  Tammany,  yet  among  those  convicted  were  several 
Republican  election  officers  who  betrayed  their  party  to  its 
opponents.  The  offences  were  of  a  motley  variety,  ranging 
from  perjury,  vote-stealing,  the  fraudulent  counting  and  re- 
jecting of  votes,  and  conspiracies  of  various  kinds  between 

1  In  1894  the  Republicans  reorganized  themselves  in  the  city  of  New  York  in  the 
hope  of  relief.  They  made  the  small  election  district  instead  of  the  assembly 
district  the  unit,  but  they  retained  the  party  methods,  and  as  a  result,  as  we  shall 
elsewhere  show,  the  abuses  under  the  new  organization  have  even  been  worse 
than  under  the  old,  and  they  have  since  abandoned  the  little  district  system  in  de- 
spair. We  have  only  to  turn  to  Philadelphia  to  see  that  the  chief  evils  are  due  to 
the  party  system  rather  than  to  the  particular  party  in  power.  The  New  York 
Democrats  also  made  a  sort  of  party  reorganization  at  nearly  the  same  time,  but 
it  was  so  superficial  as  to  leave  the  old  party  methods  still  dominant. 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT   BY   PARTY  127 

election  inspectors  of  different  parties,  down  to  the  most 
contemptible  forms  of  lying  and  miscellaneous  depravity, 
highly  suggestive  as  to  the  degrading  effects  of  city-party 
control  of  elections. 

2.  So,  also,  the  committee  of  the  New  York  legislature 
which  investigated  municipal  abuses  in  New  York  City  in 
1894  had  its  origin,  as  its  report  declares,  in  "resolutions  by 
various  prominent  and  representative  commercial  and  munic- 
ipal reform  organizations  of  the  city  of  New  York,  by  which 
charges  were  made  against  the  police  department;"  and  we 
may  add  that  no  party  and  no  party  managers  or  leaders  had 
any  part  in  causing  the  investigation  to  be  made  until  the 
public  opinion  demanding  it  had  become  too  strong  to  be 
safely  resisted.     Yet  despite  such  facts,  tens  of  thousands 
of  worthy  citizens,  blinded  by  party  spirit,  thoughtlessly 
accept  the  partisan  theories  that  all  great  forces  for  reform 
and  all  chances  of  good  city  government  must  spring  from 
political  parties.     Instead  of  choosing  fair-minded,  impartial 
persons  to  count  their  votes,  as  they  would  to  count  their 
moneys  or  to  educate  their  children,  they  select  rival  pairs 
of  intense  partisans,  —  openly  admitting  that  no  one  of  them 
can  be  trusted  alone. 

3.  In  view  of  such  facts,  it  is  not  strange  that  thoughtful 
men  are  more  and  more  clearly  seeing  that  the  city-party 
system  is  inevitably  vicious,  and  is  likely  to  become  more  so 
as  our  cities  grow  larger.     Very  likely  the  reader  has  been 
saying  that  it  would  be  far  better  if  these  assembly  district 
leaders  were  abolished,  and  what  they  do  were  not  done  at  all. 
Surely  if  the  vile  voters  they  bring  to  the  polls  should  not 
vote  at  all,  no  city  would  be  the  worse  for  it.     If  one  party 
thus  lost  more  voters  than  another,  it  would  be  that  party 
which  is  most  corrupt,  degraded,  and  despotic.     Every  city 
party  excuses  itself  for  making  corrupt  appeals  for  the  vile 
and  mercenary  vote  by  declaring  that  if  it  should  forbear  to 
compete  for  it,  its  opponents  would  capture  the  whole  of  it. 
Obviously,  we  can  suppress  this  evil  only  by  expelling  the 
party  methods  from  city  and  village  affairs. 


128  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF   MUNICIPALITIES 


VI 

The  influence  of  Tammany,  and  of  city-party  theories  and 
methods  generally,  upon  police  administration  has  been  disas- 
trous, and  it  threatens  still  greater  evils.  The  subject  will 
be  treated  at  large  elsewhere,  but  some  fundamental  princi- 
ples should  be  noticed  here.  These  propositions  seem  to  be 
indisputable:  (1)  That  a  policeman  should  not  be  a  partisan 
and  should  utterly  disregard  both  the  political  and  religious 
opinions  of  citizens;  (2)  that  in  making  selections  for  the 
police  force,  these  opinions  should  not  be  considered;  (3)  that 
a  policeman  should  not  allow  zeal  for  any  party  or  sect  to 
affect  his  official  conduct;  (4)  that  his  tenure  of  office  should 
not  be  dependent  upon  any  party,  but  upon  personal  merit 
and  fidelity  alone;  (5)  that  no  party  should  be  allowed  to 
impose  any  assessment  or  duty  upon  him;  (6)  that  no  party, 
faction,  or  party  leader  should  be  permitted  to  coerce  him  or 
to  ask  any  favor  at  his  hands ;  (7)  that  the  police  force  should 
not  be  regarded  as  a  governmental  power  which  any  party  or 
boss  may  use  for  its  own  advantage. 

Yet  we  have  seen  that  Tammany  and  the  city-party  system 
repudiate  and  habitually  violate  every  one  of  these  princi- 
ples. Instead  of  providing  police  commissioners  who  will 
protect  the  rights  and  just  independence  of  the  members  of 
the  police  force,  Tammany  —  often  aided  by  its  opponents  — 
has  placed  it  in  charge  of  scheming  politicians  and  unscrupu- 
lous party  leaders,  who  have  done  their  utmost  to  prostitute 
it  for  partisan  purposes.  To  make  a  party  leader  a  police 
commissioner  is  one  of  the  most  flagitious  offences  of  which 
a  party  or  a  mayor  can  be  guilty.  When  of  late  two  of  the 
police  commissioners  were  Tammany  leaders  appointed  by  a 
Tammany  mayor,  and  the  other  two  were  Republican  party 
leaders,  also  appointed  by  a  Tammany  mayor,  there  was 
exhibited  a  burlesque  of  justice  and  of  official  duty  and 
decency  which  disgraced  republican  government  itself. 

Such  appointments  practically  say  to  every  policeman: 
"  You  have  as  good  a  right  as  your  party,  its  leaders  or  boss, 


MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT  BY  PARTY  129 

to  use  your  authority  for  private  advantage  and  to  coerce  and 
intimidate  everybody  within  your  power."  The  lesson  was 
easily  learned,  and  the  degradation  of  a  large  part  of  the 
police  force  of  New  York  City  was  the  consequence.  The 
report  of  the  legislative  committee  which  investigated  this 
force  in  1895  declares,  in  substance,  that  it  has  been  shown 
that  in  a  very  large  number  of  election  districts  almost  every 
conceivable  crime  against  the  elective  franchise  was  either 
committed  or  permitted  by  the  police ;  that  Tammany  gained 
many  votes  by  their  connivance;  that  the  police  were 
sometimes  found  to  stand  in  actual  hostility  to  efforts  to 
"suppress  vice  ";  that  witnesses  who  were  subpoenaed  by  the 
committee  stood  in  terror  of  the  police ;  that  men  of  business 
were  harassed  and  annoyed  in  their  affairs ;  that  strong  men 
hesitated  when  required  to  give  evidence  of  their  oppression, 
and  whispered  their  stories.1 

If  anything  could  be  more  lamentable  and  ominous  than 
the  facts  which  the  committee  reported,  it  would  be  the  part 
of  their  duty  which  they  failed  to  discharge.  They  ap- 
parently had  no  condemnation  for  party  tests  for  police 
officers ;  no  rebuke  for  seeking  party  advantage  through  the 
use  of  police  authority;  no  objections  to  making  police 
commissioners  and  police  justices  out  of  party  leaders;  no 
suggestions  for  taking  the  police  force  out  of  party  politics ; 
no  non-partisan  remedies  for  protecting  worthy  policemen, 
faithful  in  the  discharge  of  their  duties,  against  cruel  in- 
justice at  the  hands  of  piratical  party  leaders  and  corrupt 
partisan  commissioners  and  justices. 


1  The  report  seems  to  show  that  nearly  a  hundred  policemen  were  paraded  be- 
fore the  committee,  who  had  been  convicted  of  unwarranted  assaults  on  citizens 
and  yet  had  never  been  suspended  from  duty ;  that  the  levying  of  blackmail  by 
policemen  upon  assignation  houses,  gambling-dens,  and  other  places  of  illegal 
resort  had  been  reduced  almost  to  a  system ;  that  their  proprietors  paid  for  their 
illegal  privileges ;  that  the  outcasts  of  society  paid  patrolmen  for  the  privilege  of 
soliciting  on  the  streets ;  that  a  police  commissioner  hardly  seemed  ashamed  in 
confessing  that  he  habitually  favored  candidates  for  appointments  upon  the  police 
for  party  reasons ;  that  appointments  to  this  force  —  especially  when  not  made 
for  party  reasons  —  were  generally  made  upon  the  payment  of  a  bribe  of  $300 
or  more,  and  that  promotions  were  secured  by  the  payment  of  money — a  cap- 
taincy costing  from  $10,000  to  $15,000. 


130  THE   GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

VII 

1.  Most  of  what  we  have  said  concerning  the  relations  of 
Tammany  and  the  city-party  system  to  the  police  force  is 
applicable  to  their  relations  to  the  police  courts.  Yet,  as  in 
many  cities  of  the  Union  evils  of  a  serious  character  have 
their  origin  in  party  interference  with  the  minor  criminal 
courts,  and  these  evils  have  had  their  extreme  development 
in  New  York  City,  the  subject  deserves  further  notice.  A 
justice  of  the  peace  has  a  jurisdiction  which  is  in  part  civil 
and  in  part  criminal,  but  in  New  York  City  the  criminal 
part  of  this  jurisdiction  is  conferred  upon  police  justices. 
Prior  to  the  reform  made  in  1895  there  were  fifteen  of  these 
justices  in  the  city,  who  were  appointed  by  the  mayor  for  a 
term  of  ten  years.  About  eighty  thousand  arrested  persons 
—  more  than  two  hundred  each  day  —  were  annually  brought 
before  these  justices.  A  large  part  of  this  horde,  who  vote, 
are  members  of  the  vile  class  of  voters  whom,  as  we  have 
seen,  party  leaders  and  captains  lead  and  hustle  to  the  polls. 

It  seems  to  be  too  clear  for  argument  that  the  propositions 
we  have  just  laid  down  as  applicable  to  policemen  are  equally 
applicable  to  police  justices  and  justices  of  the  peace.  Just 
in  the  degree  that  these  officers  are  partisans,  or  desire  to 
make  their  judicial  action  beneficial  to  any  one  party  rather 
than  another,  they  are  unfit  to  be  justices,  and  are  likely  to 
conspire  with  politicians  and  party  leaders  in  the  prostitution 
of  judicial  authority  for  party  advantage.  It  seems  almost 
incredible  that  sensible  people  are  unable  to  see  that  par- 
ticular sectarian  or  party  opinions  are  no  part  of  the  useful 
qualifications  for  being  a  justice. 

Yet  vast  numbers  of  worthy  citizens,  unconsciously  yield- 
ing to  a  besotted  party  spirit,  enter  into  vicious  party  con- 
tests for  selecting  these  justices  on  party  grounds, —  citizens 
who  would  nevertheless  feel  insulted  if  charged  with  a  purpose 
of  gaining  party  advantage  through  judicial  action.  Why, 
then,  do  parties  everywhere  interfere  with,  and  generally 
dominate,  the  choice  of  police  justices,  while  many  good 
citizens  take  no  part  in  their  selection?  The  reasons  are 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT   BY   PAATY  131 

plain.  Law-abiding  citizens,  not  regarding  themselves  as 
likely  to  be  directly  affected  by  the  character  of  the  justices, 
quite  generally  neglect  to  exert  their  influence;  and,  as  a 
consequence,  small,  unscrupulous,  partisan  lawyers,  or  base 
politicians  ignorant  of  the  law,  for  the  most  part  secure  these 
offices.  In  the  city  of  New  York,  in  1894,  when  the  reform 
movement  began  to  be  effective,  only  six  of  her  fifteen  police 
justices  w*ere  lawyers  at  all,  or,  in  other  words,  knew  the  law 
they  assumed  to  administer.1 

2.  Tammany,  and  city  parties  generally,  have  treated 
criminal  justices  as  partisan  forces  to  be  used  for  their  own 
advantage.  It  would  be  utterly  indefensible  even  to  select 
all  of  them  from  their  own  party,  but  they  have  done  much 
worse.  They  have  sometimes  made  police  justices  out  of 
those  preeminently  unscrupulous  and  diabolically  expert 
party  manipulators  who  can  be  found  among  "  city-party 
leaders."  Such  a  leader  is  as  unfit  to  be  a  police  justice  as 
a  pimp  is  to  teach  a  young  ladies'  school  or  a  wolf  is  to  guard 
a  sheepfold. 

By  putting  these  leaders  into  the  seats  of  criminal  justices, 
the  very  men  whose  party  duty  it  is  to  increase  their  party's 
votes  to  the  utmost,  even  by  coercing  and  bribing  criminals 
and  desperadoes,  are  made  to  preside  at  inquiries  into  their 
offences  with  authority  to  dismiss  charges  against  them. 
The  same  party  leader  who  last  week  perfected  a  scheme  for 
securing  fifty  fraudulent  votes,  may  next  week,  as  a  police 
justice,  sit  in  judgment  both  upon  the  voters  and  the  poli- 
ticians who,  under  his  order,  cooperated  in  the  execution  of 
the  scheme.  A  more  scandalous  burlesque  of  party  decency 
and  judicial  propriety  than  this  union  of  a  party  leader  and 
a  justice  in  the  same  person  can  hardly  be  imagined.  To 
long  escape  municipal  degeneration  under  such  methods 
would  be  little  less  than  a  miracle.  Yet  we  repeat  that  at 
the  end  of  1894  at  least  six  Tammany  leaders  were  police 
justices  by  the  appointment  of  Tammany  mayors.2 

1  But  under  the  amended  law  since  enacted,  no  one  can  be  such  a  police  justice 
unless  he  has  been  a  practising  lawyer  for  at  least  five  years. 

2  It  is  worthy  of  notice  that  the  few  Republicans  who  had  recently,  before 


132  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

3.  It  is  impossible  to  exaggerate  the  importance  of  these 
justices  being  upright  lawyers,  endowed  with  a  high  sense 
of  justice  and  great  moral  courage.  They  have  vast  discre- 
tionary powers,  and  their  action  attracts  very  inadequate 
attention  from  the  public  press.  Under  these  powers  about 
a  third  —  that  is,  more  than  twenty-five  thousand  each  year  — 
of  the  prisoners  brought  into  the  police  courts  are  summarily 
discharged  by  these  magistrates.  The  immense  influence 
which  the  exercise  of  such  powers  by  bold,  unscrupulous 
party  leaders  sitting  as  police  justices  —  urged  on  by  their 
fellow-leaders  and  by  their  boss-in-chief,  their  feudal  lord, 
—  may  exert  upon  politics  and  the  criminal  classes  in  a 
vast  city  is  almost  indescribable. 

Such  leaders,  ignorant  of  the  law,  sitting  in  police  courts, 
are  demoralizing  spectacles,  of  which  an  enlightened  city 
ought  to  be  ashamed.  They  embolden  every  criminal,  de- 
prive the  law  of  a  great  part  of  its  terrors,  disgust  and  alarm 
thoughtful  citizens,  and  degrade  the  courts  themselves  in  the 
eyes  of  the  people.  The  standards  of  city  parties  on  this  sub- 
ject seem  to  have  sunk  below  those  which  prevailed  even 
among  the  feudal  barons  of  the  thirteenth  century ;  for  the 
latter  compelled  the  execrable  King  John  to  accept  this  lan- 
guage of  the  forty-fifth  section  of  the  Magna  Charta:  "We 
will  not  make  any  justice  .  .  .  but  of  such  as  know  the  law 
of  the  realm  and  mean  duly  to  observe  it,"  —  language, 
apparently,  which  our  city-party  managers  could  not  be 
induced  to  approve.  They  think  it  easier  to  bend  mere 
ignorant  politicians  to  their  purposes  than  to  do  the  same 
thing  with  well-educated  lawyers  who  have  a  wholesome 
dread  of  the  condemnation  of  an  enlightened  profession. 

The  grossest  favoritism,  great  injustice,  and  the  discharge 
of  many  criminals  unpunished  have  been  the  result  of  this 
Tammany  justice  system.  Who  can  doubt  that  a  large  part 
of  the  inefficiency  and  degradation  of  the  police  force  of  New 

1895,  reached  the  police  bench  were  mostly  party  leaders,  and  hardly  of  a  better 
class  than  the  Tammany  justices.  A  Republican  meat-dealer  and  politician,  igno- 
rant of  the  law,  seems  to  have  been  the  one  most  favored  —  so  uniformly  does 
party  domination  tend  to  degrade  criminal  justice. 


MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT  BY  PARTY  133 

York,  disclosed  in  1895,  were  caused  by  such  police  justices  ? 
Even  an  upright  policeman  might  distrust  the  utility  of 
bringing  a  criminal  minion  of  the  party  leader  of  a  district 
before  that  leader  himself  sitting  as  its  police  justice, —  if, 
indeed,  the  policeman  would  not  incur  some  personal  danger 
by  doing  so. 

VIII 

A  few  more  words  will  not  only  illustrate  another  phase 
of  city-party  depravity,  but  will  show  the  fallacy  of  relying 
so  much  as  some  municipal  reformers  do  upon  autocratic 
mayors  as  an  agency  for  municipal  reform.  The  appoint- 
ments of  all  these  ignorant  and  partisan  justices  were  made 
by  such  mayors,  who  never  exposed  or  even  rebuked  them, 
though  their  power  to  do  so  was  ample.  We  know  not  what 
election  promises  were  in  the  way  of  their  discharging  such 
a  duty. 

It  is  significant  of  the  purpose  of  these  mayors  that,  at  the 
date  of  the  latest  Tammany  appointment  of  police  justices 
(January,  1893)  the  term  of  Justice  Kilbreth  had  just  ex- 
pired—  a  justice  who  had  been  preeminent  on  the  police  bench 
for  fidelity,  capacity,  and  legal  knowledge.  Nevertheless, 
the  mayor,  compliant  to  his  party  and  disregarding  an  out- 
spoken public  opinion  and  a  manifest  duty,  refused  to  reap- 
point  this  admirable  magistrate.  But  President  Cleveland 
soon  made  him  collector  at  the  port  of  New  York, — so  much 
higher,  for  the  reasons  we  have  stated,  is  the  moral  tone  of  a 
national  party  than  that  of  a  mere  city  party. 

To  the  police  justiceship  thus  vacant  the  Tammany  mayor 
appointed  a  notorious  Tammany  leader,  who  had  long  been 
a  favorite  of  the  liquor  dealers;  and,  at  the  same  time, 
he  appointed  another  Tammany  leader,  who  had  no  supe- 
riority for  the  place,  to  be  a  commissioner  of  the  fire  depart- 
ment.1 Thus  every  lawyer  and  criminal  in  New  York  City 
were  practically  told  that  distinguished  non-partisan  ability 
to  administer  justice  was,  in  the  view  of  the  ruling  city  party 
and  its  mayor,  of  quite  inferior  importance  to  being  an  effec- 

i  N.  Y.  Times,  Jan.  5,  1893. 


134  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

tive  party  leader  who  could  use  official  power  for  mere  party 
advantage.1 

Thoughtful  readers  have  quite  likely  been  asking  them- 
selves why  mayors  should  appoint  these  justices  at  all,  say- 
ing, perhaps,  that  mayors  are  not  likely  to  be  good  judges  of 
judicial  qualifications,  and  that  by  reason  of  their  election 
promises  mere  party-elected  mayors  have  little  liberty  —  and 
generally  not  much  inclination  —  to  look  beyond  the  selfish 
interests  of  their  party  and  the  need  of  winning  votes  for 
themselves.  There  is  much  truth  in  this  view  of  the  matter, 
and  we  shall,  in  a  more  appropriate  place,  present  a  plan  for 
the  selection  of  these  justices  by  the  judges  of  the  higher 
courts.2 

1  Mr.  Strong,  the  next  mayor  of  New  York,  was  elected  by  a  combination  of 
adherents  of  different  parties  brought  together  by  the  power  of  the  reform  senti- 
ment on  a  platform  which  declared  that  city  administration  should  be  conducted 
according  to  non-partisan  business  methods.  He  appointed  a  superior  class  of 
police  justices,  among  whom  were  adherents  of  different  parties,  and  all  of  whom 
were  experienced  lawyers.  A  great  improvement  in  the  police  courts  has  been 
one  of  the  results. 

*  See  Ch.  XVII. 


MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT  BY  PARTY  135 


CHAPTER     VI.  —  MUNICIPAL     GOVERNMENT    BY    PARTY    AS 
ILLUSTRATED  BY  THE  TAMMANY  DEMOCRACY  (concluded^) 

Tendency  of  city-party  domination  to  partisan  despotism  and  servility.  Need 
of  counteracting  it.  Proper  sphere  of  party  clubs.  Nature  and  dangerous  ten- 
dency of  Tammany's  club  system.  Number  and  power  of  her  party  clubs.  Their 
doings,  aims,  and  influence.  Their  military  and  partisan  spirit  —  doing  nothing 
for  the  higher  ends  of  city  life.  Tammany's  semi-military  display  of  brute  force 
at  conventions :  its  cost,  its  ominous  purpose  and  vicious  influence.  Chicago  has 
adopted  Tammany's  theory.  The  peril  it  portends. 

The  Tammany  boss-in-chief.  The  boss  system  a  natural  product  of  the 
city-party  system.  The  boss  system  a  usurpation  and  a  peril,  yet  a  necessity  of 
a  city-party  spoils  system.  Relation  of  boss  system  to  our  constitutions  and 
laws.  Why  no  worthy  party  needs  a  boss.  The  necessary  qualifications  of  a 
boss.  His  functions.  Boss  hostile  to  true  Home  Rule,  and  to  the  usefulness  of 
state  and  national  parties.  Tammany  continues  the  worst  of  city-party  practices. 
Past  relations  of  Tammany  to  the  police  force.  The  bi-partisan  police  system  as 
suggesting  remedies  for  the  evils  we  have  considered.  The  instructive  New  York 
police  law  of  1857,  and  what  it  suggests. 

The  New  York  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment  as  a  condemnation  of 
the  Tammany  system,  and  as  suggesting  the  kind  of  city  council  we  need.  Com- 
position and  great  significance  of  this  Board. 

The  unique  government  of  the  city  of  Washington.  Its  efficiency.  What  it 
teaches  as  to  party  government,  autocratic  mayors,  and  the  kind  of  city  councils 
required. 

WE  may  now  turn  from  the  mechanism  of  city  parties  to 
some  of  their  effects  and  purposes  not  generally  well  under- 
stood. One  of  the  tendencies  of  American  party  politics, 
especially  in  large  cities,  is  to  more  and  more  impair  the 
essential  independence  of  the  individual,  and  to  bring  him 
under  a  feudal  servility  to  party  majorities.  It  is,  therefore, 
of  great  importance  to  counteract  this  tendency  and  to  sup- 
press to  the  utmost  this  tyranny  of  the  majority. 

Every  statesman,  we  must  think,  would  be  glad  to  have 
our  young  men  and  women,  especially  in  cities,  so  instructed 
as  to  give  them  a  fair  view  of  both  sides  of  political  subjects 
and  party  issues  before  they  join  any  party  and  thereby 
become  subject  to  passions  and  interests  which  make  candid 
judgments  thereafter  very  difficult.  On  the  other  hand, 
zealous  partisans  and  especially  party  leaders  and  bosses 


186  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

naturally  desire  to  have  all  the  young  men  they  can  hope 
to  control  brought  under  the  influence  of  partisan  organ- 
izations, and  committed  to  partisan  theories,  before  a  de- 
veloped judgment  has  advanced  them  beyond  the  easy 
domination  of  mere  habit  and  passion. 

Hence,  very  generally  in  large  cities  where  politics  are 
most  degraded,  politicians  and  party  managers  have  gath- 
ered young  men  —  often  mere  boys  and  sometimes  even 
girls  —  into  societies  and  clubs,  and  have  subjected  them 
to  a  sort  of  semi-military  and  feudal  discipline  in  aid  of 
partisan  servility  and  domination.  Tammany  has  been 
conspicuous  for  such  a  policy.  Especially  is  this  practice 
vicious  in  city  affairs,  where  parties  mainly  contend  not 
about  principles,  but  about  offices,  patronage,  and  spoils. 
We  should  naturally  expect  to  find  the  worst  examples  of 
these  tendencies  in  New  York  City,  and  we  shall  not  be 
disappointed. 

1.  The  partisan  club  system  of  Tammany  which  has  be- 
come a  potential  force  for  evil  is  as  unique  as  it  is  ominous  ; 
though  the  Republican  clubs  have  gone  far  in  apparent  imi- 
tation of  the  Tammany  system.  Let  us  not  be  misunder- 
stood. Clubs  as  well  as  other  societies  for  patriotic 
endeavor,  for  social  intercourse,  for  the  discussion  of  prin- 
ciples, and  for  promoting  the  discharge  of  public  duties 
are  both  legitimate  and  useful,  and  not  the  less  so  when 
they  have  no  party  tests,  but  tests  of  character,  for  member- 
ship.1 

So  a  political  party  may  properly  form  clubs  for  the 
discussion  of  its  principles  and  for  their  dissemination  by 
legitimate  methods.  But  when  a  city  party  or  faction  like 
Tammany,  having  no  fixed  principles  and  tolerating  no 
criticism  of  its  managers  or  methods,  forms  clubs  for  the 
purpose  of  increasing  its  autocratic  power  and  of  drawing 
voters  into  servile  obedience  to  its  leaders,  the  case  is 
very  different  and  the  consequences  are  inevitably  perni- 

1  The  City  Club  and  the  Good  Government  Clubs  of  the  city  of  New  York,  the 
Municipal  League  of  Philadelphia,  and  the  Civic  Federation  of  Chicago  are  con- 
spicuous examples  of  many  similar  organizations. 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT   BY  PARTY  137 

cious.  This  club  system  is  an  effort  to  utilize  both  parti- 
san and  social  forces  for  party  purposes.  The  philosophical 
expounder  of  Tammany's  theory,  whom  we  have  quoted, 
tells  us  that  "the  social  development  of  Tammany,  lat- 
terly, has  been  very  decidedly  increased."1 

Tammany  makes  each  of  the  assembly  districts  of  the 
city  a  centre,  or  feudal  domain,  for  a  Tammany  club,  of 
which  the  district  leader  is  the  local  boss.  Each  of  these 
assembly  districts  —  to  use  the  words  of  the  official  exposi- 
tion of  its  affairs  —  is  not  only  "  a  regular  headquarters  of 
the  district  committee,  which  is  always  open,"  "but  in 
nearly  all  the  districts  there  is,  in  addition,  ...  a  club- 
house," "  and  many  of  these  club-houses  have  been  especially 
erected  for  the  purpose,  and  are  fitted  up  with  all  the  com- 
forts and  conveniences  of  modern  club-houses."2 

Some  of  these  club  buildings  are  said  to  be  "  exceedingly 
comfortable  and  elegant,  with  bowling-alleys,  billiards,  card 
and  smoking  rooms,  cafes,  and  all  the  usual  accommodations, 
furnished  at  a  very  low  rate  of  dues."  Here  the  meetings 
of  the  general  committee  of  the  assembly  district  are  held. 

The  work  just  cited  says  the  members  of  these  clubs 
"  talk  nothing  if  not  politics,"  and  after  referring  "  to  the 
'  dances,  balls,  picnics,  excursions,  and  outings  of  all  sorts ' 
under  Tammany  direction,  as  being  "  almost  invariably  suc- 
cessful," its  author  expresses  the  opinion  that  the  social 
influence  thus  aroused  is  a  valuable  help  in  the  way  "of 
strengthening  the  political  power  of  Tammany  Hall."3  He 
makes  it  plain  that  there  is  a  peculiar  kind  of  Tammany 
proselytism  promoted  by  these  clubs,  which  young  men  and 
boys  who  hope  to  be  Tammany  officers  and  laborers  know 
how  to  make  useful  to  themselves.  Even  the  shiftless  fel- 
lows who  wish  to  be  remembered  when  Tammany  distrib- 
utes coal  and  other  articles  to  the  poor  at  the  city's  expense 
are  pretty  sure  to  swell  the  ranks  of  the  shouting  party 
processions  in  which  these  clubs  take  the  lead.  Every  man 
who  seeks  favors  under  Tammany  government  naturally 

1  Politics  in  a  Democracy,  p.  73.  2  Tammany  Hall,  pp.  63,  64. 

3  Pol.  in  a  Dem.,  p.  73. 


138  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

sends  his  children,  —  if  not  money  or  refreshments,  —  to 
insure  the  success  of  the  club  dances,  picnics,  and  outings. 

Neither  Tammany's  exposition  of  itself  nor  the  writer  last 
cited  tells  us  how  the  great  sums  of  money  —  apparently 
several  millions  of  dollars  —  have  been  obtained  which  have 
made  it  possible  to  purchase,  furnish,  and  adorn  these  club- 
houses —  probably  over  thirty  in  all  —  and  to  open  them  "  at 
a  low  rate  of  dues,"  to  Tammany  supporters.  But  the 
masters  of  a  vast  metropolis  who  can  sell  nominations  and 
levy  assessments  at  rates  fixed  by  themselves  —  and  who  are 
in  friendly  relations  with  the  powerful  Republican  leaders 
of  the  legislature  —  can  hardly  be  much  embarrassed  by  a 
mere  matter  of  money  for  such  a  purpose.  Every  speculator 
in  party  favors,  knowing  that  club  influence  may  give  him  a 
valuable  city  contract  or  prevent  his  bad  work  being  faith- 
fully inspected,  will  certainly  contribute  liberally  to  the 
Tammany  club  of  his  assembly  district. 

2.  Though  no  methods  of  improved  city  government  or 
lessons  in  the  duties  of  citizenship  may  be  taught  in  these 
clubs,  they  are  far  from  being  idle.     Angry  managers  of 
local  factions  gather  in  them  to  have  their  quarrels  adjusted 
by  the  leader  or  boss  of  the  assembly  district  who  presides 
there ;  to  them  the  election  district  "  captains,  lieutenants,  and 
aides  "  go  to  make  reports  to  the  leader  as  to  how  patronage 
may  be  most  effectively  used,  and  how  party  opponents  may 
be  easiest  cajoled,  bribed,  or  frightened.     At  these  meetings 
it  is  decided  what  licenses  and  permits  should  be  granted  or 
revoked,  in  what  cases  policemen  should  be  severe  or  lenient 
toward  pawnbrokers,  grog-shop  keepers,  bawdy-house  keepers, 
and  gamblers,  and  who  should  be  allowed  to  keep  a  dance 
hall,  put  up  a  barber  pole,  or  continue  a  street  obstruction. 

In  these  clubs  also  are  considered  what  offenders  should 
be  discharged,  or  severely  punished,  by  the  police  justices,  — 
justices  who  are  perhaps  themselves  presidents  of  the  clubs, 
—  and  what  amount  of  Tammany  money  and  patronage 
should  be  used  to  defeat  an  independent  candidate. 

3.  It  is  obvious   that   if   this  Tammany  club  system  is 
useful  and  without  danger,  it  is  desirable  that  every  city 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT  BY  PARTY  139 

party  should  build  great  partisan  club-houses  in  all  the 
assembly  districts,  and  there  gather,  organize  under  party 
leaders,  and  discipline  and  drill  according  to  military  rules, 
all  the  children  of  the  districts  —  thus  beginning  to  develop 
and  teach  much  earlier  in  life  and  much  more  effectively 
than  ever  before  all  the  theories  and  methods  of  partisan 
warfare  in  cities. 

The  theory  on  which  these  clubs  are  based  helps  us  to 
comprehend  the  whole  city-party  system.  Just  as  the  cap- 
tains, lieutenants,  and  aides  go  to  the  club-houses  to  do  fealty 
to  the  district  leaders  who  preside  there,  —  as  feudal  lords  or 
bosses  of  the  assembly  district,  —  these  leaders  go  to  Tam- 
many Hall  itself  to  do  fealty  to  the  boss-in-chief,  who  there 
rules  directly.  It  is  a  system  which  everywhere  increases 
partisan  despotism  and  servility,  and  everywhere  impairs 
personal  independence.  It  brings  all  bosses  and  leaders  — 
even  those  of  different  parties  —  into  sympathetic  relations, 
and  makes  conspiracies  between  them  both  easy  and  natural. 

4.  Politicians  and  partisans  who  think  that  the  great  pur- 
pose of  parties  is  to  enforce  a  vigorous  discipline,  to  increase 
the  party  vote,  and  to  suppress  all  independent  action,  will 
see  nothing  objectionable  in  this  club  system  —  toward  which 
all  city-party  action  is  tending.  But  thoughtful  citizens 
who  comprehend  the  evils  of  an  excessive  and  despotic  party 
spirit  and  discipline  will  see  with  anxiety  a  development 
which  brings  party  divisions  and  demoralizing  party  influ- 
ence into  the  amusements  of  social  life,  and  teaches  the 
children  of  both  sexes,  in  their  dances  and  at  their  picnics, 
that  their  enjoyment  has  been  made  possible  by  the  favor  of 
a  great  party.  Tammany  has  counted  the  cost  of  this  seduc- 
tive way  of  making  converts  and  vassals,  and  has  found  it 
profitable.  It  helps  explain  the  mystery  of  its  vast  power.1 
It  was  shown  in  the  investigation  of  1895  that  these  clubs 


1  Since  the  so-called  "  Greater  New  York  "  was  created  in  1897,  Tammany  has 
been  industriously  weaving  the  network  of  its  clubs  over  all  the  territory  added 
to  the  former  city.  The  ominous  enlargement  of  the  power  of  the  central  Tam- 
many club  of  the  metropolis  since  the  election  of  that  year  has  arrested  general 
attention. 


140  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

were  much  frequented  by  New  York  City  policemen,  and 
with  such  demoralizing  consequences  that  even  Tammany 
police  commissioners  were  forced  by  public  opinion  to  for- 
mally condemn  the  practice. 

5.  If  the  time  shall  ever  come  in  our  great  cities  when 
from  the  partisan  clubs  of   the  hostile   parties,  in  all  the 
Mgembly  districts,  semi-military  processions  shall  go  forth 
to  great  party  meetings  and  picnics,  —  the  paraders  shouting 
for  their  respective  leaders,  and  singing  their  exciting  party 
songs,  —  we  shall  have  more  reasons  than  now  for  studying 
the  admonishing  club   history  of   the   Roman  and  Italian 
republics,  in  which  their  club  processions  appear  as  hostile 
bands  ready  for  deeds  of   blood.     Processions  from  these 
Tammany  clubs  already  march  under  their  club  flags  to  the 
sound  of  partisan  and  martial  music. 

6.  The  reader  has,  perhaps,  been  comparing  the  doings 
of  these  clubs  with  the  manifold  activities  of  the  churches, 
schools,   and    colleges  —  of    the    innumerable   societies   for 
charity,  benevolence,  and  patriotic  endeavor  —  which   are, 
with  the  noble  minds  who  lead  them,  the  potential  forces 
for  the  moral   elevation   and   glory  of  enlightened   cities. 
These  clubs  have,  apparently,  no  share  in  these  great  efforts 
and  agencies  for  civilization,  righteousness,  and  self-sacrifice. 
Acting  on  the  low  plane  of  selfishness,  ambition,  and  party 
spirit,  they  seem  to  require,  on  the  part  of  their  adherents, 
no  self-denial,  no  non-partisan  or  altruistic  efforts  for  the 
general  welfare.     A  thoughtful  citizen  can  hardly  ponder 
these  facts  of  our  municipal  life  without  painful  reflections 
—  especially  in  view  of   the  increasing   divergence  in  our 
cities  between  the  forces  which  are  political  and  those  which 
are  educational,  moral,  and  religious. 

II 

1.  The  same  aggressive  spirit  which  has  caused  the  mana- 
gers of  Tammany  to  appropriate  social  forces  by  means  of  clubs 
has  also  caused  them  to  display  great  bodies  of  their  followers 
at  state  and  national  conventions  with  an  obvious  purpose 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT   BY  PARTY  141 

of  demonstrating  their  brute  power,  and  influencing  these 
bodies.  This  novel  display,  which  has  hardly  yet  arrested 
public  attention,  may  be  the  first  exhibition  of  a  new  mu- 
nicipal force  which  may,  within  a  generation,  become  very 
potential  in  American  politics.  We  have  seen  that  the 
constitutional  convention  of  New  York,  in  1894,  felt  the 
need  of  guarding  the  state  against  city  domination,  and  a 
New  York  law  of  1896  provides  for  a  city  which,  within  the 
present  generation,  may  contain  a  majority  of  the  voters  of 
the  state  —  may  even  now,  by  making  common  cause  with 
one  other  large  city,  make  and  repeal  laws  at  pleasure.1 

How  is  this  city-party  domination  likely  to  be  used? 
Mr.  Ivins  gives  an  estimate  to  the  effect  that  Tammany 
spent  about  fifty  thousand  dollars  on  its  representation  to 
the  Chicago  National  Convention  of  1884,  where  it  made 
an  ostentatious  display  of  mere  physical  force  —  perhaps 
the  first  instance  of  the  kind.2  At  the  last  inauguration 
of  President  Cleveland  —  to  whose  party  theories  those  of 
Tammany  were  in  broad  contrast,  yet  from  whom  its  mana- 
gers doubtless  hoped  for  patronage  —  it  was  represented,  at 
enormous  cost,  by  several  thousands  of  its  partisans  —  there 
having  been  eight  railroad  trains  filled  with  them,  under 
the  lead  of  her  boss,  her  sachems,  the  mayor  of  New  York, 
several  of  the  police  justices  of  the  city,  and  others  of  its 
partisan  officials.3  These  thousands  of  her  brawny  champions 
were  ostentatiously  paraded,  in  semi-military  array,  upon 
the  streets  of  the  national  capital  —  an  exhibition  of  half- 
civilized  party  spirit  and  menacing  purpose  quite  in  harmony 
with  the  recent  semi-official,  Tammany  publication  to  which 
we  have  referred.4  It  was  a  spectacle  to  make  a  patriot  not 

i  See  further  on  this  subject,  Ch.  XVIII.  2  Mach.  Pol.,  p.  62. 

3  N.  Y.  Times,  March  2, 1893. 

4  Tammany  Hall.    This  publication,  with  a  tiger  rampant  on  its  frontispiece, 
commends  to  Tammany  for  imitation  the  qualities  of  the  tiger,  the  wolf,  the  bear, 
and  the  fox ;  and  it  republishes  an  article,  which  appeared  over  the  name  of  the 
present  boss  of  Tammany,  in  the  North  American  Review,  in  which  politics  is 
declared  to  be  war,  and  the  success  of  the  Jacobin  Club  is  held  up  for  an  admira- 
tion only  inferior  to  that  due  to  the  "  Tammany  Democracy,"  which  is  declared 
"  to  have  no  equal  in  political  affairs  the  world  over."    Tammany  Hall,  pp.  24-28, 
66,  67. 


142  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

only  ashamed,  but  anxious  for  his  country.  In  describing 
the  violent  and  corrupt  days  of  Rome  before  Caesar  became 
emperor,  Mommsen  pictures  scenes  of  partisan  violence  and 
passion  which  seem  far  less  incredible  after  such  a  spectacle 
at  Washington. 

2.  In  October,  1893,  the  New  York  City  journals  contained 
accounts  of  railroad  trains  carrying  fourteen  parlor-car  loads 
of  men  of  Tammany  to  a  New  York  state  convention  at 
Albany.  This  Tammany  delegation  was  under  the  general 
charge  of  the  mayor  of  New  York,  but  in  divisions  headed 
by  the  sheriff,  excise  commissioners,  fire  commissioners, 
police  justices,  civil  justices,  and  other  city  officials  —  alto- 
gether a  striking  illustration  of  the  city-party  theory  of 
municipal  government.  It  hardly  need  be  said  that  it  would 
have  been  far  more  creditable  to  the  city  of  New  York  and 
to  each  of  these  officers  had  the  latter  kept  away  from  the 
convention,  but  we  can  foresee  from  their  conduct  what  is 
likely  to  happen  under  city-party  domination  when  our 
cities  shall  have  become  much  larger.1 

The  evidence  thus  exhibited  of  an  overflowing  party 
treasury,  which  the  reader  may  think  could  never  have 
been  filled  from  the  legitimate  earnings  of  city  officers  or 
otherwise  than  by  the  means  we  have  indicated,  is  but  the 
smallest  part  of  the  ominous  significance  of  this  brutal  dis- 
play of  city-party  power.2  Who  can  be  certain  that,  in  no 
remote  future,  if  the  city-party  system  shall  prevail,  the 
delegates  from  a  few  great  cities,  combining  their  numbers 
and  vast  financial  resources,  will  not  be  able  to  dictate  the 
nominations  of  both  governors  and  presidents  ?  If  the  Tam- 

1  New  and  admonishing  developments  of  the  (city)  party  system  are  now 
occurring  since  the  text  was  written.  In  November,  1897,  a  few  days  before  the 
mayoralty  election  in  New  York  City,  nearly  three  hundred  of  the  members  of  a 
city  party  of  Chicago, —  quite  in  the  spirit  of  Tammany,  —  with  the  mayor  of 
Chicago  at  their  head,  made  an  ostentatious  journey,  in  semi-military  array,  to 
New  York,  in  aid  of  carrying  the  election  of  Tammany's  candidate  for  mayor. 
Some  of  the  New  York  journals  suggested  that  the  hotels  regarded  some  of  these 
strange  people  as  quite  undesirable  guests.  Who  can  tell  what  such  precedents 
for  influencing  elections  may  lead  to?  Tammany  may  three  years  hence  send  a 
thousand  of  its  bruisers  to  help  elect  a  mayor  of  Chicago,  or  five  thousand  to 
influence  a  convention  for  nominating  a  president. 

*  See  Ch.  XVIII.  as  to  Tammany's  abundant  funds. 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT  BY  PARTY  143 

many  method  is  followed,  regiments  of  the  regular  army 
may  be  required  to  keep  the  peace  during  the  sessions  of  a 
national  convention. 


Ill 

1.  The  city  boss-in-chief  is  the  most  developed  and  charac- 
teristic production  of  our  city-party  system,  and  without 
understanding  him  the  system  cannot  be  comprehended.  A 
party  may  legitimately  have  a  leader  to  expound  its  prin- 
ciples and  to  advise  as  to  its  policy,  but  not  the  semi-military 
despot  or  the  patronage-mongering  autocrat  which  is  called 
a  boss.  It  needs  little  argument  to  show  that  a  despotic, 
semi-military  party  system,  unrecognized  by  the  laws,  and 
which  provides  for  many  separate  jurisdictions  and  local 
commanders,  makes  a  despotic  commander-in-chief  essential 
both  for  harmony  and  for  vigor.  A  system  which  is  at 
once  despotic,  military,  and  mercenary  must  have  a  despotic 
chief  and  self -executing  methods;  for  it  cannot  rely  upon 
appeals  to  the  courts,  to  reason,  or  to  justice,  —  it  being 
unknown  alike  to  the  constitution,  to  the  laws,  and  to  the 
judges. 

We  hear  much  of  a  superficial,  delusive  theory  to  the 
effect  that  the  great  source  of  our  municipal  evils  is  the  boss 
himself,  as  if  the  carbuncle  and  the  cancer  were  the  cause  of 
the  bad  blood  which  has  produced  them.  The  Tammany 
system  or  any  unrestrained  party  system  enforced  in  city 
affairs  will,  as  we  have  seen,  from  its  very  nature  produce 
an  endless  series  of  bosses.  The  boss  system  is  an  excres- 
cence upon  our  constitutional  system,  which,  like  all  excres- 
cences, springs  from  diseased  conditions,  and  perversions  of 
natural  forces.  The  boss  system  and  the  city -party  system 
can  exist  only  when  parties  have  transcended  their  sphere 
and  become  despotic  and  mercenary  —  only  when  the  indi- 
vidual, as  a  consequence,  has  lost  much  of  his  true  inde- 
pendence and  has  become  servile  to  parties  and  their 
managers.  The  power  which  makes  the  boss  a  potential 
force  is  the  measure  of  the  independence  and  liberty  which 


144  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

the  citizen  has  lost  by  becoming  a  party  vassal.  To  restore 
that  liberty  and  independence  is  the  only  remedy  for  the 
boss. 

The  despotism  administered  by  the  boss  does  not  spring 
from  himself  but  from  the  spirit  and  methods  of  the  party 
which  created  him.  No  American  constitution,  no  useful 
law  or  sound  municipal  principle,  no  needs  —  arising  out- 
side the  circles  of  party  despotism  —  require  or  allow  a  boss 
of  any  kind.  He  has  no  legitimate  or  useful  functions.  He 
is  as  undesirable  as  a  shark  in  a  fish-pond  or  a  feudal  lord 
in  an  assembly  of  freemen.  Few  opinions  are  so  superficial 
as  that  which  assumes  that  to  merely  overthrow  a  boss  will 
suppress  the  false  theories  and  methods  which  have  pro- 
duced him.  The  members  of  every  party  and  faction,  if  not 
blinded  by  party  spirit,  would  see,  in  the  disgraceful  and 
corrupt  doings  of  the  boss  they  tolerate,  evils  for  which  they 
are  individually  responsible.  The  boss  is  no  worse  than  the 
majority  of  his  supporters  make  him.  To  suppress  the  boss 
system  we  must  suppress  the  false  and  partisan  spirit  and 
theories  from  which  it  grows. 

2.  A  boss,  either  state  or  municipal,  can  rightfully  have 
no  sanction  in  the  laws  or  the  ordinances,  no  place  under 
the  administration,  no  recognition  in  the  halls  of  legislation 
or  in  the  courts  of  justice.  He  has,  in  fact,  no  legal  exist- 
ence. Both  government  and  society  are  complete  without 
him.  He  has  no  authority  which  it  is  not  a  discredit  alike 
to  a  party,  to  a  city,  and  to  a  state  to  recognize.  No  court 
could  without  disgrace  treat  him  as  the  lawful  holder  of  the 
power  which  he  prostitutes  or  of  the  money  which  he  extorts 
—  or  which  bad  citizens  put  in  his  hands  —  for  influencing 
legislators  or  carrying  elections. 

When  a  party  has  thus  come  under  a  feudal  discipline  and 
a  spoils  system,  outside  the  laws  and  the  constitution,  it  has 
created  a  necessity  for  managing  its  own  affairs  by  self- 
executing  methods  of  its  own  creation  which  the  govern- 
ment and  the  laws  cannot  recognize.  There  is  no  resource 
left  but  the  creation  of  an  extra-legal,  secret,  despotic,  exec- 
utive boss  to  administer  the  new  system  —  the  motive  forces 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT  BY  PARTY  145 

of  which  are  party  spirit  and  selfish  hopes  and  fears.  The 
boss  system,  in  other  words,  is  self -executing1,  propelled  by 
the  selfish  and  partisan  forces  of  human  nature.  It  is  both 
a  conspiracy  against  the  constitution  and  a  defiance  of  the 
laws  and  the  courts.1 

3.  The  fact  that  a  city  party  will  make  a  boss  out  of  such 
men  as  it  would  not  venture  to  nominate  for  mayor  —  none 
of  the  bosses  of  New  York  City  having  ever  been  made  a 
candidate  for  the  mayoralty  —  is  highly  significant.     He  can 
only  be  a  leader  in  a  sphere  outside  the  government  and  the 
laws  —  from  which  he  wages  war  upon  them.     No  boss  ever 
stands  as  the  representative  of  the  principles  of  his  party ; 
no  party  faithful  to  its  principles  ever  needs  or  tolerates 
a  boss.     The  boss  is  the  natural  and  inveterate  enemy  of 
civil  service  reform,  ballot  reform,  corrupt  practice  reform, 
nomination  reform  —  in  short,  of  all  reforms  which  would 
establish  the  independence  of  the  voters  ;   for  their  triumph 
would  be  his  suppression. 

4.  Politicians  and  party  zealots  are  willing  to  support  the 
despotism  of  the  boss  because  through  him  they  expect  to 
monopolize  the  offices  and  spoils,  and  get   their   share  of 
them.     They  are  lured  to  his  support  by  the  chances  —  of 
the  gambler  and  the  lottery  ticket  holder  —  of  winning  the 
large  prizes  of  party  victory  through  his  favor.     A  hundred 
politicians  and  office  seekers,  little  and  great,  may  be  held 
in  leash  by  a  boss  through  the  hope  of  gaining  a  single  office 
or  contract,  which  has  been  dangled  alluringly  before  the 
eyes  of  all  of  them.     To  offend  the  boss  imperils  every  vas- 
sal's chances  of  spoils,  or  an  election. 

According  to  the  boss  system,  the  patronage,  offices,  and 
spoils  which  a  party  controls  are  regarded  as  a  common 
fund,  —  belonging  to  its  regular  adherents  in  good  standing 
with  the  boss  —  of  which  he  is  administrator,  with  ample 
powers  for  awarding  it  —  especially  in  the  way  of  aiding  or 
defeating  office  seekers  and  legislation.  They  fawn  before 
him,  for  their  fate  depends  upon  his  favor.  The  will  of  the 

1  It  was  not  without  peculiar  fitness  that  the  last  boss  of  Tammany  (1894)  was 
made  chairman  of  its  committee  of  finance. 
L 


146  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

boss  may  defeat  the  just  claims  of  the  noblest  citizens  —  one 
of  whom  was  lately  refused  a  seat  in  the  Senate  from  New 
York  ;  or  may  make  an  unknown  person  governor  —  as  New 
York  has  recently  learned. 

5.  The  essential  qualities  of  a  boss-in-chief  are  obvious. 
He  must  be  a  man  of  strong  will,  of  courage,  of  quick  obser- 
vation, a  firm  disciplinarian,  a  good  judge  of  partisan  and 
selfish  forces,  and  of  all  the  motives  of  criminal  life.     He 
needs  to  be  an  expert  in  the  nature  of  politicians,  and  in 
the  arts  of  partisan  manipulation.     He  must  have  —  or  be 
thought  to  have  —  enough  of  that  kind  of  honesty,  which 
even  gamblers  need,  to  induce  politicians,  office-seekers,  and 
unscrupulous  rich  men  to  put  faith  in  his  promises,  and  to 
trust  him  with  money  for  unlawful  purposes ;  and  yet  skill 
and  audacity  enough  in  the  arts  of  secrecy  and  deception 
to  prevent  his  use  of  it  being  disclosed  —  even  though  it 
debauches  officers  and  bribes  legislatures.     He  must  be  an 
intolerant  partisan  by  nature,  who  thinks  —  or  pretends  to 
think  —  his  party  always  right  and  his  opponents  always 
wrong.    He  must  have  few  scruples  as  to  gaining  voters  and 
defeating  opponents  by  such  methods  as  we  have  seen  that 
party  leaders  and  captains  employ.1 

But  he  needs  none  of  the  higher  capacities  for  statesman- 
ship, none  of  the  noble  endowments  which  elevate  or  adorn 
political  life,  no  respect  for  manly  independence  in  politics. 
He  may  be,  apparently,  so  regardless  of  the  good  opinion  of 
the  better  part  of  his  fellow-citizens  as  to  be  willing  to  allow 
charges  in  the  foremost  journals,  imputing  disgraceful,  if 
not  criminal,  conduct  to  him  to  remain  unanswered.2 

6.  To  be  a  successful  boss  it  is  not  essential  for  a  man  to 
have  rendered  services  or  to  possess  qualities  which  in  a  so- 
cial or  moral  sense  give  distinction  or  command  respect.    He 
need  not  be  identified  with  the  reputable  wealth,  the  great 
business  interests,  the  culture,  the  art,  the  refinement,  the 

» See  Ch.  V. 

2  See  on  these  points :  N.  Y.  Evening  Post,  Oct.  5, 1895,  and  NOT.  23, 1898  ; 
N.  Y.  Time*,  Nov.  4, 1895;  Harper's  Weekly,  Dec.  23,  1893,  and  May  13  and  23, 
1894;  N.  Y.  Tribune,  Dec.  7,  1896. 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT   BY  PARTY  147 

commerce,  the  philanthropy,  the  churches,  or  the  charities 
of  the  state  or  the  city  of  which  he  may  be  the  political 
tyrant.  He  may,  indeed,  be  distinguished  for  very  different 
qualities  and  relations  too  well  known  to  need  mention 
here. 

7.  The  duties  of  the  boss-in-chief  are  easily  stated.    He  is 
the  chief  engineer  for  working  the  machine,  the  chief  mana- 
ger for  carrying  elections,  the  chief  spoilsman  for  operating 
the  spoils  system,  the  chief  purveyor  and  patronage  mon- 
gerer  for  apportioning  moneys,  offices,  and  spoils  which  his 
party  has  won.     He  settles  the  contentions  about  the  as- 
signment of  patronage  to  districts.      He  receives  and  uses 
the  money  which  unscrupulous  men  and  corporations  may 
intrust  to  him  for  having  the  power  of  his  party  used  to 
defeat  the  bills  they  dislike,  and  to  pass  those  they  favor. 
He  can  easily  use  it  in  a  way  to  aid  the  members  of  his 
party  who   are   most   subservient   to   himself,  thus   greatly 
increasing  his  own  power.       This  being  done  secretly  and 
without  liability  to  account,  allows  little  mystery  as  to  how 
a  boss  may  soon  become  rich  and  powerful.     The  chief  boss 
should  fix  the  price  for  a  nomination  to  a  judgeship  and  for 
defeating  or  passing  a  bill  before  the  legislature,  —  these 
matters  being  too  large  for  the  bosses  of  the  assembly  dis- 
tricts, —  but  he  has  no  function  for  upholding  the  public 
interests  as  paramount  to  party  gain,  and  it  is  contrary  to 
the  boss  system  that  he  should  do  so.     It  is  natural  that  a 
boss  should  hate  an  independent  or  non-partisan  much  more 
than  he  hates  a  party  opponent. 

8.  If  parties  would  confine  themselves  to  their  legitimate 
objects,  —  the  dissemination  of  their  principles,  and  the  giv- 
ing of  an  effective   expression  to  the  wishes  of  those  who 
freely  accept  them,  —  there  would  be  no  boss  and  nothing 
for  a  boss  to  do.     The  election  districts  and  the  cities  would 
be  able  to  freely  choose  fit  representatives,  and  there  would 
be  no  coercion  from  beyond  them.     But  boss-led  parties  will 
not  do  this  —  the  boss  system  requiring  universal  domination 
from  the  centre  to  the  borders.     The  largest  jurisdictions 
use  their  party  power,  under  the  lead  of  the  boss,  to  coerce 


148  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

the  votes  of  the  residents  of  the  smaller  districts,  —  depriving 
them  of  free  representation.  The  state  boss  uses  his  power 
to  coerce  county  and  town  elections  ;  the  city  boss  uses  his 
power  to  coerce  city  elections  in  all  the  wards  and  districts. 
Everywhere  the  boss  and  party  are  represented,  so  that 
rarely  can  the  individual  vote  freely.  The  great  Home  Rule 
policy  of  the  state  constitutions  —  intending  free  representa- 
tion for  every  locality  having  a  right  of  election  —  is  defeated 
by  the  centralized  power  of  the  party  exerted  by  the  boss 
wherever  local  sentiment  seeks  true  representation.  The 
boss  system  is  a  central  despotism.  Hence  arises  the  possi- 
bility of  legislative  bodies  in  which  nearly  all  the  members 
adhering  to  a  party  are  of  the  same  servile  kind.  They  are 
ready  to  obey  the  orders  of  the  boss  as  soldiers  obey  their 
general  or  feudal  vassals  their  lord. 

9.  It  is  one  of  the  worst  results  of  the  boss  system  —  which 
facilitates  secret  corruption,  as  well  as  despotism  —  that  it 
causes  unscrupulous  men  and  corporations  to  think  it  cheaper 
to  buy  their  safety  and  advantage  than  to  contend  like  men 
for  their  rights,  and  therefore  to  regard  it  as  a  good  invest- 
ment to  put  money  in  the  hands  of  the  boss.  They  prac- 
tically say  to  him :  "  Take  this  money  and  use  the  party  power 
to  defeat  the  bills  we  oppose  and  to  pass  those  we  favor. 
Let  us  both  keep  our  secrets."  No  receipt  is  given,  no 
account  is  to  be  rendered,  no  investigation  is  feared.  Is  it 
strange  that  this  boss  business  is  profitable  ?  Should  we  be 
surprised  that  bosses  of  different  parties,  having  a  common 
interest  in  a  vicious  business,  conspire  together  ?  Is  it 
strange  that  they  dictate  nominations  and  control  elections  ? 
Is  it  a  wonder  that  towns  and  districts  do  not  have  free 
elections?  The  late  millionnaire,  Jay  Gould,  gave  money 
to  the  bosses  of  both  parties,  obviously  for  his  own  advan- 
tage. Not  without  a  specious  justice,  he  insisted  that  as  both 
of  them  attempted  to  extort  money  from  him,  he  had  a  right, 
in  self-defence,  to  make  the  best  terms  he  could  —  as  he 
would  with  brigands  and  the  captains  of  pirate  ships. 


MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT  BY  PARTY  149 


IV 

Before  proposing  some  formal  remedies  for  the  evils 
considered,  it  may  be  useful  to  refer  to  certain  remedial 
measures  which  not  only  further  illustrate  the  Tammany 
city-party  system,  but  which  have  been  so  successful  as  to 
suggest  the  direction  in  which  further  relief  is  to  be  sought 
and  some  of  the  methods  through  which  it  can  be  easiest 
secured. 

When  national  and  state  parties  had  got  control  of  city 
governments,  they  speedily  began  to  disregard  the  facts  that 
these  governments  had  been  created  and  should  be  managed 
to  promote  local  interests.  The  parties  treated  them  as  if 
they  existed  to  secure  party  majorities  in  national  and  state 
elections,  applying  party  tests,  even  to  the  choice  of  police- 
men, and  requiring  these  officers  to  be  active  party  elec- 
tioneerers  —  as  Tammany  still  does. 

We  have  seen  that  no  truths  can  be  plainer  than  these : 
that  a  policeman  should  have  a  stable  tenure,  that  he  should 
not  be  a  politician,  that  he  should  treat  alike  the  adherents 
of  all  parties  and  of  no  party,  and  that  he  should  neither  do 
nor  omit  any  act  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  or  injuring  any 
party.  The  disregard  of  these  truths  by  Tammany  and  the 
city-party  system,  prior  to  1857,  had  caused  the  policemen  of 
New  York  City  to  be  partisan  and  corrupt ;  to  be  servile  to 
the  mayor,  tending  to  make  him  an  autocrat ;  to  be  a  potent 
and  intolerable  party  force  for  carrying  elections.  This  sys- 
tem greatly  impaired  the  independence  of  the  voters  and 
increased  the  despotism  of  the  party  majority.  The  mayor 
—  Fernando  Wood  —  dominated  the  police  force  at  that 
time  and  was  fast  becoming  both  a  municipal  autocrat  and 
a  party  boss.  The  great  body  of  the  citizens,  in  1857,  were 
as  blind  to  the  inevitable  and  intolerable  results  of  the  city- 
party  system  as  the  most  besotted  adherents  of  the  Tammany 
faction  now  are. 

The  time  had  not  then  arrived  when  any  considerable 
number  of  voters  could  see  that  to  take  the  police  service 


150  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

out  of  partisan  politics,  it  must,  like  the  military  and  naval 
service,  be  placed  under  a  real  non-partisan  command.  Men 
who  could  see  the  absurdity  of  selecting  a  mere  party  leader 
for  commander  of  the  army  or  navy  could  see  no  absurdity 
in  selecting  several  pairs  of  such  leaders  to  command  the 
police  force  of  the  city.  When  party  men  first  begin  to  see 
that  a  police  force  under  the  control  of  a  single  party  is  sure 
to  become  oppressive  and  corrupt,  they  do  not  at  once  adopt 
the  true  and  logical  action,  by  placing  it  under  non-partisan 
control  —  party  spirit  and  blinding  party  interests  having 
perverted  both  their  vision  and  their  judgment.  By  some 
strange  jugglery  of  reasoning,  they  place  two  or  more  pairs 
of  partisans  in  control,  though  claiming  all  the  time  that  no 
two  of  them  on  the  same  side  can  be  trusted. 

Yet,  inadequate  and  indefensible  as  the  bi-partisan  system 
is,  it  is  probably  better  than  control  of  the  police  by  a  single 
partisan.  That  system  materially  restrains  the  autocratic 
power  of  a  party -elected  mayor,  upon  which  Tammany  insists. 
New  York  public  opinion  had  become,  in  1857,  only  enlight- 
ened enough  to  try  the  bi-partisan  system,  which  is  really  an 
intermediate  stage  between  party  and  mayoralty  despotism 
on  one  hand,  and  non-partisan  justice  on  the  other. 

Yet  this  law  of  1857,  which  first  adopted  this  system,  was 
so  original  in  other  respects  as  to  deserve  some  attention 
here.1  It  created  a  police  district  made  up  mainly  of  the 
cities  of  New  York  and  Brooklyn,  for  which  a  commission  of 
five  was  appointed  by  the  governor  and  confirmed  by  the 
Senate.  The  mayors  of  these  cities  were  to  be  ex  officio 
members  of  the  commission,  whose  other  members  were  to 
be  so  classified  that  each  was  to  hold  office  for  three  years. 
The  governor  could  remove  a  commissioner  for  cause  after 
a  hearing.  No  policeman  could  be  removed  save  on  written 
charges,  and  after  an  opportunity  of  being  heard  in  his 
defence.  Sergeants  of  police  must  be  selected  from  among 
the  policemen,  and  police  inspectors  from  among  the  ser- 
geants. The  police  superintendent  was  to  be  selected  by 

l  Laws,  1857,  Ch.  569. 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT   BY  PARTY  151 

the  commission,  and  was  to  supersede  the  mayors  of  these 
cities,  respectively,  as  being  the  executive  head  of  the  police 
force. 

This  law  was,  we  think,  the  first  of  the  kind  in  this  coun- 
try, and  it  marks  an  important  advance  toward  a  non- 
partisan  city  administration.  It  made  it  impossible  for  the 
city-party  majority  to  control  the  police  force,  and  for 
a  mayor  to  use  it  to  carry  city  elections ;  it  gave  the  police- 
men a  more  reasonable  stability  of  tenure,  and  a  right  of 
trial  on  charges  before  they  could  be  removed  ;  it,  in  sub- 
stance, declared  that  policemen  are  state  officers,  and  that 
the  state  may  insist  on  their  good  government.  These  were 
original  and  salutary  achievements  in  this  country,  and 
clearly  suggest  the  direction  of  municipal  reforms  in  the 
future.1  Police  administration  under  this  law  was  very 
greatly  improved,  and  it  continued  to  be  much  the  best  in 
any  American  city  down  to  1870,  when  the  Tammany  fac- 
tion triumphed.  Other  departments  of  the  New  York  City 
government  were  soon  placed  under  analogous  commissions 
which  still  (1896)  continue  with  like  advantage.  These 
precedents  soon  resulted  in  commissions  being  provided  for 
many  cities  in  New  York  and  other  states.  The  reforms 
thus  secured  were  not  due  to  any  mayor,  or  to  any  city- 
party  majority ;  nor  were  they  gained  by  setting  the  state 
at  defiance  or  asserting  any  absolute  power  of  Home  Rule. 

Government  by  commissioners  had  so  vindicated  its  superi- 
ority to  the  old  party  system  with  autocratic  mayors,  that 
when  the  Tammany  faction  triumphed  in  1870,  it  did  not 
venture  to  supersede  commissions,  but  it  gave  the  power  of 
appointing  and  removing  the  commissions  to  the  mayors. 
This  largely  restored  the  autocratic  authority  of  these 
officers  and  party-majority  control  over  the  police  and  other 
city  departments. 

Having  thus  made  half  the  advance  from  party  domina- 

1  This  law  did  not  in  terms  provide  for  adherents  of  both  parties  having  places 
on  the  commission,  but  by  classifying  its  members,  and  placing  the  mayors  of 
New  York  and  Brooklyn  among  them,  the  result  was  practically  the  creation 
of  a  sort  of  bi-partisan  commission. 


152  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

tion  and  an  autocratic  mayoralty  toward  free  and  non- 
partisan  city  government,  a  clear  view  of  this  amount  of 
progress  will  help  us  much  in  completing  the  journey.  We 
cannot  continue  under  bi-partisan  commissions.  We  cannot 
expect  any  help  from  a  mere  city-party  majority.  There  is 
no  reason  for  thinking  that  a  mere  party-elected  mayor  will 
be  potential  for  reform.  We  must  count  on  public  opinion 
and  the  most  patriotic  adherents  of  both  parties,  and  not  on 
party  opinion  ;  and  we  must  maintain  our  just  constitutional 
relations  with  the  state.1 


1.  Another  example  of  the  bad  results  of  party  rule,  an 
autocratic  mayoralty,  and  the  creation  of  a  partisan  city 
council  as  a  remedy,  deserves  notice  here.  Before  1873  the 
action  of  the  party-elected  mayor,  aldermen,  and  assistant 
aldermen  of  New  York  City  had  become  as  intolerable  as 
the  administration  of  the  departments  had  been  prior  to 
1857.  For  relief  a  law  was  enacted  in  the  former  year, 
which,  after  abolishing  the  assistant  aldermen,  deprived  the 
aldermen  of  substantially  all  their  powers  both  as  to  the 
imposition  and  expenditure  of  taxes.  It  conferred  the  tax- 
ing power,  so  far  as  allowed  to  the  city,  and  the  control  of 
expenditures  upon  a  board,  or  commission,  designated  the 
Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment,  which  has  since 
exercised  them  with  beneficial  results  —  powers  under  which 
more  than  forty  millions  of  dollars  have  been  annually 
raised  and  expended.  This  board  fixes  not  only  the  aggre- 
gate expenditure,  so  far  as  not  fixed  by  law,  but  the 
amounts  which  may  be  expended  by  each  department  and 
branch  of  the  city  government,  without  there  being  any 
power  of  changing  these  amounts  by  the  Board  of  Alder- 
men or  other  city  authority.  By  this  law  most  of  the 
local  authority  for  government,  not  already  given  to  the 
commissioners,  was  taken  from  the  legislative  department 

1  3/im.  Prob.,  Ch.  II.  and  X.,  where  Professor  Goodnow  has  treated  this  sub- 
ject very  instructively. 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT   BY  PARTY  153 

and  the  mayor,  and  was  conferred  upon  a  body  most  of 
whose  members  were  to  be  chosen  for  service  in  other  depart- 
ments. It  was  a  great  municipal  revolution.1 

This  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment  is  composed 
of  four  city  officials  besides  the  mayor,  no  one  of  them  being 
elected  or  appointed  directly  to  its  membership,  —  the  mem- 
bers being  the  mayor,  who  is  elected  for  two  years,  the 
comptroller,  who  is  elected  for  three  years,  the  president  of 
the  Board  of  Aldermen,  who  is  elected  for  two  years,  the 
president  of  the  department  of  taxes  and  assessments,  who 
is  appointed  for  six  years,  and  the  corporation  counsel,  who 
is  appointed  for  four  years.  It  will  be  observed  that  the 
two  of  these  members  who  have  the  longest  terms  are 
appointed  officers.2 

2.  It  is  plain  that,  inasmuch  as  the  elected  members  of 
the  New  York  board  are  chosen  at  different  times,  and  for 
different  terms,  and  the  appointed  members  hold  their  places 
for  long  yet  unequal  terms,  they  are  likely  to  be  adherents  of 
different  parties,  and  are  at  least  quite  sure  to  represent 
diverse  phases  of  city-party  and  public  opinion.  Adherents 
of  different  parties  have  been  and  now  are  (November,  1897) 
members  of  the  New  York  City  Board  —  thus  really  giving 
some  measure  of  minority  representation  in  both  the  legis- 
lative and  the  executive  departments.  This  law  in  large 
measure  suppresses  the  mayor's  veto  power,  and  condemns 
and  defeats  the  autocratic  mayoralty  theory.  For  as  to 
financial  matters,  the  mayor's  vote  is  only  that  of  one  out 
of  five.  The  dominant  party-majority  of  the  hour  cannot 
longer  absolutely  control  the  administration.  It  is  obvious 
that  these  boards  are  in  the  nature  of  a  continuous,  non- 

1  Mr.  Conkling  says  the  only  important  power  remaining  to  the  aldermen  "is 
to  regulate  the  use  of  streets,  highways,  roads,  and  public  places."    City  Govt., 
pp.  39  and  47. 

2  N.  Y.  Laws,  1873,  Ch.  335,  Sec.  112 ;  N.  Y.  Consol.  Act,  90.    The  corporation 
counsel  was  made  a  member  of  the  Board  in  1893.    N.  Y.  Laws,  1893,  Ch.  106. 
Increased    significance   is  given  to  these    revolutionary  changes    by  the  fact 
that  the  charter  of  Brooklyn,  enacted  after  fifteen  years'  trial  of  this  new  sys- 
tem in  New  York  City,  has  pretty  closely  reproduced  it  for  Brooklyn.     The 
city  of  Detroit,  and,  we  believe,  several  other  cities,  have  followed  these  prece- 
dents. 


154  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

partisan  city  council,  of  which  they  suggest  the  utility,  and 
into  which  they  might  be  in  large  measure  developed.1 

They  bring  much  more  stability  and  experience  into  the 
management  of  city  affairs  than  was  possible  under  the 
former  system,  and  create  some  independence  of  mere  party 
dictation.  They  make  it  possible  to  pursue  a  steadier  and 
more  consistent  policy  than  can  be  attained  under  the  old  or 
the  latest  party  system.  In  fact,  the  whole  policy  estab- 
lished by  such  boards  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment  is 
as  utterly  opposed  to  the  theory  according  to  which  some 
municipal  reformers  are  now  insisting  that  mayors  shall  be 
autocrats,  as  they  are  to  the  old  system  of  strict  party  rule. 

They  have  unquestionably  caused  much  improvement  in 
city  administration,  and  hardly  any  other  part  of  the  govern- 
ments of  the  cities  of  New  York  or  Brooklyn  has  been  so 
satisfactory,  or  so  far  independent  of  partisan  and  boss  dic- 
tation. No  serious  scandal  has  stained  the  records  of  these 
boards,  and  no  part  of  the  city  government  has  commanded 
a  larger  measure  of  public  respect. 

It  is  worthy  of  notice  that  it  would  be  only  necessary  to 
confer  upon  these  boards  the  city  ordinance-making  power 
—  now  distributed  among  various  commissions  and  the  alder- 
men in  New  York  —  to  constitute  them  a  body  whose  action 
could  readily  supply  a  large  part  of  the  need  which  now 
exists  for  very  frequent  appeals  to  the  legislatures  for  special 
laws.  They  could  not  be  made  adequate  as  councils,  yet 
they  might  be  highly  useful  in  the  intermediate  stage  in 
passing  from  party  government  to  the  creation  of  such 
councils,  and  they  supply  valuable  suggestions  as  to  proper 
composition  of  such  bodies. 

VI 

1.  The  District  of  Columbia  and  the  city  of  Washington  — 
for  which  Congress  under  the  Constitution  makes  the  laws 
much  as  the  state  makes  them  for  other  cities  —  has  a  very 

1  Such  was  the  condition  when  the  Greater  New  York  charter  was  adopted. 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT   BY   PARTY  155 

unique  lesson  for  us  concerning  party  and  mayoralty  gov- 
ernment. Congress  had  many  years  ago  provided  for  having 
a  mayor  and  city  council  in  two  branches  for  Washington, 
and  an  executive  organization  according  to  the  prevailing 
party  theory.  City-party  government  prevailed  up  to  1871, 
but  it  became  so  corrupt  and  intolerable  that  Congress 
imposed  upon  it  various  restraints.  Still  disgraceful  and 
intolerable  abuses  continued.  In  1874  and  1876  Congress 1 
abolished  the  whole  party  and  mayoralty  structure,  and  pro- 
vided a  new  municipal  system  which  abolished  all  voting  as 
to  city  affairs.  Since  this  new  system  went  into  operation 
no  one  has  voted  for  any  municipal  officer  in  Washington ;  it 
has  had  no  mayor  ;  there  have  been  no  local,  party  contests 
for  capturing  its  government  or  creating  municipal  virtue. 

The  law  of  1878  provided  for  the  appointment  by  the 
President  of  three  commissioners  to  whom  the  municipal 
government  of  the  city  of  Washington,  and  the  selection  and 
removal  of  nearly  all  its  officials,  were  intrusted.  Two  of 
the  commissioners  were  made  appointive  from  civil  life  and 
for  terms  of  three  years  ;  and  the  other  was  to  be  selected 
from  time  to  time  from  among  the  members  of  the  corps  of 
engineers  of  the  United  States  Army  —  whose  members,  we 
may  say,  are  neither  politicians  nor  partisans.  They  are 
of  the  class  of  men  who  should  be  placed  at  the  head  of  our 
city  police  and  boards  of  public  works.  The  engineer  com- 
missioner, who  has  no  fixed  term  of  office,  is,  under  the 
commission,  practically  superintendent  of  the  department  of 
public  works.  The  two  other  commissioners  are  not,  in 
practice,  selected  from  the  same  party.  The  commission  — 
save  as  subject  to  the  power  of  Congress  over  taxation  and 
expenses  —  has  much  the  same  powers  which  would  belong 
to  a  council  in  New  York  City  which  should  possess  the 
combined  authority  of  its  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportion- 
ment and  of  all  of  the  city  commissions. 

Here,  therefore,  is  a  city  government  substantially  non- 
partisan.  It  not  only  discards  the  whole  theory  of  an 

l  Laws,  1874,  Ch.  337,  and  Laws,  1878,  Ch.  180. 


156  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

autocratic  mayoralty  and  the  delusion  of  "holding  the 
mayor  responsible,"  but  it  has  no  mayor  whatever.  There 
are  no  elections  for  getting  municipal  patriotism  and  wis- 
dom out  of  partisan  contests  over  city  offices,  no  assembly 
districts  or  party  leaders,  no  city  party,  no  primaries,  no 
bosses,  only  able  administrators  who  become  familiar  with 
their  duties  and  feel  responsibility  to  public  opinion. 

2.  Nevertheless,  the  city  of  Washington,  under  this  new 
system,  has  had  the  most  economical,  efficient,  and  respectable 
government  of  any  city  in  the  United  States.  There  have 
been  under  it  no  great  scandals  or  frauds  and  only  very  small 
abuses  of  the  Tammany  or  city-party  kind.  The  sanitary 
administration  of  Washington  has  been  excellent,  its  police 
force  has  not  been  guilty  of  corruption,  its  clean,  smooth, 
and  well-shaded  and  paved  streets  have  been  generally 
admired.1 

This  example  of  good  local  government  is  all  the  more 
interesting,  and  the  problem  solved  has  been  all  the  more 
difficult,  because  the  local  power  to  some  extent  embraces 
the  jurisdiction  of  a  state  as  well  as  that  of  a  city.  The 
people  of  Washington  seem  to  appreciate  the  advantages  of 
their  form  of  government  and  to  be  satisfied  with  it.  A 
recent  writer,  speaking  of  it,  says,  "  The  commissioners  are 
more  sensitive  to  public  opinion  than  an  elected  executive. 
An  informal  vote,  lately  taken,  has  shown  that  only  a  minute 
fraction  of  the  people  favored  the  introduction  of  suffrage." 
Citizens'  associations  exist  on  a  large  scale,  and  seem  to  make 
public  opinion  an  effective  power  for  good  government.2 

Though  we  should  not  attempt  the  suppression  of  local 
voting  for  municipal  officers  within  the  states,  yet  the  ex- 
ample of  Washington  may  well  set  us  upon  revising  some 
of  our  most  confident  municipal  theories.  When  the  ques- 
tion arises  as  to  whether  city-party  contests  tend  to  good 
city  government,  Washington  gives  us  no  uncertain  answer. 
When  the  question  shall  arise  whether  a  mayor  elected  by 

1  There  are  still  in  Washington  a  very  few  local  officers  whom  the  President 
appoints  and  removes  sometimes  —  to  his  discredit  —  apparently  for  party  reasons, 
a  Political  Science  Quarterly,  September,  1897,  pp.  414,  419. 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT   BY   PARTY  157 

popular  vote  and  having  autocratic  powers  is  an  essential 
condition  of  such  government,  the  answer  which  Washing- 
ton gives  would  seem  to  be  unmistakable.  And  we  shall 
soon  find  that  the  republican  city  of  Paris  has  no  mayor, 
that  all  the  enlightened,  well-governed  cities  of  Europe  are 
not  only  without  mayors  elected  by  the  people,  but  are  with- 
out any  sort  of  party  government  whatever. 

3.  We  hope  our  readers  will  be  prepared  for  some  sugges- 
tions for  municipal  reform,  based  in  part  on  the  experience 
we  have  now  cited,  which  seems  to  call  for  important  re- 
visions of  several  conventional  methods  and  theories  which 
have  not  apparently  been  well  considered. 

There  seems  to  be  a  manifest  need  of  a  central,  legislative, 
non-partisan  body  in  cities,  —  some  kind  of  a  city  council,  of 
which  the  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment  in  New 
York,  the  commissions  in  many  cities,  and  the  unique  gov- 
ernment of  Washington  are  the  suggestion  and  prophecy, 
a  council  having  general  powers  for  making  all  city  ordi- 
nances, for  bringing  the  whole  municipal  government  into 
harmony,  and  for  abolishing  needless  appeals  to  the  legisla- 
ture for  special  laws.  This  council  must  represent  not  mere 
parties,  or  party  opinion,  but  public  opinion,  and  the  whole 
mass  of  citizens  and  municipal  interests.  Its  proper  consti- 
tution is  the  greatest  problem  of  city  government.1 

1  An  adequate  presentation  of  the  results  of  party  government  under  Tammany 
would  contain  some  account  of  the  grave  abuses  which  have  existed  in  the  offices 
of  constables,  coroners,  county  clerks,  sheriffs,  civil  justices,  school  boards,  and 
boards  of  public  works ;  but  we  have  no  space  for  further  details,  and  must  leave 
these  matters  to  the  imagination  of  the  reader,  aided  by  some  incidental  illustra- 
tions as  we  proceed.  Very  likely  the  reader  may  regard  it  as  an  important 
omission  that  we  have  not  mentioned  the  neglect  of  many  intelligent  citizens  to 
take  part  in  the  city  primaries,  and  to  vote  at  many  of  the  elections,  as  being  a 
great  cause  of  bad  city  government.  This  matter  —  far  more  significant  and 
profound  than  it  is  generally  thought  to  be  —  will  receive  attention  in  a  more 
appropriate  place.  See  Ch.  X. 


158  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 


CHAPTER  VII.  —  SEVERAL  VICIOUS  CONDITIONS  AND 
PRACTICES  CONSIDERED  AND  REMEDIES  FOR  THEM  PRO- 
POSED. THE  MERIT  —  OR  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM  —  SYS- 
TEM 

Individuals  and  parties  compared  as  sources  of  municipal  evils.  The  ultimate 
powers  which  make  for  municipal  reform.  How  party  spirit  and  interests  divide 
the  true  friends  of  good  city  government.  The  cooperation  of  these  friends 
essential  and  a  duty.  The  coercion  of  city  laborers  a  potential  and  degrading 
party  force.  An  easy  remedy  for  this  coercion  explained. 

The  prostitution  of  municipal  authority  for  party  ends  a  great  evil.  Party  tests 
for  city  offices  indefensible.  The  methods  of  civil  service  reform  as  a  remedy. 
This  reform  and  its  practical  results  explained.  Why  called  the  "  merit  system." 
The  promotion  of  the  most  worthy  a  duty.  Removals  for  party  advantage  un- 
justifiable. The  merit  system  will  make  true  Home  Rule  much  easier.  City  ser- 
vants should  not  be  active  in  party  politics.  The  origin  and  progress  of  civil 
service  reform.  Removals  for  party  advantage  should  be  a  criminal  offence. 
The  proper  tenure  and  official  term  for  municipal  officers.  Most  of  their  terms 
far  too  short.  Elections  in  which  no  principles  are  involved  are  demoralizing. 
$  Examples  of  too  short  terms  and  too  many  elected  officers  in  cities  and  villages. 
Electing  jurymen.  The  larger  the  city  the  longer  should  be  the  terms  of  its  offi- 
cers. The  army  and  navy  and  the  federal  judiciary  illustrate  the  advantage  of 
long  terms.  The  Brooklyn  charter  of  1888  as  illustrating  the  policy  commended 
}  in  this  chapter  and  the  evils  of  city-party  government. 

1.  THE  reader  is  reminded  that  we  are  not  to  consider  so 
much  the  ultimate  influences  —  educational,  moral,  or  reli- 
gious —  which  bear  upon  this  subject,  as  those  which  spring 
from  false  theories  and  methods  and  from  vicious  organiza- 
tions. While  to  elevate  the  standard  of  morality  and  intelli- 
gence must  always  be  the  ultimate  purpose,  it  is  plainly  a 
matter  of  vast  importance  to  determine  by  what  means  we 
can  secure  the  best  government  possible  from  the  virtue  and 
intelligence  which  now  exist  among  the  people.  We  believe 
that  much  better  municipal  administration  than  that  which 
now  prevails  is  possible  even  within  this  decade. 

That  a  large  proportion  of  the  evils  in  our  city  affairs 
spring  from  ignorance,  selfishness,  and  corruption  on  the  part 
of  individuals,  for  which  parties  and  false  theories  and 
methods  are  not  responsible,  no  candid  man  can  deny.  Much 


SEVERAL  VICIOUS  CONDITIONS  AND  PRACTICES        159 

of  the  bribery  which  exists  should  be  charged  directly  upon 
individuals  —  in  very  large  measure  upon  the  so-called  respect- 
able classes  or  the  corporations  which  they  control.1 

Nevertheless,  the  bribery  and  corruption  in  city  govern- 
ment which  originates  in  the  private  action  of  individuals  is 
small  compared  with  that  which  springs  from  the  doings  of 
parties  and  factions,  and  finds  justification  in  an  excessive 
party  spirit.2 

2.  Yet  there  is,  beyond  the  special  sphere  of  our  discussion, 
a  broad  field  for  instruction  and  for  patriotic  and  altruistic 
endeavor  in  which  the  teacher,  the  ministers  of  religion,  and 
all  organizations  for  municipal  reform  have  a  high  function 
and  duty.  It  is  for  them  to  present  lofty  ideals,  to  arouse 
the  sense  of  civic  pride  and  duty,  to  elevate  the  municipal 
standards  of  the  people  and  impel  them  by  irresistible  moral 
and  religious  forces  to  the  better  discharge  of  their  obliga- 
tions to  themselves  and  their  country.  It  would  be  no  small 
gain  to  make  it  as  discreditable  for  our  young  men  —  whose 
college  studies  have  perhaps  extended  to  the  governments  of 
Greece,  Rome,  and  Germany  —  to  have  no  sound  and  definite 
views  as  to  what  are  the  proper  relations  between  parties  and 
municipal  governments,  or  as  to  the  best  means  of  improving 
the  latter,  as  it  is  for  our  rich  social  leaders  to  take  no  part 
in  municipal  administration,  while  surrendering  themselves 
to  ostentatious  and  demoralizing  social  display — when  our 
cities  are  the  worst  governed  amongst  those  of  the  enlight- 
ened nations. 


We  have  called  attention  to  the  important  fact  that,  at  the 
outset  of  all  attempts  to  unite  the  natural  friends  of  good  mu- 

1  The  mayor  of  Chicago  in  a  recent  speech  to  leading  citizens  is  reported  to 
have  used  these  words  :  "  Who  bribes  the  Common  Council?    It  is  not  men  in  the 
common  walks  of  life.    It  is  men  in  your  own  walks  of  life.  .  .  .    Who  is  respon- 
sible for  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  city  of  Chicago  ?    Your  representative 
business  men.    If  an  assessor  grows  rich  in  office,  with  whom  does  he  divide  ?   Not 
with  the  common  people  .  .  .  but  with  the  man  who  tempted  him  to  make  a  low 
assessment."     N.  Y.  Evening  Post,  Dec.  30,  1895. 

2  See  Chs.  III.,  IV.,  and  V. 


160  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

nicipal  government,  we  find  them  separated  into  hostile  party 
camps  and  made  distrustful  of  each  other  by  irrelevant  party 
issues,  prejudices,  and  rivalries.  Yet,  so  profoundly  impor- 
tant is  this  fact  —  directly  in  the  way  of  all  arguments  as  to 
remedies  —  that  we  must  add  a  few  more  words  concerning 
it.  The  party  interests  and  distrusts  arising  out  of  issues 
external  to  municipal  affairs  make  it  very  difficult  even  for 
candid  party  men  —  and  impossible  for  partisans  —  to  coop- 
erate in  any  municipal  policy,  or  to  take  a  just  view  either  of 
city  interests  or  of  their  own  obligations. 

They  can  hardly  comprehend  the  fundamental  fact  that  a 
city  or  a  village  has  no  valid  claim  to  a  separate  government 
except  to  enable  it  to  govern  in  reference  to  its  own  needs 
and  interests.  Naturally  enough,  therefore,  they  habitually 
sacrifice  the  welfare  of  municipalities  to  the  interests  and 
ambitions  of  state  and  national  parties.  Their  partisan  spirit 
and  ambition  involve  them  in  endless  contests  and  intrigues 
for  mere  city  and  village  patronage,  spoils,  and  votes  to  be 
used  in  aid  of  external  and  irrelevant  party  elections.  By 
this  means  both  their  sense  of  municipal  duty  and  their  con- 
ception of  the  dignity  and  importance  of  city  affairs  become 
debased.  Naturally  enough,  they  fail  to  see  that  if  city  gov- 
ernments and  party  managers  would  confine  themselves  to 
their  proper  spheres  there  would  be  few  conflicts  between 
them  —  these  conflicts  springing  mainly  from  invasions  by 
each  of  the  domain  of  the  other. 

It  is  almost  too  clear  for  argument  that  only  by  a  union 
of  the  natural  friends  of  good  city  government,  thus  unnatu- 
rally separated  and  made  hostile  toward  each  other,  can  such 
government  be  established  or  preserved.  For  the  number 
in  any  one  political  party,  which  will  stand  for  true  city 
government,  is  too  small  to  establish  it  —  to  carry  the  city 
elections  —  both  against  its  own  partisans  and  all  the  adhe- 
rents of  the  other  party.  An  indispensable  condition  of 
municipal  reform,  therefore,  is  the  union  and  cooperation, 
in  its  behalf,  of  the  worthier  voters  of  both  parties  —  the 
natural  friends  of  municipal  reform  —  in  support  of  methods 
of  city  government  upon  which  they  can  honorably  unite, 


SEVERAL   VICIOUS   CONDITIONS   AND   PRACTICES        161 

while  retaining  their  existing  affiliations  in  national  and  state 
parties. 

Thus  far,  nearly  every  triumph  of  such  reform  has  been 
achieved  through  a  temporary  union  of  its  party-divided 
—  though  natural  —  friends ;  and  it  is  plain  that  to  make 
such  reform  permanent  these  friends  must  permanently 
stand  together.  Only  by  being  faithful  to  city  interests  can 
they  be  victorious.  The  first  essential  advance  toward  such 
a  union  is  for  the  citizen  himself  to  subordinate  his  party 
passions  to  his  sense  of  municipal  duty.  The  man  incapable 
of  this  can  have  no  part  in  the  primal  and  noblest  work  of 
municipal  salvation.  In  other  words,  the  first  great  victory 
for  such  a  cause,  in  which  any  citizen  can  take  a  noble  part, 
must  be  one  achieved  within  himself  —  a  victory  of  the 
patriot  over  the  partisan,  of  the  good  citizen  over  the  poli- 
tician in  his  own  nature,  of  his  sense  of  duty  over  his 
party  passions  and  ambitions. 

Upon  the  intelligent  and  thoughtful  citizens  —  upon  the 
men  best  endowed  by  nature  for  achieving  such  a  victory 
over  themselves,  who,  nevertheless,  for  party  reasons  refuse 
to  cooperate  with  each  other  —  must  rest  the  chief  responsi- 
bility for  our  municipal  future.  They  can  have,  and  will 
deserve  to  have,  little  better  municipal  administration  until 
they  achieve  such  a  victory  over  themselves. 

2.  In  the  history  of  half-civilized  times,  we  can  read  with 
surprise  how  men  who  differed  about  religion  refused  to  act 
together  for  justice  or  good  government.  But  what  shall  we 
say  when,  under  our  political  system,  which  tolerates  all 
opinions,  men  of  adverse  politics  —  men  who  worship  in  the 
same  churches  and  cooperate  harmoniously  on  the  same 
boards  in  all  business  affairs  —  yet,  in  a  half-civilized  spirit, 
refuse  for  mere  partisan  reasons  to  make  common  efforts  for 
good  government  at  their  own  doors  ?  They  unite,  irrespec- 
tive of  party,  in  all  sorts  of  partnerships,  and  corporations,  and 
in  supporting  churches,  charities,  reforms,  and  amusements, 
yet  they  stand  in  angry,  partisan  array,  despite  their  plain 
duty  to  support  non-partisan  government,  —  which  would 
most  aid  the  objects  for  which  they  thus  jointly  labor.  A 


162  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

few  leading  citizens  in  a  village,  and  a  few  hundred  such  in  a 
great  city,  —  prominent  in  the  different  parties  and  in  social 
life,  —  could  by  their  united  efforts  lead  to  success  a  move- 
ment for  the  overthrow  of  party  despotism  and  municipal 
corruption. 

The  most  intelligent  men  of  a  city  know  better  than 
others  that  it  is  of  no  importance,  intrinsically,  under  a  good 
municipal  system,  what  are  the  party  politics  of  its  mayor, 
its  judges,  its  justices,  its  policemen,  its  clerks,  or  its  laborers 
—  it  being  enough  that  they  are  trustworthy  and  capable. 
So  long  as  such  men  connive  in  enforcing  party  tests  in  the 
selection  of  these  municipal  servants,  they  are  most  guilty 
and  do  most  to  degrade  city  affairs,  for  they  sin  most  know- 
ingly and  disastrously. 

II.     Labor  Registration 

1.  From  those  who  ought  to  lead  patriotically,  we  turn  to 
citizens  standing  on  the  lower  plane  of  municipal  service, 
who  suffer  most  from  the  lack  of  such  leadership.  "We  have 
seen  in  Chapter  III.  that  a  very  large  part  of  the  despotic 
and  corrupt  control  of  elections  and  administration,  which  a 
debased  party  exercises  in  a  city,  is  made  possible  by  reason  of 
its  ability  to  employ,  promote,  and  dismiss  laborers  for  the 
city  at  pleasure.  These  city  laborers  —  many  thousands  in 
a  great  city  —  are  bribed  and  coerced  by  appeals  to  their 
fears  and  hopes.  Every  consideration  of  justice  and  morality 
makes  it  important  that  employment  in  the  municipal  service 
should  be  secured  by  open  and  fair  means,  irrespective  of 
political  or  religious  opinions,  and  that  such  opinions  should 
have  nothing  to  do  with  discharges  from  this  service.  Every 
municipal  government  which  fails  to  protect  its  own  worthy 
laborers  against  the  partisan  piracy  and  despotism  of  its 
politicians  is  as  degrading  as  it  is  disgraceful.  Probably 
from  five  to  twenty  voters,  who  seek  each  of  these  places 
in  the  labor  service  under  the  city-party  system,  have  been 
tempted,  if  not  bribed,  to  servility  by  promises  of  employ- 
ment on  the  condition  of  voting  and  electioneering  for  the 


SEVERAL  VICIOUS  CONDITIONS  AND  PRACTICES     163 

ruling  party  or  faction.  A  constant  fear  of  dismissal  tends 
to  make  the  city  laborers  active  henchmen  and  electioneerers 
servile  to  the  boss  and  the  party  leaders. 

2.  Under  the  party  system,  which  prevailed  in  New  York 
City  and  Boston  for  example,  before  the  methods  of  civil 
service  reform  were  introduced,  laborers  could  hardly  gain  a 
place  in  the  municipal  labor  service  without  the  approval  or 
"  request "  in  writing  of  some  party  agent  or  official  —  a  re- 
quest hardly  obtainable  save  on  the  payment  of  a  fee,  and 
the  surrender  of  their  independence  in  voting.  In  some 
American  cities  there  is  reason  to  think  that  these  scandalous 
"  requests  "  have  been  on  sale  in  the  labor  market.  Nor  was 
this  all.  There  seem  to  be  good  reasons  for  believing  —  as 
Colonel  Waring  declared  —  that  the  wages  of  laborers  for 
cities  have  sometimes  been  fixed  above  the  market  rate,  so 
that  the  partisan  purveyors  of  these  "  requests  "  may  be  able 
to  sell  them  to  laborers  for  a  good  profit. 

It  would  obviously  be  of  immense  public  advantage  so  to 
regulate  the  employment  and  discharge  of  laborers  in  the 
municipal  service  that  they  can,  according  to  just  provisions, 
secure  such  employment  upon  their  merits  as  workmen,  re- 
gardless of  their  political  or  religious  opinions.  Happily,  it 
has  been  proved  to  be  easily  practicable  to  do  this  ;  but  we 
have  no  space  for  explaining  the  methods  in  detail.  They 
do  not  require  examinations,  but  only  a  registration  of  appli- 
cations for  employment,  and  simple  regulations  which  cause 
every  one  who  seeks  it  to  be  fairly  treated  —  to  have  em- 
ployment in  particular  kinds  of  labor  in  the  order  of  his 
application  —  and  to  be  protected  from  the  interference  of 
party  leaders  and  managers. 

If  labor  places  are  sought  in  which  ability  to  read  or  write, 
some  mechanical  skill,  or  knowledge  of  arithmetic  is  essen- 
tial, there  are  proper  inquiries  on  these  points.  Yet,  the 
laborer  who  can  neither  read  nor  write,  and  who  has  no  in- 
fluence behind  him,  may  be  registered,  and  will  have  his 
chance  in  due  order  for  any  employment  for  which  he  is 
competent.  The  trial  of  this  system  in  Boston,  where  it  has 
been  longest  enforced,  has  demonstrated  its  practical  justice 


164  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

/and   utility,  and  has  caused  the  laboring  classes   to  be  its 
]  vigorous  supporters,  while  the  corrupt  politicians  and  party 
/  leaders  have  appeared  as  its  inveterate  enemies,  for  it  sup- 
\  presses  a  large  part  of  their  power  and  spoils.1 
C     Substantially  the  same  methods  were  soon  after  that  date 
established  —  and  with  admirable  results  which  still  continue 
—  in  the  labor  service  of  the  United  States  Navy  Depart- 
ment.    The  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Dec.  2, 
1896,  says  that  "  every  naval  officer  .  .  .  brought  into  con- 
tact .  .  .  with  the  laborers  ...  at  our  government  yards, 
will,  I  am  sure,  testify  to  the  immeasurable  superiority  of 
the  present  over  the  old  system." 

3.  Under  great  difficulties,  without  adequate  legislation, 
and  against  the  bitter  opposition  of  party  leaders  and  bosses, 

C  similar  methods  are  now  (1896)  being  enforced  with  marked 
(  success  in  the  cities  of  New  York  and  Brooklyn.  A  tenth 
part  of  the  time  and  exertion  given  to  useless  party  conten- 
tions concerning  the  politics  of  laborers  in  these  cities  would 
have  made  the  registration  of  laborers  highly  effective  for 
suppressing  evils  which  these  contentions  do  much  to  ag- 
gravate.2 

4.  Under  the  labor  registration  system  the  most  efficient 
and  faithful  laborers  naturally  rise  to  the  highest  places ; 
and  if  a  laborer  is  discharged  for  indefensible  reasons,  the 
laboring  class  resents  it,  and  a  party  approving  it  loses  votes. 


1  The  first  trial  of  the  system  of  Labor  registration  in  the  United  States  was 
made  in  the  city  of  Boston  in  1884.    Laws  Mass.,  1884,  Ch.  320,  Sec.  14.    This 
law,  mainly  based  on  the  national  Civil  Service  law  of  1883,  contained  an  original 
provision  for  such  a  system.    The  highly  satisfactory  results  obtained  under  it  in 
Boston  have  caused  the  system  to  be  extended  to  other  cities  of  Massachusetts  in 
response  to  their  own  requests.    Laborers  must  be  selected  in  the  order  of  their 
registry  and  the  reasons  for  their  dismissal  must  be  stated  in  writing. 

2  By  a  law  enacted  in  1895  the  state  of  Illinois  provided  for  the  enforcement  of 
a  labor  registration  system  in  any  city  which  by  popular  vote  should  adopt  the 
law.    The  city  of  Chicago  has  adopted  it,  and  is  now  ( is'.i?)  successfully  enforc- 
ing the  system  with  every  promise  of  continuing  usefulness — though  the  law 
contains  some  quite  radical  provisions  to  be  enforced  in  the  outset.    This  law 
(Sec.  22)  wisely  prohibits  the  demand  of  a  party  assessment  from  a  city  laborer, 
and  also  the  payment  of  any  by  such  laborer,  for  any  party  or  political  purpose. 
Such  payments  are  often  only  bribes  for  avoiding  a  deserved  discharge  from  em- 
ployment. 


SEVERAL  VICIOUS  CONDITIONS  AND  PRACTICES     165 

There  is,  in  fact,  very  little  inducement  to  discharge  a  laborer 
for  party  reasons,  for  the  next  man  upon  the  registry  must 
be  put  in  his  place,  and  he  may  belong  to  the  same  party  as 
the  one  discharged.  Hence  the  laboring  classes  strongly 
favor  labor  registration  as  soon  as  they  comprehend  it. 

There  is  probably  no  way  in  which,  at  so  small  an  expense 
and  with  so  little  patriotic  effort,  a  larger  share  of  the  cor- 
rupting despotism  and  spoils  of  municipal  politics  can  be 
suppressed,  and  the  salutary  independence  of  the  voters  can 
be  more  increased,  than  by  enforcing  a  just,  non-partisan 
system  of  labor  registration. 

III.     The  Merit  System 

1.  From  the  labor  service  we  turn  to  the  large  class  of  offi- 
cials, next  above  them,  who  carry  on  the  great  mass  of  the 
administrative  work  of  cities,  and  have  only  the  mayor  and 
the  heads  of  departments  and  bureaus  in  the  superior  execu- 
tive service. 

Of  these  officials  of  the  executive  departments,  thus  inter- 
mediate between  the  highest  and  the  laborers,  there  were, 
in  1897,  in  the  city  of  New  York,  about  twelve  thousand. 
Nearly  all  the  reasons  which  commend  the  policy  we  have 
advised  as  to  laborers  also  require  the  selection  of  these 
clerks  and  other  administrative  officials  by  means  which 
disregard  all  political  and  religious  opinions  and  exclude  the 
methods  of  party  patronage  and  discrimination.  Indeed, 
the  moment  it  appeared  that  party  government  has  no  fit 
place  in  cities  and  villages,  the  whole  theory  of  appointing, 
promoting,  and  removing  municipal  officials  for  party  reasons 
became  utterly  indefensible. 

Yet,  irrespective  of  this  general  fact,  party  tests  for  mere 
administrative  offices  are  both  absurd  and  useless.  There 
is  no  Democratic  and  no  Republican  way  of  keeping  city 
accounts  or  of  doing  any  of  the  work  of  city  clerks.  Party 
opinions  are  no  part  of  the  qualifications  needed  for  dis- 
charging the  duties  of  municipal  officers.  In  fact,  every 
such  officer  is  likely  to  be  a  bad  one  in  the  degree  that  he  is 


166  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

a  mere  politician  or  partisan,  or  seeks  to  favor  one  political 
party  or  to  obstruct  another. 

The  public  has  a  right  to  the  best  persons  in  such  offices 
who  will  serve  it  for  the  salaries  offered,  and  he  who  offers 
the  best  character  and  capacity  for  the  salary  has  the  highest 
claim  upon  the  offices,  quite  irrespective  of  his  party  and 
religious  views.  Every  party,  sect,  or  party  leader  that 
obstructs  such  a  claimant  therefore  obstructs  both  indi- 
vidual justice  and  the  public  interest. 

2.  When  different  persons  seek  such  offices,  the  just  way, 
and  that  which  is  manifestly  in  the  public  interest,  is  to 
have  public  examinations  into  the  relative  merits  of  the 
several  applicants  for  doing  the  city  work,  to  allow  them  to 
compete  with  each  other  in  these  examinations,  to  mark  and 
grade  them  according  to  the  merits  disclosed,  and  to  appoint 
those  of  good  character  who  show  themselves  to  be  most 
capable  of  rendering  the  best  public  service, — all  without 
regard  to  their  political  or  religious  views  or  affiliations. 
Such  examinations  are  known  as  free,  open,  competitive  ex- 
aminations, because  they  are  open  and  free  to  all  applicants 
on  the  same  conditions,  without  the  aid  of  influence,  and  re- 
gardless of  the  party  or  sect  to  which  the  applicants  may 
belong  There  are  various  grades  of  these  examinations  fitted 
to  test  the  qualifications  needed  in  different  parts  of  the  city 
service.1  The  son  of  the  poor  man  and  the  son  of  the  rich 
man,  the  favorite  of  a  party  and  the  independent  voter  whom 
a  party  hates,  stand  on  the  same  basis  in  competitive  exami- 
nations. They  must  equally  rely  upon  themselves  alone  for 
entering  them  and  for  securing  appointments.  The  persons 
will  be  first  appointed  and  promoted  who  are  shown  to  be 
most  competent. 

1  There  is  another  kind  of  examinations  known  as  pass-examinations,  which 
provides  for  no  free,  non-partisan  competition  of  merit ;  they  are  not  open  to 
all  applicants ;  they  merely  decide  whether  the  favored  applicant  admitted  to 
them  comes  up  to  a  certain  arbitrary  standard.  The  favor  of  being  examined  is 
generally  secured  through  the  influence  of  some  boss,  party  leader,  or  public  offi- 
cer. These  examinations  do  not  enable  the  government  to  secure  the  best  who 
are  ready  to  serve  it  for  the  salary  offered ;  they  enable  adherents  of  one  party  to 
secure  a  monopoly  of  all  or  nearly  all  the  offices.  Politicians  and  bosses  naturally 
much  prefer  mere  pass-examinations. 


SEVERAL  VICIOUS  CONDITIONS  AND  PRACTICES     167 

The  competitive  system  —  obviously  based  on  justice  — 
develops  self-reliance  and  independence  of  character  as  much 
as  it  discourages  servility  and  reliance  upon  mere  influence 
and  intrigue.1 

3.  It  is  upon  such  views  of  justice  and  the  public  inter- 
ests that  civil  service  reform,  competitive  examinations,  and 
merit  system  are  based.  According  to  the  methods  of  this 
reform,  no  aid  is  required  from  any  party,  politician,  or 
boss  to  enable  any  citizen  to  enter  —  unaided  —  the  exami- 
nations upon  the  same  conditions.  No  inquiries  are  made 
concerning  the  political  or  religious  opinions  of  those  ex- 
amined. The  questions  which  are  asked  on  the  examina- 
tions, which  are  in  writing,  relate  to  the  character  and 
capacity  needed  in  the  part  of  the  public  service  in  which 
the  applicant  seeks  an  appointment.  Every  applicant  makes 
for  himself  the  record  of  fitness  or  unfitness  which  deter- 
mines his  relative  standing  among  all  the  competitors. 
Those  who  pass  the  best  examinations  are  graded  highest. 
All  are  graded  in  the  order  of  merit  as  shown  by  the 
examinations,  and  the  appointments  follow  the  same  order, 
except  that  those  who  fall  below  an  essential  and  required 
capacity  are  not  appointed  at  all. 

Only  a  very  small  number  of  places  in  the  municipal 
service  —  probably  not  one  in  a  hundred  —  require  an  educa- 
tion above  that  imparted  in  the  public  schools.  In  the  state 
of  Massachusetts,  where,  between  1885  and  1896, 17,198  per- 
sons were  examined,  16,935  were  educated  in  the  common 
schools,  and  only  263  had  received  a  college  education. 
When  a  people  think  a  common  school  education  so  valuable 
as  to  tax  themselves  for  giving  it  to  all  their  children,  it 
seems  only  reasonable  to  insist  that  those  who  have  acquired 
the  most  of  it,  and  have  also  the  best  character  and  capacity, 
should  be  first  appointed  to  office. 

It  is  obvious  that  these  competitive  examinations  not  only 

1  Mayor  Strong  of  New  York,  in  his  annual  message  (Jan.  7, 1896),  declared 
competitive  examinations  to  be,  within  their  proper  range,  "the  only  just  and 
proper  means  "  of  making  selections  for  the  municipal  service,  and  he  sustained 
them  to  the  great  advantage  of  the  city  of  New  York. 


168  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

stimulate  and  honor  our  system  of  public  schools,  but  justly 
reward  the  youth  who  excel  in  them.  Each  applicant  who 
wins  an  office  through  his  examination  may  almost  be  said  to 
have  put  himself  into  office  by  his  own  merits  alone.  To  the 
extent  that  these  applicants  thus  gain  the  offices  by  their 
superior  character  and  capacity,  they  obviously  limit  partisan 
patronage,  diminish  the  corrupt  trade  in  party  politics  —  in 
short,  suppress  the  spoils  system  itself. 

It  seems  clear  that  if  all  of  the  administrative  and  labor 
places  in  the  municipal  service  could  be  filled  by  the  methods 
we  have  pointed  out,  the  spoils  system  would  speedily  cease 
to  exist,  and  that  the  assembly  district  leaders  and  the  boss 
himself  would  soon  die  of  starvation  —  save  as  corruption 
might  survive  in  connection  with  legislation,  and  with  legis- 
lative offices  of  which  we  have  yet  to  speak. 

Labor  registration  and  the  civil  service  examinations 
should  be  regarded  as  the  first,  and  most  decisive,  practical 
steps  toward  the  solution  of  the  great  municipal  problem. 
These  reforms  once  completed,  nearly  all  the  others  will  be 
comparatively  easy  and  certain.  We  shall  show  that  promo- 
tions from  those  who  have  thus  entered  the  service  would 
inevitably  be  made  to  fill  nearly  all  the  higher  positions. 

4.  Some  of  the  direct  practical  consequences  of  enforcing 
f  these  two  methods  deserve  special  notice.  (1)  There  would 
/  be  little  inducement  left  to  act  the  mischievous  part  of  a  city- 
'  party  leader,  or  carry  on  the  trade  of  city  politics.  Those 
who  thus,  by  their  merits,  win  the  places  in  municipal  service, 
would  neither  buy  the  leader's  influence,  fear  his  power,  nor 
vote  according  to  his  orders.  The  complicated  machinery 
and  the  demoralizing  contests  for  apportioning  appointments 
among  numerous  districts  and  between  rival  managers, 
leaders,  and  captains,  would  be  useless.  Those  belonging 
to  different  parties,  which  the  registrations  and  examinations 
would  bring  into  the  service,  by  sitting  side  by  side  in  the 
doing  of  the  city  work  would  constantly  teach  people  the 
absurdity  of  party  opinions  as  tests  for  such  employments. 

(2)  The  public  servants  who  have  gained  their  places  by 
their  own  merit  would  not  be  the  natural  admirers  of  those 


SEVERAL  VICIOUS  CONDITIONS   AND   PRACTICES     169 

who  have  secured  office  on  the  basis  of  favoritism  and  in- 
fluence—  that  method  naturally  seeming  to  them  to  be  both 
unjust  and  demoralizing.  Their  sympathies  would  go  out 
warmly  to  all  those  who  by  their  own  merits  and  endeavors, 
alone,  are  trying  to  win  the  places  to  which  they  are  justly 
entitled.  They  would  hardly  be  able  to  respect  those  who 
by  secret  and  vicious  ways  were  seeking  honors  which  they 
do  not  deserve. 

(3)  It  is  obvious  that  a  system  which  awards  the  munic- 
ipal places   to   those  whose   characters   and   capacity  have 
passed  the  highest  examinations  must  strongly  tend  to  bring 
superior  persons  into  the  municipal  service,  to  improve  its 
moral  tone,  and  to  elevate  it  in  the  estimation  of  the  people. 
Experience  has  demonstrated  that  such  have  been  the  actual 
results  under  the  free  competitive  system.1    The  officials  who 
have  entered  the  departments  at  Washington  under  this  sys- 
tem are  greatly  superior  to  those  they  have  succeeded  —  much 
more  work  being  done  now  by  the  same  number  of  officials  than 
formerly.     Those  who  enter  the  public  service  through  com- 
petitive examinations  are  under  no  obligations  to  parties  or 
party  managers.     As   a   natural   consequence   of   their   su- 
perior capacity  and   independence,  the  public  servants   of 
our  cities  and  villages  would  be  elevated  in  the  respect  of 
their  inhabitants.     No  people  can  respect  partisan  servility 
in  the  public  service.     But  who  can  refuse  their  respect  to 
the  men  and  women  who  have  won  their  positions  in  hon- 
orable public  competitions  of  character  and  capacity  ? 

(4)  The  merit  system,2  thus  enforced  through  free  pub- 

1  A  public  competitive  examination  is  greatly  dreaded  by  those  whose  char- 
acter or  habits  are  open  to  successful  attack  —  they  rarely  venturing  to  take  part 
in  them.    Every  competitive  rival  is  interested  in  exposing  them  and  having 
them  struck  from  the  list  of  competitors. 

2  There  is  a  peculiar  fitness  in  calling  this  system  the  "  Merit  System,"  as 
every  one  who  enters  the  civil  service  through  it  does  so  by  virtue  of  superior 
merits  demonstrated  by  the  examination  he  has  passed.    It  was  for  this  reason, 
and  to  bring  out  clearly  the  issue  between  it  and  the  spoils  system,  which  caused 
the  author  in  1880  to  suggest  the  phrase  "  Merit  System,"  which  has  now  come 
into  general  use.    Eaton's  Civil  Service  in  Great  Britain,  p.  161.    There  would 
be  an  obvious  convenience  in  having  fit  phrases,  such  as  the  "  Merit  Service,"  the 
"  Spoils  Service,"  and  the  "  Party  Service,"  for  distinguishing  those  members  of 
the  executive  service  who  have  entered  it  through  the  merit  system,  from  those 


170  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

lie  examinations,  provides  for  examinations  for  promotions 
within  the  service,  by  which  the  most  competent  may 
reach  the  highest  places.  The  examinations  for  promotions 
not  only  cause  the  public  servants  to  exert  themselves  to 
make  a  good  record  by  doing  their  work  well,  and  give  the 
people  the  benefit  of  having  the  most  capable  in  the  highest 
positions,  but  they  suppress  the  pernicious  practice  of  placing 
mere  politicians  and  party  leaders,  ignorant  of  administrative 
methods,  at  the  head  of  bureaus  and  departments  for  mere 
party  advantage.  This  is  not  the  place  for  considering  how 
fur  the  selection  from  the  lower  places  of  those  who  are  to 
fill  the  higher  should  be  carried  —  whether  all  heads  of 
bureaus  and  departments,  if  not  even  the  mayor  himself, 
should  not  be  chosen  from  those  already  in  some  branch  of 
municipal  service.1 

It  is  worthy  of  notice  that,  despite  the  opposition  of  party 
managers  and  spoilsmen,  it  has  already  become  a  common 
practice  to  fill  the  higher  places  —  save  those  of  commis- 
sioners —  in  the  best  American  police  and  fire  departments 
by  the  promotion  of  subordinates.  This  practice  should 

who  have  entered  it  through  the  spoils  system,  or  the  party  system.  From  the 
lack  of  such  phrases  an  absurd  practice  has  arisen  of  designating  the  former  as 
well  as  the  system  by  which  they  have  gained  office  as  the  "  civil  service,"  though 
they  are  —  no  more  than  the  other  two  classes  —  a  part  of  the  civil  service.  Can- 
didates for  office  are  formally  asked  whether  they  are  in  favor  of,  or  opposed  to, 
"  Civil  Service  "  —  a  question  which  is  obviously  senseless  and  absurd,  unless  in- 
tended to  ask  whether  the  candidate  thinks  there  should  be  any  civil  officers 
whatever.  The  inquiries  should  be  thus  :  Are  you  in  favor  of,  or  will  you  sup- 
port, a  Merit  Service  ?  Do  you  favor  a  Spoils  Service  ?  Or  a  Party  Service  ?  The 
phrases  "  Merit  Officer"  and  "  Spoils  Officer  "  might  also  be  found  both  conven- 
ient and  useful. 

1  If  no  man  could  be  made  mayor  who  had  not  served  for  at  least  two  years  in 
a  city  council,  or  as  the  head  of  a  department,  we  should  know  much  more  than 
we  now  do  about  our  mayors,  and  they  would  be  much  more  competent  for  their 
duties.  We  should  also  follow  the  precedents  of  the  best-governed  cities  of  the 
world.  If  it  be  said  that  not  many  trustworthy  and  competent  men  for  the  high- 
est places  enter  the  subordinate  positions  —  under  party  government  and  the 
spoils  system  —  this  may  be  admitted.  But  let  it  be  provided  that  the  lower 
places  shall  be  filled  by  free  competition,  and  that  the  higher  shall  be  given  to  the 
most  meritorious  who  have  served  in  the  lower  grades,  and  all  experience  has 
shown  that  abundant  capacity  will  enter  the  lower  grades.  In  every  army,  navy, 
and  good  police  force,  —  and  in  the  best  consular  and  diplomatic  services  of  the 
world,  —  those  who  fill  the  higher  offices  are  generally  chosen  from  among  those 
\vho  have  served  worthily  in  the  subordinate  positions. 


SEVERAL  VICIOUS  CONDITIONS  AND  PRACTICES     171 

be  extended  to  all  city  departments.  Why  should  we  put 
ignorant  politicians  and  party  manipulators  in  command  of 
the  experienced  and  able  subordinates  of  these  departments 
—  thus  humiliating  the  most  meritorious  who  have  won  their 
places  by  their  superiority,  degrading  the  moral  tone  of  the 
administration,  and  depriving  the  people  of  the  leadership  of 
the  men  most  competent  to  serve  them  ? 

5.  Most  unjustifiable  removals  are  made,  not  for  the  pur- 
pose of  putting  particular  persons  out  of  office,  but  to  make 
places  for  the  favorites  of  officers  and  politicians ;  and, 
inasmuch  as  under  the  methods  of  civil  service  reform  one 
of  the  highest  on  the  competitive  lists  must  succeed  to  the 
vacancy,  it  is  not  generally  found  possible  to  accomplish  this 
purpose.  Hence,  unjust  removals  are  largely  suppressed  by 
the  merit  system.  Nevertheless,  we  think  that  the  removal  i 
of  municipal  officers,  (1)  for  party  advantage,  (2)  by  reason 
of  their  political  or  religious  opinions,  (3)  for  any  other 
causes,  save  those  which  shall  be  definitely  stated  in  writing, 
(4)  or  until  after  allowing  an  opportunity  to  make  an  / 
explanation  in  self-defence,  should  be  prohibited  by  law. 

No  formal  trial  should  be  required  as  a  condition  of  remov- 
ing the  members  of  the  municipal  service  with  which  we  are 
dealing,  but  common  justice  demands  that  definite  charges 
should  be  made  necessary  and  that  a  full  opportunity  for 
making  explanations  should  be  allowed  to  the  officer  sought 
to  be  removed. 

For  these  requirements  there  are  ample  precedents.  Sec- 
tion 12  of  the  Illinois  law,  cited  in  this  chapter,  prohibits  the 
removal  of  any  city  officer  or  employee,  appointed  under  the 
examinations,  "  except  for  cause  upon  written  charges,  after 
an  opportunity  to  be  heard  in  his  own  defence."  The  consti- 
tution of  New  York,  as  amended  in  1894,  provides,  as  to  the 
removal  of  certain  classes  of  officers  by  the  governor,  that 
one  of  them  may  be  removed  after  "giving  such  officer  a 
copy  of  the  charges  against  him  and  an  opportunity  of  being 
heard  in  his  defence,"  and  as  to  removing  other  officers,  that 
a  "  statement  of  the  cause  of  removal "  must  be  filed  by  the 
governor,  with  the  secretary  of  state,  and  reported  to  the 


172  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF   MUNICIPALITIES 

legislature.1  If  a  governor  may  be  required  to  comply  with 
such  conditions,  they  may  certainly  be  fitly  enforced  against 
a  mayor,  or  the  head  of  a  city  department. 

The  laws  relating  to  the  city  of  New  York  provide  that 
•*  no  regular  clerk  or  head  of  a  bureau  shall  be  removed  until 
he  has  been  informed  of  the  cause  of  the  proposed  removal, 
and  has  been  allowed  an  opportunity  of  .making  an  explana- 
tion, and  in  every  case  of  removal  the  true  ground  thereof 
shall  be  entered  upon  the  records  of  the  department." a 
There  cannot  be  the  least  doubt  as  to  the  salutary  effects  of 
such  limitations  upon  the  arbitrary  power  of  removal  as  prac- 
tised by  city  parties,  but  we  shall  point  out  the  need  of  yet 
greater  restraints  upon  this  power.8  These  provisions  are 
certainly  in  broad  contrast  with  the  theories  of  that  peculiar 
class  of  reformers  who  insist  upon  an  absolute  right  of 
removal  at  the  mere  pleasure  of  party-elected  mayors. 

6.  It  is  one  of  the  good  results  of  filling  municipal  places 
through  competitive  examinations  and  the  registration  of 
laborers,  that  every  party  is  likely  to  have  the  proportion 
of  its  adherents  due  to  their  numbers  in  the  municipal 
service  —  a  fact  which  will  do  much  to  allay  party  jealousies 
and  make  it  easier  to  establish  and  preserve  a  non-partisan 
municipal  system.  No  party  is  likely  to  be  satisfied  with 
any  municipal  system  which  will  enable  its  opponents  to 
grasp  all  the  city  offices  and  places,  but  it  can  hardly  make 
even  a  plausible  opposition  to  one  which  bestows  them  upon 
individual  merit  and  makes  no  discrimination  for  or  against 
any  party. 

C  After  the  merit  system  has  been  for  some  time  fairly  en- 
/  forced,  parties  will  be  able  to  see  that  it  is  after  all  of  not 
7^  much  importance  to  them  to  have  their  adherents  in  city 

1  Const.,  Art.  5,  Sees.  3  and  4 ;  Art.  10,  Sec.  1. 

«  Laws  New  York,  1882,  Ch.  410,  Sec.  48,  and  Laws,  1897,  Ch.  378,  Sec.  1643. 

8  Since  the  text  was  written,  the  President  has  amended  the  llth  Civil  Service 
Rule  by  adding  these  important  words:  "  No  removal  shall  be  made  from  any 
position  subject  to  competitive  examination  except  for  just  cause  and  upon 
written  charges  filed  with  the  head  of  the  department,  or  other  appointing  officer, 
and  of  which  the  accused  shall  have  full  notice  and  an  opportunity  to  make  de- 
fence." 14  Rep.  U.  S.  Civ.  Ser.  Com.,  p.  24. 


SEVERAL   VICIOUS   CONDITIONS   AND  PRACTICES     173 

C  offices,  for  they  cannot  convert  them  into  party  electioneerers 
Cor  make  them  pay  assessments.  Men  of  different  parties 
who  have  gained  their  places  by  their  own  merits,  and  who 
have  been  accustomed  to  work  side  by  side,  naturally  enough 
come  to  think  that  they  ought  not  to  use  their  official  influ- 
ence for  controlling  party  politics.  It  soon  becomes  much 
easier  to  restrain  such  official  intermeddling,  as  the  experi- 
ence of  Boston  has  already  shown  us.  There  the  examina- 
tions—  as  well  as  the  registry  of  laborers  —  has  continued 
longest  and  been  most  complete.  As  a  natural  result,  the 
city  has  recently  adopted  an  ordinance  which  provides  that 
"  no  clerk,  employee,  commissioners,  member  of  any  board,  or 
other  officer  of  the  city  government,  except  those  elected  by 
popular  vote,  shall  be  an  officer  of  any  political  caucus  or  a 
member  of  any  political  committee  or  convention."1  The 
contrast  between  this  ordinance  and  the  city-party  system  we 
have  considered  seems  almost  that  between  an  enlightened 
and  a  semi-civilized  condition.  Before  civil  service  exami- 
nations were  established  in  England,  she  was  compelled  to 
disfranchise  many  of  her  officials  during  a  long  period,  in 
aid  of  suppressing  their  corrupt  and  oppressive  activity  in 
party  politics.  In  the  time  of  Queen  Anne  the  officials 
in  the  postal  service  were  forbidden  to  endeavor  to  influence 
the  voters;  and  in  1772  officers  in  the  revenue  and  postal 
service  were  forbidden  by  law  to  vote  at  all  for  members 
of  Parliament.  This  restriction  and  disfranchisement  con- 
tinued for  more  than  a  century,  —  up  to  the  time  when  in 
1876  the  civil  service  examinations  had  brought  such  non- 
partisan  officials  into  these  branches  of  the  public  service, 
and  had  so  enlightened  the  prevailing  sense  of  duty  and  pro- 
priety, that  these  officers  could  be  safely  —  and  they  were 
again  —  allowed  to  vote.2 

7.  The  right  —  at  least  in  a  moral  sense  —  of  a  city,  vil- 
lage, or  state  to  forbid  its  administrative  servants  taking  an 
active  part  in  managing  politics  and  controlling  elections  is 
too  clear  for  question.  These  servants  ought  to  be  not  only 

i  Boston,  Rev.  Ord.,  p.  143. 

3  Eaton's  Civil  Service  in  Great  Britain,  pp.  85, 131. 


174  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

impartial  toward  all  citizens,  —  but  to  seem  to  be  so,  which 
is  impossible  if  they  are  to  take  leading  parts  in  party  strife. 
Most  people  can  see  that  for  policemen  or  judges  to  be 
active  in  managing  parties  would  not  only  be  indecent,  but 
dangerous  ;  and,  but  for  long  usage  and  partisan  blindness, 
it  would  seem  only  in  a  little  less  degree  improper  for  any 
other  municipal  officials  to  do  the  same  things. 

Every  city  and  village  should  possess  and  exercise  an 
authority  to  make  ordinances  at  least  as  stringent  and  com- 
prehensive as  those  of  Boston.  How  can  it  be  said  that 
municipal  election^  are  free  if  the  city  party  in  power  may 
make  party  forts  and  rifle-pits  out  of  the  city  offices,  partisan 
soldiers  out  of  the  municipal  servants,  and  tax  these  servants 
at  pleasure  to  pay  the  expenses  of  its  warfare  with  its  oppo- 
nents? While  the  municipal  employees  and  officers  should 
be  allowed  to  vote,  they  should  not  be  allowed  to  use  their 
power  to  interfere  with  other  voters,  or  to  conspire  with 
party  managers  for  controlling  city  elections.  The  city 
election  should  be  made  by  law  a  cause  of  removal.1 

We  have  no  space  for  further  facts,  save  as  they  appear  in 
the  note  below,  by  which  it  is  shown  that  the  enforcement 
of  labor  registration  and  competitive  examinations  have  been 
as  salutary  in  their  practical  effect  as  they  are  just,  demo- 
cratic, and  republican  in  theory.2 

1  The  difficulties  of  establishing  the  salutary  principle  declared  in  the  Boston 
ordinance  just  cited  are  much  greater  than  most  people  imagine.  When  in  18(15 
a  bill  was  being  prepared  under  the  direction  of  the  Committee  of  Seventy  for  the 
reorganizing  of  the  police  courts  of  New  York  City,  one  of  its  sub-committees 
refused  to  insert  in  the  bill  a  provision,  proposed  by  the  writer,  prohibiting  police 
justices  being  party  leaders  or  taking  an  active  part  in  party  management. 

3  Civil  service  examinations  began  in  England  in  a  small  way  before  1850. 
The  utility  they  demonstrated  soon  caused  them  to  be  greatly  extended.  Eaton's 
Civil  Service  in  Great  Britain,  Ch.  XIII.  Party  managers,  patronage-mongers, 
and  especially  the  aristocratic  classes  opposed  them  from  the  beginning,  for  they 
set  up  personal  merit  against  aristocratic  influence  and  birthright.  Before  1876 
they  had  been  extended  to  almost  every  branch  of  the  civil,  and  to  various  parts 
of  the  military,  administration,  with  immense  advantage  to  the  public  service. 
They  had  been  before  established  in  British  India,  and  have  since  been  more  and 
more  extended  to  English  colonies.  A  quarter  of  a  century  or  more  ago  civil 
service  reform  methods  had  ceased  to  be  a  matter  of  controversy  either  on  the 
part  of  English  parties  or  English  statesmen.  Partisan  appointments  and  re- 
movals were  long  ago  suppressed  in  English  cities.  And,  strange  as  it  may  seem 


SEVERAL  VICIOUS  CONDITIONS  AND  PRACTICES     175 

IV 

1.  Every  reason  which  can  justify  treating  as  criminals  the 
men  who  conspire  for  driving  a  person  out  of  private  employ- 
to  us,  civil  service  reform  methods  have  so  completely  suppressed  patronage  ap- 
pointments and  removals  for  party  reasons,  that  upon  a  change  of  ministry  in 
England  less  than  a  hundred  officers  altogether  are  changed  for  such  reasons. 
There  are,  however,  in  addition,  a  trifling  number  of  petty,  detached  officials 
who  maybe  changed  whose  offices  —  mainly  from  their  insignificance  or  from 
mere  neglect  —  have  not  yet  been  brought  within  the  examinations.  This  reform 
in  England  has  everywhere  been  a  triumph  of  republican  and  democratic  equality 
and  justice  —  largely  the  victory  of  superior  character  and  capacity  in  humble 
life  —  over  that  control  of  places  in  the  public  service  which  the  privileged  classes, 
the  supporters  of  the  national  church,  the  landed  aristocracy,  and  patronage- 
mongering  rich  men  had  monopolized  for  centuries. 

The  good  effects  of  the  English  experiment  naturally  led  to  the  establishment 
of  civil  service  examinations  in  the  United  States,  —  though  in  a  very  limited  and 
inadequate  manner,  —  under  acts  of  Congress  passed  in  1853  and  1855.  They  pro- 
vided only  for  pass-examinations,  not  as  we  have  explained,  practically  open  to 
all,  but  only  to  the  adherents  of  the  dominant  party ;  yet  they  were  in  a  limited 
way  useful.  Between  1872  and  1875  there  was  a  Civil  Service  Commission  ap- 
pointed by  the  President,  under  very  inadequate  legal  provisions,  yet  its  results 
were  beneficial.  Congress  was,  however,  too  blind  and  partisan  to  make  the 
needed  appropriations  for  continuing  these  examinations.  It  was  not  until  1883 
that  the  National  Civil  Service  Reform  methods,  with  competitive  examinations 
in  a  large  and  systematic  manner,  were  established  in  the  United  States  under 
the  law  of  January  16,  1883. 

This  law,  and  the  bill  which  became  the  law,  have  been  quite  generally  re- 
ferred to  as  "The  Pendleton  Bill"  and  the  "  Pendleton  Law"  —  apparently 
because  Senator  Pendleton  patriotically  presented  and  supported  it  in  the  United 
States  Senate,  as  he  had  before  presented  in  that  body  a  civil  service  reform  bill 
which  seems  to  have  been  the  production  of  Mr.  Jenckes  and  Senator  Sumner. 
The  facts  are  that  Mr.  Pendleton  had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  prepara- 
tion of  the  so-called  Pendleton  Bill.  It  was  drafted  by  the  author  of  this  volume. 
After  being  revised  by  the  New  York  Civil  Service  Reform  Association, — but 
without  the  addition  or  material  change  of  any  section,  —  it  was  by  request  of 
the  Association  placed,  by  the  writer,  in  the  hands  of  Mr.  Pendleton  for  pres- 
entation in  the  Senate,  and  it  was  there  presented  by  him.  The  designation 
of  the  bill  as  the  "Pendleton  Bill"  facilitated  its  substitution  in  place  of  the 
prior  bill  which  Mr.  Pendleton  had  before  presented  —  a  bill  which,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  writer,  was  not  only  unconstitutional,  but  in  several  particulars  incapable 
of  enforcement.  The  bill  as  it  passed  Congress  remains  unamended  to  this  time, 
1898.  The  new  law  provided  for  a  Civil  Service  Commission  —  of  which  the 
writer  was  the  member  first  appointed  —  and  for  the  establishment  of  a  system  of 
open  competitive  examinations. 

1.  The  first  examinations  under  this  law  extended  to  little  less  than  fourteen 
thousand  official  places,  and  to  only  twenty-three  —  being  the  largest — post- 
offices.  It  has  so  won  the  support  of  public  opinion  that,  despite  constant  party 
opposition,  the  examinations  for  which  it  provides  are  now  extended  to  more 
than  eighty-seven  thousand  official  places  and  to  more  than  six  hundred  post- 


176  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

ment,  or  for  making  him  odious,  would  justify  party  managers 
and  leaders  being  treated  as  guilty  of  criminal  conspiracy  when 

office*.  Every  President,  responding  to  the  public  sentiment  in  their  favor,  has 
largely  extended  the  enforcement  of  the  reform  methods.  The  whole  number  of 
officials  and  employees  in  the  Federal  executive  service  in  1  vi;  to  which  examina- 
tions might  be  extended  was  187,000,  whose  salaries  amount  to  $100,000,000.  The 
annual  salaries  of  those  to  which  the  examination  already  extend  amount  to 
870,000,000,  and  they  are  being  steadily  extended  to  the  residue  of  these  places, 
being  mostly  those  of  minor  importance.  14  Rep.  Civ.  Ser.  Com.,  pp.  21,  22. 

2.  The  enforcement  of  the  civil  service  law  of  Massachusetts,  enacted  in 
1884  and  based  on  the  national  law,  has  been  followed  by  admirable  results  both 
in  the  civil  service  of  the  state  and  in  that  of  its  municipalities.    No  party  in  the 
state  now  ventures  to  oppose  a  civil  service  reform  policy. 

3.  In  the  state  of  New  York,  in  which  a  civil  service  reform  law,  also  based 
on  that  of  the  nation,  was  enacted  in  1883  (Laws,  1883,  Ch.  354),  the  progress  of 
the  examinations  has  been  less  satisfactory  than  in  Massachusetts,  mainly  by 
reason  of  partisan  opposition  to  them  and  the  lack  of  friendly  support  on  the 
part  of  several  governors  and  mayors.    While  Mr.  Cleveland  was  governor,  the 
reform  advanced  as  rapidly  in  New  York  as  it  did  in  Massachusetts.    But  sub- 
sequently several  governors  and  various  mayors  have  appointed  unworthy  com- 
missioners and  other  officers  to  execute  the  law,  and  have  apparently  been 
willing  that  the  authority  conferred  by  it  should  be  prostituted  for  party  advan- 
tage.   Frauds  and  inefficiency  in  its  execution  were  the  natural  result,  but  we 
cannot  go  into  details.      It  must  suffice  to  say  that  the  law  as  a  whole  has 
achieved  very  useful  results,  and  is  now  (December,  1897)  being  pretty  well  exe- 
cuted in  the  official  service  of  the  state  and  in  that  of  several  cities,  and  especially 
in  Brooklyn,  New  York  City,  and  Buffalo.    The  principles  on  which  the  law  is 
bated  have  at  this  time  (1897)  a  stronger  support  in  the  public  opinion  of  the 
state  than  they  ever  had  before.    The  New  York  Constitutional  Convention  of 
1894  approved  the  reform  policy  and  assured  its  ultimate  enforcement  by  a  con- 
stitutional provision  in  these  words:   "Appointments  and  promotions  in  the 
civil  service  of  the  state,  and  of  all  the  civil  divisions  thereof,  including  cities 
and  villages,  shall  be  made  according  to  merit  and  fitness,  to  be  ascertained  so 
far  as  practicable  by  examinations,  which,  so  far  as  practicable,  shall  be  com- 
petitive "  (Const.,  Art.  V.  Sec.  9).    This  language,  which  the  highest  court  of 
New  York  has  interpreted  most  favorably  for  the  purpose  intended,  is  at  once 
the  most  comprehensive  and  enlightened  provision  ever  yet  made  by  an  Ameri- 
can state  for  the  improvement  of  its  civil  service.    It  can  hardly  fail  to  prove 
fatal  to  the  spoils  system,  the  boss  system,  the  city-party  system,  and  the  autocratic 
mayoralty  system.    It  is  a  fact  of  significance  that  in  the  New  York  Constitu- 
tional Convention,  which  adopted  this  noble  provision,  both  parties  were  fairly 
represented.    But  in  the  legislatures  of  New  York,  since  1894,  a  partisan  ma- 
jority, led  by  a  state  boss,  has  prevailed  until  1898.    Hence  we  need  not  be  sur- 
prised that  this  majority  has  refused  to  enact  the  proper  laws  for  carrying  this 
provision  into  effect,  though  the  courts  have  supported  its  execution  as  far  as  prac- 
ticable under  the  old  law  and  the  constitution  itself.    It  ought  to  be  added  that 
the  last  governor  of  New  York  (Mr.  Black)  used  his  influence  for  the  passage  of 
a  pernicious  law  which  has  been  almost  as  disastrous  to  the  cause  of  reform  in 
New  York  as  it  has  been  to  his  own  prospects  and  renomination.    But  the  out- 
come has  been  that  Colonel  Roosevelt  —  the  first  earnest  Republican  supporter  of 
civil  service  reform  ever  elected  governor  of  New  York  —  is  his  successor;  and 


SEVERAL  VICIOUS  CONDITIONS  AND  PRACTICES     177 

they  conspire  or  cooperate  for  causing  the  removal  of  a  public 
servant,  or  for  making  him  odious,  because  he  omits  to  pay  a 
political  assessment,  or  to  electioneer  for  a  party.  We  have 
seen  that  an  Illinois  law,  referred  to,  prohibits  the  payment 
of  moneys  for  any  party  or  political  object  by  any  municipal 
employee,  to  any  other  municipal  officer  or  employee,  or  to 
certain  other  officers  named.  This  prohibition  should  be 
made  yet  more  general  and  absolute  so  far  as  city  officers 
and  employees  are  concerned.  Such  payments  are  generally 
made  by  them  either  from  fear,  or  from  hope  of  official  or 
party  favor,  if  they  are  not  in  fact  intended  as  bribes  to 
avoid  removal.  The  people  will  never  believe  municipal 
servants  to  be  impartial  —  nor  are  they  likely  to  be  —  so 
long  as  they  contribute  to  the  campaign  funds  of  a  political 
party.  Provision  should  be  made  by  law  for  paying  all 
legitimate  expenses  of  municipal  elections,  and  all  others 
had  better  remain  unpaid.1 

2.  In  view  of  the  salutary  effects  of  civil  service  reform, 
it  has  very  likely  occurred  to  the  reader  that,  if  the  managers 
of  the  great  parties  in  our  cities  had  during  the  last  decade 
given  one-tenth  part  of  the  efforts  and  the  money  to  its  sup- 
port which  they  have  given  to  partisan  contentions  for  pat- 
ronage, and  to  vicious,  hopeless  endeavors  to  secure  good 
governments  through  the  city-party  system,  they  would  have 
succeeded  in  removing  a  very  large  part  of  the  municipal 
evils  which  are  now  so  threatening.  Taking  an  illustration 
from  New  York  City,  it  may  be  said  that  for  more  than  six- 
teen years  and  under  great  difficulties,  a  small  number  of  her 
citizens  have  successfully  maintained  the  struggle  for  this 
reform,  while  the  great  body  of  politicians,  and  party  mana- 
gers, have  bitterly  opposed  it.  Tammany  —  like  the  Repub- 
lican boss  and  his  vassals  —  did  not  fail  early  to  see  that  its 
triumph  would  be  fatal  not  merely  to  its  own  domination 

there  is  every  prospect  that  the  reform  policy  of  the  constitution  of  New  York 
will  now  have  a  sincere  and  efficient  support  at  the  hands  of  her  governor. 

1  In  state  and  national  contests  involving  principles,  money  may  be  given  with 
advantage  for  paying  the  legitimate  expenses  of  enlightening  the  people  as  to 
those  principles.  But  party  principles  are  not  involved  in  elections  for  city 
officers. 


178  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

but  to  the  city-party  system.  The  mere  partisan  and  cor- 
rupt  Republicans  have  resisted  a  civil  service  reform  policy, 
apparently  because  they  care  less  for  the  public  interests 
and  for  the  many  worthy  Republicans  which  a  reform  policy 
would  put  into  office  in  New  York  City,  than  they  do  for 
the  spoils  which  they  expect  to  secure  through  their  friendly 
relations  with  Tammany  and  its  boss. 


1.  The  proper  term  and  tenure  for  municipal  office  is  one 
of  great  and  neglected  importance,  as  to  which  something 
should  be  said  here  —  but  more  will  be  added  in  future 
chapters.  All  the  reasons  which  require  that  persons 
should  enter  the  official  and  labor  service  of  cities  irrespec- 
tive of  political  opinions,  and  on  the  basis  of  merit  alone,  also 
require  that  they  should  not  be  removed  by  reason  of  such 
opinions,  or  to  promote  any  party  purpose.  The  public 
interest  generally  requires  that  they  should  remain  so  long 
as  they  continue  to  be  both  faithful  and  efficient,  yet  subject 
to  such  wise  and  just  provisions  as  may  be  established  as  to 
the  proper  term  of  office.  There  are  several  peculiar  and 
seductive  interests  which  tend  to  establish  shorter  terms  than 
the  general  welfare  requires :  (1)  young,  sparsely  peopled 
communities  incline  to  provide  them  in  the  interest  of  rota- 
tion in  office ; 1  (2)  city  parties  favor  short  terms  because 
they  and  their  managers  gain  power  and  profit  from  frequent 
and  numerous  elections ;  (3)  office-seekers,  patronage-mon- 
gers, and  demagogues  desire  them  for  reasons  too  obvious  to 
be  mentioned. 

The  interests  of  the  unselfish  public  in  the  matter  being 
indirect  and  remote,  these  special  interests  are  too  often  able 
to  prevail.  Besides,  there  is  an  unfortunate  lack  of  appre- 
ciation of  the  reasons  which  make  short  terms  of  office  and 
inadequate  official  experience  —  especially  in  large  cities  —  a 
great  misfortune.  It  is  almost  obvious  that  the  larger  the 

1  It  is  a  familiar  fact  that  some  of  the  early  New  England  colonies  chose 
their  officers  for  a  term  of  only  six  months. 


SEVERAL  VICIOUS   CONDITIONS   AND   PRACTICES      179 

city  and  the  more  complicated  its  affairs,  the  greater  the 
need  of  long  terms  for  office  —  long  enough  for  the  officers  to 
become  well  instructed  in  municipal  methods  and  details. 

When,  in  state  and  national  elections,  important  principles 
are  discussed,  these  elections  may  have  an  educational  and 
elevating  influence ;  but  in  city  elections  for  mere  city  officials 
such  principles  are  rarely  involved,  and  the  contests,  being 
largely  for  party  spoils  and  power,  are  generally  without 
elevating  effects  —  even  if  they  are  not  demoralizing. 

To  reduce  the  number  of  these  elections  by  increasing  the 
length  of  official  terms  and  diminishing  the  number  of  elected 
officers  —  without  going  so  far  as  to  prevent  the  people  hav- 
ing a  real  control  of  their  affairs  —  is,  therefore,  in  the  public 
interest.  We  can  easily  see  what  interests  would  gain  most, 
and  what  would  lose  most,  by  reducing  official  terms  to  two 
or  three  months,  and  by  electing  four  or  five  times  as  many 
officers  as  are  now  elected.  The  business  of  managing  party 
politics  and  elections  might  become,  under  such  conditions, 
the  most  active  and  profitable  known  to  our  cities.  If,  on 
the  other  extreme,  there  were  no  popular  elections  for  city 
officers  oftener  than  once  in  from  two  to  four  years,  our  city 
parties,  and  their  managers  and  leaders,  might  be  ruined 
from  lack  of  business,  —  so  dependent  are  they  on  short 
terms  and  numerous  elections. 

2.  Obviously,  a  very  important  principle  —  aside  from 
such  considerations  —  is  involved  in  the  matter  of  deter- 
mining the  proper  length  of  the  terms  of  municipal  officers  — 
a  matter  which  has  been  very  inadequately  considered,  and 
as  to  which  heterogeneous  usages  prevail.  From  the  mere 
habit  of  having  short  terms  for  officers  in  villages  and  small 
cities,  where  every  voter  can  judge  as  to  how  official  func- 
tions are  discharged,  such  terms  have  been  thoughtlessly  — 
or  by  partisan  connivance  —  extended  to  large  cities,  where 
no  such  judgment  is  possible,  and  very  short  terms  and  all 
needless  elections  are  a  misfortune. 

Three  characteristic  examples  will  illustrate  these  evils  : 
(1)  A  law  enacted  in  1895 1  created  a  board  of  police  magis- 

i  Laws  New  York,  1895,  Vol.  2,  Ch.  601. 


180  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

trates  for  New  York  City,  of  which  the  members  were  given 
an  appropriate  term  of  ten  years.  But  the  law  provided  that 
the  clerks  —  under  the  board,  whom  it  appoints  —  shall  have 
a  term  of  only  four  years,  and  that  the  assistant  clerks  and 
other  subordinates  shall  have  a  term  of  only  two  years. 
These  short  terms  tend  to  cause  the  clerks  to  constantly 
intrigue  for  retaining  their  places  through  vicious  influence, 
and  also  to  encourage  outsiders  to  constantly  hustle  and 
bargain  for  them.  No  good  reason  can  be  given  why  the 
terms  of  the  clerks  should  not  be  as  long  at  least  as  those  of 
the  magistrates,  or  even  why  a  clerk  should  not  remain  in 
office,  like  a  policeman,  until  removed  for  good  cause.1  To 
send  them  away  at  the  end  of  two  years,  when  they  have 
just  become  familiar  with  their  duties,  is  a  needless  act  of 
folly,  highly  detrimental  to  the  public  interest.  (2)  The 
charter  of  the  city  of  Brooklyn  enacted  in  1888  provides  for 
the  election,  by  the  residents  of  each  of  its  wards,  of  a  con- 
stable every  year  for  the  term  of  one  year  only.  When  we 
consider  that  a  constable  is  an  officer  no  more  fit  to  be  elected 
than  a  policeman,  or  a  fireman,  what  an  amount  of  intrigue, 
wire-pulling,  and  expense  attend  every  such  election,  and 
how  great  would  be  the  advantage  of  bringing  all  constables 
under  the  appointment  and  the  supervision  of  some  court, 
and  of  giving  them  a  stable  tenure  analogous  to  that  of  a 
policeman,  we  may  well  be  astonished  —  save  for  the  greed 
and  power  of  patronage-mongering  politicians  —  that  such 
elections  are  tolerated  in  any  enlightened  city. 

(3)  A  charter  granted  by  the  legislature  of  Vermont  in 
1894  for  the  new  city  of  Montpelier  contains  a  variety  of 
mischievous  provisions  as  to  short  terms  and  excessive  elec- 
tions, several  of  which  we  fear  are  not  uncommon  in  recent 
city  charters.  The  members  of  the  city  council  are  annually 
elected,  and,  not  being  classified,  they  are  all  elected  each 
year  —  a  method  which  not  only  strongly  tends  to  mere 
party  government,  but  to  prevent  adequate  experience  in  the 

1  While  these  pages  are  being  revised  (July,  1897),  a  scandalous  contention  is 
going  on  in  this  Board  of  Magistrates  relative  to  the  appointment  of  some  of  these 
short-term  clerks. 


SEVERAL  VICIOUS   CONDITIONS  AND  PRACTICES     181 

body,  or  a  steady  and  consistent  policy.  The  fact  that  all 
members  are  elected  in  and  for  little  wards  —  none  being 
from  the  city  at  large  —  must  constantly  tend  to  local  fac- 
tions, to  the  choice  of  little  politicians  as  members,  and  to 
the  neglect  of  a  policy  broadly  conceived  in  the  interest  of 
the  whole  city  rather  than  in  that  of  particular  sections  of  it. 
Only  the  high  character  of  the  voters  of  the  city  can  long 
arrest  the  debasing  tendency  of  such  a  government.  If  half 
or  two-thirds  of  the  members  of  the  council  were  selected 
from  the  city  at  large,  and  all  of  them  were  so  classified  that 
no  more  than  one-third  of  the  whole  would  be  renewed  the 
same  year,  we  must  think  that  a  much  better  government 
than  is  now  possible  would  result. 

The  mayor  is  annually  elected,  and  he  appoints  the  chief 
of  police  and  such  "  other  police  officers  "  as  he  "  shall  think 
necessary  "  —  all  for  the  same  one-year  term  as  his  own  — 
perhaps  about  as  effective  and  mischievous  a  provision  as 
could  be  contrived  for  securing  a  partisan  police  force,  and 
making  it  servile  in  the  mayoralty  elections.1  The  power  of 
appointment  and  removal  is  not  restricted  by  any  safeguards 
against  partisan  proscription,  or  in  aid  of  securing  good 
character  and  capacity  in  office,  but  may  be  exercised  "  at 
pleasure,"  as  may  suit  the  designs  of  a  partisan  and  scheming 
mayor  or  party  majority. 

The  city  judge  is  elected  for  only  two  years,  a  term  which 
in  most  large  cities  would  be  disastrous,  but  which  may  be 
tolerated  for  a  time  in  a  state  of  such  rare  political  virtues 
as  Vermont,  which  has  kept  its  judges  long  in  office,  though 
they  have  been  annually  or  biennially  elected. 

But  this  charter  has  other  provisions  worthy  of  notice. 
It  not  only  makes  the  mayor,  treasurer,  city  clerk,  aldermen, 
sheriff,  auditors,  and  constables  elective  by  the  people,  but 
also  "city  grand  jurors,"  "an  overseer  of  the  poor,"  .  .  . 
"petit  jurors,  and  grand  jurors  for  the  county  .  .  ."as 
well.  On  the  whole,  this  charter  may  be  regarded  as  a 

1  A  city  people  so  virtuous  as  those  of  Montpelier,  who  need  only  two  police- 
men, and  have  only  seven  arrests  a  year  for  breaches  of  the  peace,  can  probably 
endure  so  vicious  a  charter  for  a  short  time. 


182  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

model  for  establishing  mere  party  government,  and  the  most 
numerous,  needless,  and  mischievous  elections  possible  in  a 
little  city.  It  is  not  easy  to  imagine  what  would  be  the 
disastrous  results  of  such  a  municipal  system  if  applied  to 
a  large  city. 

8.  It  cannot  be  too  earnestly  insisted  that  as  cities  grow 
larger  the  need  becomes  much  greater  for  long  terms  of  office, 
in  order  to  gain  the  experience  necessary  for  pursuing  a  con- 
sistent, economical  policy  in  carrying  forward  large  munici- 
pal works.  Much  city  administration  —  that  connected  with 
drainage,  water  supply,  internal  transit,  parks,  docks,  streets, 
and  public  buildings  —  must  be  carried  on  according  to  com- 
prehensive and  consistent  plans  requiring  several  years  for 
their  execution.  When  the  terms  of  administrative  office 
are  very  short,  it  is  almost  impossible  to  fix  responsibility 
upon  the  guilty.  Beyond  this,  too  frequent  city  elections 
lead  to  the  despotic  rule  of  parties,  and  to  the  impairment 
of  official  independence,  so  that,  in  most  large  cities,  the 
most  competent  officers  lack  the  independence  essential  for 
the  best  discharge  of  their  functions. 

We  have  seen  that  the  long  terms  of  the  members  of  city 
commissions  have  contributed  to  their  salutary  efficiency, 
that  disastrous  effects  were  the  result  of  short  terms  of  office 
for  police  justices  in  the  city  of  New  York,  and  that  great 
improvements  followed  the  lengthening  of  their  terms  to 
ten  years.  Every  judge  is  independent  and  courageous 
for  the  best  discharge  of  his  duties  in  the  degree  that  his 
tenure  is  firm  and  his  term  is  long.  The  large  cities  whose 
judges,  justices,  constables,  coroners,  and  sheriffs  have  had 
the  shortest  terms,  have,  we  think,  had  the  worst  judicial 
administration.  It  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  if  the  terms 
of  administrative  officers  in  cities  were  generally  made  only 
a  fourth  as  long  as  they  are,  municipal  abuses  would  be 
increased  fourfold,  or  that  if  the  terms  of  these  officers  were 
doubled,  abuses  would  be  greatly  diminished.1 

1  It  hardly  need  be  said  that  adequate  terms  of  office  should  be  accompanied 
by  more  effective  provision  for  the  speedy  exposure  of  all  malfeasance,  and  for 
prompt  removals  for  good  cause  —  subjects  on  which  we  shall  offer  some  further 


SEVERAL   VICIOUS  CONDITIONS   AND  PRACTICES     183 

4.  The  party  theory  of  short — generally  only  two-year — 
terms  for  mayors  and  many  appointed  officers  seems  to  have 
found  favor  not  as  a  demonstrative  utility  but  as  a  specious 
theoretical  remedy,  justified  by  no  experience.     Every  good 
city  police  department,  health  department,  and  fire  depart- 
ment condemns  short  terms  and  frequent  elections,  and  is 
excellent  in  the  degree  that  it  is  independent  of  them.     If 
our  policemen  and  firemen  were  appointed  or  elected  for 
only  one  or  two  years,  who  can  doubt  they  would  be  as  bad 
as  our  constables,  coroners,  and  sheriffs? 

5.  There   is   hardly  any  business   administration  in  the 
country  which  is  better  conducted  than  that  great  mass  of 
it  which  is  connected  with  the  navy  department  and  the 
engineering  duties  of  the  war  department.     The  fortifica- 
tions, the   army   stations,  the  transportation,  the  arsenals, 
the  navy  yards,  the  ships,  the  forts,  the  works  of  internal 
improvements,  and  the  vast  expenditures  all  over  the  Union 
which  the  army  and  navy  require,  would  afford  opportuni- 
ties for  fraud  and  corruption  —  under  the  city-party  system  — 
much  greater  than  cities  supply ;  yet  frauds  and  abuses  in 
cities  are  far  greater  than  those  which  arise  out  of  these 
departments. 

It  is  profoundly  significant  that  the  officials  who  directly 
control  the  work  under  these  departments  have  no  official 
terms,  and  that  their  superiors  are  affected  by  no  term  less 
than  four  years.  Most  of  those  who  direct  this  work  serve 
during  good  behavior.  Yet,  their  work  not  only  goes  on 
with  a  regularity,  vigor,  and  economy,  but  with  an  exemption 
from  frauds  and  scandals,  which  our  city  officers  seem  in- 
capable of  rivalling,  and  from  which  our  politicians  and 
party  managers  seem  incapable  of  learning.  Does  any  one 
think  that  a  two-year  term  for  postmasters,  collectors,  sub- 
treasurers,  United  States  engineers,  and  United  States  dis- 
trict attorneys  in  cities,  would  be  an  improvement  ? 

6.  There  is  no  better  municipal   administration   in   our 

suggestions.  It  would  be  a  public  advantage  to  greatly  extend  the  requirement 
that  city  officers  shall  give  security  for  good  behavior  —  as  they  must  in  St. 
Louis. 


184  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

great  cities  than  that  which  goes  on  under  the  judges  of  our 
higher  courts,  whose  terms  are  longest  and  whose  opportuni- 
ties for  corruption  and  injustice  are  greatest,  yet  who  are  — 
save  at  rare  periods  —  unadmonished  to  duty  by  any  immi- 
nent election.  Letter  carriers  cannot  now  be  removed  save 
for  cause,  yet  they  were  never  before  so  faithful. 

Obviously,  there  is  some  effective,  omnipresent  power, 
quite  independent  of  short  terms,  or  near  election,  which 
holds  to  duty  both  these  judges  and  the  other  officers  we 
have  just  referred  to  —  a  power  of  which  the  short-sighted, 
short-term,  frequent  party-election  theory  takes  little  notice. 
It  is  the  power  and  fear  of  public  opinion  and  that  noble  sense 
of  public  duty  which  all  worthy,  non-partisan  officers  feel  — 
not  to  serve  a  party  servilely,  but  the  whole  people  faithfully. 

7.  In  the  whole  range  of  official  functions  under  the  re- 
public, there  are  hardly  two  classes  of  officers  whose  duties 
are  more  unlike,  and  none  whose  positions  subject  them  to 
greater  temptations,  than  justices  of  the  Supreme  Court  and 
the  engineers  of  the  United  States  army ;  and  yet  no  officers 
have  discharged  their  duties  more  faithfully,  and  none  have 
been  less  affected  by  any  saving  influences  from  short  terms 
or  impending  elections  —  both  having  a  tenure  during  capac- 
ity and  good  behavior.  Such  considerations  seem  to  make 
it  clear  that  in  trying  to  improve  our  municipal  administra- 
tion, we  should  rely  more  upon  public  opinion  and  an  inde- 
pendent sense  of  duty,  and  less  upon  short  terms  of  offices, 
frequent  elections,  and  partisan  contests. 

The  fact  may  be  stated  here,  —  to  be  established  later,  — 
that  in  European  cities,  where  administration  is  much  better 
than  in  American  cities,  the  official  heads  of  departments, 
and  their  subordinates  as  well,  hold  their  offices  much  longer, 
and  have  a  far  more  stable  tenure,  than  like  officers  in  the 
United  States.  The  short-term,  biennial-election  theory  of 
city  government  is  that  which  all  professional  politicians 
prefer  —  and  especially  for  mayors.  They  know  by  experi- 
ence that  party-elected  mayors — with  rare  exceptions  —  feel 
a  paramount  responsibility,  not  to  the  city,  but  to  their  party 
and  its  managers. 


SEVERAL  VICIOUS  CONDITIONS  AND  PRACTICES     185 

VI 

1.  It  will  be  instructive  to  consider  some  of  the  partisan 
theories  noticed  in  this  chapter,  as  they  are  embodied  in  the 
charter  of  a  great  city.  We  select  that  of  Brooklyn,  New 
York,  because  while  it  has  some  excellent  pro  visions  of  which 
we  shall  avail  ourselves,  it  has  done  more  than  any  other 
charter  to  introduce  the  pernicious  practice  of  changing  the 
heads  of  city  departments  biennially  for  party  reasons,  and 
to  establish  a  partisan  and  autocratic  mayoralty  system.1  It 
has  come  to  be  a  largely  accepted  American  doctrine  that 
the  improvement  of  city  government  must  be  sought  through 
increasing  the  power  of  the  mayor  and  diminishing  that  of 
the  council  and  other  officers,  and  through  the  election  of 
both  the  mayor  and  the  members  of  the  council  for  the 
same  two-year  term.  This  Brooklyn  charter  first  gave 
prominence  to  this  doctrine,  and  it  is  assumed  without  war- 
rant to  have  vindicated  its  wisdom.  The  mayor  had  not,  in 
fact,  so  comprehensive  a  power  under  this  charter  as  he  is 
often  assumed  to  have  possessed ;  and  in  the  departments 
where  his  power  was  the  greatest  the  government  was  the 
worst,  being  a  strict  party  government,  quite  compatible 
with  a  constant,  dominating  boss,  save  in  the  cases  of  up- 
risings of  the  people  for  municipal  reform. 

This  famous  charter  provides  for  a  combination  of  incon- 
gruous theories  and  methods  in  city  administration  :  (1)  for 
a  city  council  —  with  members  elected  for  a  term  of  two 
years  —  which  has  nearly  all  the  ordinance-making  authority, 
the  mayor,  however,  having  a  veto  power  which  two-thirds 
of  the  council  can  override  ,-  (2)  for  a  board  of  estimate  and  < ' 
apportionment  made  up  of  various  independent  officers  and 
bodies  having,  approximately,  the  vast  powers  we  have  ex- 
plained in  the  case  of  the  New  York  City  Board  of  Estimate ; 
(3)  for  fourteen  separate  commissions,  several  of  them  having  1 
large  powers,  and  some  of  them  made  up  of  members  having  S 
much  longer  terms  than  that  of  the  mayor ;  (4)  for  a  mayor   * 

i  Laws  New  York,  1888,  Ch.  583. 


186  THE   GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

f  who  is  to  be  elected  by  popular  vote  once  in  two  years,  and 
/  who  is  to  appoint  the  members  of  many  of  the  commissions 
C  for  the  same  term  as  his  own. 

2.  It  is  obvious  that  such  a  government  is  based  upon 
very  incompatible  theories.     The  mayor  being  elected  by  a 
party  majority  every  two  years,  and  the  council  being  elected 
for  the  same  two  years  —  and  probably  by  the  same  party 
majority ;  and  the  two  —  having  the  whole  ordinance-making 
power  and  appointing  power  —  proclaim  the  purpose  of  estab- 
lishing a  strict  party  government ;  while  the  Board  of  Esti- 
mate and  Apportionment  and  the  thirteen  other  commissions 

—  with  the  long,  classified,  official  terms  of  their  members 
which  might  often  bring  adherents  of  different  parties  into 
office  —  express  a  distrust  of  this  biennial  party  system,  and 
declare  the  need  of  longer  terms  of  office  and  a  more  stable 
policy.  We  shall  soon  find  it  necessary  to  decide  which  of 
these  conflicting  theories  should  prevail.  This  Brooklyn  char- 
ter is  obviously  appropriate  only  for  a  transitional  period. 

3.  Several  of  the  commissions  under  this  charter  are  con- 
spicuous for  their  repudiation  of  short  terms  and  autocratic 
mayors.     For  example,  the  Board  of  Elections  consists  of  four 
members  whose  terms  are  five  years,  and  only  two  are  to  be 
of  the  same  party.    The  ten  members  of  the  Board  of  Assess- 
ors are  appointed  for  the  term  of  five  years,  and  these  terms 
are  so  classified  that  only  two  members  retire  biennially. 
The  official  terms  of  the  forty  members  of  the  Board  of  Edu- 
cation are  three  years,  and  they  are  so  classified  that  they  do 
not  all  retire  at  once.    The  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportion- 
ment is  a  very  great  check  upon  the  mayor's  power.      It  is 
manifestly  absurd  to  hold  a  mayor  responsible  for  such  a 
government,  or  to  regard  government  under  this  charter  as 
having  demonstrated  the  utility  of  an  autocratic  mayoralty, 
which  did  not  exist  —  save  within  narrow  limits. 

Nevertheless,  the  heads  of  the  majority  of  the  Brooklyn 
departments  have  terms  of  only  two  years,  contemporane- 
ous with  that  of  the  mayor,  which  involve  them  in  all  the 
scheming  and  bargains  of  his  election.  Among  the  depart- 
ments so  involved  are  the  fire  department,  the  health  depart- 


SEVERAL   VICIOUS   CONDITIONS  AND  PRACTICES        187 

ment,  the  excise  department,  and  the  police  department  — 
being  those  which  can  more  readily  than  the  others  be  prosti- 
-  tuted  for  carrying  party  and  mayoralty  elections.  Despite 
•ts  good  provisions,  it  was  the  manifest  purpose  of  the  framers 
H)f  this  charter  to  establish  party  government,  to  rely  upon  an 
endless  series  of  party  contests,  and  to  give  the  city  offices, 
in  the  main,  as  rewards  to  the  members  of  the  party  which 
should  triumph  in  the  city  elections.  Such  a  purpose  is 
made  plain  by  the  provision  which  allows  the  mayor  and  the 
chiefs  of  departments  a  much  larger  power  of  removal  within 
thirty  days  next  following  their  entering  upon  their  official 
duties  than  they  are  allowed  afterward. 
f  This  provision  in  substance  says  that  to  the  victors  belong 
/the  spoils — spoils  which  these  officers  should  be  able  to 
(  grasp  and  apportion  within  thirty  days.  It  would  have 
been  much  more  in  the  interest  of  good  government  if  the 
new  and  inexperienced  officers  had  been  forbidden  —  save 
for  cause  clearly  proved  —  to  make  any  removals  for  several 
months  after  entering  their  office,  until  they  had  learned 
who  ought  to  be  removed,  and  there  had  been  time  for  party 
passions  to  cool.  During  these  thirty  days  the  mayor  is 
allowed  to  remove  at  his  pleasure,  but  for  the  twenty-three 
remaining  months  of  his  term  his  attempts  to  remove  would 
be  ineffective  unless  approved  by  a  court.  It  is  difficult  to 
say  which  of  these  extremes  is  most  indefensible  and  mis- 
chievous. But  the  politicians  of  Brooklyn  were  naturally 
satisfied  when  the  mayor  they  had  elected  was  compelled  to 
speedily  give  them  offices  from  which  only  the  judgment  of 
a  court  could  oust  them.  We  must  think  that  any  man  fit 
to  be  a  mayor  would  be  ashamed  to  remove  an  officer  for 
reasons  that  he  had  not  the  moral  courage  to  avow.  To 
hold  such  a  mayor  responsible  for  the  government  of  the  city 
—  especially  after  the  first  thirty  days  of  his  term  —  is  mani- 
festly absurd.  The  full  appointing  power  of  the  mayor  of  the 
city  of  St.  Louis — who  is  elected  for  four  years  —  does  not 
arise  until  the  third  year  of  his  term,  when  he  is  likely  to 
have  become  able  to  act  intelligently. * 

1  Am.  Comw.,  604. 


188  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

These  biennial  terms  practically  say  to  the  heads  of  city 
departments  and  bureaus  in  Brooklyn,  "  No  superiority  of 
ability  or  devotion  on  your  part  will  keep  you  in  office  be- 
yond two  years  ;  the  city  expects  no  administrative  polic^j 
at  your  hands  which  looks  beyond  twenty-four  months ;  ^ 
"  If  you  wish  a  reappointrnent,  use  your  official  power,  not 
independently  for  good  government,  but  effectively  to  in- 
crease the  vote  of  some  new  mayoralty  candidate."  This 
immediate  control  by  the  new  mayor  of  the  most  important 
patronage  naturally  tended  to  involve  its  promise  and  dis- 
tribution, for  votes,  in  every  mayoralty  election. 

Practice  under  the  Brooklyn  charter  has  responded  to  the 
natural  tendency  of  its  provisions.  The  city  government  of 
Brooklyn,  with  very  limited  exceptions,  has  been  a  party 
government,  so  far  as  the  action  of  the  mayor  has  been 
effective,  in  which  the  machine  and  the  spoils  system  have 
prevailed.  From  the  time  when  the  reform  sentiment  tri- 
umphed in  the  election  of  Mayor  Low  in  1881  until  —  after 
his  term  —  it  triumphed  again  in  1894,  mayors  were  elected, 
and  appointments  were  made  by  them,  on  party  grounds. 
To  a  large  extent  the  interests  of  the  city  were  subordinated 
to  the  interests  of  party  —  the  main  checks  upon  the  spoils 
system  having  been  the  civil  service  examinations  which 
public  opinion  and  the  state  law  enforced. 


SEVERAL  VICIOUS  CONDITIONS  AND  PRACTICES     189 


CHAPTER  Vm. — THE  SAME  SUBJECT  (concluded').  EVIL 
EFFECTS  OF  TOO  SHORT  TERMS  OF  OFFICE  AND  TOO  MANY 
ELECTIONS.  HOW  TO  INSURE  A  SALUTARY  PUBLICITY  OP 
OFFICIAL  ACTION 

Why  needlessly  short  terms  and  too  frequent  elections  are  evils.  Examples  of 
them.  What  duties  of  officers  in  making  appointments  should  be  declared  and 
enforced  by  law.  The  subordinate  officers  wrongfully  removed  should  have  a 
personal  remedy.  The  exposure  of  malversation  in  office  should  be  facilitated  by 
law.  The  right  to  know  what  officers  do.  The  remedies  the  people  need  in  order 
to  destroy  the  trade  of  the  boss  and  the  corruptionist.  Publicity  as  a  remedy  for 
political  evils.  Examples  of  legislation  in  aid  of  publicity  of  official  acts.  The 
more  stringent  laws  needed.  The  qualification  of  voters,  naturalization,  registra- 
tion, and  their  enrolment  considered.  Some  laws  on  these  subjects  suggested, 
and  some  remedies  for  abuses  proposed.  Duty  of  citizens  to  aid  in  securing  good 
nominations  and  to  vote.  Theory  of  compulsory  voting.  Basis  of  the  feeling  of 
official  responsibility.  Little  city  assembly  districts  destroy  it,  discourage  voting, 
and  favor  party  despotism.  Election  in  the  city  at  large  highly  desirable.  How 
little  city  districts  strengthen  the  Tammany  and  partisan  system  and  put  little 
politicians  into  office. 

IN  looking  over  the  facts  brought  out  these  truths  are 
conspicuous :  (1)  that  our  laws  allow  needless  facilities 
for  the  abuse  of  municipal  power ;  (2)  that  a  large  part  of 
the  success  which  attends  official  malfeasance  is  made  possible 
by  reason  of  the  secrecy  of  official  action  ;  (3)  that  publicity 
more  complete  than  heretofore  may  be  made  a  salutary 
remedy ;  (4)  that  as  nearly  all  municipal  reforms  have  re- 
sulted from  a  union  of  patriotic  citizens  of  different  parties 
who  are  peculiarly  independent  of  partisan  dictation,  it  is 
desirable  that  these  citizens  should  have  increased  facilities 
both  for  effective  cooperation,  and  for  understanding  and 
defeating  the  secret  and  corrupt  action  of  the  enemies  of 
good  government. 

We  shall  therefore  propose  several  methods  having  these 
ends  in  view  —  not  hesitating  to  suggest  some  which  are  in 
a  measure  novel. 

1.  Every  needless  city  election,  and  hence  every  need- 
lessly short  term  for  a  city  officer,  adds  to  the  mass  of  the 


190  THE   GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

municipal  evils  to  be  dealt  with.  We  need  to  elect  mayors, 
members  of  city  councils,  and  members  of  legislatures  and 
of  Congress,  from  cities,  for  they  are  representative  officers 
who  make  laws  and  ordinances.  They  must  have  relatively 
short  terms,  so  that  the  wishes  of  the  people  may  at  all  times 
be  truly  represented.  Through  them,  if  worthy,  the  people 
can  secure  the  kind  of  laws  and  ordinances  they  desire.  But 
all  municipal  officers  whose  function  it  is  to  aid  in  carrying 
these  laws  and  ordinances  into  effect  —  whose  duties  are 
administrative  and  should  be  discharged  at  all  times  in  the 
same  way,  and  regardless  of  political  or  religious  opinions  — 
should  be  appointed,  and  they  should  therefore  remain  in 
office  so  long  as  they  are  both  faithful  and  efficient.1 

It  would  be  better  in  practice  if  most  of  the  subordinate, 
administrative  officers  were,  like  policemen  and  firemen, 
without  any  fixed  term  of  office,  so  that  they  may  be  re- 
tained so  long  —  and  only  so  long  —  as  they  continue  both 
faithful  and  efficient,  being  always  liable  to  be  removed  for 
cause,2  These  officers  do  not  deal  with  principles  or  have 
discretion  as  to  policy,  but  are  concerned  with  the  details  of 
business  needing  practical  skill  and  much  knowledge  of 
details.  They  should  be  unaffected  by  popular  elections. 

Partisan  blindness,  or  mere  usage,  closes  the  eyes  of  vast 
numbers  of  voters  to  the  absurdity  of  what  goes  on  before 
them.  As  these  pages  are  being  written  (November,  1895), 
a  costly,  needless  party  election  is  being  held  in  the  city  of 
New  York,  where  more  than  230,000  city  voters  are  casting 
their  ballots  in  more  than  1300  election  districts,  for  two 
persons  —  nominated  after  manifold  and  corrupting  barter 
and  scheming  in  the  party  primaries  —  to  fill  the  offices  of 
County  Clerk  and  Register  for  terms  hardly  long  enough  to 
enable  them  to  become  expert  in  the  discharge  of  their 
duties.  The  functions  of  these  officers,  who  have  charge  of 
city  papers  and  records,  are  administrative  —  are,  in  fact, 
largely  clerical.  All  party  intervention  in  their  selection, 

1  We  are  not  here  speaking  of  judicial  officers,  though  most  that  has  been  said 
is  applicable  to  them. 

1  Such  is  the  view  of  Professor  Goodnow.    Mun.  Prob.,  p.  277. 


SEVERAL   VICIOUS  CONDITIONS  AND   PRACTICES      191 

and  all  discrimination  based  on  their  political  or  religious 
opinions,  —  being  as  needless  as  they  are  mischievous,  —  are 
discreditable  to  our  municipal  intelligence. 

The  party  opinions  of  these  officers  and  their  subordinates 
are  intrinsically  hardly  of  more  importance  than  the  party 
opinions  of  the  architects  and  builders  who  planned  and  con- 
structed the  buildings  in  which  the  duties  of  these  officials 
are  to  be  discharged.  Yet,  a  fierce,  demoralizing  party  con- 
test goes  on  concerning  them  and  the  spoils  involved,  with 
the  result  that  the  persons  generally  chosen  are  hardly 
superior  mentally  —  if  they  are  not  morally  inferior  —  to  the 
ordinary  bookkeepers  of  a  large  corporation  or  dry-goods 
store.  A  fit  exercise  of  the  power  of  promotion  would  fill 
these  offices  with  persons  —  all  the  more  useful,  perhaps,  if 
their  party  politics  were  unknown  —  much  superior  to  the 
men  who  generally  secure  them.  A  thoughtful  man  can 
hardly  contemplate  such  elections  without  some  doubts  as 
to  the  competency  for  local  self-government  of  the  people 
who  tolerate  them. 

II 

1.  When  the  public  interest  requires  that  party  government 
shall  be  excluded  from  cities  and  villages,  and  that  appoint- 
ments be  made  from  among  the  most  meritorious,  irrespec- 
tive of  their  political  or  religious  opinions,  it  is  of  course 
the  plain  official  duty  of  every  municipal  officer  in  making 
appointments,  promotions,  and  removals  to  conform  to  these 
interests.  It  may  be  difficult  in  the  present  state  of  public 
opinion  to  fully  enforce  this  duty  by  penal  enactment.  Yet 
we  can  go  far  toward  it,  and  the  true  rule  of  moral  obliga- 
tion should  be  distinctly  declared  by  law.  Such  a  declara- 
tion would  do  much  toward  creating  a  public  opinion  which 
would  exact  its  rigid  enforcement,  —  would  strongly  tend  to 
make  any  mayor  or  other  city  officer  infamous  who  should 
disregard  it.  We  enforce  laws  against  gambling  and  lot- 
teries, though  we  know  these  crimes  can  hardly  be  com- 
pletely suppressed.  No  good  citizen  will  justify  a  mayor 
or  other  city  officer  in  making  an  appointment  or  removal 


192  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

against  the  public  interests,  for  gaining  an  advantage  for 
himself,  his  relatives,  or  his  party,  or  for  injuring  his  op- 
ponents. Why,  then,  should  not  the  law  condemn  such 
conduct  ?  Are  high  city  officers  to  be  allowed  with  impunity 
to  flaunt  their  violations  of  their  official  duty  in  these  regards 
—  to  admit  their  malfeasance  in  making  removals  without 
good  cause  —  before  the  eyes  of  the  people,  while  the  meri- 
torious laborers  and  clerks  who  suffer  from  this  wrong- 
doing are  denied  all  remedy  ? 

There  are  few  more  striking  evidences  of  the  dangerous 
perversion  of  public  judgment  by  party  spirit  than  the  fact 
that  such  prostitution  is  not  yet  condemned  by  law  —  that 
hundreds  of  worthy  municipal  servants  may  be  dismissed, 
without  fault  on  their  part,  by  a  rough,  half-civilized  poli- 
tician and  swashbuckler  at  the  head  of  a  municipal  office, 
for  the  purpose  of  aiding  his  faction  and  rewarding  his  cor- 
rupt followers,  and  yet  commit  no  crime.  There  are  some 
wrongs  which  cannot,  with  advantage,  be  punished  by  law, 
but  we  shall  hope  to  show  that  these  are  not  among  them. 
The  difficulty  of  proving  the  purpose  or  motive  in  making 
wrongful  appointments  or  removals  could  hardly  be  as  great 
as  that  of  proving  "malice  aforethought"  on  a  trial  for 
murder.1 

2.  The  power  of  appointment  and  removal  is  a  power  in 
trust  to  be  used  for  the  benefit  of  the  people,  and  not  for 
the  advantage  of  any  person  or  political  organization.  To 
use  it  for  the  latter  purposes  is  as  indefensible  and  is  as  fit  a 
matter  for  penal  prohibition  as  to  use  the  public  money  for 
the  same  purpose.  It  is  only  besotted  party  blindness  and 
seductive  usage  which  have  allowed  the  wholesale  prostitu- 
tion of  the  appointing  power  to  go  unpunished,  while  the 

1  In  the  main,  the  remedy  for  such  wrongs  must  be  through  public  prosecu- 
tions, but  we  think  an  inferior  officer  should  be  allowed,  under  carefully  guarded 
provisions,  and  in  aggravated  cases,  to  maintain  an  action  against  his  official 
superior.  Suppose  it  were  admitted  that  a  removal  of  a  competent  and  worthy 
person  had  been  made  for  revenge  or  to  gain  a  party  advantage,  or  to  make  room 
for  an  unfit  person.  Should  there  be  no  means  of  investigating  the  facts  ?  The 
danger  of  having  corrupt  party  and  patronage-mongering  secrets  exposed  by 
such  a  proceeding  would  obviously  impose  very  salutary  restraint  upon  appoint- 
ing officers. 


SEVERAL  VICIOUS  CONDITIONS  AND  PRACTICES     193 

misuse  of  public  money  is  prohibited  as  a  crime.  It  may 
sometimes  be  more  difficult  to  prove  that  a  clerk  was  ap- 
pointed by  a  superior  officer  in  violation  of  law  for  party  or 
personal  advantage  than  to  prove  that  the  officer  used  public 
money  for  the  same  purpose,  but  we  do  not  allow  the  authors 
of  secret  poisonings  or  of  assassinations  in  the  dark  to  escape 
untried  because  their  crimes  are  not  so  easy  to  prove  as  the 
taking  of  life  by  the  firing  of  pistols  or  stabbing  in  daylight. 

Ill 

1.  Another  remedial  suggestion  is  appropriate  here.  We 
have  seen  how  debased  city  parties  and  factions  —  by  con- 
trolling policemen,  police  justices,  jury  commissioners,  and 
district  attorneys,  and  especially  by  selling  judicial  nomina- 
tions —  have  made  it  increasingly  difficult  to  expose  malver- 
sations in  office.  Not  only  the  ruling  party,  but  its  whole 
circle  of  officials  mainly  its  adherents,  have  a  common 
interest  in  keeping  disgraceful  secrets.  Citizens,  in  their 
efforts  to  expose  official  malfeasance  and  the  crimes  of  party 
favorites,  have  not  only  had  to  meet  the  expenses  of  their 
efforts,  but  to  overcome  the  obstructions  which  partisan 
officials  naturally  put  in  their  way.  Adherents  of  a  city 
party  are  generally  ostracized,  and  certainly  lose  their  chances 
of  an  office,  if  they  expose  the  frauds  of  their  party  or  its 
leaders. 

When  the  despotic  discipline  of  the  two  great  conspiring 
city  parties  generally  prevents  their  adherents  disclosing 
official  malfeasance,  should  the  publicity  so  greatly  needed 
be  obtainable  only  through  a  grand  jury,  or  a  legislative 
committee  usually  selected  by  one  of  these  parties  ?  It  is  a 
fact,  often  illustrated,  that  such  committees  seek  party  ad- 
vantage quite  as  much  as  the  disclosure  of  salutary  truths, 
even  if  they  do  not  wholly  shrink  from  exposing  the  gravest 
abuses  lest  their  leaders  be  found  in  conspiracy  with  their 
guilty  opponents.  The  people  have  a  legal  and  moral  right 
to  know  how  public  authority  is  exercised,  what  corruptions 
are  being  concealed,  regardless  of  its  effect  upon  any  party. 


194  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

They  have  not  only  a  right  to  know  all  this,  but  should  be 
provided  with  the  best  facilities  practicable  for  ascertaining 
the  facts  promptly,  and  with  the  least  trouble  and  expense. 
Public  officers  have  no  right  in  their  own  interest  to  keep 
secrets  from  the  people. 

For  preventing  most  evils  in  official  action,  prompt  and 
complete  publicity  is  one  of  the  most  effective  remedies.  If 
the  bargaining,  the  secret  incriminating  correspondence,  and 
the  patronage-mongering  between  partisan  officials  and  party 
bosses  and  leaders  —  which  result  in  frauds,  bribery,  and 
unjustifiable  appointments  and  removals — could  be  made 
public  as  they  occur,  who  can  doubt  that  the  largest  part 
of  such  abuses  and  nearly  the  whole  trade  of  the  boss  would 
be  suppressed  ? 

2.  Though  the  complete  publicity  to  be  desired  may  be 
impossible,  we  should  do  our  utmost  to  encourage  and  facili- 
tate the  bringing  of  official  wrongdoings  before  the  people  — 
so  as  to  make  the  dread  of  exposure  a  constant  admonition  to 
malefactors.     A  notorious,  sauntering  burglar  is  examined 
to  see  if  he  has  the  tools  of  his  trade  in  his  pockets.     Why 
may  not  a  notorious  boss  or  lobbyist  be  examined,  in  the 
discretion  of  a  judge,  on  prima  facie  proof  that  he  is  the 
holder  of  a  fund  raised  to  be  used  according  to  the  methods 
of  his  trade  —  to  bribe  voters  or  buy  legislators?     Should  he 
be  undisturbed,  if  he  has  the  money  at  command  ready  to 
pass  or  defeat  a  pending  bill? 

3.  More  and  more  of  late  statesmen  have  felt  the  need  of 
affording  private  citizens  the  means  of  exposing  official  mal- 
feasance, and  of  securing,  through  their  own  action,  that 
publicity  in  aid  of  justice  and  good  government  which  par- 
ties and  partisans  official  so  generally  deprecate  and  dread. 
Some  examples  of  this  are  interesting  and  instructive.     An 
English  statute  gives  four  voters  —  or  even  one  if  he  be  a 
candidate  —  a   right  to   initiate   and  carry  forward  a  pro- 
ceeding in  court  for  determining  whether  the  result  of  a 
municipal  election  was  secured  by  illegal  or  corrupt  means, 
—  certainly  a  far-reaching  and  very  appropriate  authority.1 

1  Eng.  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1882;  Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  0.  B  ,  pp.  344,  345. 


SEVERAL  VICIOUS  CONDITIONS  AND   PRACTICES      195 

A  law  of  New  Jersey,  enacted  in  1879,1  authorizes  twenty- 
five  freeholders  and  taxpayers  who  shall  state  in  an  affidavit 
"  that  they  have  cause  to  believe  that  the  moneys  belonging 
to  a  city  or  village  are  being,  or  have  been,  unlawfully  or 
corruptly  expended,"  may  apply  to  a  justice  for  an  order 
for  a  summary  investigation;  and  it  is  made  his  duty,  in 
his  discretion,  to  order  it.  The  municipal  corporation 
investigated  must  pay  the  costs  of  the  proceeding.2  A 
law  of  Massachusetts,  enacted  in  1893,3  authorizes  any 
five  electors  to  conduct  a  legal  proceeding  to  compel  a 
compliance  with  certain  important  requirements  of  law  — 
requirements  which  parties  and  politicians  are  not  inclined 
to  obey. 

The  constitution  of  New  York,  as  amended  in  1894,4  gives 
any  citizen  a  right  to  maintain  a  suit  to  determine  whether 
an  apportionment  of  representation  made  under  it  is  consti- 
tutional and  valid  —  a  power  certainly  of  far-reaching  im- 
portance which  establishes  a  very  salutary  principle.5  The 
laws  of  New  York  authorize  taxpayers  to  bring  suits  to  pre- 
vent the  illegal  use  of  official  power.6  Why  should  not  the 
taxpayer,  according  to  the  theory  of  these  laws,  be  author- 
ized to  inquire  into  a  proposed  corrupt  use  of  money  for  an 
alleged  public  purpose? 

A  law  of  New  York 7  authorizes  a  justice  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  on  the  application  of  the  officers  of  a  charity  associa- 
tion, to  make  an  order  empowering  its  agents  to  enter, 
inspect,  and  report  upon  the  condition  of  state,  county,  and 
city  institutions,  and  requires  the  officials  in  charge  of  them 
to  facilitate  such  inspection  in  all  possible  ways.  Here  is  an 

1  Laws,  1879,  Ch.  15. 

2  Hon.  Garret  A.  Hobart,  Vice-President  of  the  United  States,  was  the  most 
effective  influence  for  the  passage  of  this  law,  now  known  as  the  "  Hobart  Law," 
and  in  a  letter  to  the  author  he  says  "  it  has  been  very  efficient  in  its  work  and 
in  accomplishing  results." 

«  Ch.  417,  Sec.  239.  *  Art.  3,  Sec.  5. 

5  A  law  of  Illinois,  approved  March  20,  1895,  has  in  a  limited  way  adopted  the 
same  policy. 

6  Zeigler  v.  Chapin,  126  New  York  Reps.,  342;   N.  Y.  Laws,  1881,  Ch.  531; 
1887,  Ch.  673. 

'  Laws,  1893,  Ch.  635. 


196  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

immense  power  for  causing  a  prompt  and  salutary  publicity 
to  be  given  to  official  delinquency  —  a  proceeding  which, 
with  the  other  laws  cited,  seems  to  be  in  point  of  principle 
adequate  precedents  for  any  investigation  we  have  sug- 
gested. 

4.  Yet  there  is  authority  for  investigations  in  the  laws  of 
New  York *  of  a  far  more  extensive  and  important  kind  than 
any  authorized  by  the  laws  we  have  cited.3  This  law  pro- 
vides that  any  five  citizens,  being  taxpayers,  who  shall  set 
forth  in  an  affidavit  any  misapplication  of  public  money,  any 
violation  of  law,  any  neglect  of  duty,  or  any  delinquency  on 
the  part  of  any  officer  or  persons  mentioned  in  the  affidavit, 
may  go  before  a  judge  and  obtain  an  order  for  the  public 
examination  of  such  officer  or  person  before  any  judge  touch- 
ing such  matters,  and  that  the  officer  or  person  implicated 
must  answer  concerning  the  same  upon  the  examination 
which  is  to  follow.  The  scope  of  the  charges  in  the  affidavit 
measures  the  scope  of  the  examination.  Comprehensive  as 
these  provisions  are,  they  affirm  a  principle  which  is  obvi- 
ously capable  of  a  still  larger  practical  enforcement  —  an 
enforcement  which  may  be  made  broad  enough  to  reach 
almost  every  kind  of  unlawful  doings  of  officers  or  citizens, 
connected  with  their  public  duties.  The  law  should  clearly 
be  made  to  reach  the  custodians  and  purveyors  of  corruption 
funds,  held  to  be  used  for  influencing  legislatures  after  the 
manner  of  American  lobbyists  and  bosses,  and  also  the  hold- 
ers of  all  moneys  received  as  assessment  extortions  from  the 
public  servants. 

The  proceeding  under  this  law  is  not  intended  to  be  a 
trial,  or  any  part  of  a  trial,  but  is  an  easy  and  prompt  means 
of  exposing  dangerous  and  unjustifiable  doings.  It  pro- 
claims a  right  of  publicity  as  to  official  action,  and  provides 
for  securing  it.  The  dread  of  exposure  would  be  a  constant 
and  wholesome  admonition  to  all  malefactors. 

The  proofs  taken  under  this  New  York  law  are  to  be  filed 
with  a  clerk  of  one  of  the  courts,  and  are  not  to  be  used  as 

i  See  also  N.  Y.  Laws,  1882,  Ch.  410,  Sec.  423. 

»  See  Laws,  1873,  Ch.  335,  Sec.  109,  and  N.  Y.  Consolidation  Act,  Ch.  60. 


SEVERAL  VICIOUS  CONDITIONS  AND  PRACTICES     197 

evidence  against  the  persons  compelled  to  answer,  but  are  to 
be  open  to  public  inspection.,1 

5.  We  must  think  that  a  well-framed  law,  based  on  the 
theory  of  those  we  have  cited,  could  hardly  fail  to  be  a  salutary 
check  both  upon  corrupt  schemes  and  partisan  despotism. 
It  would  make  the  higher  public  opinion,  as  uttered  through 
the  public  press,  a  far  more  prompt,  effective,  and  salutary 
power.     Investigations  would  not  depend  on  the  willing- 
ness of  a  party-elected  district  attorney  or  a  party  majority 
in  a  legislature  to  make  them.     Slander  of  public  officers 
might  be  less  mischievous,  for  every  officer  unjustly  aspersed 
could  challenge  his  accusers  to  either  examine  him  or  be 
silent.     There  would  be  little  excuse  for  defamation  based 
on  mere  suspicion  when  the  facts  could  be  so  easily  ascer- 
tained. 

6.  We  think  that,  in  aid  of  these  examinations,  and  of 
official  honesty,  there  should  be  a  law  forbidding  any  public 
officer,  association,  or  person,  knowingly  becoming  the  custo- 
dian, controller,  stakeholder,  trustee,   or  purveyor,   of  any 
money  or  property  raised,  or  intended  to  be  used,  for  accom- 
plishing any  illegal  or  corrupt  purpose,  or  for  influencing  any 
legislator,  officer,  or  court.     The  collection  of  political  assess- 
ment being  illegal,  why  should  not  banks  and  trust  companies 
be  forbidden  by  law  to  knowingly  accept  on  deposit  the 
money  thus  extorted  ?     The  nation  refuses  to  have  its  mail- 
bags  contaminated  by  obscene   literature.     Can   banks   or 
trust  companies  justify  themselves  in  knowingly  receiving 
money  collected  by  illegal  means,  or  intended  to  be  used  for 
bribing  legislatures  or  buying  votes  ? 


1  Under  this  law,  if  slightly  amended,  —  and  at  vastly  less  expense  than  by  any 
other  means,  —  we  think  all  the  investigations  could  have  been  made  which  were 
conducted  by  a  legislative  committee  in  New  York  City  in  1894-1895.  Abuses 
could  have  been  probed  from  which  the  ruling  party  shrank.  An  examination 
under  the  law  some  years  ago  drove  an  unworthy  New  York  police  commissioner 
—  Oliver  Charlick  —  from  his  office.  The  law  contains  various  safeguards  against 
the  abuse  of  the  proceedings  under  it ;  and  costs  and  penalties  may  be  imposed 
for  causing  an  examination  without  apparent  justification  in  the  facts  dis- 
closed. 


198  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 


IV 

The  subjects  of  the  qualifications  of  voters,  their  natural- 
ization and  registration,  and  their  enrolment  for  taking 
part  in  party  primaries  and  conventions  are  matters  of 
general  application,  which  can  receive  no  adequate  con- 
sideration in  this  treatise.  Yet,  as  they  are  connected  with 
the  gravest  abuses  in  cities,  a  few  remedial  suggestions  are 
appropriate.  It  is  impossible  to  consider  the  constitutional 
and  legal  provisions  on  these  subjects  in  reference  to  the 
public  interests  without  the  feeling  that  some  of  them  have 
been  framed,  not  so  much  to  promote  the  general  welfare,  as 
to  secure  party  advantage.  The  leaders  of  city  parties, 
naturally  dreading  the  repute  of  being  more  unfavorable 
than  their  opponents  to  opening  the  franchise  to  the  vilest 
class  of  voters,  whom  they  hope  to  win,  enter  into  a  de- 
moralizing competition  for  a  mischievous  extension  of  the 
franchise.  Our  too  extended  suffrage  is  largely  the  result 
of  this  party  competition  —  the  higher  public  opinion  having 
been  in  but  a  small  measure  an  effective  force  in  fixing  its 
conditions.  The  reputable  men  of  both  parties  vote  to  en- 
franchise the  vilest  citizen,  not  because  they  think  it  in  the 
public  interest  to  do  so,  but  because  they  fear  the  action  of 
their  opponents  will  win  most  of  their  votes. 

1.  As  it  seems  to  us  clear  that  all  attempts  to  establish 
a  property  qualification  for  suffrage  —  even  if  it  would  be 
just  —  will  be  unavailing,  we  shall  give  no  space  to  the 
subject.  Poor  men  may  be,  if  not  generally  as  intelligent, 
yet  quite  as  patriotic  and  conscientious  as  rich  men.  It 
is  not  always  easy  to  say  whether  the  poor  or  the  rich 
most  need  the  suffrage  for  their  safety,  or  which  is  in  the 
greatest  danger  from  voters  of  the  depraved  class,  —  which 
city  parties  do  most  to  bribe  and  to  bring  to  the  polls. 

We  cannot  do  justice  to  the  reasons  which  would  demon- 
strate the  utility  of  raising  the  standards  botli  of  character 
and  education  for  admission  to  municipal  suffrage,  or  which 
require  longer  local  residence  before  the  ballot  is  conceded 


SEVERAL  VICIOUS  CONDITIONS  AND  PRACTICES     199 

in  cities.  Such  changes  would  be  as  salutary  in  diminishing 
the  number  of  servile,  fraudulent,  and  mercenary  voters,  as 
they  would  be  in  stimulating  education,  defeating  frauds  in 
registrations  and  elections,  and  increasing  the  dignity  of  the 
suffrage  itself. 

In  Massachusetts  a  person  who  is  a  pauper  or  under  guar- 
dianship cannot  vote,  nor  can  he  unless  he  can  read  the  state 
constitution  in  the  English  language,  and  can  write  his  own 
name  ;  and  his  vote  will  not  be  received  at  a  city  election 
unless  he  has  resided  one  year  in  the  state  and  six  months  in 
the  city.1  It  is  much  to  be  regretted  that  these  provisions 
are  not  in  force  in  all  the  states.2  The  constitution  of  New 
York  as  amended,  in  1894,  though  failing  —  apparently  for 
party  reasons  —  to  provide  for  the  least  educational  qualifica- 
tion, requires  a  period  of  ninety  days,  instead  of  ten  days,  as 
formerly,  to  intervene  after  naturalization  before  the  privi- 
lege of  voting  is  conceded.  But,  in  strange  contrast,  it 
declares  that  no  persons  shall  lose  a  residence  for  voting 
while  confined  in  any  public  prison  —  a  lamentable  provision 
which  we  trust  will  yet  give  way  to  one  providing  that  a 
person  who  has  been  confined  in  such  prison  shall  not  vote 
thereafter  during  a  period  at  least  equal  to  the  length  of  his 
confinement. 

In  Missouri  a  foreigner  who  has  resided  in  the  state  a  year 
may  vote,  if  in  that  period  before  an  election  he  has  declared 
his  intention  to  become  a  citizen  and  has  resided  merely 
twenty  days  in  the  precinct  where  he  offers  to  vote.  How 
can  citizens  have  an  adequate  sense  of  their  duty  as  voters,  or 
of  the  dignity  of  the  franchise,  when  they  see  both  laws  and 
constitutions  thus  tender  the  high  privilege  of  voting,  not 
only  to  criminals  and  to  the  depraved  classes,  but  to  mere 
unassimilated  city  sojourners  for  a  few  weeks  —  to  aliens 
possibly  fresh  from  foreign  prisons,  and  perhaps  unable 
either  to  speak  the  language  or  read  the  laws  of  the  state  ? 

1  Mass.  Laws,  1893,  Ch.  417,  Sec.  13. 

2  We  by  no  means  despair  of  educational  qualifications  for  suffrage.    The  state 
of  California  adopted  it  by  a  popular  vote  of  more  than  three  to  one  in  1892. 
Mun.  Prob.,  p.  147.    It  is  also  beiiig  favored  by  some  of  the  Southern  states. 


200  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

2.  The  manner  of  executing  the  naturalization  laws  —  for 
example,  in  New  York  City  —  seems  to  have  been  even  more 
discreditable  than  their  provisions.     The  address  issued  by 
the  New  York  Constitutional  Convention  of  1894  declares 
that  a  single  judge  has  naturalized  persons  at  the  rate  of 
more  than  live  hundred  a  day  —  many  of  them,  we  may  add, 
being  vile,   ignorant,  desperate   creatures,   most  of  whom 
party  bribery,  coercion,  or  fraud  have  brought  before  the 
court.1 

Such  is  the  genesis  and  character  of  the  proceedings  under 
which  the  national  government  may  come  under  obligation 
to  protect  a  so-called  American  citizen  in  every  quarter  of 
the  globe.  We  have  no  right  to  expect  good  city  govern- 
ment, nor  shall  we  deserve  its  blessings,  until  we  better  pro- 
tect the  dignity  and  purity  of  the  franchise,  and  cease  to 
allow  it  to  be  made  the  spoils  of  party  managers  and  the  favor 
of  unfaithful  and  partisan  judges.  "Who  can  doubt  that,  if 
mere  party  influence  could  be  expelled  from  New  York  City, 
the  standard  for  voting  could  be  at  once  raised  as  high  as  it 
is  in  Massachusetts  ?  Her  judges  are  appointed  and  hold 
their  offices  during  good  behavior  and  efficiency. 

Better  influences  are  now  (1897)  prevailing  in  New  York 
City,  and  the  power  of  an  aroused  public  opinion  defeats 
many  unfit  applicants  for  naturalization.  Yet  we  need  a 
stringent  statute  for  securing  publicity  —  such  as  we  have 
just  explained  —  under  which  unfaithful  judges  can  be  ex- 
amined and  exposed. 

3.  Formal  applications  for  naturalization  should  be  re- 
quired to  be  filed  at  least  thirty  days  before  the  right  of 
voting  can  be  granted.     Special  sessions  of  the  court  should 
be  set  apart,  and  formal  proceedings  should  be  prescribed 


1  Mr.  Conkling  (City  Govt.,  p.  19fi),  calling  attention  to  the  fact  that  in  Tweed's 
time  (1870)  persons  were  naturalized  at  the  rate  of  three  in  five  minutes,  says 
that  in  1893  he  saw  a  judge  in  New  York  City  "admit  three  applicants  to  citizen- 
ship in  just  three  minutes  and  that  the  answers  given  to  questions  in  American 
history  and  geography  were  ludicrous."  But  can  a  judge  who  has  paid  his  party 
$15,000  for  his  nomination  be  expected  to  do  much  better  than  this  when  its 
leaders  bring  before  him  the  vile  wretches  they  have  bribed  or  hustled  from  the 
bar  of  the  grog-shop  to  the  bar  of  justice? 


SEVERAL   VICIOUS   CONDITIONS   AND  PRACTICES      201 

for  naturalizations,  of  which  full  records  should  be  kept. 
Mr.  Conkling  justly  thinks  that,  to  keep  the  matter  out  of 
partisan  strife  at  the  period  of  elections,  no  one  should  be 
allowed  to  vote  under  naturalization  proceedings  which  have 
not  been  completed  six  months  before  the  election.  The 
failure  of  a  few  foreigners  to  vote  —  the  defeat  of  a  few 
colonized  voters  to  carry  a  district  —  would  be  the  merest 
trifle  compared  with  the  general  demoralization  and  the 
stupendous  frauds  which  our  vicious  methods  have  caused. 
Naturalization  proceedings  should  be  without  reference  to 
any  particular  election,  and  the  conclusion  reached  should 
be  duly  registered  in  permanent  books,  which  should  be  the 
primary  evidence  of  citizenship.  In  view  of  the  facts  already 
stated,  it  seems  important  that  no  party  boss,  leader,  or 
agent  should  have  any  recognized  privilege,  or  be  allowed 
any  participation  in  connection  with  the  naturalization  of 
foreigners. 

4.  The  matter  of  registration  is  closely  connected  with 
that  of  naturalization,  and  what  has  been  said  concerning  the 
latter  is  in  the  main  applicable  to  the  former.     The  statutes 
of  Massachusetts  last  cited 1  contain  provisions  which  may  be 
usefully  studied  by  all  friends  of  municipal  reform.    They  pro- 
vide for  a  permanent  registration  board,  and  for  the  keeping 
of  a  general  register  of  all  voters,  which  is  to  be  as  complete 
as  practicable  at  all  times,  so  that  in  case  of  local  or  special 
elections  the  facts  appearing  on  the  general  register  can  be 
used.     There  are  also  valuable  provisions  for  identifying  the 
registered  voters.     Such  provisions  cannot  fail  to  make  it 
much  easier  than  it  had  before  been  to  prevent  those  many 
registration  frauds  which  are  inevitable  under  laws  which 
allow  the  registrations  to  be  hurriedly  made  under  great 
party  excitement,  in  the  very  few  days  which  immediately 
precede  the  elections. 

5.  We  have  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  by  far  the 
greater  part  of  the  registration  frauds,  and  of  the  bribery 
connected  with  them,  have  resulted  from  the  use  of  money 

lLaws,  1893,  Chs.  413  and  417,  Sees.  15  and  36-47. 


202  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

raised  by  parties,  and  from  the  vicious  exertions  of  their 
leaders  and  minions  for  bringing  vile  voters  to  the  polls. 
Therefore,  in  the  degree  that  we  shall  suppress  party  gov- 
ernment in  municipalities  we  shall  also  suppress  these  evils. 

It  is  plain  that  if  city  officers  were  elected  in  the  main 
by  the  city  at  large,  as  they  should  be,  rather  than  from 
small  districts,  many  of  the  complications  and  vicious  facili- 
ties attending  registration,  and  most  of  the  fraudulent  colo- 
nizations of  voters  from  one  district  to  another,  would  be 
avoided.  In  New  York  City,  the  required  residence  of 
thirty  days  in  a  district  as  a  condition  of  voting  would  be 
rendered  useless  —  the  city  residence  being  sufficient ;  and 
it  might  be  made  easily  practicable  to  require  the  registra- 
tion to  be  mainly  completed  at  least  a  month  before  an  elec- 
tion The  few  honest  voters  who  would  be  thus  excluded 
from  the  registry  might  be  allowed  to  vote  by  virtue  of 
their  state  and  country  residence,  for  the  proceeding  part 
of  the  year.  When  city  government  shall  be  framed  in  the 
interest  of  the  people,  rather  than  in  that  of  parties  and  pro- 
fessional politicians,  we  may  feel  sure  that  registration  will 
be  much  more  carefully  guarded,  and  that  it  will  be  com- 
pleted early  enough  to  allow  ample  time  for  the  correction 
of  the  voting-lists. 

6.  So  long  as  parties  shall  be  allowed  to  control  nomina- 
tions, and  the  party  system  shall  prevail  in  cities,  the  subject 
of  party  enrolment  and  primaries  will  remain  important, 
and  the  need  of  greatly  improving  their  vicious  methods 
will  continue.  The  movement  for  ballot  reform  has  been, 
in  large  part,  an  effort  to  suppress  the  evils  incident  to  the 
party  system  and  party  control  of  voting,  to  which  enrol- 
ments are  incidents.  As  we  shall  have  to  consider  these 
matters  elsewhere,  little  need  be  said  here  concerning  them. 
As  our  cities  have  increased  in  population,  the  management 
of  party  primaries  and  conventions  has  become  more  and 
more  despotic  and  corrupt,  and  the  necessity  of  regulating 
their  action  by  law  and  of  limiting  it  to  regular  and  honest 
methods  has  been  recognized.1 

1  Though  it  has  been  but  a  few  years  since  the  first  laws  were  enacted  upon  the 


SEVERAL  VICIOUS  CONDITIONS  AND  PRACTICES     203 


1.  In  considering  our  remedial  suggestions,  it  has  very 
likely  occurred  to  the  reader  that  remedies  of  great  impor- 
tance have  been  unnoticed  —  the  duty  of  all  citizens,  (1)  to 
promote  the  acceptance  of  sound  principle ;  (2)  to  be  active  in 
securing  good  nominations ;   (3)  to  vote,  and  persuade  other 
citizens  to  vote.     These  duties  are  so  obvious  as  to  need 
no  demonstration,  and  their  neglect  is  both  lamentable  and 
ominous.      We  need   a  patriotic  and  stern  public  opinion 
which  shall  make  all  intelligent  citizens  infamous  who  neg- 
lect these  universal  obligations  of  good   citizenship.     We 
must  think  it  would  not  be  unjust  to  disfranchise  for  a  short 
time,  to  make  ineligible  to  office  for  a  much  longer  time, 
and  to  designate  on  the  general  voting  registers,  the  legal 
voters  who  habitually,  and  without  good  reasons  assigned, 
neglect  to  vote  —  whatever  view  we  may  take  of  the  policy 
of  compulsory  voting  as  a  general  rule.     Can  it  be  doubted 
that  if  every  neglect  to  vote  was  recorded  on  a  register  many 
more  respectable  voters  would  go  to  the  polls  than  now  go 
there?1 

2.  If  the  omission  to  take  part  in  primary  nominations 
and  to  vote  occurred  under  an  election  system  which  did  not 

subject,  legislation  affecting  it  has  already  become  complicated  in  several  states, 
and  the  difficulty  of  securing  honest  proceedings  and  fair  nominations  seems  to  be 
almost  insurmountable.  See  "Primary  Elections,"  3  Lalor's  Pol.  Sci.,  p.  343. 
Some  of  the  best  legislation  on  the  subject  may  be  found  in  the  laws  of  Massa- 
chusetts. Laws,  1893,  Ch.  417.  We  shall  dispose  of  this  subject  by  presenting  a 
method  of  making  Free  nominations  by  certificate.  See  Ch.  IX. 

1  Hon.  F.  W.  Holls,  a  member  of  the  New  York  Constitutional  Convention  of 
1894,  has  written  an  able  and  interesting  pamphlet  on  compulsory  voting.  That 
such  compulsion  would  secure  some  useful  results  can  hardly  be  doubted.  Men 
fit  to  vote  might  with  advantage  be  compelled  to  vote.  But  until  the  standard 
for  suffrage  is  made  so  high  as  not  to  put  upon  the  voting  lists  the  vilest  citizens, 
the  wisdom  of  compelling  all  to  vote  who  have  a  legal  right  to  do  so  may  well  be 
doubted.  To  force  all  those  abominable  specimens  of  human  nature  —  whom 
parties  and  their  leaders  generally  bribe  and  hustle  to  register  themselves  —  to 
actually  vote,  would  be  a  curse  to  any  city,  and  a  disgusting  burlesque  on  repub- 
lican government.  It  would  be  better  to  fine  the  low  politicians  and  party  leaders 
who  caused  them  to  register,  and  to  use  the  money  thus  collected  to  reward  the 
vile  voters  who  should  have  the  shame  and  decency  to  keep  away  from  the  polls. 


204  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

—  as  is  in  the  case  with  the  prevailing  systems  —  call  for  a 
needless  number  of  nominations  and  elections,  these  neglects 
would  be  far  more  serious  than  they  now  seem  to  be.  We 
may  well  believe  that  the  excessive  number  of  nominations 
and  elections  we  now  have  tire,  disgust,  and  repel  many 
voters  who  would,  nevertheless,  be  ready  to  discharge  all  the 
duties  which  a  wisely  constructed,  non-partisan  municipal 
system  would  impose.  Suppose  our  official  terms  were  only 
six  months,  how  many  besides  politicians  and  those  they  had 
bribed  would  attend  the  primaries  or  vote?  Yet,  bad  as  are 
the  methods  of  our  primaries  and  conventions,  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  their  doings  would  be  much  improved  if  all, 
save  the  worst,  citizens  would  discharge  their  duty  by  taking 
part  in  their  proceedings.  We  are  far  from  justifying  —  we 
emphatically  condemn  —  those  who  for  such  reasons  shirk 
their  civil  duties,  but  we  must  regard  the  fact  that  they  ha- 
bitually do  so  as  one  of  our  fundamental  municipal  problems, 
which  we  shall  consider  in  the  next  chapter.  We  think  it 
can  be  shown  that  many  men,  who  for  the  reasons  indicated 
neglect  their  duty,  may  be  persuaded  to  fairly  discharge  it, 
through  better  methods  and  under  less  exacting  conditions. 
They  refuse  all  exertions  when  needless  demands  are  made 
upon  them.  When  they  are  invited  to  many  needless  elec- 
tions, find  that  frauds  go  unpunished,  and  are  compelled  to 
hustle  with  partisan  bullies  and  vile,  bribed  voters,  in  order 
to  secure  the  nomination  of  worthy  candidates,  they  retire  in 
disgust  from  the  contest.  Hence  the  great  importance  of 
getting  along  with  fewer  elected  officers,  less  frequent  elec- 
tions, and  with  much  simpler  methods  of  making  nomina- 
tions. We  shall,  therefore,  invite  the  attention  of  the  reader 
to  some  novel  suggestions  on  these  subjects. 

VI 

We  have  considered  certain  evils  incident  to  the  small 
district  system,  but  there  are  others  which  require  notice. 

It  is  a  fundamental  need  that  an  elected  officer  should 
represent  definite  interests  and  principles  in  which  those 


SEVERAL  VICIOUS   CONDITIONS   AND   PRACTICES      205 

who  vote  at  his  election  should  have  a  common  interest,  and 
to  which  he  may  feel  an  effective  obligation  of  duty.  In 
such  conditions  we  have  the  basis  of  all  official  responsi- 
bility, and  of  that  salutary  and  effective  sense  of  amenability 
which  does  most  to  keep  the  officer  in  the  line  of  his  duty, 
and  to  prevent  patronage,  spoils,  and  blind  party  spirit  domi- 
nating his  conduct.  Towns  and  combinations  of  towns  into 
districts  have  definite,  local  interests  growing  out  of  their 
peculiar  products,  general  corporate  welfare,  and  geographi- 
cal relations.  The  residents  of  towns  constitute  a  corporate 
body,  having  governmental  functions,  including  the  power 
of  taxation ;  they  are  accustomed  to  meet  and  act  together, 
and  to  seek  legislation  adapted  to  their  peculiar  interests. 
They  know  their  representatives  and  require  them  to  be 
faithful  to  their  local  needs.  Here  are  the  elements  of  an 
effective  sense  of  official  responsibility  —  much  as  party  dis- 
cipline impairs  its  force. 

So  in  the  main  it  may  be  in  a  small  city  so  long  as  a  single 
officer,  or  a  class  of  officers,  are  elected  at  large  and  represent 
the  whole  city. 

But  when  the  city  is  divided  up  into  districts  for  electing 
members  of  the  city  council  or  of  the  legislature  —  not  be- 
cause different  local  interests  or  new  geographical  policies 
or  productions  have  been  developed,  but  merely  because  the 
city  has  become  entitled  to  more  elected  officers,  the  whole 
situation  —  so  far  as  the  reality  of  representation  and  a  sense 
of  responsibility  are  concerned  —  is  changed.  The  local  elec- 
tion districts  —  there  are  (in  1897)  thirty-five  of  them  in 
New  York  City  for  electing  members  of  the  State  Assembly 
and  city  aldermen  —  are  created  rather  to  serve  an  arith- 
metical convenience  than  to  secure  an  actual  representation 
of  classes,  distinctive  industries,  or  local  needs.  These  dis- 
tricts are  based  on  the  mere  contiguity  of  the  voters'  resi- 
dences, if  happily  the  gerrymandering  policy  of  parties  and 
factions  does  not  dictate  their  boundaries. 

The  limits  of  these  districts,  which  are  often  changed,  are 
certain  streets  or  lines  of  buildings  enclosing  a  population 
which  forms  no  natural  or  useful  basis  for  a  separate  repre- 


2<  M;  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

sentation.  In  the  main  the  voters  of  a  district  are  strangers 
to  each  other,  have  no  interests  or  sympathies  in  common, 
and  many  of  them  live  in  one  district  and  carry  on  busi- 
ness in  another.  Who  can  say  in  which  they  should  most 
properly  vote?1  These  district  residents  have  no  peculiar 
interests  or  corporate  relations ;  they  almost  never  meet  as 
a  body  to  instruct  their  representative  or  to  call  him  to 
account. 

When  he  rises  to  speak  in  a  legislative  body  he  can  hardly 
feel  that  he  represents  anything  definite,  save  a  party,  a 
faction,  or  a  boss.  In  fact,  the  residents  of  these  small  dis- 
tricts, under  the  party  system,  do  not  so  much  nominate  the 
officer  they  elect  as  accept  him  at  the  hands  of  the  central 
party  organization,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  generally  domi- 
nates every  district.  It  is  obvious  that  such  a  pseudo- 
representative  cannot  feel  the  wholesome  or  effective  sense 
of  responsibility  —  the  dread  of  being  justly  rebuked  by  his 
constituents — which  is  generally  felt  by  the  representatives 
of  towns.  He  has  probably  made  no  pledge  to  be  faithful 
to  anything  but  the  party,  faction,  or  boss  which  dictated 
his  nomination  —  or  sold  it  to  him. 

It  would  hardly  be  possible  to  contrive  any  method  more 
effective  for  depriving  formal  representation  of  its  reality, 
its  dignity,  and  its  most  salutary  admonitions.  The  facts 
that  little-district  members  of  legislatures  and  of  city  coun- 
cils are  so  generally  little,  contemptible  politicians,  with 
little  sense  of  municipal  duty,  are  but  natural  results  from 
central  party  domination  and  the  little-district  system. 
Hardly  any  representative  of  the  great  city  is  authorized  to 
speak  for  it  as  a  whole  —  of  its  dignity,  of  its  combined  in- 
terests, of  its  large  policy  —  even  if  he  were  competent.2 


1  In  some  large  cities  there  may  be  certain  peculiar  interests  so  situated  geo- 
graphically as  to  be  a  fair  basis  for  a  geographical  or  local  representation. 

2  Mr.  Graham,  in  his  New  York  City  and  Its  Masters,  showed  that  in  the  first 
district  of  New  York  City  for  electing  members  of  the  legislature  in  1887,  there 
was  a  saloon  for  every  41  of  its  residents,  that  in  the  second  district  there  was  a 
saloon  for  every  94  of  its  residents,  that  in  the  third  district  there  was  a  saloon  for 
every  13fi  of  its  residents ;  and  that  in  the  three  districts  there  were  1851  drinking- 
sfiloons  and  only  17  schools.    We  hardly  need  add  that  the  character  and  intelli- 


SEVERAL  VICIOUS  CONDITIONS  AND  PRACTICES     207 

Little  districts  not  only  aid  little  men  to  office,  but  cause 
great  men  to  scorn  it.  An  election  on  a  general  ticket  by 
all  the  voters  of  a  great  city  would  impose  a  duty  to  act 
broadly  for  its  general  welfare,  would  give  a  dignity  to 
the  representative  office  which  would  appeal  to  the  honor- 
able ambition  of  men  of  character  and  capacity.  It  can 
hardly  be  said  that  the  strong  tendency  of  elections  at  large 
to  secure  the  choice  of  officers  of  high  ability  and  character 
would  always  accomplish  that  result.  For  Tammany,  under 
the  lead  of  Tweed,  elected  a  despicable  board  of  aldermen  on 
general  ticket.  But  that  was  a  time  of  unexampled  degra- 
dation. Minority  representation  is  needed  to  reenforce  that 
tendency — a  subject  which  we  shall  soon  consider. 

No  candid  man  will  deny  that  an  election  contest  in  a 
little  fraction,  or  district,  of  a  city — so  many  blocks  of 
houses,  shops,  and  stables — naturally  repels  worthy  candi- 
dates and  favors  the  triumph  of  intrigue,  fraud,  and  pesti- 
lent, partisan  politics.  Adroit  and  unscrupulous  little 
politicians  of  tarnished  reputations,  who  would  have  small 
chance  of  election  on  a  general  ticket,  may,  by  secret,  crafty 
management — supported  by  the  central  party  organization 
—  easily  secure  a  victory  in  one  of  these  little  districts. 
Who  can  doubt  that  if  the  assembly  and  aldermanic  dis- 
tricts in  cities  were  reduced  to  a  fifth  of  their  present  size, 
the  chances  of  yet  more  contemptible  politicians  and  spoils- 
men being  elected  would  be  greatly  increased,  while  the 
party  machine  would  become  far  more  oppressive.  The 
local  clubs,  leaders,  captains,  lieutenants,  aides,  and  all  the 
electioneering  swashbucklers  of  the  ruling  city  parties  would 
be  more  effective  and  pernicious  than  ever  before. 

It  seems  almost  too  plain  for  doubt  that  if  city  candidates 
for  the  legislature  and  for  city  councils  had  to  make  their 
appeals  to  the  whole  body  of  city  voters  for  support,  and  in 
some  reference  to  their  own  fitness  to  act  for  the  whole  city, 
the  consequences  would  be  highly  favorable  to  the  triumph 

gence  of  their  elected  officers  —  far  baser  than  would  be  nominated  on  a  general 
ticket  —  have  usually  represented  the  ignorant  and  degraded  moral  conditions 
which  such  facts  suggest. 


208  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

of  public  opinion  and  to  the  nomination  and  election  of  men 
of  good  ability  and  reputation,  generally  known  through- 
out the  city. 

The  one  patriotic  objection  of  any  weight  to  abolishing 
small  districts  for  representation,  or  reducing  them  to  three 
or  four  in  the  largest  cities — being  the  claim  that  small  dis- 
tricts favor  the  representation  of  the  minority — will  be  con- 
sidered in  the  next  chapter,  where  we  shall  propose  a  far 
more  effective  and  just  method  of  minority  representation. 


FREE  NOMINATIONS  AND  FREE  VOTING          209 


CHAPTER  IX.  —  CONCERNING  FREE  NOMINATIONS  AND  FREE 
VOTING  ;   MINORITY  REPRESENTATION 

When  parties  may  justly  make  nominations.  The  true  function  of  nomina- 
tions. Parties  attempt  to  make  them  decisive  of  elections.  Ballot  reform  affirms 
the  principle  of  Free  Nominations.  Meaning  of  Free  Nominations.  Laws  of 
Massachusetts  and  New  York  for  Free  Nominations.  New  York  laws  unjust  to 
independent  voters.  Nominations  by  Free  Nomination  certificates  sufficient  and 
just,  and  would  diminish  corruption.  Many  signers  to  certificate  nominations 
needless.  Utility  of  such  nominations.  Free  Nominations  in  England  salutary. 
Often  no  opposing  candidates  in  English  cities  and  then  a  nomination  is  by  law 
equivalent  to  an  election.  More  limited  suffrage  in  England  as  affecting  Free 
Voting.  The  wider  the  suffrage  the  greater  the  need  of  Free  Nominations.  As  to 
danger  of  too  many  nominations.  Precautions  against  them. 

Free  Voting  in  city  elections.  It  is  a  right.  Party  theory  of  voting.  Why  it 
is  unjust.  Party  voting  and  Free  Voting  compared.  Free  Voting  and  limited 
voting  compared.  Proportional  Representation,  Minority  Representation,  and 
Cumulative  Voting  more  complicated  and  difficult  than  Free  Voting.  Free  Vot- 
ing has  a  peculiar  purpose  of  its  own.  Free  Voting  is  always  an  absolute  need. 
How  far  it  can  give  minority  representation.  Good  results  from  Free  Voting. 
Free  Voting  by  business  corporations.  Free  Voting  provided  for  in  Illinois  con- 
stitution. Its  practical  effect.  Objections  to  Free  Voting  considered.  "  Plump- 
ing." Politics  in  Illinois  and  adjoining  states  compared.  Attempt  to  establish 
Free  Voting  in  New  York  in  1872.  Laws  of  Pennsylvania  as  to  Free  Voting. 
Their  practical  effects.  How  the  triumph  of  the  spoils  system  in  Pennsylvania 
caused  repeal  of  most  of  the  Free  Voting  laws.  Examples  and  good  results  of 
Free  Voting  in  the  School  Boards  in  English  cities.  Examples  of  party  voting  in 
American  cities.  Free  Voting  would  make  it  much  easier  to  secure  party  support 
for  non-partisan  city  administration. 

WHAT  the  party  boss,  managers,  and  machines  have 
gained  by  aggression  and  usurpation  in  city  politics,  the 
individual  citizens  have  lost,  being  parts  of  their  just  inde- 
pendence. The  growing  despotism  of  the  former  measure 
the  increased  vassalage  of  the  latter.  Nowhere  are  this 
gain  and  loss  more  conspicuous  and  disastrous  than  in  the 
sphere  of  making  nominations,  which  we  are  now  to  consider. 

1.  We  have  seen  that  there  is  a  natural  basis,  so  far  as 
state  and  national  affairs  are  concerned,  for  legitimate  and 
useful  political  parties.  When  these  parties  are  faithful 
and  really  representative,  there  is  an  obvious  fitness  in  their 
conventions  making  nominations  for  state  and  national  offi- 


210  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

cere.  Nevertheless,  so  perverse  and  despotic  is  party  spirit 
that  it  will  always  be  essential,  not  only  in  the  interest  of 
justice  and  liberty,  bat  of  fidelity  and  usefulness  on  the  part 
of  parties  themselves,  that  independent  citizens  shall  at  all 
times  be  able  to  nominate  for  state  officers  candidates  for 
whom  they  can  conscientiously  vote,  whether  these  candi- 
dates are  approved  by  parties  or  not. 

When  we  come  to  the  elections  of  officers  for  managing 
city  affairs, —  in  which,  as  we  have  seen,  there  is  no  natural 
basis  for  useful  party  action, — the  case  is  widely  different. 
There  is  no  just  basis  for  allowing  parties  to  control  their 
nominations,  but  a  manifest  need  of  enabling  all  citizens  to 
freely  exert  their  influence  both  as  to  nominations  and  elec- 
tions, irrespective  of  party  relations  and  interests.  We 
have  allowed  the  development  of  so  haughty  a  despotism 
on  the  part  of  parties  that  their  majorities  now  claim  a 
right  to  dictate  all  the  nominations,  and  very  largely  the 
votes  of  their  adherents.  What  should  be  represented  by 
the  candidates  in  the  city  elections  of  city  officers  is  neither 
parties  nor  factions  nor  party  principles,  but  the  public 
opinion,  policy,  and  interests  of  the  city  and  its  residents 
concerning  their  own  affairs,  regardless  of  party  affiliations. 
This  true  representation  can  be  secured  only  by  means  that 
shall  prevent  coercion  by  party  managers  and  majorities,  and 
give  the  people  a  real  freedom  in  the  nomination  and  elec- 
tion of  their  city  officers.1 

II.    Free  Nominations 

1.  A  few  words  will  be  useful  concerning  the  essential 
function  of  nominations  and  the  condition  and  nature  of  a 
real  freedom  in  voting ;  for  these  matters  have  been  lament- 
ably neglected  and  misconceived.  The  paramount  function 
of  a  true  party,  aside  from  its  educational  efforts,  is  to  com- 

1  In  a  legal  sense,  under  some  charters  and  constitutions,  the  phrase  "  city 
officers  "  would  not  include  members  of  state  legislatures  elected  in  cities.  Such 
members,  though  directly  representing  city  interests,  —  which  are  non-partisan,  — 
must  nevertheless  sometimes  act  in  reference  to  the  political  interests  of  the  state 
and  the  nation. 


FREE   NOMINATIONS   AND   FREE   VOTING  211 

bine  and  give  an  effective  expression  to  the  opinions  and 
interests  of  those  having  convictions  and  purposes  in  com- 
mon. Party  action  is  a  facility  for  a  free  and  effective 
action,  in  the  way  of  voting,  on  the  part  of  those  who  have 
the  same  interests  and  purposes.  But  for  a  party  to  use  its 
power  to  prevent  its  own  most  independent  and  conscien- 
tious adherents,  or  any  other  citizens,  from  having  a  perfect 
freedom  and  facility  of  voting  for  those  whom  they  prefer  is 
to  pervert  party  into  a  conspiracy  and  a  despotism.  No  party 
can  justly  use  its  power  to  compel  one  of  its  own  adherents 
to  vote  for  a  candidate  he  disapproves.  It  is  no  legitimate 
function  of  a  party  to  coerce  voters  by  controlling  nomina- 
tions. It  is  an  utter  perversion  of  its  power  for  a  party  to 
attempt  to  compel  a  voter  to  support  any  person  for  office, 
save  by  appeals  to  his  reason  and  his  sense  of  duty.  Civil 
Service  reform,  Ballot  reform,  Corrupt  Practice  reform,  and 
Free  Nominations  have  a  common  purpose  to  restrain  par- 
ties within  their  legitimate  functions  and  to  prevent  party 
tyranny. 

The  paramount  aim  in  making  nominations  should  be  to 
enable  as  many  citizens  as  possible  to  vote  for  candidates 
whom  they  approve,  and  who  fairly  represent  their  convic- 
tions and  interests  ;  and  there  is  a  plain  duty  on  the  part  of 
every  government  to  facilitate  to  the  utmost  the  making  of 
such  nominations.  No  political  right  is  clearer  than  that 
of  all  citizens  to  freely  nominate  such  candidates  as  they 
prefer. 

Every  voter  should  be  the  sole  judge  for  himself  as  to 
how  far  it  is  a  patriotic  duty  for  him  —  and  there  may  be 
such  a  duty  —  to  cooperate  with  others  in  elections.  Yet 
city  parties  quite  generally,  and  their  managers  and  leaders 
almost  constantly,  seek  not  only  to  make  nominations  deci- 
sive of  elections,  but  to  deprive  the  citizens  of  all  real 
liberty  to  vote  effectively  for  any  other  candidates  save 
those  which  these  parties  impose  upon  them.1 

1  We  may  yet  find  it  necessary  to  make  it  a  criminal  offence  for  party  mana- 
gers to  conspire  in  the  use  of  party  power  for  the  suppression  of  free  nomina- 
tions. Why  is  not  coercive  action  —  any  conspiracy  —  against  the  freedom  of 


212  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

The  opposition  which  party  managers  and  bosses  have 
made  to  ballot  reform  and  nominations  by  certificate  has 
been  mainly  because  these  reforms  have  facilitated  conscien- 
tious and  independent  citizens  in  making  free  and  effective 
nominations  without  the  consent  of  the  politicians. 

2.  It  is  a  familiar  fact  that  since  public  opinion  has  com- 
pelled the  recognition  of  the  legality  of  nominations  made 
outside  of  party  caucuses  and  conventions, —  nominations  by 
certificate, — party  managers  have  done  their  utmost  to  make 
these  free  nominations  as  difficult  and  ineffective  as  pos- 
sible. They  have  had  as  good  reasons  for  opposing  free 
nominations  as  the  old  slaveholders  had  for  opposing  vol- 
untary emancipations, —  they  would  be  dangerous  examples 
of  freedom,  which  would  endanger  their  own  despotic 
power. 

What  can  be,  intrinsically,  more  indefensible  and  arro- 
gant than  the  claim  that  because  certain  persons  have  agreed 
to  act  together  as  a  party,  and  to  call  themselves  such,  they 
shall  have  a  monopoly  of  making  all  nominations,  whilst 
other  citizens  wishing  to  act  and  cast  their  ballots  together 
shall  have  no  right  to  make  a  nomination  to  suit  themselves  ? 
The  adherents  of  parties  can,  manifestly,  have  no  more  ex- 
clusive right  —  no  more  monopoly  —  of  making  all  nomina- 
tions, than  they  can  have  of  doing  all  the  voting  or  of 
holding  all  the  offices. 

The  prostitution  of  party  power  involved  in  the  exercise 
of  the  monopoly  of  making  nominations  has  degraded  our 
municipal  politics  and  developed  a  spirit  of  feudal  vassal- 
age on  the  part  of  a  vast  number  of  blind  and  prejudiced 
city  partisans.  How  potential,  profitable,  and  corrupting  is 
this  monopoly,  and  how  largely  it  operates  as  a  coercion,  is 
shown  by  the  facts  we  have  considered,  —  the  open  and 
shameless  sale  of  the  most  important  city  nominations  at 
the  rate  of  from  $5000  to  $15,000  as  the  market  price 
of  each.1  It  is  no  wonder  that  city  parties  and  their 

nominations  as  legitimately  punishable  as  analogous  action  against  the  freedom 
of  trade  ? 

1  See  Chs.  V.  and  VI. 


FREE   NOMINATIONS  AND  FREE  VOTING  213 

managers  oppose  free  nominations,  which  would  suppress 
so  profitable  a  business. 

It  seems  almost  an  affront  to  intelligent  readers  to  treat 
it  as  an  open  question  whether  this  party  monopoly  should 
continue.  Imagine  the  incommensurable  audacity  of  party 
managers  in  first  refusing  to  independent  and  conscientious 
voters  a  practicable  method  of  making  nominations  which 
they  can  honestly  support,  and  then  putting  all  the  party- 
made  nominations  on  the  market  for  money  to  be  used  by 
themselves  and  their  party  to  bribe  voters  and  fill  their  own 
pockets.  It  is  not  easy  to  say  which  is  the  more  disgrace- 
ful to  a  city  or  more  dangerous  to  republican  institutions, 
the  suppression  of  Free  nominations,  or  the  making  of  mer- 
chandise out  of  the  sale  of  party-made  nominations. 

Ill 

From  principles  let  us  turn  to  precedents.  Just  as  the 
chief  purposes  of  civil  service  reform  and  corrupt  practice 
reform  were  to  put  worthy  men  into  office  and  deprive  par- 
ties of  the  vast  and  degrading  power  derived  from  patron- 
age and  political  assessments,  so  the  chief  purposes  of  ballot 
reform  were  to  suppress  the  despotic  and  corrupting  power 
of  parties  and  bosses  over  nominations,  voting,  and  elec- 
tions, and  thus  secure  for  the  most  independent  and  con- 
scientious citizens  a  real  freedom  for  nominating  the  best 
candidates  and  combining  their  votes  for  their  support. 
Free  Nominations  are  an  extension  of  the  methods  and 
purposes  of  all  those  reforms.1 

Before  the  enactment  of  our  first  ballot  reform  law  in  1888 
there  was  but  a  half-developed  conception  of  such  a  freedom 
in  the  American  mind,  and  it  was  almost  unimaginable  on 
the  part  of  mere  partisans  and  politicians.2 

1  We  call  the  method  we  propose  for  making  nominations  Free  Nominations, 
because  it  would  largely  emancipate  the  citizen  from  party  dependence,  and 
restore  to  him  a  freedom  to  nominate  which  every  citizen  had  before  any  party 
was  formed,  and  which  would  remain  if  every  party  should  disband.    It  is  a  free- 
dom which  every  citizen  had  in  the  primitive  town-meeting. 

2  The  first  ballot  reform  law  in  this  country  was  enacted  in  Massachusetts  in 


214  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

The  practicability  and  justice  of  making  nominations 
otherwise  than  by  the  action  of  party  primaries  and  conven- 
tions have  been  but  little  considered,  and  are  not  yet  gener- 
ally comprehended  in  partisan  circles,  so  that  an  exposition 
of  the  principles  already  established  by  law  may  be  a  sur- 
prise to  many.  The  laws  of  Massachusetts  and  New  York 
may  serve  as  illustrations.  That  of  the  former  state,1  after 
elaborate  provisions  for  preventing  fraudulent  nominations 
in  party  caucuses  and  conventions,  provides  for  free  nomi- 
nations to  be  made  by  mere  certificates  signed  by  individu- 
als, regardless  of  any  party  authorization.  One  thousand 
qualified  voters,  by  signing  a  certificate  and  conforming  to 
some  other  easy  conditions,  may  make  a  regular  nomination 
for  any  office  to  be  filled  by  the  voters  of  the  state  at  large ; 
and  a  number  of  voters  —  provided  not  less  than  fifty  in  all 
—  equal  to  one  in  a  hundred  of  all  the  voters  in  a  city,  or 
city  district,  who  voted  for  governor  at  the  last  election,  may 
make  a  nomination  of  candidates  for  officers  for  such  city  or 
district  by  signing  a  certificate  and  conforming  to  such  con- 
ditions. Similar  provisions  extend  to  town  elections.  The 
effect  in  Massachusetts  of  thus  making  independent  nomi- 
nation by  certificates  has  been  highly  salutary,  resulting  in 
defeating  bad  and  unfair  nominations,  mere  machine  candi- 
dates, and  corrupt  practices.2  "Numerous  members  of  the 
state  legislature,  of  both  Senate  and  House,  have  been  nomi- 
nated and  elected  under  this  system  after  defeating  candi- 
dates nominated  through  the  party  machine  methods.  .  .  . 
Some  cities  have  some  years  had  all  the  nominations  for 
municipal  offices  made  under  this  system.  .  .  ."8 


1888,  and  the  second  in  New  York  in  1890.  Richard  H.  Dana,  of  Boston,  and 
Horace  E.  Deming,  of  New  York,  acted  leading  parts  in  securing  these  valuable 
laws.  The  reform  policy  thus  established  has  already  extended  over  the  Union, 
and  is  a  striking  example  of  the  rapidity  with  which  a  wise  movement  may 
triumph. 

1  Mass.  Laws,  1803,  Ch.  417,  Sees.  71-77;  and  Mass.  Laws,  1896,  Ch.  469. 

2  In  1894,  this  method  of  making  nominations  was  extended  to  the  election  of 
party  delegates  to  conventions.    Mass.  Laws,  1894,  Ch.  503,  Sec.  15 ;  Mass.  Laws, 
18517,  Ch.  530. 

8  Letter,  Richard  H.  Dana,  Esq.,  to  author.    No  one  is  more  competent  than 
Mr.  Dana  to  speak  on  this  subject. 


FREE  NOMINATIONS  AND  FREE  VOTING  215 

The  laws  of  New  York l  contain  provisions  analogous  to 
those  in  the  laws  of  Massachusetts;  but  to  make  an  inde- 
pendent nomination,  at  least  three  thousand  signers  of  a 
certificate  are  required  in  case  of  offices  to  be  filled  by  the 
voters  of  the  entire  state ;  five  hundred  voters  are  required 
to  sign  a  certificate  in  case  of  offices  to  be  filled  by  the  vote 
of  a  city;  two  hundred  and  fifty  voters  are  required  to  sign 
in  the  case  of  offices  to  be  filled  by  the  voters  of  a  school- 
commission  district;  only  twenty-five  voters  of  a  ward, 
town,  or  village  are  required  to  sign  the  certificate  to 
make  a  valid  nomination  for  an  office  to  be  filled  by  the 
voters  thereof.  But  if  an  office  is  to  be  filled  by  the  voters 
of  the  city  and  county  of  New  York,  or  of  Kings  County, 
or  the  city  of  Brooklyn,  the  certificate  must  be  signed  by 
six  hundred  voters. 

We  have  no  space  for  explaining  the  elaborate  provisions 
which  regulate  these  nominations.  The  important  facts  are 
that  the  legal  sufficiency  of  nominations  by  certificate  is 
established,  that  the  practicability  of  so  making  them  is 
demonstrated,  that  party  intervention  in  the  matter  is  shown 
to  be  unnecessary,  and  that  the  complications  and  frauds 
which  the  system  of  party  primaries  causes  in  cities  may  be 
suppressed.2 

Since  the  foregoing  was  written,  the  New  York  legis- 
lature of  1896,  a  body  remarkable  for  its  servile  party  spirit 
and  its  unprecedented  vassalage  to  the  party  machine  and 
the  state  boss,  has  amended  the  law  of  1895 3  by  greatly 
increasing  —  in  several  cases  more  than  doubling  —  the  num- 
ber of  signers  required  to  make  a  certificate  of  nomination. 
Not  only  are  six  thousand  instead  of  three  thousand  signers 

1  Laws,  1895,  Vol.  I.  Ch.  810,  Sees.  56  and  57. 

2  It  is  noticeable  that  a  much  larger  number  of  signers  is  required  upon  the 
New  York  certificates  than  upon  those  of  Massachusetts,  thus  making  inde- 
pendent nomination  more  difficult  in  the  former  state  than  in  the  latter,  —  facts 
which  will  not  surprise  those  who  remember  that  only  the  former  state  has  a 
boss,  and  that  the  party  management  of  New  York  has  long  been  more  despotic 
and  corrupt  than  that  of  Massachusetts.    The  law  of  New  York  provides  for 
voting  a  whole  party  ticket  by  making  a  single  cross,  but  that  of  Massachusetts 
does  not  allow  this. 

8  See  Laws,  1896,  Ch.  909,  Sees.  56,  57. 


216  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

required  to  make  a  nomination  for  the  whole  state,  but 
among  them  there  must  be  fifty  signers  from  each  county 
but  two.  The  object  was  apparently  to  make  independent 
nominations  more  difficult  and  expensive,  while  the  making 
of  nominations  through  certificates  signed  by  the  officers  or 
committees  of  the  regular  parties  and  primaries  was  facili- 
tated. Yet  these  more  restricted  opportunities  allowed  by  the 
law  of  1896  are  not  available  to  a  party,  even  in  town,  vil- 
lage, or  city  elections,  that  did  not  cast  ten  thousand  votes 
for  a  candidate  for  governor  the  year  before.  Candidates 
for  municipal  offices  to  be  voted  for  by  the  whole  of  cities 
of  the  first  class  can  only  be  nominated  by  certificates  signed 
by  two  thousand  voters. 

These  needless  restrictions  upon  the  freedom  of  nomina- 
tions show  a  purpose  on  the  part  of  the  managers  of  the 
great  parties  to  retain  the  monopoly  of  making  nominations 
to  the  utmost,  and  to  use  party  power  to  suppress  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  individual  voter. 

Unless  party  despotism  is  to  surpass  all  precedent,  we 
must  think  the  question  of  Free  Nominations  will  soon 
become  a  great  issue  in  American  politics.  The  largest 
practical  freedom  in  naming  candidates  is  essential  to  polit- 
ical liberty  and  the  suppression  of  the  boss  system.  Neither 
any  sound  policy  nor  any  practical  difficulty  in  enforcing  the 
New  York  law  of  1895  called  for  the  change  made  in  1896. 
Apparently  the  party  managers  and  the  state  boss  had  be- 
come alarmed  at  the  possible  effect  of  even  a  moderate  meas- 
ure of  Free  Nominations,  and  they  resolved  to  suppress  them 
to  the  utmost,  before  their  great  contribution  to  free  and 
non-partisan  voting  should  be  demonstrated. 

2.  It  hardly  need  be  said  that  nominations  made  by  mere 
certificates  are  for  all  legal  purposes  just  as  effective  as  those 
made  by  parties.  Indeed,  even  the  party  nominations  in 
New  York  must  now  be  made  by  a  formal  certificate  under 
the  law  of  1896.  The  great  principle  thus  proclaimed  by 
these  leading  states  —  though  by  no  means  carried  to  its  full 
logical  results  —  can  be  as  easily  comprehended  as  the  neces- 
sity which  compelled  its  establishment.  There  had  long 


FREE   NOMINATIONS  AND   FREE   VOTING  217 

been  a  movement,  of  constantly  increasing  force,  which 
refused  to  submit  to  a  partisan  monopoly  of  nominations. 
In  yielding  to  it,  these  laws  in  substance  declare :  (1)  That 
the  old  party  monopoly  of  nominations  —  to  be  made  in  con- 
ventions —  is  indefensible  and  vicious ;  and  (2)  that  it  is  a 
duty  to  facilitate  a  kind  of  nomination  through  which  inde- 
pendents and  voters  of  all  parties  can  unite  in  freely  pre- 
senting a  candidate  of  their  choice. 

3.  On  the  score  of  principle  there  is  no  good  reason  why 
all   municipal   nominations  should  not   be  required  to  be 
made  by  certificate  alone.      It  is  obvious  that  parties,   as 
well  as  citizens  belonging  to  different  parties  who  wish  to 
unite  ther  efforts,  can  make  their  nominations  by  certificate. 
We  should  then  be  rid  of  all  legal  questions  as  to  the  regu- 
larity of  primary  and  convention  nominations,  and  most  of 
the  endless  cheating,  bribery,  arid  corruption  which  attend 
them.      The   great   loss  which  the  change  would   involve 
would  be  that  of  the  profits  and  power  springing  from  the 
party  control  of  the  primaries  and  a  probable  fall  in  the 
market  price  on  the  sale  of  party  nominations. 

4.  It  is  desirable  to  have  a  clear  view  of  the  fact  —  which 
we  shall  demonstrate  from  experience  —  that  neither  the  suf- 
ficiency nor  the  utility  of  nominations  by  certificates  depends 
upon  their  having  a  large  number  of  signers.     Indeed,  there 
would  be  some  great  advantages  in  having  city  candidates 
come  before  the  voters  upon  their  character  and  capacity 
alone.     Yet  a  certificate  signed  by  a  few  well-known  and 
highly  esteemed  citizens  would  be  not  only  a  basis  for  con- 
fidence, but  a  legitimate  advantage  in  every  way.     A  small 
number  of  signers  —  say  from  twenty  to  two   hundred  — 
would  answer  every  legitimate  purpose,  the  number  varying 
according  to  the  extent  of  the  jurisdiction  to  be  represented. 
No  more  than  the  required  number  of  signers  should  be 
allowed  upon  any  certificate,  so  as  to  exclude  a  practice  of 
seeking  influence  from  mere  numbers.     The  law  should  not 
take,  nor  allow  the  election  officials  to  take,  any  notice  of 
any  nominations  save  those  made  by  regular  certificates.1 

1  Of  course,  after  the  nomination  has  heen  made  complete  hy  the  certificates, 


218  THE   GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

5.  Few  changes  are  more  needed  in  our  municipal  methods 
than  those  which  will  make  high  character,  capacity,  and 
good  reputation  potential,  and  diminish  the  power  of  mere 
organization,   numbers,   and  partisan   machinations.       The 
moment  parties  lose  their  monopoly  of  making  municipal 
nominations   in  the  old  way,   and  are  compelled  to  make 
them  by  the  same  means  which  are  open  to  all  citizens,  they 
will  lose  much  of  their  power  and  prestige.     No  one  could 
have  any  part  in  making  nominations  under  the  old  party 
system  who  was  not  a  regular  member  of  a  primary.     To 
become  a  member,  the  citizen  had  to  surrender  a  large  part 
of  his  independence.     He  must  promise  to  support  all  regu- 
lar nominations  and  all  party  platforms.     As  a  rule  only 
from  a  sixth  to  a  tenth  of  the  voters  have  been  willing  to 
consent  to  make  that  surrender.      Hence  the  nominations 
have  generally  been  made  by  the  most  servile  and  intense 
partisans,    who   find  their  pecuniary  advantage   in    being 
active    in    primary    management.       This   management    has 
naturally  become  a  profitable  trade.1     Hardly  any  facts  in 
municipal  party  domination  are  of  more  profound  signifi- 
cance than  these. 

6.  Free  municipal  nominations  by  certificate  would  soon 
cause  the  people  to  see  how  utterly  untenable  is  the  theory 
that  city  parties  are  essential   for  nominating  city  candi- 
dates;  after  which  the  inflated  claims  made  to  the  effect 
that  the  partisans  who  work  the  nominating  machinery  are 
rendering  a  necessary  and  highly  patriotic  service  would 
soon  become  ridiculous.     The  ability  to  make  free,  non-par- 
tisan nominations  will  obviously  add  much  not  only  to  the 
power  of  public  opinion,  but  to  the  effective  influence  of  in- 
dependent and  conscientious  voters.     The  boss  and  the  oper- 
ators of  the  party  machinery  will  see  a  much  greater  need 
of  conciliating  these  voters,  for  they  can  no  longer  say  to  the 

any  number  of  citizens  or  any  party  can  declare  in  the  public  journals  or  in 
public  meetings  their  purpose  to  support  it.  Yet  the  hostility  of  all  mercenary 
party  schemers  to  these  free,  certificate  nominations  shows  how  dangerous  they 
feel  them  to  be  to  the  profitable  party  monopoly  and  despotism  under  our  nomi- 
nating system. 

l  3  Lalor's  Cyclo.  Pol.  Set.,  pp.  343-350. 


FREE   NOMINATIONS   AND   FREE  VOTING  219 

latter,  and  to  all  honorable  aspirants  for  office,  "  You  cannot 
even  have  a  nomination  until  you  have  paid  our  price  for  it." 
Can  good  citizens  much  lament  if  a  large  part  of  the  activ- 
ity of  city  primaries  —  that  in  which  little  besides  pestilent 
dealing  in  city  nominations,  patronage,  and  spoils  takes 
place  —  shall  cease  ?  Who  will  think  it  a  public  detriment 
if  much  of  the  low  code  governing  regularity  of  city  nomina- 
tions, and  the  whole  band  of  vicious  practitioners  under  it, 
shall  be  superseded?  There  is  hardly  any  imaginable  way 
in  which  a  few  citizens,  greatly  esteemed  by  the  community, 
and  consequently  of  great  influence,  can  exert  a  more  salu- 
tary power  in  city  elections  than  by  inducing  the  men  most 
fit  for  offices  to  accept  nominations  by  certificate  at  their 
hands.  It  would  be  a  noble  change  to  have  nominations 
made  on  the  heights  rather  than  in  the  slums  of  municipal 
life. 

IV 

1.  The  reasons  in  favor  of  Free  Nominations  are  not  con- 
fined to  the  limited  experience  of  this  country.  The  question 
as  to  the  best  method  of  making  them  has  received  long  and 
thoughtful  consideration  in  Great  Britain,  and  very  decisive 
results  have  been  reached.  We  may  study  her  experience 
with  great  advantage,  though  we  should  solve  our  problems 
in  the  spirit  of  our  own  constitutions  and  social  life.1 
Municipal  nominations  for  elections  by  the  people  of  mem- 
bers of  city  councils,  under  the  English  system,  are  made 
only  by  official  papers  called  voting  papers,  in  a  manner 
analogous  to  the  provisions  of  the  laws  of  Massachusetts 
and  New  York  just  cited,  though  by  a  method  much  more 
simple  and  convenient.  At  the  time  fixed  by  law,  before 
such  elections,  the  proper  city  officer  publishes  an  official 
notice  designating  the  offices  to  be  filled,  for  which  nomina- 
tions must  be  made.  To  make  such  a  nomination,  nothing 
more  is  required  than  that  ten  competent  voters  shall  sign 

1  It  seems  that  a  system  of  Free  Nominations  and  Free  Voting  was  first  pro- 
posed in  the  United  States.  Buckalew's  Proportional  Representation,  pp.  166, 
167,  263. 


220  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

the  formal  nominating  paper  in  the  prescribed  manner,  and 
cause  its  delivery  to  such  officer  for  publication  by  him 
within  the  time  and  in  the  manner  required  by  law.  Any 
number  of  such  nominations  may  be  so  made.1  The  proper 
public  officers  make  due  publication  of  these  nominations, 
and  place  the  names  of  the  nominees  on  the  balloting  papers. 
The  general  expenses  of  the  election  are  a  public  charge, 
as  every  consideration  of  justice  and  wisdom  require  they 
should  be.  The  old  theory  that  a  city  election  is  a  party 
affair  has  been  discarded  in  England.  No  party  or  party 
manager,  as  such,  has  any  necessary  or  legitimate  relations 
with  the  subject,  or  seems  to  be  recognized  in  connection 
with  it.  The  whole  machinery  of  party  caucuses,  primaries, 
and  conventions  is  ignored.  The  voter  marks  on  the  papers 
the  candidates  for  whom  his  ballot  is  to  be  counted.2 

If  no  more  candidates  are  nominated  than  there  are  officers 
to  be  elected, — that  is,  where  there  are  no  opposing  candi- 
dates,—  the  nomination  is  by  law  made  equivalent  to  an  elec- 
tion, and  no  actual  vote  is  taken.  This  is  frequently  the 
fact,  strange  as  it  may  seem  to  American  politicians,  and  it 
is  a  part  of  the  salutary  results  of  the  triumph  of  non- 
partisan  city  methods  over  the  city-party  system  in  English 
cities.8 

2.  In  considering  non-partisan  government  theoretically, 
we  called  attention  to  its  natural  tendency  to  suppress 
mere  partisan  contention  in  city  elections  and  to  make 
public  opinion  rather  than  party  opinion  controlling.  In 
Great  Britain  this  tendency  has  been  demonstrated  by  long 
experience,  there  having  been  an  increasing  number  of  vot- 
ing districts,  in  which,  to  use  the  words  of  Dr.  Shaw,  "pub- 
lic opinion  had  in  advance  agreed  so  decisively  upon  a 
particular  man  that  nobody  was  nominated  against  him, 
and  the  entire  expense  and  distraction  of  a  contest  at  the 

1  An  individual  voter  may  practically  pat  himself  in  nomination  —  he,  like  the 
others,  being  liable  to  pay  bis  share  of  the  expense  of  printing  the  votes.  Good- 
now's  Mun.  Prob.,  p.  213. 

*  English  Laws,  1882,  Ch.  50,  pp.  220,  288,  289;  Shaw's  Mun.  Oov.  G.  B.,  pp. 
33,  46-69,  245,  236,  237. 

*  Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  0.  B.,  p.  245. 


FREE   NOMINATIONS   AND   FREE   VOTING  221 

polls  was  thus  obviated."  In  the  twenty-five  wards  of 
Manchester,  for  example,  in  1894,  there  were  only  seven- 
teen contests,  that  is,  actual  elections;  and  in  Birmingham, 
in  the  same  year,  there  were  contests  in  only  six  of  its 
eighteen  wards ;  and  when  in  Liverpool  there  was  an  unu- 
sual display  of  party  spirit,  there  were  contests  in  only 
twelve  of  its  sixteen  wards.  In  England  in  1893  there 
were,  altogether,  no  less  than  fifty  cities J  in  which,  strange 
as  it  may  seem  to  us,  there  were  no  actual  election  contests, 
—  public  opinion  having  not  only  made  the  nominations  but 
superseded  the  need  of  any  actual  voting. 

3.  Here,  certainly,  is  city  government  pretty  effectively 
taken  out  of  party  politics,  partisan  contention  having  been 
suppressed  by  public  opinion  and  a  just  method  of  non-par- 
tisan nominations.     Lest  many  party  men  among  us  may 
find  it  very  difficult  to  believe  these  facts,  we  may  say  that 
we  shall  soon  show  that  an  election  of  members  of  a  city 
council  in  England  involves  the  distribution  of  almost  no 
patronage  or  spoils. —  as  an  election  should  not  in  American 
cities.     We  have  elsewhere  shown  that  English  cities  were 
formerly  as  much  involved  in  partisan  contention,  despotism, 
and  corruption  as  American  cities  now  are.2     It  will  else- 
where appear  that  this  method  of   Free  Nominations  has 
greatly  aided  in  securing  municipal  officers  in  Great  Britain 
who  are  much  superior  to  those  generally  chosen  in  Ameri- 
can cities.3    It  is  thus  demonstrated,  by  the  experience  of 
the  most  practical  of  nations,  that  party  nominations,  or 
nominations  according  to  party  methods,  for  city  officers  are 
needless.     Like  the   trial   by   jury,   this   experience   is   as 
available  for  the  United  States  as  for  England. 

4.  But  it  is  said  that  suffrage  is  broader  in  this  country 
than  in  England,  and  that  therefore  we  do  not  need,  or  can- 
not utilize,  her  experience.     If  it  were  said  that,  under  a 

1  Cities  seem  to  be  frequently  designated  towns  in  English  election  laws  and  by 
English  writers.    Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  p.  48. 

2  Speaking  of  municipal  elections  at  present,  Dr.  Shaw  says  the  "  American 
primary  election  or  party  caucus  system  is  quite  unknown  ...  in  England." 
Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  p.  51. 

8  See  Ch.  IX. 


222  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

suffrage  which  includes  the  most  of  the  utterly  ignorant  and 
the  vile,  it  is  more  difficult  to  cure  the  evils  at  which  Free 
Nominations  are  aimed,  than  it  would  be  under  a  wisely 
limited  franchise,  few  sensible  persons  would  dispute  the 
fact.  But  to  say  because  there  are  a  larger  proportion  of 
the  ignorant,  depraved,  and  criminal  classes  among  the 
voters  in  the  United  States  than  there  are  in  England,  that 
therefore l  we  have  no  need,  or  less  need,  of  Free  Nomina- 
tions, is  one  of  the  most  absurd  statements  that  shallow 
thinkers  or  besotted  partisans  have  ever  made.  The  greater 
the  proportion  of  the  voters  who  are  unfit  for  the  franchise, 
the  greater  is  the  need  of  simple,  non-partisan  nominations 
in  order  to  increase  the  influence  of  the  intelligent  and  con- 
scientious vote,  and  to  diminish  to  the  utmost  the  effect  of 
partisan  machinations  and  mere  brute  numbers.  What  can 
be  clearer  than  this:  that  if  the  privilege  of  voting  were 
extended  to  the  vilest  of  our  disfranchised  classes,  to  all 
prison  inmates,  to  mere  children,  and  to  all  alien  resi- 
dents, the  need  for  Free  Nominations  would  be  all  the 
greater;  while  that  need  would  be  much  less  if  none  could 
vote  who  have  ever  been  convicted  of  crime  or  cannot  read 
and  write?  Party  despotism  and  all  municipal  evils  in- 
crease with  the  degradation  of  the  suffrage. 

5.  It  was  natural,  when  enacting  the  law  for  Free  Nomina- 
tions in  England,  that  there  should  be  some  fear  that  an 
inconvenient  number  of  candidates  would  be  nominated. 
The  law,  therefore,  provides  precautions  against  such  re- 
sults. We  have  no  space  for  details  on  the  subject.  It  is 
enough  that  these  provisions  have  been  effective.  The  obli- 
gation, on  certain  conditions,  to  pay  the  expense  of  printing 
votes  has  been  most  effective  in  preventing  an  inconvenient 
number  of  nominations.  There  have  been  no  serious  diffi- 
culties by  reason  of  too  many  of  them. 

Nevertheless,  we  may  reasonably  expect  that,  for  a  time, 
under  Free  Nominations,  American  politicians  will  unite 
their  dishonest  energies  —  and  possibly  with  some  tem- 

1  The  ratio  of  the  voters  to  the  whole  people  in  the  United  States  and  England 
seems  to  be  about  that  of  nine  voters  here  to  six  there,  in  an  equal  population. 


FREE   NOMINATIONS   AND   FREE  VOTING  223 

porary  success  —  for  the  purpose  of  embarrassing  the  exe- 
cution of  such  a  system.  But  even  if  the  government 
should  be  compelled  for  a  time  to  print  a  needless  number 
of  votes,  the  trouble  and  expense  would  be  but  trifles  com- 
pared with  the  vast  good  which  would  spring  from  such 
nominations.  The  enemies  of  the  reform,  as  English  expe- 
rience shows,  would  soon  see  the  folly  of  a  practice  which 
would  be  useless  to  them  and  would  soon  make  them  ridicu- 
lous. The  best  remedy  for  such  abuses,  so  far  as  not  found 
in  the  laws  cited,  is  not  by  requiring  many  names  on  the 
nominating  papers,  —  a  condition  with  which  parties  and 
factions  could  most  readily  comply, —  but  in  requiring  those 
who  make  nominations  to  deposit  money  for  the  payment  by 
themselves,  in  whole  or  in  part,  of  the  expenses  of  printing 
which  their  nomination  makes  necessary,  in  case  their  candi- 
date shall  fail  to  receive  a  number  of  votes  equal  to,  say,  a 
tenth  of  the  largest  number  of  votes  cast  for  any  of  the  can- 
didates for  offices  to  which  they  make  nominations.1 

6.  The  principle  of  Free  Nominations,  and  the  safeguards 
just  mentioned  against  an  excessive  number  of  candidates, 
are  already  finding  an  auspicious  support  of  a  more  liberal 
kind  than  the  illustration  we  have  cited  from  the  laws  of 
Massachusetts  and  New  York.2  A  law  of  Missouri  relating 
to  primary  elections  allows  any  number  of  the  electors,  not 
less  than  twenty,  upon  depositing  fifty  dollars  with  the 
recorder  of  votes,  to  have  placed  upon  the  ballot  a  delega- 
tion selected  by  themselves;  and  any  citizen  may  himself 
separately  become  a  candidate  by  so  depositing  ten  dollars. 

1  This  cost  of  printing  should,  by  general  laws,  be  made  definite  for  different 
classes  of  nominations  and  should  not  be  so  great  as  to  unduly  discourage  the 
making  of  independent  nominations  in  good  faith.     Candidates  who  after  accept- 
ing a  nomination  should  resign  before  election,  might  be  required  to  pay  some 
large  part  of  the  cost  of  the  votes  and  printing  they  have  made  necessary.     The 
candidate  might  be  required,  in  accepting  the  nomination,  to  declare  under  oath 
his  purpose  to  remain  a  candidate  and  to  serve  if  elected.    As  a  precaution  against 
bad  faith,  those  who  sign  a  certificate  of  nomination  might  be  required  to  state 
under  oath  that  they  believe  their  candidate  to  be  worthy  of  the  office  for  which 
he  is  proposed,  that  they  intend  to  vote  for  him,  and  that  they  believe  he  will 
receive,  say,  at  least  one-fifth  of  the  votes  cast  for  the  office.     But  these  are  only 
examples  of  various  precautionary  provisions  easily  made. 

2  Laws,  Missouri,  1891,  p.  137,  Sec.  8. 


224  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

The  balance  of  the  money  so  deposited,  not  required  for  the 
expenses  of  the  election,  is  to  be  paid  over  to  the  school 
board.  The  latest  election  law  of  California1  allows  any 
person,  or  combination  of  persons,  desiring  to  circulate  and 
use  a  ticket  at  any  election  for  selecting  delegates  to  any 
political  party  convention,  to  do  so  at  their  own  expense. 
These  provisions  are  certainly  in  wide  contrast  with  the  late 
despotic  statutes  of  New  York,  which  seek  to  give  to  parties 
a  practical  monopoly  of  making  nominations,  and  to  suppress 
to  the  utmost  the  freedom  of  the  voters. 


V.    Free   Voting 

1.  From  the  need  of  freedom  in  nominating  candidates,  we 
naturally  turn  to  the  need  of  freedom  in  voting  for  them. 
The  same  reasons  which  have  caused  city  parties  to  exert 
themselves  for  a  monopoly  in  making  nominations  have  also 
impelled  them  to  do  their  utmost  to  suppress  a  real  liberty 
in  voting  on  the  part  of  the  independent  and  non-partisan 
citizens,  who  are  unable  to  concentrate  their  full  voting 
power  in  favor  of  the  candidates  they  prefer.  Between  the 
electors  and  the  exercise  of  the  moral  right  of  every  citizen 
to  cast  his  whole  vote  for  any  one  or  more  candidates,  par- 
ties and  their  managers  have  despotically  interposed  their 
mighty  machinery  for  obstruction  and  coercion. 

In  what  follows  in  this  chapter  we  have  special  reference 
to  the  election  of  city  and  village  officers,  which  legitimately 
involves  no  party  issues;  yet  we  shall  show  that  Free  Voting 
may  with  advantage  be  applied  to  the  choice  of  city  mem- 
bers of  legislatures.  We  need  to  have  clearly  in  mind  some 
fundamental  principles  as  to  the  right  of  voting.  Though 
suffrage  cannot  be  demanded  as  a  natural  right,  but  must  be 
sought  as  a  privilege  to  be  allowed  by  the  state,  it  ought  to 
be  conceded  on  a  basis  of  common  justice  and  equality,  and 
to  be  allowed  in  a  way  that  will  most  promote  the  general 
welfare. 

The  just  claim  for  suffrage  is  an  individual  claim  abso- 

i  Stat.  of  Cal.,  1897,  Ch.  104,  Sec.  25. 


FREE  NOMINATIONS  AND  FREE  VOTING  225 

lutely  independent  of  all  parties, — a  claim  which  was  com- 
plete before  any  party  existed  and  would  survive  unimpaired 
if  every  party  should  be  dissolved.  Obviously,  therefore,  no 
combination,  whether  a  little  clique  or  a  great  party,  can,  as 
such,  acquire  any  right  to  regulate  or  monopolize  voting —  any 
more  than  nominations  —  in  its  own  interest,  or  to  put  any 
restraint  upon  the  independent  action  of  the  individual.  He 
has,  if  allowed  the  franchise,  a  moral  right,  and  should  be 
enabled,  to  cast  a  free  and  effective  vote  according  to  his 
own  convictions  of  duty.  Whatever  obligation  may  rest 
upon  him  to  cooperate  with  others  for  great  principles,  and 
thus  gain  the  advantage  of  united  efforts,  is  one  of  which 
he  is  the  sole  judge.  Neither  any  other  person  nor  any 
party  can  have  any  right  to  decide  that  matter  for  him. 

2.  The  theories  of  voting  upon  which  city  parties  and 
their  devotees  generally  insist  are  these:  (1)  when  a  single 
officer  is  to  be  elected,  each  party  should  nominate  a  single 
candidate,  and  there  should  be  no  others;  (2)  each  voter 
may  cast  a  single  ballot  for  one  or  another  of  these  candi- 
dates, which  should  be  that  of  his  own  party,  thus  not  only 
leaving  the  minority  practically  unrepresented,  but,  as  far  as 
possible,  depriving  the  individuals  in  the  opposing  party 
ranks,  or  in  different  districts,  who  may  wish  to  unite  their 
votes,  of  all  opportunity  of  doing  so ; 1  (3)  that  when  voting 
is  to  be  in  districts  from  which  several  officers  are  to  be 
elected  at  the  same  time,  parties  insist  not  only  that  all  the 
nominations  shall  be  made  by  themselves,  but  that  every 
voter  should  support  all  the  candidates  of  some  one  of  the 
parties.  In  this  case,  not  only  is  all  minority  representa- 
tion excluded,  but  it  is,  so  far  as  practicable,  made  impos- 
sible for  the  voter  to  concentrate  all  his  votes  upon  the  best 
candidates  he  finds  in  nomination;  in  other  words,  he  is  prac- 
tically refused  a  freedom  of  using  his  whole  voting  influence 
in  favor  of  the  candidate  whom  he  knows  to  be  the  most 
worthy. 

1  Where  the  contests  turn  only  on  party  principles,  this  method  of  voting  has 
certain  advantages,  and  need  not  materially  impair  a  salutary  freedom,  but  it 
is  quite  otherwise  in  municipal  elections  —  and  all  others  —  where  party  principles 
are  not  involved. 


'2-2*\  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

By  reason  of  this  manner  of  voting,  the  citizen  is  com- 
pelled to  vote  for  all  of  the  candidates  of  one  party,  though 
he  knows  some  of  them  to  be  unfit,  and  against  all  those  of 
the  other,  though  he  knows  most  of  them  to  be  the  best,  - 
or  a  portion  of  his  voting  power  must  be  lost.  It  is  obvious 
that  this  party  method  is  intended  to  limit  the  influence  of 
the  most  independent  and  conscientious  voters;  while,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  unscrupulous  voters  who  support  the 
party  nominees,  good  or  bad,  are  enabled  to  exercise  their 
full  voting  power.  Hence  city  parties  and  bosses  naturally 
favor  this  method,  and  become  through  it  more  and  more 
despotic  and  debased. 

There  is  reason  to  fear,  so  strong  and  misleading  are  party 
theories  and  interests,  that  the  conviction  that  the  para- 
mount purpose  in  voting  at  all  should  be  to  enable  all  citi- 
zens to  freely  and  conscientiously  vote  according  to  their 
sense  of  duty  has  become  greatly  impaired  in  American 
cities. 

3.  There  is,  perhaps,  some  need  of  explaining  what  is 
meant  by  declaring  that  the  voter  should  be  enabled  to  con- 
centrate his  whole  voting  influence  upon  a  less  number  than 
all  of  the  candidates  of  the  same  kind  to  be  voted  for  at  the 
same  time  in  the  same  district.  Let  us  assume  that  three 
members  of  a  board  of  aldermen  or  school  trustees  are  to  be 
elected  in  a  single  district  at  the  same  time.  According  to 
the  strict  party  theory  the  voter  should  cast  one  ballot  for  or 
against  all  three  of  them;  though,  according  to  prevailing 
laws,  he  may  cast  one  vote  for  a  less  number  than  all  of  them, 
—  this  being  the  extent  of  his  freedom. 

Now  this  party  theory  of  voting  is  plainly  the  equivalent  of 
casting  three  separate  ballots,  one  for  each  of  said  candidates, 
and  it  is  an  admission  that  each  voter  may  cast  as  many  sep- 
arate votes  as  there  are  separate  candidates  to  be  elected  at 
the  same  time.  If  the  voter  disapproves  of  one  of  the  can- 
didates, he  may,  according  to  law,  erase  his  name,  and  yet 
vote  for  the  two  others.  Why  should  he  not  be  allowed  to 
insert  a  new  name  in  place  of  the  one  erased?  Why  may 
he  not,  instead  of  new  names,  insert  the  name  of  the  third 


FREE  NOMINATIONS  AND  FREE  VOTING  227 

candidate  in  place  of  each  of  two  names  which  he  may  have 
erased,  and  thus  cast  his  three  votes  for  the  best  candidate  ? 
Parties  and  mere  politicians  would  refuse  this  liberty,  for 
they  would  tell  us,  if  they  confessed  the  truth,  that  it  would 
be  the  beginning  of  an  independent  action  which  would  en- 
danger their  power  and  monopoly. 

Finding  one  of  these  three  candidates  to  be  very  good, 
and  the  others  bad,  the  voter  wishes  to  exert  all  of  his  vot- 
ing power  —  to  cast  his  three  votes  in  this  case  —  for  the 
good  candidate.  Is  it  not  a  part  of  the  just  and  salutary 
freedom  of  voting  to  allow  him  to  do  so?  Will  not  its 
moral  effect  be  good?  What  man  or  party  has  a  right  to 
dictate  his  choice  in  the  matter?  Every  man  who  votes  for 
three  candidates  contributes  three  votes  to  the  mass  to  be 
counted.  He  who  casts  three  votes  for  one  candidate  does 
no  more.  Therefore,  by  allowing  him  such  liberty,  his  just 
franchise  as  a  voter  is  not  extended,  but  is  simply  respected, 
preserved,  and  made  more  effectual  for  good.  It  is  only  his 
just  freedom  which  is  enlarged,  only  his  conscientious 
sense  of  duty  which  is  recognized  and  favored.  He  is 
merely  enabled  to  break  through  the  restraints  which  parties 
and  politicians,  in  the  interest  of  their  monopoly  and  usur- 
pations, have  imposed  upon  his  freedom  of  choice. 

That  this  freedom  would  invite  conscientious  voters  to  the 
polls,  and  would  deepen  the  sense  of  the  utility  and  respon- 
sibility of  voting,  would  seem  to  be  very  clear.  While  to 
really  open  and  candid  minds  these  views  may  seem  mere 
truisms  requiring  an  apology  for  stating  them,  it  is  to  be 
feared  that  most  zealous  partisans  will  regard  them  as  the 
dreams  of  academic  and  impracticable  radicalism. 

4.  It  is  desirable,  at  this  point,  to  have  a  clear  view  of  the 
fundamental  difference  between  Free  Voting  and  limited  vot- 
ing, the  latter  being  that  according  to  which  the  voter  can 
cast  ballots  for  only  a  less  number  of  candidates  than  the 
whole  to  be  elected  at  once.  Free  Voting  respects  the  free- 
dom and  the  independence  of  the  voter,  while  limited  vot- 
ing impairs  both.  Free  Voting  restricts  the  control  of  the 
party  majority,  but  limited  voting  invites  and  enables  nomi- 


228  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

nal  party  opponents  to  conspire  together  for  joint  control  and 
the  suppression  of  the  independent  voters.1 

Under  the  methods  of  Free  Voting,  the  candidates,  up  to 
the  full  number  of  offices  to  be  filled,  who  receive  the  most 
votes  should  be  held  to  be  elected,  even  though  some  of 
them,  by  reason  of  others  being  much  the  most  popular, 
shall  have  very  few  votes.  The  small  number  of  the  votes 
of  the  latter  would  not  seem  to  be  material  except  in  a  salu- 
tary way  by  diminishing  their  moral  influence  and  by  tend- 
ing to  dissuade  unworthy  men  pushing  for  nominations. 

5.  It  is  worthy  of  notice  that  Free  Voting,  while  in  its 
main  purpose  having  much  in  common  with  what  has  been 
designated  Proportional  Representation,  Minority  Represen- 
tation, Personal  Representation,  and  Cumulative  Voting,2 

1  There  have  been  laws  in  New  York  and  several  other  states  for  limited  vot- 
ing.   They  are  claimed  to  be  in  the  interest  of  minority  representation,  but  this  is 
true  only  on  the  assumption  that  nothing  but  parties  are  to  be  represented,  a  result 
which  mere  politicians  generally  favor.    Massachusetts  has  such  a  law  applicable 
to  the  election  of  the  members  of  the  Boston  City  Council.     In  practice,  it  makes 
a  party  nomination  almost  the  equivalent  of  an  election.     In  choosing  certain 
delegates  to  the  New  York  Constitutional  Convention  of  1867,  no  voter  was  allowed 
to  vote  for  more  than  sixteen  out  of  the  thirty-two  to  be  chosen.    In  the  same  year, 
a  law  of  England  provided  that  where  three  members  of  parliament  were  to  be 
elected  from  the  same  district,  no  elector  should  vote  for  more  than  two  of  them. 
Buckalew's  Proportional  Representation,  pp.  41,  42,  93,  94.    This  is  a  very  inter- 
esting and  thoughtful  volume,  which  deserves  far  more  attention  than  it  has  re- 
ceived.   Its  author  was  a  United  States  Senator  from  Pennsylvania  who  took  a 
statesmanlike  view  of  public  questions. 

2  There  is  a  considerable  literature  on  these  subjects.    The  writings  of  Mr.  Mill 
and  Mr.  Hare  have  long  been  well  known.  Mr.  Simon  Sterne  made  a  valuable  report 
upon  Personal  Representation  to  the  New  York  Constitutional  Convention  of  1867. 
One  of  the  most  interesting  and  valuable  of  the  late  works  on  these  subjects  is 
that  of  Professor  Commons,  published  in  1896  and  entitled  Proportional  Represen- 
tation.   There  has  been  a  Proportional  Representation  League  in  the  United  States 
which  published  a  Review,  and  the  number  for  December,  1893,  contains  a  bibliog- 
raphy of  those  subjects.    We  are  compelled  to  think  that  some  of  the  writers  upon 
those  subjects  with  whose  views  we  agree  in  the  main  have  attempted  a  too  com- 
plete, complicated,  and  theoretical  representation  of  the  minority  for  the  beginning 
of  a  reform  movement  of  the  kind.   This  has  naturally  led  to  a  diversity  of  opinion 
in  their  own  ranks  and  to  confusion  and  doubt  in  the  public  mind.     That  great 
good  will  finally  spring  from  their  efforts,  we  feel  confident,  yet  we  must  think 
that  some  simple  and  limited  illustrations  of  their  theories,  applied  successfully  in 
practical  affairs,  will  be  found  essential  to  the  early  acceptance  of  their  broader 
application  in  practice.    The  first  stages  of  the  advance  of  civil  service  reform 
justifies  these  views.    The  attempt  to  enforce  it  radically  and  comprehensively  in 
1870  and  1871  was  a  lamentable  failure.     It  was  the  limited  enforcement  of  the 


FREE  NOMINATIONS  AND  FREE  VOTING  229 

has  nevertheless  distinctive  principles  and  objects  of  its 
own  which  are  less  theoretical,  more  readily  understood, 
and  can  be  more  easily  carried  into  effect,  than  the  methods 
and  purposes  generally  included  under  either  of  those  desig- 
nations. When  the  fundamental  principle  of  free  voting  has 
been  vindicated  in  the  public  judgment,  all  that  is  most 
desirable  in  the  methods  of  those  reforms  will  follow  in  due 
time. 

6.  The  paramount  and  distinctive  purpose  of  Free  Voting, 
and  the  claim  of  right  and  freedom  on  which  it  rests,  cannot 
be  too  much  emphasized.     They  would  (1)  give  the  voter  a 
real  freedom  to  vote  according  to  his  judgment  and  sense  of 
duty ;  and  (2)  they  would  enable  him,  when  several  candi- 
dates are  to  be  voted  for  at  the  same  time,  to  concentrate  all 
his  votes,  his  whole  voting  influence,  upon  one  or  more  of 
them  as  he  chooses,  whether  they  be  only  three  or  a  larger 
number.      Every  one  of  the  reforms  just  referred  to,   by 
whichever  of  the  names  designated,  rests  on  this  right  and 
freedom,   and  all   their  complicated   machinery  is    but  an 
amplification  of  them.      Those  reforms  will  be  distrusted 
and  must  fail,  if  this  right  and  freedom  are  not  vindicated, 
as  the  higher  mathematics  must  be  distrusted  if  the  funda- 
mental rules  of  arithmetic  should  be  involved  in  doubt. 

7.  A  fundamental  purpose  of  all  voting  is  to  put  the  best 
men  into  office.    The  law  cannot  tell  the  citizen  whom  to  vote 
for ;  it  can  only  give  him  a  real  freedom  of  choice  in  bestow- 
ing his  vote.     He  must  exercise  it  freely,  according  to  his 
judgment  and  conscience,  for  the  accomplishment  of  that 
purpose.     He  must,  therefore,  be  allowed  to  cumulate  his 
votes  or  not  cumulate  them,  to  vote  for  minority  represen- 
tation or  against  it,  as  his  own  sense  of  duty  shall  dictate. 
Therefore  neither  cumulative  voting  nor  proportional  repre- 
sentation, however  just  and  useful  generally,  can  be  regarded 
as  ends  which  the  law  should  primarily  seek,  the  paramount 


reform  methods  in  1883,  under  the  law  of  that  year,  which  led  on  to  a  constant  and 
glorious  success.  The  public  mind  needed  to  be  educated  by  the  practical  lessons 
which  the  enforcement  of  examinations  within  a  limited  sphere,  under  this  law, 
clearly  taught. 


230  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

end  being  a  real  and  constant  freedom  in  voting.  Those 
methods  are,  in  fact,  but  means  through  which  the  people, 
by  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  free  voting,  may  seek  to  pro- 
mote the  general  welfare.  Yet  not  always  so.  Why  desire 
minority  representation  in  cases  where  the  candidates  of  the 
majority  are  good  and  those  of  the  minority  are  bad?  What 
sense  in  resorting  to  cumulative  voting  when  all  the  candi- 
dates are  equally  worthy?  Why  insist  on  proportional  rep- 
resentation in  cases  in  which  it  would  bring  to  the  polls  the 
depraved  and  criminal  classes  who  ought  never  to  have  been 
allowed  to  vote  at  all  ?  But  in  every  conceivable  condition 
it  is  primarily,  ultimately,  and  absolutely  true  that  free  vot- 
ing is  both  salutary  and  essential.1 

8.  In  these  considerations  we  can  see  that  a  preference  for 
the  phrase  "  Free  Voting  "  over  the  other  phrases  referred  to 
is  not  a  mere  matter  of  taste,  but  of  substance.     It  is  need- 
ful both  to  avoid  misleading  suggestions  and   to   fix   the 
attention  upon  great  fundamental  rights  and  purposes.     Nor 
should  we  fail  to  see  that  the  phrase  is  likely  to  appeal  to 
the  voters'  love  of  liberty  and  right.     Besides,  while  cumu- 
lative and  proportional  voting  may  seem  mj'sterious  to  the 
simple-minded,  every  voter  thinks  it  right  that  he  should 
be  allowed  to  bestow  his  votes  as  he  pleases,  and  he  cannot 
deny  to  other  voters  what  he  claims  for  himself.     The  name 
"  Free  Voting  "  is  an  argument  in  its  own  favor.     Why  not, 
then,  begin  non-partisan  voting  in  our  cities  by  a  method 
absolutely  just,  descriptive,  and  persuasive  in  its  very  name, 
easily  understood  and  established,  and  which  not  only  avoids 
complicated  questions  which  divide  the  friends  of  reform, 
but  has  successful  precedents  for  its  support,  as  we  shall  soon 
see. 

9.  Free  Voting,  by  increasing  the  number  of  officers  to  be 

1  There  is  an  objection  to  declaring  for  an  exclusive  personal  representation 
in  a  fact  which  we  shall  set  forth  —  the  fact  of  a  growing  need  for  having  cities 
themselves  represented  in  legislatures  by  members  whom  the  city  councils,  in- 
stead of  the  voters  personally,  shall  elect.  The  incorporated  municipal  body 
should  be  represented  in  a  legislature  as  a  state  is  represented  in  the  national 
Senate.  But  personal  representation,  in  contradistinction  of  party  representation 
or  mere  majority  representation,  is  in  the  highest  degree  desirable  in  city  affairs. 


FREE  NOMINATIONS  AND  FREE  VOTING  231 

selected  at  the  same  time,  can  be  made  to  secure  almost  any- 
desirable  amount  of  minority  representation.  The  ballots 
can  be  readily  cast  by  uneducated  voters,  and  they  can  be 
easily  counted  without  involving  mystery  or  mathematical 
problems.  The  names  of  all  candidates  being  printed  upon 
the  voting  paper,  all  the  voter  has  to  do  is  to  mark  by  a  figure 
against  the  name  of  any  candidate  the  number  of  his  votes 
which  he  wishes  counted  for  him.  Mr.  Buckalew,  one  of 
the  ablest  students  of  this  class  of  subjects,  —  a  man  skilled 
in  practical  politics,  who  had  been  a  United  States  Senator 
from  Pennsylvania,  —  seems  to  have  reached  the  same  conclu- 
sions here  expressed.  He  thought,  as  we  do,  that  it  would 
be  a  great  gain  for  the  cause  of  electoral  reform  if  all  its 
friends  would  unite  in  supporting  the  simple  methods  of 
Free  Voting,  leaving  the  more  complete  representation  of  the 
minority  to  be  developed  in  the  near  future.  The  free  vote, 
he  says,  "is  more  comprehensive  and  flexible  than  others, 
.  .  .  and  may  be  used  to  accomplish  their  objects.  ...  It 
combines  the  advantages  of  other  plans,  without  their  im- 
perfections, while  it  is  not  open  to  any  strong  objection 
peculiar  to  itself."1 

10.  Other  good  results  seem  likely  to  spring  from  Free 
Voting:  (1)  It  would  apparently  in  large  measure  suppress 
the  profits  of  the  corrupt  trade  of  managing  elections;  for 
how  can  party  nominations  and  the  influence  of  party  leaders 
command  a  high  price  in  the  markets  of  city  politics  when 
the  conscientious  voters  have  such  facilities  for  secretly 
defeating  the  party  nominees?  (2)  It  would,  apparently, 
for  like  reasons,  much  diminish  party  bribery,  for  the  results 
of  elections  could  no  longer  be  calculated  with  sufficient  cer- 
tainty to  justify  large  investments  in  the  purchase  of  votes. 
(3)  The  minority,  under  Free  Voting,  can  be  represented  to 
the  extent  due  to  its  numbers,  as  the  voters  may  determine 
by  their  ballots.  When  every  voter  can  cast  three  ballots 
for  the  election  of  three  officers,  and  bestow  them  as  he 
pleases,  one  more  than  one-fourth  of  the  electors  will  always 
be  able  to  select  any  person  in  support  of  whom  they  may 

1  Proportional  Representation,  pp.  70-80. 


232  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

unite.  The  greater  the  number  of  officers  to  be  elected  at 
the  same  time,  the  more  complete  will  be  minority  repre- 
sentation under  Free  Voting.1 

(4)  It  is  obvious,  when,  by  uniting  as  explained  in  the 
last  note,  a  small  proportion  of  the  voters  may  elect  men 
who  truly  represent  them,  that  they  may  continue  to  reelect 
them,  thus  causing  great  non-partisan  interests  to  be  effec- 
tively represented.     These  representatives  will  be  independ- 
ent, for  no  party  managers  can  defeat  them ;  the  vote  that 
elected  them  can  reelect  them,  continually.2 

(5)  It  would  be  a  great  gain  to  have  our  legislative  bodies 
made  up  of  members  who  have  independent  convictions  and 
who  truly  represent  the  diverse  sentiments  and  interests  of 
the  community,  rather  than  of  a  common  type  of  mere  parti- 
sans and  politicians   servile   to  the   majority,   who  rarely 
engage  in  any  instructive  or  patriotic  debates.     Our  legis- 
latures would  no  longer  be  bodies  obedient  to  bosses  or  party 
managers.      At  a  time  when  partisan  servility  and  a  lack 
of   individual  independence  are  notorious  and   lamentable 
faults  of  our  legislators  and  city  councils,  any  change  which 
will  give  them  more   manhood   and   courage   is   obviously 
desirable. 

(6)  Another  advantage   of   Free  Voting,   though  by  no 
means  apparent  at  first,  is  yet  important.     While  conferring 
upon  every  voter  equal  liberty  and  opportunity,  it  yet  en- 
ables men  of  superior  education,  worth,  and  sagacity  to  make 
themselves  increasingly  effective  through  a  union  of  efforts, 

1  The  general  rule,  under  Free  Voting,  is  this :  If  two  officers  are  to  be  elected 
at  once  in  a  district,  any  number  of  voters  above  one-third  of  the  whole  —  though 
only  one  in  excess  of  a  third  —  may  by  uniting  elect  their  candidate;  if  three 
officers  are  to  be  so  elected,  voters  exceeding  a  fourth  of  the  whole  may  by  uniting 
elect  their  candidate ;  if  five  officers  are  to  be  so  elected,  voters  exceeding  a  sixth 
of  the  whole  may  elect  their  candidate,  etc  ,  so  that  if  nine  officers  are  to  be 
so  elected  at  once,  voters  exceeding  a  tenth  of  all  of  them  can  elect  their  candi- 
date.   Buckalew's  Pro.  Rep.,  p.  263. 

2  If  by  analogous  Free  Voting  gamblers,  burglars,  bawdy-house,  grog-shop- 
keepers,  and  all  the  criminal  and  vile  classes  shall  be  able  to  elect  members  of 
their  kind,  it  will  be  a  desirable  result;  for  their  representations  would  be  in- 
famous by  reason  of  being  well  known  and  conspicuous.    The  poison  of  their 
influence  would  be  less  diffused  through  municipal  politics,  and  hence  less 
injurious. 


FREE  NOMINATIONS  AND  FREE  VOTING  233 

for  which  they  have  the  largest  capacity.  Such  men  could 
become  more  influential  against  mere  numbers,  in  contend- 
ing with  stupidity,  ignorance,  and  depravity  under  the  lead 
of  corrupt  politicians  and  demagogues  —  a  great  advantage 
certainly  under  a  system  of  universal  suffrage.  We  should 
be  glad  that  all  the  advantages  which  would  accrue  from  this 
better  utilization  of  superior  intelligence  and  character  would 
especially  promote  the  welfare  of  the  inferior  and  illiterate 
citizens. 

VI 

1.  Let  us  now  see  how  far  our  reasoning  in  favor  of  Free 
Voting  has  been  justified  by  experience.  It  is  familiar 
knowledge  that  some  of  the  evils  in  our  political  elections, 
which  have  sprung  from  undue  control  by  parties  and  selfish 
majorities,  have  also  existed  in  connection  with  elections 
in  our  great  business  corporations.  The  large  shareholders 
have  dominated  the  small  ones,  the  latter  being  unable  to 
combine  and  elect  an  independent  director  who  would  ex- 
pose the  despotic  schemes  of  the  conspiring  majority. 

To  remedy  these  evils,  the  constitution  of  Illinois,  adopted 
in  1870,1  provided  in  substance  that  every  corporate  share- 
holder might  cast  as  many  votes  for  directors  as  would  be 
expressed  by  the  number  of  directors  to  be  elected  at  once 
multiplied  by  the  number  of  shares  the  voter  owns,  and  that 
he  might  give  all  his  votes  to  one,  two,  or  more  candidates 
for  election,  distributing  them  at  his  pleasure  according  to 
the  method  of  Free  Voting  as  we  have  explained  it.  This 
constitution  forbids  such  elections  in  any  other  way,  and 
such  has  since  remained  the  rule  in  Illinois,  with  advantage 
to  the  shareholders  and  the  public.  This  provision  has  been 
adopted  by  other  states.2 

1  Art.  XIII.  Sec.  3. 

2  West  Virginia  incorporated  it  into  its  constitution  in  1872;  the  territory  of 
Utah  adopted  the  same  principle  in  its  proposed  constitution  of  the  same  year. 
Buckalew's  Pro.  Rep.,  pp.  226,  227.    In  1873  a  provision,  closely  analogous  to 
the  foregoing,  was  put  into  the  constitution  of  Pennsylvania,  and  laws  for  carry- 
ing it  into  effect  make  it  applicable  to  nearly  every  kind  of  corporation  except 
municipal  corporations.    It  is  applied  even  to  fire-engine  companies  in  cities. 


234  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

2.  But  the  Illinois  constitution  of  1870  went  much  farther 
in  establishing  Free  Voting.1  It  provided  that  three  repre- 
sentatives in  the  lower  house  of  the  legislature  shall  be 
elected  from  each  representative  district  for  the  term  of  two 
years,  and  in  respect  thereto  used  these  words :  "  Each  quali- 
fied voter  may  cast  as  many  votes  for  one  candidate  as  there 
are  representatives  to  be  elected,  or  may  distribute  the  same 
.  .  .  among  the  candidates  as  he  shall  see  fit,  and  the  candi- 
dates highest  in  votes  shall  be  declared  elected."  This  pro- 
vision was  adopted  by  a  large  majority  of  the  people  on  a 
separate  ballot  submitting  it  to  them.2  Districts  for  the 
elections  of  single  representatives  to  the  lower  house  were 
abolished.  This  is  absolute  Free  Voting,  —  an  American 
creation,  —  and  it  is,  we  believe,  the  first  provision  ever 
made  in  this  country  for  its  enforcement  in  the  election 
of  members  of  a  legislative  body.8 

This  Free  Voting  system  has  been  since  enforced  in  Illinois, 
and  apparently  with  much  advantage  to  the  public  interest. 
It  has  not  only  enlarged  the  freedom  and  independence  of 
the  voter,  but  has  established  the  principle  of  minority  rep- 
resentation, securing  a  measure  of  it  in  a  form  so  simple  as 
to  exclude  all  mathematical  complications.  Every  voter  can 
at  a  glance  understand  it,  and  he  can  promptly  and  easily 
perform  his  part  under  it.  What  has  been  accomplished  is 
indeed  much  short  of  an  ideal  or  most  desirable  minority 
representation,  yet  it  is  a  sound  basis  on  which  to  build. 
It  has  established  an  essential  and  invaluable  principle. 
It  will  aid  in  preparing  the  people  for  a  more  complete 
minority  representation  in  the  future. 

Const.,  Penn.,  1873,  Art.  XVI.  Sec.  4;  Laws,  Penn.,  1874,  p.  79;  1876,  pp.  47  and 
49.  One  of  these  laws  is  a  model  by  reason  of  its  clear  and  comprehensive  pro- 
visions. It  should  be  studied  by  American  legislators.  In  1875,  Missouri  put 
these  Illinois  provisions  into  its  constitution,  and  so  has  the  state  of  Nebraska. 
Const.,  Nebraska,  Art.  XI.  Sec.  5;  Const.,  Missouri,  Art.  XII.  Sec.  6.  Altogether 
eleven  states  have  already  adopted  this  Illinois  system.  Commons's  Pro.  Rep.,  364. 

i  Art.  IV.  Sees.  7  and  8.    Goodnow's  Mun.  Prob.,  p.  154. 

a  Const.,  Art.  IV.  Sees.  7  and  8. 

*  Mr.  Bnckalew  speaks  of  a  plan  of  applying  Free  Voting  to  Nominations. 
Buckalew's  Pro.  Rep.,  pp.  166,  167,  263.  It  might  perhaps  be  applied  for  Im- 
proving our  system  of  making  party  nominations,  but  that  is  beyond  the  scope  of 
our  subject. 


FREE  NOMINATIONS  AND  FREE  VOTING  235 

We  cannot  spare  the  space  for  adequate  details  as  to  the 
practical  effects  of  Free  Voting  under  this  constitution,  but 
the  following  conclusions,  cited  from  a  very  competent 
writer  who  has  recently  investigated  the  subject,  will  suf- 
fice for  our  purpose.1  He  says:  (1)  Minority  representation 
has  been  established ;  (2)  every  district  of  the  state  has  been 
enabled  to  have  the  conflicting  views  of  its  interests  actually 
represented  —  and,  if  need  be,  debated  —  in  the  legislature 
by  members  knowing  the  facts;  (3)  the  misrepresentation 
and  secrecy  which  existed  under  the  old  system  as  to  local 
party  interests  have  been  made  impracticable  under  Free  Vot- 
ing; (4)  "it  is  an  obstacle  in  the  way  of  gerrymandering;" 
(5)  it  obviously  makes  legislation  for  mere  party  advantage 
vastly  more  difficult ;  (6)  "it  leads  the  people  generally  to 
take  more  interest  in  public  affairs;"  (7)  "by  dividing  the 
people  more  equally  and  facilitating  discussions,  it  causes 
more  care  in  making  laws."2 

Far  as  the  good  effects  of  these  limited  experiments  have 
fallen  short  of  what  the  idealists  naturally  desire,  we  think 
that  men  of  large  experience  in  party  politics  will  see  in  the 
results  attained  ample  reasons  for  thinking  that  to  establish 
and  extend  the  Illinois  system  will  be  found  much  the  easiest 
means  of  securing  adequate  minority  representation. 

As  was  natural  to  expect,  party  zealots  and  professional 
politicians,  who  detest  minority  representation,  are  hostile 
to  the  Illinois  system ;  while  persons  who  think  that  party 
domination  should  be  checked  take  the  opposite  view,  —  ex- 
cept those  radicals  who  will  aid  nothing  less  than  ideal 
reforms  at  the  outset. 

3.  The  most  important  objection  which  has  been  urged 
by  candid  persons  against  Free  Voting  is  that  an  undue 

1  M.  N.  Forney,  Esq.    His  views  of  the  subject  appear  in  a  small  volume 
entitled  Political  Reform,  etc.,  pp.  63  and  88.    Mr.  Forney  has  kindly  read  this 
chapter  in  manuscript. 

2  While  Professor  Goodnow  has  doubts  as  to  the  expediency  of  adopting  the 
Illinois  system,  —  apparently  only  because  he  thinks  a  more  complete  system  in 
the  same  spirit  is  practicable, — yet  he  gives  quite  as  strong  reasons  in  favor  of 
the  Illinois  experiment  as  those  given  by  Mr.  Forney.    The  worst  results  at- 
tributed to  it  seem  to  be  far  preferable  to  those  from  the  party  system.    Mun. 
Prob.,  pp.  155, 156. 


236  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

cumulation  of  votes  upon  popular  candidates  may  sometimes 
have  the  effect  of  limiting  the  representation  of  the  major- 
ity. It  is  perhaps  impossible  to  wholly  avoid  such  results 
at  the  outset,  without  a  resort  to  those  complicated  forms  of 
voting  to  which  we  have  referred,  and  which  it  is  impossible 
to  introduce  until  public  opinion  has  been  greatly  enlight- 
ened. But  these  occasional  results  are  at  most  only  a  very 
small  measure  of  that  injustice  which  constantly  occurs 
under  the  party  system  of  voting,  under  which  little  more 
than  the  majority  is  generally  represented  at  all.  Besides, 
experience  has  demonstrated  that  this  evil  of  an  excessive 
cumulation  of  votes  is  not  practically  of  much  importance. 
Mr.  Forney  shows  that  there  was  only  one  case  of  such 
cumulation  in  Illinois  in  1892,  and  that  there  has  hardly 
been  more  than  three  or  four  cases  there  in  fifteen  years. 

The  party  system  of  voting  leaves  the  minority  in  every 
separate  district  at  all  times  wholly  unrepresented.  This 
excessive  cumulation  —  sometimes  called  "plumping"  —  is 
on  some  grounds  hardly  a  matter  of  regret.  It  demonstrates 
the  complete  independence  of  the  voters  which  the  system 
has  secured.  It  can  only  happen  when  a  very  popular, 
worthy  man  is  a  candidate  on  the  same  side  with  one  who 
is  not  much  respected  or  is  very  inferior.  The  "plumping  " 
of  the  vote  on  the  former  will  tend  to  prevent  the  nomina- 
tion of  unworthy  candidates  and  to  make  them  shrink  from 
accepting  nominations.  They  will  dread  the  ridicule  of 
being  thus  disgracefully  defeated. 

The  important  fact  should  be  repeated  that  whatever  need 
there  may  be  of  superior  intelligence  and  good  judgment  to 
avoid  cumulating  too  many  votes  tends  to  increase  the 
potential  force  of  the  highest  class  of  voters,  and  is  very 
unfavorable  to  the  supremacy  of  the  scheming  little  poli- 
ticians and  the  stupid  and  depraved  human  brutes  whom 
they  hustle  to  the  polls. 

4.  Several  additional  facts  speak  significantly  concerning 
the  effects  of  Free  Voting  in  Illinois.  Never  since  it  was 
established  has  the  state  had  a  state  boss  or  the  repute  of 
having  one.  Partisan  gerrymandering,  subsequent  to  the 


FREE   NOMINATIONS  AND  FREE   VOTING  237 

establishment  of  Free  Voting,  has  been  of  a  much  less  aggra- 
vated kind  in  Illinois  than  that  which  has  disgraced  several 
states  in  her  section  of  the  Union.  Examples  of  gerryman- 
dering in  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Wisconsin  are  selected  by  Pro- 
fessor Commons  as  the  most  extreme  for  the  illustration  of 
that  abuse  —  that  in  Wisconsin  having  recently  been  declared 
unconstitutional  by  its  highest  court.1  What  more  natural 
than  that  this  evil  should  be  found  nearly  impracticable  in 
a  legislature  like  that  of  Illinois,  in  which  both  parties  are 
fairly  represented?  No  senator  has  been  elected  in  Illinois 
within  the  last  twenty-five  years  whom  any  candid  man 
would  compare  with  a  senator  elected  a  few  years  ago  in 
Ohio,  or  with  the  recent  senators  from  New  York  or  from 
Pennsylvania,  —  states  in  which  the  voting  system  is  most 
partisan  and  despotic.  It  was  not,  therefore,  an  unnatural 
fact  that  Illinois  —  though  Ohio  is  the  older  state  —  should 
be  the  first  state  in  the  West  to  adopt  an  enlightened  civil 
service  reform  system  by  popular  vote,  though  Cincinnati 
has  been  long  cursed  by  a  flagitious  boss  system.  Nor,  in 
view  of  such  facts,  is  it  any  matter  for  surprise  that  in  the 
same  year  in  which  the  legislature  of  Illinois  defeated  her 
spoilsmen  in  an  election  of  a  United  States  Senator,  the 
partisan  and  servile  majority  of  the  legislature  of  New 
York,  rejecting  a  brilliant  and  admirable  candidate,  elected 
to  the  national  Senate  a  notorious  state  boss.  Nor  has 
Pennsylvania  done  much  better. 


Prior  to  1872,  the  salutary  effects  of  Free  Voting  in  Illinois 
had  attracted  attention  in  the  state  of  New  York.  The 
Republican  party  in  the  state  had  not  yet  been  disgraced  by 
accepting  a  boss.  Its  majority  was  sagacious  enough  to 
see  that  such  voting  would  not  only  honor  the  party,  but 
would  be  disastrous  to  the  corrupt  despotism  of  Tammany. 
In  that  year  an  act  passed  the  legislature  —  in  which  the 
Republicans  were  in  majority  — •  which  provided  for  the  elec- 

l  Pro.  Rep.,  pp.  53,  54,  69. 


238  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

tion  of  forty-five  members  of  the  Board  of  Aldermen  of  New 
York  City,  nine  of  them  to  be  elected  from  each  of  five  sepa- 
rate city  districts.  The  vote  for  the  aldermen  was  to  be 
according  to  the  method  of  Free  Voting,  each  elector  being 
allowed  to  cast  nine  votes  and  to  bestow  them  as  he  should 
see  fit  for  the  nine  aldermen  from  his  district.  The  bill  was 
defeated  by  the  veto  of  Governor  Hoffman,  a  favorite  rep- 
resentative of  Tammany,  whose  connections  with  certain 
scandalous  Tammany  naturalization  proceedings  are  not  yet 
forgotten.  If  this  bill  had  become  a  law,  it  is  very  likely  that 
New  York  would  never  have  had  a  state  boss.  It  is  certain 
that  the  Republican  boss  system  since  developed,  and  its 
frequent  alliances  with  Tammany,  have  been  the  greatest 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  Free  Voting  and  the  overthrow  of 
that  organization.  Such  a  system  of  representation  applied 
to  the  election  of  members  of  the  legislature  from  New  York 
City  would  have  given  the  Republicans  the  number  due  to 
their  city  vote.1 

VIII 

1.  The  laws  of  Pennsylvania  furnish  interesting  ex- 
amples of  the  methods  of  Free  Voting,  but  our  space  will 
not  allow  us  to  trace  their  development.2  The  original  and 
most  striking  law  for  distinctive  Free  Voting  was  that  relat- 
ing to  elections  in  the  borough  or  town  of  Bloomsburgh, 
enacted  in  1870.8  This  unique  law  declares  its  object  to 
be  "that  the  electors  of  Bloomsburgh  may  exercise  their 
right  of  suffrage  without  undue  restraint  and  may  obtain 
for  themselves  complete  representation  in  their  local  gov- 
ernment,"—  an  admirable  statement  of  the  main  object  of 
Free  Voting.  It  provides  for  its  being  accomplished  sub- 
stantially through  such  methods  as  we  have  explained.  For 
example,  when  six  officers  are  to  be  elected  at  once,  the 
voter  is  allowed  to  cast  six  votes,  and  may  distribute  them 

1  Commons's  Pro.  Rep.,  pp.  251-259.  Horace  Qreeley  was  as  earnest  for  mi- 
nority representation  as  the  present  state  boss  is  against  it.  Id.,  p.  251. 

»  Buckalew's  Pro.  Rep.,  pp.  228,  229, 163,  230,  243. 

»  Penn.  Laws,  1870,  p.  343.  Buckalew's  Pro.  Rep.,  pp.  153,  233.  Blooms- 
burgh was  his  residence. 


FREE  NOMINATIONS  AND  FREE  VOTING          239 

equally,  or  cumulate  them,  as  lie  pleases  among  the  candi- 
dates.1 

The  good  effect  of  this  law  so  clearly  and  quickly 
appeared  that  within  the  succeeding  three  years  after  1870 
various  local  laws  were  enacted  in  Pennsylvania  to  the  same 
effect.2 

It  was  almost  inevitable  under  such  laws  that  the  minority 
should  secure  a  just  representation,  and  such  was  the  fact 
from  the  beginning.  In  Bloomsburgh,  for  example,  where 
the  number  of  persons  adhering  to  each  party  were  about 
equal,  and  there  were  about  six  hundred  voters  in  all,  there 
were,  at  the  first  election  under  the  law,  three  Democrats 
and  three  Republicans  elected  members  of  the  council. 

Free  Voting  was  soon  after  extended  to  the  election  of 
constables,  assessors,  school  directors,  and  auditors  in  sev- 
eral localities.  After  stating  that  the  new  system  "  dimin- 
ishes the  number  of  candidates  and  gives  every  respectable 
interest  its  due  representation,"  Mr.  Buckalew  states  the 
general  results  of  the  new  system  in  this  language :  "  The 
officers  chosen  .  .  .  are  fairly  divided  between  parties.  Not 
one  person  among  the  whole  six  hundred  voters  is  known  to 
have  expressed  himself  against  the  change,  or  is  believed  to 
be  desirous  of  returning  to  the  old  and  unfair  majority  vote. 
...  In  short,  the  change  has  been  completely  satisfactory 
and  is  strongly  indorsed  by  public  opinion.  .  .  .  Each 
party  obtained  its  share  of  the  town  officers  by  its  own 
votes.  .  .  .  The  new  plan  ensures  justice  to  all,  prevents 
intrigue  and  corruption,  preserves  the  orderly  action  of  par- 
ties, .  .  .  and  encourages  the  selection  of  good  men  as 
candidates."3 

1  And  in  aid  of  more  complete  representation,  the  voter  was  allowed  to  give 
even  a  fraction  of  a  vote  to  a  candidate ;  but  we  must  think  so  nice  a  provision 
of  doubtful  utility  in  the  present  state  of  public  opinion.    There  is  in  the  law  a 
slight,  but  hardly  a  material,  limitation  upon  the  absolute  right  of  Free  Voting. 

2  One  extended  Free  Voting  to  the  election  of  school  directors ;  and  a  general 
law  was  also  passed  declaring  that  in  boroughs  to  be  thereafter  incorporated  there 
shall  be  six  members  of  the  council,  and  that  the  principle  of  Free  Voting  estab- 
lished by  law  for  Bloomsburgh  shall  apply  to  such  boroughs.    Buckalew's  Pro. 
Rep.,  pp.  229-242. 

8  Buckalew's  Pro.  Rep.,  pp.  154,  245,  248,  252.  A  new  edition  of  this  work  is 
much  needed,  and  nothing  on  the  subject  is  better  worth  reading. 


240  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

2.  The  party  managers  in  Pennsylvania,  when  these  laws 
for  Free  Voting  were  passed,  had  no  more  conception  of  their 
far-reaching  effects  than  the  politician  and  patron  age-mon- 
gering  classes  had,  at  the  outset,  of  the  far-reaching  effects  of 
the  first  civil  service  reform  laws.     Both  laws  were  more 
enlightened  than  public  opinion  was  at  their  passage.    When 
those  effects  were  demonstrated,  those  classes  united,  —  the 
managers  of  both  the  great  parties  conspiring  to  defeat  Free 
Voting.     Within  three  years  they  succeeded  in  repealing  the 
law  making  Free  Voting  general  in  the  municipalities  of 
Pennsylvania.     But  they  left  in  force  the  few  special  Free 
Voting  laws  of  limited  application,  and  these  are  still  in 
force,  and  their  influence  has  continued  to  be  salutary  to 
the  present  time. 

There  is  a  curious  analogy  between  these  facts  and  the 
combination  of  the  patronage-mongering  politicians  against 
the  first  enforcement  of  civil  service  reform  examinations. 
In  England  the  partisan  majority  in  Parliament,  within 
three  years  after  such  enforcement  commenced,  refused  all 
appropriations  for  the  purpose,  but  the  English  administra- 
tion persevered  and  triumphed.  In  the  United  States  a 
partisan  majority  in  Congress  refused  appropriations  in 
1874, — within  four  years  after  such  an  enforcement  of  the 
civil  service  examinations  commenced;  and  President  Grant 
did  not  persevere,  but  failed  to  enforce  the  examinations. 
But  public  opinion  soon  triumphed  again,  and  civil  service 
reform  examinations  were  finally  established  in  1883. 

3.  The  higher  public  opinion  has  not  yet  regained  control 
in  Pennsylvania ;  on  the  contrary,  the  spoils  system  has  been 
intrenched    there    within    the    last    few    years.      No   well- 
informed  man  would  have  supposed  that  Free  Voting  could 
be  restored  in  these  recent  years  in  Pennsylvania  —  years  in 
which  there  has  been  a  steady  degradation  in  her  politics, 
until  her  present  senators  now  stand  in  disgraceful  contrast 
with  their  predecessors  before  1870.     The  supremacy  of  such 
bosses  as  those  which  dominate  New  York  and  Pennsylvania 
and  the  extension  of  Free  Voting  cannot  be  contemporaneous 
events. 


FREE  NOMINATIONS  AND  FREE  VOTING  241 

Why  should  we  expect  Republican  politicians  —  in  major- 
ity in  Pennsylvania  —  to  concede  minority  representation  to 
Philadelphia, —  a  Republican  city, —  when  the  Republicans 
in  majority  in  the  state  of  New  York  have  not  had  sagacity 
or  patriotism  enough  to  extend  such  representation  to  New 
York  City,  by  which  their  votes  in  state  elections  would  be 
largely  increased  ?  The  state  boss  of  New  York  and  his  vas- 
sals apparently  prefer  the  patronage  and  spoils  which  a  con- 
spiracy with  Tammany  will  secure  them,  rather  than  allow 
an  honest  vote  of  the  Republican  minority  in  New  York 
City,  which  might  undermine  the  boss  system  itself.1 

4.  The  just  and  salutary  effects  of  Free  Voting  in  securing 
minority  representation  are  striking  when  compared  with  the 
results  under  the  old  party  system.  It  has  been  estimated 
that  under  the  party  system  generally  at  least  forty  per  cent 
of  the  voters  have  no  actual  representation  either  in  Con- 
gress, state  legislatures,  or  city  councils.  It  appears  that  in 
the  New  York  legislature  of  1869  forty-one  per  cent,  and  in 
that  of  1871  forty-two  per  cent,  of  the  voters  were  unrepre- 
sented. In  the  New  York  assembly  of  1894  over  forty-four 
per  cent  were  unrepresented,  and  in  the  same  year,  in  the 
New  York  City  Board  of  Aldermen,  over  fifty-one  per  cent 
were  unrepresented.2  In  St.  Paul  in  1894,  12,180  Republi- 
cans elected  only  4  aldermen,  but  11,327  Democrats  elected 
7  aldermen.3  More  striking  still,  in  the  New  York  City 
election  of  1892,  the  Democrats  cast  less  than  170,000  votes 
to  nearly  100,000  cast  by  the  Republicans,  yet  the  latter 
were  unable  to  elect  either  a  single  member  of  the  state  sen- 
ate or  assembly,  or  a  single  member  of  the  city  Board  of 
Aldermen.  Such  results  are  a  mere  burlesque  upon  repre- 
sentation, and  are  an  astounding  result  of  the  boss  system 
and  city-party  despotism.4 

Patriotic,  non-partisan  readers,  not  very  familiar  with  the 
theories  and  the  interests  of  professional  politicians,  have 

1  Commons's  Pro.  Rep.,  p.  142. 

2  Commons's  Pro.  Rep.,  p.  141;  Buckalew's  Pro.  Rep.,  Preliminary  Remarks, 
pp.  xi  and  xii. 

8  Commons's  Pro.  Rep.,  pp.  70,  71. 
4  Forney,  Pol.  Ref.,  p.  21;  Commons's  Pro.  Rep.,  p.  71. 
R 


242  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

very  likely  been  asking  why  the  Republican  party  of  New 
York,  for  example,  has  not  long  ago  established  Free  Voting 
in  New  York  City,  which  would  obviously  insure  the  party 
a  large  representation  from  the  city  in  the  legislature.  We 
have  just  suggested  some  of  the  reasons,  and  it  is  for  the 
reader  to  say  whether  any  other  more  creditable  can  be 
imagined. 

IX 

1.  After  such  an  experience  in  this  country,  it  is  hardly 
necessary  to  cite  that  of  England,  yet  it  is  too  instructive 
to  be  omitted.  We  shall  soon  refer,  in  dealing  with  another 
subject,  to  the  peculiar  methods  by  which  she  long  ago 
nearly  eliminated  party  politics  from  her  municipal  affairs. 
An  exception  to  this  was  in  the  management  of  her  school 
system,  in  which  the  intimate  relations  between  the  state 
church  and  party  politics  made  the  task  peculiarly  difficult. 
Free  Voting  as  a  remedy  was  established  in  England  in  the 
election  of  school  boards  in  1870,  and  has  since  been  enforced 
with  great  advantage.  It  is  significant  of  the  just  and  lib- 
eral spirit  which  promoted  this  reform  that,  contemporane- 
ous with  its  establishment  in  that  year,  a  general  extension 
was  made  of  the  English  free-school  system,  which  has 
since  been  a  great  blessing  to  the  poor  classes.1 

An  election  of  members  of  the  school  board  of  Glasgow 
under  this  law  affords  an  admirable  example  of  Free  Voting, 
—  one  which  goes  almost  as  far  as  the  most  theoretical  and 
radical  methods  for  securing  minority  representation.  This 
board  is  composed  of  fifteen  members,  and  they  are  elected 
on  general  ticket.  From  all  the  persons  nominated,  the 
voter  may  select  fifteen,  and  he  may  give  one  vote  to  each, 
or  may  bestow  all  his  fifteen  votes  upon  one  of  them,  or 
otherwise  distribute  or  cumulate  them  as  he  pleases.  Voters 
exceeding  a  sixteenth  of  the  whole  can,  therefore,  by  unit- 
ing, elect  their  candidate.  Dr.  Shaw  says :  "  The  result  has 
been  satisfactory.  The  board  is  widely  representative,  has 

1  Commons's  Pro.  Rep.,  p.  246. 


FREE  NOMINATIONS  AND  FREE  VOTING  243 

the  public  confidence,  and  has  been  able  to  proceed  boldly 
and  brilliantly  with  the  work."1 

2.  A  very  recent  example  of  an  election  of  the  members  of  an 
English  school  board  —  that  for  the  city  of  Manchester  —  is 
instructive.  Fifteen  members  of  the  school  board  were  to  be 
elected  at  the  same  time.  There  were  forty-four  candidates. 
The  Catholic  voters  were  the  most  numerous,  and  under  the 
old  system  could  perhaps  have  elected  all  the  members.  The 
Episcopalian  voters  were  the  next  most  numerous.  Of  the 
fifteen  members  elected,  the  one  having  the  fewest  votes 
received  more  than  seventy-five  hundred.  The  Catholics 
elected  only  two  members,  owing,  perhaps,  to  that  excessive 
cumulation  or  "plumping"  to  which,  as  we  have  explained, 
certain  classes  of  voters  are  likely  to  resort.  The  others 
seem  to  have  elected  about  the  proportion  due  to  their  num- 
bers. The  Episcopalians  elected  five  members,  the  Wesley- 
ans  two,  the  Presbyterians  two,  the  Philanthropists  one,  the 
Secularists  one,  and  the  Unsectarians  or  non-religionists  two 
between  them.  Party  politics  seem  to  have  been  so  little 
regarded  that  the  political  opinions  of  elected  members  are 
not  even  mentioned  in  the  accounts  we  have  seen. 

Who  can  deny  that  a  board  thus  composed  is  far  more 
competent  for  the  just  and  enlightened  management  of  the 
school  system  than  such  partisan  boards  as  are  generally 
elected  for  like  purposes  in  the  United  States?  Certainly 
some  of  the  votes  were,  in  one  view,  not  very  wisely  dis- 
tributed, but  how  can  we  much  regret  such  plumping  until 
the  plumping  voters  become  more  liberal  and  intelligent? 
A  doctrinaire  reformer  —  a  radical  devotee  of  Hare  —  may 
regret  such  nominal  loss  of  votes  as  is  shown ;  yet  what  a 
vast  improvement  was  this  election  on  the  results  of  the 
party  system  in  the  United  States.  Why  should  we  weep 
over  the  lack  of  ideal  perfection  in  representation,  when 
such  Free  Voting  —  which  is  a  long  and  essential  step 
toward  complete  minority  representation  —  will  do  more 
than  everything  else  to  lay  its  just  and  abiding  founda- 

i  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  pp.  40,  139. 


244  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

tions.  No  community  which  has  once  made  that  advance 
will  ever  go  back  to  the  old  party  system,  unless  it  has 
entered  on  the  final  decadence  of  liberty. 

8.  It  will  be  instructive,  even  if  it  be  humiliating,  to 
consider  some  American  contrasts.  Recently  the  city  of 
Cleveland,  Ohio,  elected  a  school  board  of  seven  members 
on  general  ticket.  The  Republicans  cast  110,518  votes  and 
the  Democrats  91,764.  It  was  apparently  a  mere  intolerant 
party  contest  in  a  sphere  where  all  party  issues  are  as  lam- 
entable as  they  are  irrational  and  needless.  The  Repub- 
licans elected  every  member  of  the  board,  —  and  what 
prescriptive  results  followed  the  reader  must  imagine. 
Another  example  may  be  stated  in  the  words  of  Professor 
Commons :  "  The  Cook  County  (Illinois)  Commissions  are 
elected  on  general  ticket,  with  the  result  that,  in  1892,  the 
Democrats,  with  a  vote  of  133,000,  elected  their  entire  ticket 
of  ten  candidates,  and  the  Republicans,  with  100,000  voters, 
were  unrepresented."1 

4.  The  elections  of  the  members  of  the  London  school 
board  well  illustrates  the  results  of  English  Free  Voting. 
The  board  consists  of  fifty-five  members,  and,  by  reason  of 
the  vastness  of  the  population,  the  elections  are  held  in 
eleven  districts,  five  members  being  elected  from  each. 
Each  elector  has  five  votes,  and  he  may  distribute  or  cumu- 
late them,  as  is  explained  in  the  case  of  Glasgow.  Dr. 
Shaw  says:  "The  London  plan  gives  every  considerable 
element  an  opportunity  to  secure  representation."  He  tells 
us  that  "the  general  educational  condition  of  London  has 
been  revolutionized  within  twenty-five  years,"  that  "there 
are  now  at  least  750,000  children  enrolled  in  schools  of  good 
character,"  and  that  compulsory  education  is  not  a  mere 
nominal  provision,  but  attendance  in  London  "is  enforced 
by  an  army  of  272  visitors."2  The  method  of  Free  Voting  is 
applied  to  the  election  of  the  members  of  school  boards 
throughout  England.  Under  the  Free  Voting  system  the 
English  public  school  administration  has  become,  in  some 

1  Commons's  Pro.  Rep.,  pp.  98,  87,  88.  *  Mun.  Gov.  O.  B-,  p.  308. 


FREE  NOMINATIONS  AND  FREE  VOTING  245 

particulars,  quite  superior  to  that  which  generally  prevails 
in  the  United  States.  It  is  to  a  large  extent  free  from 
the  scandalous  relations  with  partisan  politics  which  so 
frequently  disgrace  and  enfeeble  the  American  school 
system. 

5.  It  is  worthy  of  special  notice,  in  conclusion,  that  Free 
Nominations  and  Free  Voting  would  make  it  far  easier  than 
it  can  be  under  the  old  methods  to  secure  party  support  for 
non-partisan  city  administration.  No  party  is  likely  to 
favor  methods  which  may  give  all,  or  nearly  all,  the  offices 
to  its  opponents  in  great  cities ;  but  no  reasonable  and  patri- 
otic party  can,  without  the  strong  censure  of  public  opinion, 
oppose  methods  which  will  give  to  all  parties,  as  well  as 
to  all  classes  of  citizens,  "that  proportion  of  the  city  and 
village  officers  which  is  due  to  the  number  and  intelligence 
of  its  municipal  adherents,  —  an  effect  which  is  sure  to 
follow  the  enforcement  of  Free  Nominations  and  Free 
Voting. 


246  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 


CHAPTER    X.  —  CONCERNING    THE    FUNCTIONS    AND    RELA- 
TIONS OF  CITY  COUNCILS  AND  MAYORS 

What  is  meant  by  the  Council?  Its  character  and  tendency  generally  stated. 
Relations  of  councils  and  mayors  considered  in  reference  to  principles  and 
American  constitutions.  Councils  must  make  ordinances,  determine  expendi- 
tures, and  investigate  abuses.  The  larger  powers  needed  for  true  Home  Rule  are 
legislative  —  fit  for  a  council  and  not  for  a  mayor.  To  avoid  constant  appeals  to 
legislature,  we  must  have  councils  competent  to  make  ordinances  which  relieve 
need  of  special  laws.  A  true  council  is  a  non-partisan  body,  but  a  mayor  is 
inevitably  a  party  representative.  The  autocratic  mayor  and  his  origin.  We 
must  choose  between  a  partisan,  autocratic  mayor  and  a  non-partisan  council. 
Who  support  autocratic  mayors.  The  delusive  theory  of  "holding  the  mayor 
responsible."  The  vicious  theory  of  removals  "  at  pleasure."  Such  remov- 
als anti-republican  and  the  very  embodiment  of  the  spoils  system.  Causes 
which  resulted  in  autocratic  mayors.  The  noble  forces  unrepresented  in  partisan 
councils  which  Free  Nominations  and  Free  Voting  would  make  effective  in  non- 
partisan  councils.  The  composition  of  the  council  —  the  great  unsolved  city 
problem.  Vicious  distribution  of  ordinance-making  power  in  American  cities. 
Imperative  need  of  competent  non-partisan  councils.  Can  never,  without  such  a 
council,  have  consistent  or  adequate  laws  for  cities.  Power  and  duty  of  city 
council  as  to  city  laws.  Councils  should  elect  some  members  of  the  legislatures. 
Provisions  of  constitution  of  New  York  for  hearings  before  mayor  as  to  pending 
city  bills.  Evils  possible  from  this  provision.  Hearing  should  be  before  the 
council  and  prior  to  presenting  bills  to  legislature.  Why  non-partisan  city  gov- 
ernment having  adequate  Home  Rule  powers  is  easiest  established.  The  funda- 
mental differences  between  city  governments  in  which  the  mayor  is  paramount 
and  those  in  which  the  councils  are  paramount.  City  councils  as  essential  to 
municipal  corporations  as  boards  of  directors  or  trustees  are  to  business  corpora- 
tions. City  affairs  —  a  municipal  corporation  —  contain  the  elements  of  many 
business  corporations.  Neither  should  regard  the  politics  or  religion  of  its 
officers.  Why,  as  cities  grow  larger,  such  party  discrimination  will  become 
more  intolerable. 

1.  THE  subjects  thus  far  considered  would  remain  impor- 
tant whatever  the  framework  of  city  government.  We  must 
now  decide  what  should  be  the  fundamental  parts  of  this 
framework,  especially  what  should  be  the  relations  between 
the  council  and  the  mayor.1 

1  The  word  "  council  "  is  used  to  include  whatever  legislative  body,  whether 
of  two  chambers  or  only  one,  may  exercise  the  legislative  powers  —  or  what  are 
more  accurately  designated  as  the  ordinance-making  powers  —  of  a  municipality. 
The  council  cannot  be  said  to  include  commissions,  whose  powers  are  quite  as 


FUNCTIONS  OF  CITY  COUNCILS  AND  MAYORS      247 

To  make  our  meaning  definite,  and  to  prevent  the  council 
we  have  in  view  being  confounded  with  the  familiar  partisan 
bodies  which  have  existed  in  this  country,  we  wish  to  say, 
at  this  point,  that  we  shall  propose  a  city  council  of  which 
a  large  portion  of  the  members  will  be  elected  from  the  city 
at  large ;  that  in  the  main  their  terms  of  office  will  be  six 
years;  that  they  will  be  so  classified  that  only  about  one- 
third  of  them  will  be  elected  each  alternate  year,  thus 
renewing  one-third  of  the  body  biennially  and  making  a 
steady  business,  non-partisan  policy  possible;  and  that  the 
members  of  the  council  will  be  nominated  according  to  the 
method  of  Free  Nominations,  and  will  be  elected  by  Free 
Voting.  Therefore  not  only  all  parties,  but  all  minorities 
and  all  considerable  classes  and  interests  among  the  people, 
will  be  duly  represented  in  the  membership  of  that  body. 
It  would  therefore  be  hardly  possible  for  any  party  to  cap- 
ture the  control  of  the  council  as  the  result  of  any  single 
election;  and  the  council  would  obviously  be  such  a  non- 
partisan  and  continuous  city  legislature  as  no  American  city 
has  ever  had.  The  experiment  of  a  non-partisan  city  gov-f 
ernment  has  never  yet  been  tried  in  the  United  States, 
unless  in  Washington,  it  having  been  only  the  city-party , 
system  and  party  government  which  has  been  tested, 
which  has  failed. 

2.  It  is  a  striking  illustration  of  the  difficulties  in  dealing 
with  our  municipal  problems,  that  even  as  to  questions  so 
fundamental  as  the  fit  powers  and  relations  of  mayors  and 
councils  there  is  much  contrariety  of  opinion  and  no  gener- 
ally accepted  basis  on  which  to  stand. 

A  glance  at  some  first  principles  may  contribute  to  sound 
conclusions.  We  may  go  back  on  the  course  of  govern- 
mental development  to  the  time  when  a  king  united  in  his 
person  all  political  powers  and  departments,  —  legislative, 
judicial,  and  executive, —  and  his  will  was  law.  As  justice 

much  executive  as  legislative ;  but  when  a  good  municipal  system  shall  have  been 
developed,  we  must  think  that  commissions  will  be,  in  the  main  at  least,  super- 
seded—  their  ordinance-making  powers  devolving  upon  the  council.  Ordinances 
properly  include  by-laws  and  rules,  but  the  law  and  council  may  allow  heads  of 
departments  to  make  regulations  consistent  with  the  ordinances. 


248  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

and  liberty  advanced,  three  grand  departments  thus  desig- 
nated were  developed;  and  under  no  government  is  that 
development  so  broad  and  complete  as  under  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States.  An  American  statesman  can 
hardly  imagine  any  just  government  which  has  not  these 
three  carefully  balanced  departments.  To  make  laws,  to 
interpret  laws,  and  to  execute  laws, —  these  are,  in  the  very 
nature  of  government,  three  distinct  and  essential  functions. 
As  righteous  government  has  been  advanced  through  the 
differentiation  of  these  three  departments,  so,  on  the  con- 
trary, a  tendency  to  revert  to  despotism  has  been  marked  by 
a  gradual  suppression  of  one  or  more  of  these  departments, — 
generally  by  curtailing  the  powers  of  the  legislative  and 
judicial  departments  and  accumulating  them  upon  the  exec- 
utive. Not  only  Caesars,  Cromwells,  and  Napoleons,  but 
such  municipal  despots  as  various  American  cities  are  tend- 
ing to  make  out  of  their  mayors,  are  developed  through  such 
a  reversion.  We  cannot  in  general  have  a  good  municipal 
government  without  having  the  substance  of  each  of  these 
'three  departments,  though  the  state  may  in  the  main  supply 
J  the  municipal  judiciary. 

'  It  seems  to  be  of  late  largely  assumed,  in  some  sections 
^of  the  United  States,  that  a  mayor  elected  by  the  people, 
and  who  possesses  an  autocratic  power,  is  essential  to  good 
city  government.  Nevertheless,  in  the  city  of  Washington, 
the  best-governed  city  in  the  Union,  there  is  no  mayor;  in 
the  city  of  Paris  the  nearest  approximations  to  a  mayor  are 
two  prefects;  in  all  English  cities  the  mayors  are  elected  by 
the  councils  from  their  own  members;  and  in  all  Europe 
there  is  not  an  enlightened  and  well-governed  city  in  which 
the  mayor  is  elected  by  popular  vote. 

3.  The  first  article  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  declares  the  powers  of  Congress,  —  the  legislative 
powers  of  the  government.  This  article  in  substance  de- 
fines the  sphere  within  which  all  judicial  and  executive 
authority  must  be  confined.  So  in  granting  a  municipal 
charter,  the  first  and  main  things  to  be  made  clear  are  the 
powers  of  the  legislative  body, —  the  council, —  in  reference 


FUNCTIONS  OF   CITY  COUNCILS  AND  MAYORS      249 

to  which  all  judicial  and  executive  authority  for  a  city  must 
be  conferred.  The  natural  conception  of  a  municipal  cor- 
poration is  that  of  a  body  of  which  the  council  is  the  funda- 
mental and  paramount  force,  though  a  charter  may  properly 
vest  considerable  original  powers  in  a  mayor,  as  a  constitu- 
tion may  in  a  president  or  a  governor.  The  mayor's  office 
should  be  made  one  of  high  honor  and  dignity.  Yet  to 
regard  the  mayor  as  supreme,  and  as  responsible  for  the 
whole  city  government,  is  as  unnatural  and  unwarranted 
as  to  look  upon  the  President  as  supreme  and  responsible 
for  the  whole  national  government,  or  the  governor  as 
supreme  and  responsible  for  the  whole  state  government. 
The  fact  that  many  Americans  so  regard  their  mayors  is  an 
ominous  evidence  of  unsound  municipal  conceptions  and 
perverted  municipal  powers. 

4.  The  great  function  of  the  council  is  to  make  the  city 
ordinances,  as  it  is  of  Congress  and  the  legislatures  to  make 
the  state  and  national  laws.  A  main  function  of  mayors  is 
to  execute  the  ordinances,  as  it  is  of  presidents  and  govern- 
ors to  execute  the  laws.  Ordinances  may  impose  duties  on 
mayors,  as  laws  may  impose  duties  on  governors  and  presi- 
dents ;  as  business  corporations,  through  the  orders  of  their 
directors,  may  impose  a  policy  which  their  presidents  are 
bound  to  carry  into  effect.  Ordinances  are  as  binding  upon 
mayors  as  laws  are  upon  governors.  A  mayor  is  no  more 
exclusively  responsible  for  good  government  in  a  city  than 
a  governor  is  for  good  government  in  a  state,  or  the  Presi- 
dent is  for  good  government  in  the  nation.  But  for  debased 
municipal  conditions,  we  should  not  think  otherwise.  If  we 
clearly  grasp  these  fundamental  truths,  we  have  gone  far 
toward  denning  the  true  relations  between  mayors  and 
councils. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  city  ordinances  made  by  a  compe- 
tent council  will  most  authentically  and  authoritatively 
express,  in  a  governmental  sense,  the  wisdom,  the  moral 
tone,  and  the  policy  of  the  local  government,  and  of  the 
people  who  live  under  it.  The  city  ordinances  begin  just 
beneath  the  laws,  and  may  fill  the  whole  governmental 


250  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

sphere  below  them.  If  wisely  framed,  they  would  consti- 
tute an  enlightened  municipal  code  of  which  statesmen  and 
philanthropists  might  be  proud,  and  by  which  the  govern- 
mental powers  possessed  by  the  city  would  be  patriotically 
declared  for  its  well-being.  They  would  prescribe  not 
merely  the  important  duties  and  methods  of  a  few  of  the 
city  departments  and  offices,  but  would  definitely  outline 
and  regulate  the  action  of  the  municipal  officers  generally. 
To  properly  frame  such  ordinances  requires  the  greatest  wis- 
dom and  the  broadest  experience  which  the  city  can  supply. 

5.  Let  us  get  a  practical  view  of  the  natural  relations 
between  the  council  and  mayor.  Suppose  a  legislature  has 
just  given  a  city  much  larger  powers.  The  instant  need  of 
a  competent  council  to  make  new  ordinances  for  their 
exercise  is  obvious.  The  mayor  is  not  the  first  to  act,  nor 
does  he  act  the  principal  part;  he  approves  the  action  of 
the  council,  or  obstructs  it,  so  far  as  he  can,  by  his  veto. 
It  is  the  legislative  department  which  is  in  its  nature  both 
paramount  and  primary. 

Under  all  liberal  governments,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  legis- 
lative branch  to  investigate  the  executive  branch,  to  take 
care  that  executive  officers  do  not  transcend  their  authority 
or  exceed  the  expenditures  allowed  by  law.  Congress  in- 
quires into  the  doings  of  the  President.  One  of  its 
branches  impeaches  him  for  malfeasance,  and  the  other 
tries  him  and  may  displace  him.  Legislatures  investigate 
the  conduct  of  governors.  The  modern  American  doctrine 
in  some  states  of  making  the  municipal  executive  auto- 
cratic, and  conferring  legislative  power  —  aside  from  his 
veto  —  upon  mayors,  is  repugnant  to  the  whole  theory  of 
liberal  governments,  —  is  a  distinct  retrogression  toward 
despotism.  There  would  not  only  be  great  utility,  but  an 
obvious  conformity  to  the  general  principles  of  American 
constitutions,  in  provisions  which  should  enable  city  coun- 
cils, when  their  members  shall  be  properly  selected,  to  fix 
and  scrutinize  expenditures,  to  investigate  the  doings  of 
mayors,  and  to  have  an  important  part  in  proceedings  for 
their  removal. 


FUNCTIONS  OF   CITY  COUNCILS  AND  MAYORS      251 

6.  It  is  as  clearly  the  function  of  a  city  council  (subject 
to  the  veto  power  of  the  mayor)  to  fix  the  salaries  of  munici- 
pal officers  and  the  wages  of  municipal  employees,  as  it  is 
the  function  of  legislatures  and  Congress  to  fix  the  salaries 
and  wages  of  state  and  national  officers  and  employees. 
The  giving  of  large  control  over  such  matters  to  mayors 
and  executive  municipal  officers  is  an  illustration  of  a  des- 
potism in  our  municipal  methods  which  would  arouse  an 
active  resistance  if  extended  to  governors,  presidents,  or  the 
heads  of  state  and  national  departments.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  fixing  of  these  amounts  by  legislatures  is  often 
an  act  of  arbitrary  power  for  party  ends,  without  adequate 
information  and  according  to  standards  very  unjust  to  the 
municipalities. 

II 

1.  A  suggestion  arising  from  the  very  nature  of  the  ordi- 
nance-making powers  should  be  noticed  here.     The  larger 
powers  needed  for  adequate  Home  Rule  are  not  in  the  main 
executive  powers,  but  are  emphatically  legislative  powers. 
They  are  therefore  fit  to  be  conferred  upon  a  city  council 
and  unfit  to  be  conferred  upon  a  mayor.     What  cities  need 
and  reasonably  demand  is  not  more  executive  powers,  but 
larger  authority  to  legislate  for  themselves,  more  exemption 
from  special  state  laws.     If  the  power  of  legislation  by  the 
city,  and  hence  by  its  council,  should  be  even  quadrupled, 
the  mayor  would  not  need  much  larger  powers.     But  the 
duties,  functions,  and  responsibilities  of  the  council  would 
obviously  be  much  increased. 

2.  It  is  plain  that  we  cannot  avoid  very  frequent  appeals 
to  the  state  for  special  municipal  laws  unless  we  empower 
some  municipal  body  or  officer  to  supply  the  needs  on  which 
these  appeals  are  based,  that  is,  the  need  of  local  legislation 
for  the  city.     It  is  generally  admitted  that  this  power  of 
local  legislation,  through  ordinances  to  be  made  by  commis- 
sions, must  be  superseded.     It  must  be  conferred  upon  some 
other  local  authority.     It  may  be  conferred  (1)  upon  mayors, 
(2)  upon  city  councils,  or  (3)  upon  the  two  jointly.     We 


252  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

shall,  in  another  chapter,  show  how  this  power  may  be 
jointly  conferred  upon  the  council  and  the  mayor,  in  a  man- 
ner likely  to  result  in  good  government.  It  remains  to 
consider  here,  therefore,  the  theory  which  would  confer  it 
upon  mayors,  or  mainly  upon  them,  and  would  of  course 
vastly  increase  their  power. 

(1)  Practical  objections  of  a  grave  character  to  such  a 
policy  appear  at  once.     We  have  seen  that  one  of  the  most 
serious  evils  in  our  municipal  condition  is  the  fact  that  it 
is  mainly  parties,   factions,   politicians,  and   political  and 
selfish  interests,   rather  than  enlightened  sentiments,   the 
higher  intelligence,   and  sound   business   interests,   which 
are   represented    and  dominate   in   our   city  governments. 
Hence  the  need  of  Free  Nominations  and  Free  Voting. 

It  is  not  practicable  to  secure  any  representation  of  this 
minority,  or  of  these  high,  non-partisan  elements,  when  a 
mayor  —  only  a  single  officer  —  is  to  be  chosen  at  the  same 
time.  The  mere  numerical  majority  will  inevitably  prevail. 
Save  in  very  rare  cases  of  a  non-partisan  uprising  and  union 
for  municipal  reform,  a  mayor  will  be,  not  the  representative 
of  the  city  or  its  people  as  a  whole,  but  only  of  some  party 
majority.  Such  an  election  would  increase  party  power  and 
would  tend  to  perpetuate  city-party  domination.  It  would 
be  easy  to  establish  this  truth  by  many  examples,  but  two 
must  suffice.  Every  mayor  of  Brooklyn  —  five  mayors  in 
succession  —  from  the  end  of  Mayor  Low's  term  in  1885 
until  the  combination  which  elected  a  reform  mayor  in  1894, 
appointed  only  adherents  of  his  own  party,  a  practice  which 
enabled  the  boss,  the  machine,  and  the  party  managers  to 
rule  and  prosper  continuously.  The  prostitution  for  party 
purposes  of  the  powers  of  the  two  party-elected  mayors  of 
New  York  City  who  preceded  Mayor  Strong  was  of  a  gross 
kind  which  led  to  the  uprising  for  municipal  reform  in  1894. 

(2)  It  is  plain  that  a  true  council  is  in  its  nature  a  non- 
partisan  body,  because  one  in  which,  as  we  have  explained, 
all  parties,  interests,  and  sentiments  of  importance  will  be 
represented.      To  increase  the  authority  of  the  mayor  is 
therefore  to  increase  the  power  of  party  in  the  city  govern- 


FUNCTIONS  OF   CITY  COUNCILS   AND  MAYORS      253 

f  ment,  while  to  increase  the  authority  of  the  council  is  to 
augment  the  influence  of  the  non-partisan  and  independent 
elements  among  the  people.  The  issue  between  predomi- 
nating powers  in  a  mayor  and  predominating  powers  in  a 
council  is  consequently  but  another  form  of  the  issue  be- 
tween party  government  and  non-partisan  government  in 
cities,  —  between  government  by  party  opinion  through  par- 
tisan officers  and  government  by  public  opinion  through 
non-partisan  officers. 

All  mere  politicians  and  partisans  instinctively  favor  a 
dominating  power  on  the  part  of  the  mayor,  as  much  as  they 
condemn  Free  Nominations,  Free  Voting,  and  Civil  Service 
reform.  Under  mayoralty  domination  the  whole  govern- 
ment is  practically  controlled,  save  as  that  reform  imposes 
some  checks,  through  the  nomination  and  election  of  the 
mayor,  and  his  appointment  of  the  leading  officers.  Ap- 
pointments in  his  discretion  will  be  promised  for  votes  and 
will  be  made  to  pay  for  electioneering  services.  Under  the 
autocratic  mayoralty  system,  everything  is  brought  to  the 
politicians'  favorite  test, —  the  test  and  issue  of  a  party- 
caucus  nomination,  party-election  methods,  and  a  party 
majority.  Why,  then,  should  any  one  be  surprised  that  the 
Republican  state  boss  of  New  York,  Tammany  and  its  boss, 
the  last  two  legislatures  of  New  York, —  the  most  servilely 
partisan  the  state  has  known, —  and  the  present  governor  of 
New  York,  —  bitterly  hostile  to  civil  service  reform, —  and 
the  managers  of  the  Republican  party  machine  in  New 
York,  were  and  are  all  earnestly  in  favor  of  autocratic 
\\  mayors  ? 1 

(3)  There  is  room  for  differences  of  opinion  as  to  what 
should  be  the  respective  powers  of  mayors  and  councils  as 
to  various  details,  even  when  the  purpose  is  to  give  only 
the  legitimate  legislative  powers  to  one  and  the  legitimate 
executive  powers  to  the  other.  These  matters  will  be  con- 
sidered in  a  subsequent  chapter.  We  are  now  dealing  only 
with  the  new  theory  which  with  premeditated  purpose  makes 

l  This  was  written  in  1898. 


254  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

an  autocratic  mayor  the  dominating  power  in  city  govern- 
ment. It  says  that  the  council  shall  not,  in  analogy  to  a 
Congress  or  a  legislature,  decide  upon  policy,  limit  appro- 
priations, or  investigate  and  hold  in  check  mayoralty  mal- 
versation. A  new  kind  of  mayor  is  demanded.  The  usual 
veto  authority  —  which  makes  the  power  of  the  executive  for 
defeating  a  measure  equal  to  that  of  one-sixth  of  the  mem-, 
bers  of  the  legislature  —  is  not  enough.  The  power  of  the 
mayor,  we  are  told,  should  be  so  increased  that  he  may  be 
properly  regarded  as  the  chief  municipal  authority,  substan- 
tially responsible  for  the  whole  city  government,  while  the 
council  should  act  only  a  very  subordinate  part. 

Having  once  discarded  sound  and  established  principles, 
the  zealots  for  autocratic  mayors  have  been  led  far  astray, 
and  seem  to  have  no  definite  landmarks.  Who  can  tell  us 
whether  the  new  kind  of  mayors  are  to  possess  the  authority 
heretofore  devolved  on  commissions  ?  Whether  they  are  to 
manage  the  school  system  and  election  system?  Whether 
they  are  to  levy,  collect,  and  expend  taxes  ?  Whether  they 
are  to  be  the  only  authority  for  suppressing  administrative 
abuses  under  themselves  —  are  to  have  the  sole  power  of  pun- 
ishing the  wrong-doing  of  their  own  appointees?  Whether 
they  are  to  be  removed  at  the  pleasure  of  governors,  thus 
making  true  Home  Rule  impracticable,  —  are  to  remove  them- 
selves, or  are  not  to  be  removed  at  all  ? 

We  cannot  account  for  the  recent  theories  of  governing 
cities  through  despotic  mayors  except  upon  the  same  reasons 
which  explain  the  triumph  of  a  despotic  party-boss  system. 
The  autocratic  mayor  is  a  party  despot  in  city  politics  so  far 
as  he  is  recognized  by  law ;  while  the  boss-in-chief  is  a  party 
despot  in  city  politics  so  far  as  he  is  not  recognized  by  law. 
Each  demands  supreme  power,  and  each,  as  the  agent  of  the 
dominating  party,  requires  the  legislative  department  of  the 
city  to  be  subservient  to  his  will. 

(4)  It  is  obviously  necessary  to  decide  which,  as  between 
the  council  and  the  mayor,  is  to  be  the  paramount  power  as 
to  city  policy.  Perpetual  uncertainty  between  them  as  to 
their  powers  would  be  disastrous.  One  or  the  other  must 


FUNCTIONS  OF  CITY  COUNCILS  AND  MAYORS      255 

determine  the  policy,  expenditures,  and  legislation  of  the 
city,  though  the  mayor  will  of  course  always  have  the  in- 
fluence due  to  his  veto  power  and  his  appointing  power. 
Thoughtful  writers  have  seen  the  vital  importance  of  these 
matters.  Professor  Commons  says  "there  is  in  fact  no  half- 
way position  between  rule  by  mayor  and  rule  by  council.  If 
Americans  accept  the  present  tendency,  they  cannot  stop 
short  of  the  abolition  of  the  council."  Mayors,  he  tells  us, 
will  be  removed  by  governors,  even  for  political  reasons. 
He  declares  that  "  Home  Rule  .  .  .  and  municipal  patriot- 
ism .  .  .  must  gradually  disappear  in  the  face  of  advancing 
centralization."1  There  is  a  class  of  city  reformers  who 
mean  to  substantially  suppress  city  councils  and  make  a  sort 
of  municipal  king.  Ex-Mayor  Low,  speaking  of  American 
cities,  says  it  "sometimes  seems  almost  as  though  the 
attempt  would  be  made  to  govern  without  any  local  legisla- 
ture." He  condemns  this  attempt  and  declares  the  need  of 
a  council  with  large  powers.2  A  well-known  writer  cited 
by  Mr.  Bryce  has  advised  that  the  mayor  be  the  only  elected 
city  officer,  and  that  every  executive  function  be  exercised 
by  officials  appointed  by  him.3  A  volume  just  published  by 
a  New  York  writer  demands  a  yet  more  autocratic  mayor, 
declaring  that  "  it  is  wise  to  give  the  mayor  absolute  sway. 
He  should,"  he  says,  "be  the  king  or  monarch  of  the  city."4 
If  the  opinion  should  begin  to  prevail  that  the  powers  of 
Congress  and  of  legislatures  should  be  devolved  on  presi- 
dents and  governors,  what  statesman  would  not  have  fears 
as  to  the  stability  of  the  republic?  But  are  we  sure  the 
danger  is  much  less  when  we  are  ready  to  suppress  munici- 
pal representation  and  make  despots  out  of  mayors  whom 
the  bosses  of  our  city  parties  elect  and  control? 

There  is  a  natural  tendency,  when  politics  become  corrupt 
and  the  citizens  become  desperate,  to  accumulate  arbitrary 
power  upon  executive  officers.  The  cities  of  the  Italian 
republics  of  the  Middle  Ages,  as  their  governments  sank 
more  and  more  into  partisan  corruption,  thus  accumulated 

i  Pro.  Rep.,  pp.  215,  216.  2  i  Bryce,  Am.  Comw.,  p.  633. 

8  1  Bryce,  Am.  Comw.,  p.  614.  *  Conkling's  City  Govt.,  p.  32. 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

powers  upon  their  executive  chiefs,  or  mayors,  until  these 
officers  became  despotic,  and  municipal  liberty  was  sup- 
pressed.1 When  the  boss  can  nominate  the  mayor,  and 
compel  all  his  appointments  from  the  ruling  party,  what 
more  natural  than  that  both  the  party  and  the  boss  should 
welcome  every  increase  of  mayoralty  power? 

Such  a  mayor  also  finds  support  in  that  class  of  well- 
meaning  people  who  are  too  indolent  to  study,  or  too  dull 
to  comprehend,  the  difficult  problem  of  city  government. 
Ready  to  take  the  gambler's  chance  that  a  party  will  elect 
a  patriotic  despot  for  mayor,  they  dismiss  the  subject  by 
saying  they  will  "hold  him  responsible,"  reckless  of  the 
fact  that  he  feels  no  effective  responsibility  save  to  the  party 
and  its  leaders  by  whom  he  was  elected.  He  defies  public 
opinion,  being  satisfied  with  the  laudations  of  the  managers 
of  his  own  party,  through  whom  he  expects  to  secure  a  re- 
election. "  Holding  him  responsible  "  is  perhaps  the  most 
evasive,  mischievous,  and  deceptive  phrase  in  municipal 
literature.  It  disguises  an  open  surrender  to  party  des- 
potism and  seeks  to  respectably  evade  the  duty  of  establish- 
ing something  better. 

3.  If  from  principle  we  turn  to  the  best  authorities,  they 
seem  to  be  decisive  against  autocratic  party-elected  mayors. 
Dr.  Shaw  tells  us  that  "  the  plan  of  greatly  increasing  the 
power  of  the  mayor  ...  is  the  plan  of  a  periodically  elec- 
tive dictatorship  .  .  .  which  is  unrepublican, "  and  that 
"the  one-man  power  is  on  the  decline  everywhere  in  this 
age."2  It  seems  strange,  indeed,  that  a  republic  should 
resort  to  this  municipal  dictatorship,  while  monarchies  re- 
ject it.  But,  apparently,  the  autocratic  mayor  and  the  mu- 
nicipal boss  are  the  inevitable  accompaniment  of  each  other. 
•  Professor  Commons  declares  that  autocratic  mayors  would 
\  result  in  what  he  calls  a  "  mayoralty  despotism "  and 

1  "  Despotism  is  the  natural  and  legitimate  government  of  an  early  society,  in 
which  knowledge  has  not  yet  developed  the  power  of  the  people ;  .  .  .  but  when 
it  is  introduced  into  a  civilized  community,  it  is  in  the  nature  of  a  disease  .  .  . 
which,  unless  it  be  checked,  has  a  continued  tendency  to  spread."  2  Lecky's 
European  Morals,  p.  276. 

»  JIun.  Gov.  0.  B.,  pp.  78,  79,  62,  63. 


FUNCTIONS  OF  CITY  COUNCILS  AND  MAYORS      257 

involve  city  affairs  in  national  politics.1  Professor  Good- 
now  of  Columbia  University  seems  to  have  reached  much 
the  same  conclusions,  and  he  doubts  the  success  of  this  pro- 
posed advance  to  municipal  reform  through  what  he  calls 
"mayoralty  despotism"  and  a  "monarchical  mayor."  He 
says  that  in  the  well-governed  cities  of  monarchical  Europe, 
where  city-party  government  is  unknown  and  where  des- 
potic power  in  a  mayor  would  seem  natural,  no  such  vast 
powers  have  been  conferred  upon  mayors  as  have  been  pro- 
vided for  them  in  this  country.  He  points  to  the  need  of 
a  "council  which  shall  determine  the  policy  of  the  city."2 

4.  A  recent  law  of  New  York  relative  to  the  appointing 
power  of  the  mayor  of  New  York  City3  affords  a  very  definite 
illustration  of  the  autocratic  mayoralty  theory.  This  law 
authorizes  the  mayor,  at  any  time  within  six  months  after 
the  commencement  of  his  term,  to  "  at  pleasure  *  remove  from 

1  Pro.  Rep.,  pp.  198,  199,  215,  216. 

2  Mun.  Home  Rule,  pp.  5,  6;  Mun.  Prob.,  pp.  257,  308.     In  close  analogy  to 
the  plan  of  making  mayors  despots,  there  has  been  a  theory  advanced,  according 
to  which  cities  are  to  have  unlimited  powers  for  their  own  enlargement.    Under 
this  scheme  the  vote  of  the  city  and  that  of  any  contiguous  district,  large  or 
small,  may  by  a  mere  concurrence  add  the  district  to  the  city ;  and  this  process 
may  apparently  go  on  year  after  year  until  the  whole  state  is  swallowed  up  by  a 
single  municipality,  and  the  governor  shall  become  a  subordinate  of  a  mayor. 
The  scheme  ignores  the  paramount  and  essential  sovereignty  of  the  state,  as  well 
as  its  right  and  duty  to  decide  as  to  what  general  policy  should  prevail  as  to  its 
subdivisions.    If  cities  are  to  be  allowed  this  power  for  their  extension,  the  same 
power  must  be  allowed  to  towns,  villages,  and  counties ;  and,  apparently,  the 
discretion  of  making  subdivision  of  themselves,  as  well  as  extensions,  must  also 
be  conceded.    The  state  might  soon  become  contemptible  in  the  eyes  of  those  who 
would  dominate  its  subdivisions,  which  might  become  supreme.    Every  ruling 
party  in  a  city  would  seek  by  money,  influence,  and  coercion  to  gain  control  of 
the  largest  district  which  would  add  most  to  its  majority  vote.    Thus  an  active 
element  of  constant  partisan  intrigue  and  corruption  would  be  introduced  into 
municipal  affairs.    When  the  same  party  should  be  in  power  in  a  state  and  in  one 
of  its  great  cities,  it  would  be  poor  party  management  that  did  not  result  in  the 
corrupt  perpetuation  of  the  control  of  both  by  that  party.    If  the  cities  may,  as 
some  contend,  make  their  own  charters,  fix  their  own  limits,  and  make  autocrats 
of  their  mayors,  it  will  very  soon  be  of  little  consequence  what  the  rural  residents 
—  of  some  states  at  least  —  shall  say  or  do  concerning  their  governments.    The 
largest  cities  will  be  supreme. 

8  Laws,  1895,  Ch.  11. 

4  We  must  regard  it  as  discreditable  to  any  American  legislature  to  propose  to 
allow  one  officer  to  remove  another  "  at  pleasure."  The  phrase  is  feudal  and 
despotic,  and  of  evil  suggestion  under  republican  government.  There  can  be  no 
moral  right  to  remove  "  at  pleasure"  or  for  pleasure,  but  o^ly  to  remove  in  the 

S 


258          THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

office  any  public  officer  holding  office  by  appointment  from 
the  mayor,  except  judicial  officers."  No  reasons  need  be 
given  for  removals  under  this  abominable  law;  no  malfea- 
sance or  incompetency  need  be  even  suggested;  no  right  to 
ask  an  explanation  is  allowed  to  the  officer  about  to  be 
removed;  he  may  be  the  most  worthy  and  efficient  in  the 
municipal  service;  the  removal  may  be  made  "at  the  pleas- 
ure "  of  the  mayor  in  the  execution  of  the  corrupt  and  parti- 
san bargain  which  secured  his  own  election ;  it  may  be  made 
even  to  gratify  his  personal  revenge,  or  to  pay  his  election 
debts.  Could  any  royal  despot  do  more  than  this?  Could 
any  diabolical  ingenuity  do  much  more  to  make  city-party 
despotism  absolute  in  the  executive  service,  or  to  repel  from 
it  all  self-respecting  citizens  ?  Yet  this  lamentable  spoils- 
system  enactment  was  promoted  in  the  name  of  municipal 
reform !  It  is  a  disgrace  to  the  state  of  New  York  and  will 
bring  shame  to  the  next  generation.1 

This  law  practically  said  to  the  gamblers,  the  grog-shop- 
keepers, and  all  the  vile  and  criminal  classes:  "Give  us 
the  needed  votes  to  elect  our  mayor,  and  he  will  remove  at 
his  pleasure  the  commissioners  and  high  officers  most  obnox- 
ious to  you  and  appoint  such  as  you  will  like  to  succeed 
them."  We  may  now  add  (1898)  that  the  ability  to  do 
this  probably  brought  thousands  of  votes  and  vast  sums  of 
money  to  Tammany  in  the  Greater  New  York  election  of 
last  autumn.2 

5.  Every  reason  that  will  justify  a  mayor  in  removing  the 
officers  below  him  "at  pleasure,"  or  without  giving  a  good 
reason  and  an  opportunity  for  explanation,  will  also  justify 
every  officer  in  the  municipal  grades  below  in  acting  on  the 
same  spoils-system  theory.  Municipal  literature  presents  no 
greater  absurdity  than  the  attempts  made  to  support,  at  the 

public  interest  —  for  the  well-being  of  the  people  —  as  the  law  may  allow.  An 
officer  mast  undoubtedly  sometimes  be  the  sole  judge  of  this  duty  of  removal. 

1  It  was  enacted  by  a  partisan,  Republican  legislature,  when  the  Republicans 
expected  to  elect  the  next  mayor  of  New  York.  He  was,  however,  elected  by 
Tammany,  with  this  law  un repealed.  It  is  now  the  chief  intrenchment  of  the 
Tamnruiy  system  and  its  boss. 

«  See  Ch.  XVI11, 


FUNCTIONS  OF  CITY  COUNCILS  AND  MAYORS      259 

same  time,  both  an  autocratic  mayor  and  civil  service  reform 
policy, —  an  attempt  to  show  that  all  the  higher  officers  should 
be  appointed  and  removed  by  mayors  "at  pleasure,"  while  all 
the  lower  ones  should  be  appointed  only  for  merit  and  re- 
moved only  for  cause  regardless  of  party.  Yet  some  may  say 
it  is  a  yet  greater  absurdity  for  supporters  of  the  merit  sys- 
tem to  insist  that  the  mayor  is  to  be  still  looked  upon  as 
responsible  for  every  part  of  a  city  government  —  according 
to  the  old  theory  of  a  despot  —  after  nineteen-twentieths  of 
all  those  who  administer  it  have  been  appointed  on  the  basis 
of  merit  tested  by  the  civil  service  examinations. 

We  must  think  that  in  a  truly  enlightened  community 
every  candidate  for  the  mayoralty  would  be  condemned  as 
by  nature  a  coward,  a  despot,  or  a  mercenary  malefactor 
who  should  even  desire  an  authority  to  make  removals  at 
pleasure,  or  for  any  cause  which  he  was  unwilling  to  avow. 
He  ought  to  be  ashamed  to  hold  up  his  head  before  his 
fellow-citizens. 

Ill 

From  the  evils  incident  to  the  autocratic  mayoralty  system 
we  may  turn  to  some  of  the  causes  of  its  adoption.  Many 
men  support  the  system  not  because  they  like  it  or  fail  to 
see  its  dangers,  but  because,  partisan  councils  having  failed, 
they  see  nothing  more  satisfactory  at  hand.  Yet  the  greater 
part  of  the  strength  of  this  system  comes  from  the  besotted 
party  spirit  which  the  spoils  system  and  the  boss  system 
have  developed,  making  ordinary  party  men  far  more  servile 
to  their  leaders  in  large  cities  than  they  are  in  the  villages 
or  the  country.  Men  in  the  country  who  would  be  shocked 
at  the  proposal  to  confer  despotic  power  upon  presidents  and 
governors  merely  because  excessive  party  control  has  caused 
grave  evils  in  Congress  and  legislatures,  yet  seem  to  be 
ready  .to  allow  great  cities  to  have  autocratic  mayors  with- 
out considering  why  city  councils,  or  what  kind  of  councils, 
have  so  largely  failed.  Sensible  men  who  know  that  the 
most  complete  failures  that  have  ever  occurred  in  any  part 
of  American  city  government  were  those  on  the  part  of  the 


260  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

New  York  judiciary  in  1870,  in  the  time  of  Tweed  and  Bar- 
nard, and  those  on  the  part  of  police  courts  just  before  the 
uprising  in  New  York  City  in  1894,  have  not  proposed  to 
abolish  the  courts  or  to  confer  judicial  power  upon  the 
mayors.  They  have,  on  the  contrary,  tried  to  make  —  and 
in  the  main  have  made  —  these  tribunals  what  they  should 
be.  Why  not  deal  in  the  same  way  with  city  councils,  by 
making  them  what  they  should  be,  instead  of  conferring  all 
their  powers  upon  mayors? 

The  stupendous  evils  which  led  to  the  uprising  in  New 
York  City  in  1894  were  little  more  than  the  direct  outcome 
of  the  prostitution  of  autocratic  powers  by  mayors  in  the 
appointment  of  police  justices  and  police  commissioners  and 
other  officers.  In  substance  the  city  had  no  fit  council,  and 
the  lack  of  it  facilitated  the  abuse  of  mayoralty  despotism. 
To  give  mayors  yet  more  autocratic  powers,  in  order  to  im- 
prove such  a  condition,  is  as  wise  as  to  apply  a  blister  to 
cure  a  burn,  or  to  set  up  a  Star  Chamber  to  aid  free 
discussion. 

The  men  who  think  that  party  government  is  the  best  for 
a  city,  or  that  the  American  people  are  incapable  of  main- 
taining any  other,  ought  certainly  to  oppose  non-partisan 
councils,  and  should  seek  to  make  mayors  autocrats.  We 
may  not  be  able  to  change  their  opinions  at  once,  but  we 
may  remember  that  the  years  are  very  few  since  their  atti- 
tude was  equally  hostile  toward  civil  service  reform,  corrupt 
practice  reform,  and  ballot  reform;  and  we  may  profitably 
ponder  the  facts  that  autocratic  mayors  elected  by  popular 
vote,  and  the  lack  of  a  council  which  represents  the  people 
rather  than  the  party  majority,  are  as  distinctive  features  of 
American  city  governments  as  are  the  party  spoils  system 
and  general  malfeasance  in  their  administration. 

IV 

No  reflecting  mind  will  lightly  estimate  the  potent  and 
uplifting  forces  which  now  have  but  a  slight  representation 
in  the  membership  of  our  city  councils.  The  citizens  who 


FUNCTIONS  OF  CITY  COUNCILS  AND  MAYORS      261 

represent  these  forces  —  and  whom  Free  Nominations  and 
Free  Voting  would  give  seats  in  well-constituted  city  coun- 
cils — have  been  the  inspirers,  proposers,  and  strength  of  the 
best  measures  for  the  improvement  of  municipal  laws  and 
administration.  Such  men  have  a  moral  power  far  beyond 
that  due  to  their  numbers,  and  have  been  the  creators  of  our 
highest  municipal  ideals.  I  But  members  of  the  partisan  and 
politician  classes,  who  generally  manage  our  city  politics, 
rarely  lead  in  such  improvements.  Hardly  any  of  the  noblest 
municipal  laws  or  methods  have  originated  with  them  or  been 
supported  by  them.  1  Colonel  Waring  did  more  in  three  years 
to  raise  the  ideal  01  municipal  cleanliness  than  the  managers 
of  Tammany,  and  the  Republicans  who  have  conspired  with 
them,  had  done  in  three  generations.1 

The  just  influence  of  the  non-partisan,  benevolent,  and 
altruistic  classes  has  been  obstructed  in  the  municipal 
sphere  by  many  obstacles  which  party  interests  and  monopo- 
lies have  interposed.  Mere  politicians  and  partisans  dislike 
these  classes.  Who  can  doubt,  if  we  shall  give  these  classes 
free  and  effective  methods  for  combining  their  strength  and 
putting  it  into  the  city  councils,  that  representatives  of 
themselves  would  soon  become  much  more  powerful  and 
salutary  than  they  have  ever  been  in  our  municipal  affairs  ? 
The  elevating  forces  in  city  life  are  mainly  business,  social, 
moral,  humanitarian,  and  religious  forces,  rather  than  those 
which  are  partisan  and  political.  It  is  mainly  the  members 
of  these  classes  representing  such  forces  who  are  the  promise 
and  potency  of  our  municipal  regeneration.  They  have 
brought  the  abuses  of  our  municipal  administration  to  pub- 
lic judgment  and  have  created  our  highest  municipal  litera- 
ture. Though  denied  representation,  they  have  supplied 
the  courage  and  devotion  which  have  initiated  and  advanced 
our  most  effective  improvements,  laboriously  and  patriotically 
carrying  many  of  the  intrenchments  by  which  politicians  and 
partisan  mayors  have  tried  to  arrest  the  progress  of  municipal 
reform.  The  members  of  these  classes  are  the  source  and 

1  See  on  this  subject  Professor  Commons's  Pro.  Rep.,  Ch.  IX.,  which  is  very 
suggestive. 


262 

strength  of  that  large  number  of  societies,  unions,  and 
leagues,  in  many  American  cities,  which  prove  that  the 
higher  municipal  public  opinion  is  at  last  aroused,  and  en- 
able us  to  feel  that  the  city-party  system  is  doomed. 


There  are  ample  reasons  which  justify  the  statement  of 
Ex-Mayor  Low  that  "the  council  is  the  great,  unsolved, 
organic  problem  in  connection  with  municipal  government 
in  the  United  States,"1  and  that  of  Professor  Goodnow  that 
"the  council  must  determine  the  policy  of  the  city."2  The 
power  to  make  the  ordinances  of  a  city  is  a  power  to  direct 
its  policy.  The  mayor,  like  all  other  citizens,  must  obey  the 
ordinances  as  well  as  the  laws. 

In  most  American  cities  the  ordinance-making  power  is 
distributed  between  limited  councils,  commissions,  boards, 
and  single  officers.  Much  conflict,  confusion,  and  needless 
litigation  are  the  inevitable  result,  as  there  would  be  con- 
cerning the  laws  if  there  were  several  law-making  bodies  in 
the  same  state.  Ordinances  which  all  citizens  must  obey 
certainly  ought  to  be  enacted  by  a  competent  body  having 
general  city  jurisdiction,  after  public  debate  and  a  consider- 
ation of  the  needs  of  all  official  departments  and  all  business 
interests.  But  quite  generally  in  American  cities,  by  reason 
of  the  lack  of  any  competent  council,  ordinances  are  made  in 
a  semi-secret  manner,  by  some  authority  —  some  commis- 
sion, board,  or  officers  having  only  a  limited  jurisdiction  — 
without  conferring  with  those  at  the  head  of  other  parts  of  the 
administration,  or  even  the  hearing  of  representatives  of  the 
city  or  its  people.  Besides,  large  parts  of  the  administra- 
tion are  not  regulated  by  ordinances  at  all,  as  justice  and 
good  administration  require  they  should  be ;  for  where  good 
ordinances  end  in  municipal  administration  despotic  or  cor- 
rupt official  favoritism  generally  begins.8 

1  Bryce's  Am.  Cornw.,  p.  633.  *  Man.  Prob.,  p.  208. 

*  The  New  York  City  Board  of  Health  had  (in  1896)  202  ordinances  made  by 
itself  alone,  and  constituting  the  sanitary  code  for  the  city,  which  profoundly 


FUNCTIONS  OF   CITY  COUNCILS  AND  MAYORS      263 

2.  For  the  regulation  of  the  police  force  of  New  York 
City  there  are  (1897)  more  than  520  ordinances,  which  deeply 
affect  the  most  varied  public  interests  and  official  duties. 
Yet  they  have  been  prepared  by  the  Police  Board  itself,  and 
have  been  adopted  without  any  public  discussion,  any  hear- 
ing on  the  part  of  the  other  branches  of  the  city  government, 
or  any  participation  of  representatives  of  the  people  of  the 
city.     It  may  be  safely  assumed  that  they  do  not  impose  any 
undue  responsibilities  or  duties  upon  the  police  commission- 
ers, or  too  much  facilitate  intelligent  public  criticism  or 
exposure  of  their  malfeasance.     Possibly  if  these  ordinances 
had  been  framed  by  independent  representatives  of  the  public 
interests,  or  had  been  publicly  discussed  before  a  competent 
city   council,    they  would   have  imposed  so  much  severer 
duties  and  responsibilities  upon  police  commissioners,  and 
would  have  so  much  better  protected  the  public  interests, 
that  New  York  City  would  have  escaped  much  of  the  cor- 
ruption and  disgrace  which  have  been  connected  with  her 
police  administration. 

3.  The  need  of  an  enlightened,  non-partisan  council  for 
making   all   ordinances   is   obviously  imperative,   and  will 
increase  with  the  growth  of  the  industries  and  population 
of  every  city.     It  is  difficult  to  say  which  would  be  the  more 
absurd  and  dangerous,  to  give  the  mayor  the  ordinance-mak- 
ing power  or  to  give  him  the  taxing  power.     The  prosperity 
and  safety  of  city  residents  depend,  in  various  particulars, 
as   much  upon   the   ordinances   as   upon   the   laws.     It   is 
through  their  ordinances  that  city  people  declare   in   the 
most  emphatic  way  their  sense  of  justice,  their  views  of 
official  and  public  duty,  their  attitude  toward  education, 
health,  morality,  and  religion  —  therefore  their  capacity  for 
Home  Rule.     To  split  up  the  ordinance-making  power  and 
parcel  it  out  among  different  semi-independent  bodies,  allow- 

affects  many  important  private  interests  and  rights,  as  well  as  the  duties  of  many 
city  officers  outside  the  Board.  As  some  justification  for  the  author's  statements, 
he  may  say  that  at  the  request  of  the  Board  of  Health  he,  as  its  counsel,  drafted 
in  1866  the  original  of  this  code,  which  consisted  of  165  ordinances,  and  that,  with 
very  small  changes,  they  were  adopted  by  the  Board  without  any  hearing  or  con- 
sent on  the  part  of  any  other  city  authority,  or  even  of  the  city  itself. 


264  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

ing  each  to  use  so  much  of  it  as  it  pleases  to  magnify  its  own 
jurisdiction,  and  aggrandize  itself  at  the  expense  of  the  gen- 
eral safety  and  convenience,  is  at  least  evidence  of  a  munici- 
pal condition  of  which  no  enlightened  people  can  be  proud. 

VI 

1.  If  we  consider  the  relations  of  cities  to  the  making  of 
laws  we  shall  find  the  need  of  a  council  with  paramount 
powers  hardly  less  imperative  than  in  regard  to  ordinances. 
It  is  conceded  that  one  of  the  greatest  evils  of  the  municipal 
situation  is  the  need  for  frequent  appeals  to  the  state  for  special 
laws  to  be  enacted  by  legislatures  most  of  whose  members  have 
no  adequate  knowledge  of  municipal  affairs.  We  have  seen 
that,  being  without  competent  city  councils,  American  cities 
cannot  —  until  such  councils  are  created  —  be  safely,  and  are 
not  likely  to  be,  trusted  with  much  larger  powers  for  Home 
Rule.  Most  cities  are  without  even  nominal  authority  in 
the  legislature  to  speak  for  themselves  as  a  whole  in  regard 
to  the  laws  they  require,  only  little  districts  and  parties 
being  therein  represented.1  Commissions,  boards,  and  sep- 
arate officers,  as  well  as  all  citizens,  may  at  pleasure  submit 
bills  to  the  legislature  asking  for  larger  powers,  exceptions, 
privileges,  or  salaries  in  their  own  interests,  without  the 
city  being  even  notified.  Nothing  of  equal  importance, 
perhaps,  is  so  neglected  by  American  cities  as  the  means 
of  securing  good  and  of  preventing  bad  legislation  affect- 
ing their  affairs.  It  is  not  wholly  the  fault  of  the  legis- 
lature if  it  is  frequently  misled,  unless  it  has  refused  the  city 
the  means  of  being  heard.  Is  it  any  just  matter  of  surprise 
that  municipal  laws  are  often  incongruous,  confused,  selfish, 
unjust,  defective  as  well  as  excessive,  and  more  in  the  inter- 
ests of  schemers,  parties,  and  officers  than  in  that  of  the 
cities  themselves?2  Many  of  these  excessive  laws  may  have 

1  The  first  chapter  of  Professor  Goodnow's  work,  Mun.  Prob.,  seta  this  subject 
in  a  clear  light. 

*  The  laws  applicable  to  the  city  of  Now  York,  for  example,  have  become  an 
enormous,  confused  mass,  "incomprehensible,"  says  Professor  Goodnow,  "even 
to  the  learned."  Mun.  Prob.,  p.  8.  See,  on  this  subject,  Ch.  L 


FUNCTIONS  OF  CITY  COUNCILS  AND  MAYORS      265 

probably  been  applied  for  only  by  reason  of  the  ease  of  thus 
gaining  selfish  advantages  over  the  public.  We  hold  it  to 
be  a  sound  general  rule  that  no  private  person  and  no  city 
board  or  officer  should  be  allowed  to  approach  the  legislature 
for  the  passage  of  a  bill  affecting  the  charter  or  interests  of 
the  city  until  the  city  council  has  had  a  fit  opportunity  for 
considering  it  and  expressing  its  opinion,  —  a  rule  which 
would  much  reduce  the  number  of  such  bills  and  greatly 
increase  the  information  of  the  legislature  for  dealing  with 
them.  It  is  something  near  to  treachery  in  a  city  officer  to 
use  his  official  power  or  influence  in  the  legislature  in  try- 
ing to  change  the  city  charter  before  a  hearing  has  been  had 
on  the  part  of  the  city  itself. 

The  legislature  may  properly  prepare  such  bills  as  it  feels 
compelled  to  prescribe  for  a  city,  but  it  should  provide  for 
the  city  being  heard  before  they  are  enacted.  As  a  rule, 
the  legislature  should  not  allow  any  other  bill  relating  to 
affairs  of  a  city  to  be  presented  before  it  until  the  bill  has 
been  considered  or  seasonably  presented  for  consideration  in 
the  city  council.  Party  managers  and  traders  in  legislation 
would  of  course  bitterly  oppose  such  requirements,  which 
would  vastly  reduce  the  number  of  vicious  and  needless 
local  bills,  as  well  as  the  amount  of  their  own  corrupt 
profits.  But  who  can  doubt  that  the  quality  of  city  laws 
enacted  would  be  as  much  improved  as  their  number  would 
be  reduced  by  such  provisions  ? 

If  the  councils  of  cities  were  to  have  no  other  functions 
than  those  of  adopting  ordinances  and  attending  to  legisla- 
tion, they  would  be  among  the  most  important  forces  affect- 
ing their  welfare,  and  would  need  the  services  of  their 
wisest  and  best  citizens. 

2.  The  municipal  corporation  for  which  the  council  acts, 
and  whose  policy  it  must  guide,  is  recognized  as  fit  to 
possess  a  large  measure  of  legislative  power.  The  people 
of  the  cities  are  represented  in  the  lower  house  of  the  legis- 
lature as  the  people  of  the  states  are  represented  in  the  lower 
house  of  Congress.  Why  should  not  the  councils  of  great 
cities  —  in  substance  the  cities  themselves  acting  as  a  unit 


•Ji;»-,  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

through  the  council  —  be  represented  by  senators  in  the 
upper  houses  of  the  legislatures,  as  state  legislatures  are 
in  substance  represented  by  senators  in  the  upper  house  of 
Congress  ? 

The  senators,  if  allowed  from  the  councils,  should  be 
elected  by  the  councils  themselves  from  among  their  own 
members  who  have  served  in  it  for  at  least  two  years.  Such 
senators  would  understand  city  affairs  and  could  greatly  aid 
legislatures  in  dealing  with  them  justly  and  wisely,  —  cer- 
tainly an  aid  which  legislatures  much  need.  That  these 
senators  would  be  among  the  most  intelligent,  non-partisan, 
and  useful  members  in  our  state  legislatures  we  can  hardly 
doubt  That  such  a  mode  of  choice  would  give  added  dig- 
nity to  the  councils  themselves,  and  invite  superior  men  to 
enter  them,  seems  highly  probable.  These  senators  should 
be  chosen  by  the  method  of  free  voting,  so  as  to  increase  the 
influence  of  the  non-partisan  members  of  the  council  and 
prevent  a  mere  representation  of  the  party  majority  in  the 
body. 

3.  The  framers  of  the  constitution  of  New  York  as 
amended  in  1894,1  recognizing  the  need  of  a  better  under- 
standing of  city  interests  in  our  legislatures,  provided  for 
a  hearing  upon  bills  relating  to  cities  before  some  city 
authority  prior  to  their  taking  effect.  In  certain  cities  the 
hearing  is  to  be  before  the  mayor  and  the  legislative  body 
of  the  city,  but  in  the  largest  cities,  from  the  lack  of  an 
adequate  council,  the  hearing  is  to  be  before  the  mayor  alone. 
If  the  city  authority  disapproves  a  bill,  it  fails,  unless  it 
shall  again  pass  the  legislature.  Therefore  in  the  larger 
cities  the  mayor's  disapproval  alone  practically  nullifies  the 
action  of  both  branches  of  the  state  legislature, — certainly  a 
remarkable  illustration  of  the  power  of  an  autocratic  mayor, 
and  of  the  consequences  of  suppressing  city  councils. 

This  original  device,  useful  to  some  extent,  may  be  but  a 
first  step  toward  insuring  cities  an  adequate  hearing  con- 
cerning bills  especially  affecting  them.  But  it  is  obviously 

1  Art.  Xn.  Sec.  2. 


FUNCTIONS  OF  CITY  COUNCILS  AND  MAYORS      267 

very  objectionable  in  various  ways.  The  mayor  is  not  only 
called  upon  to  perform  legislative  functions,  but  may  have 
to  do  so  on  first  entering  office,  when  he  has  had  no  adequate 
experience  in  city  affairs  and  may  be  familiar  with  hardly  a 
single  city  department.1 

A  council  in  which  all  parties  and  interests  are  repre- 
sented—  a  continuous  body  whose  members  have  long,  clas- 
sified terms  of  office,  and  who  must  of  necessity  be  at  all 
times  familiar  with  city  affairs  —  would  seem  to  be  a  pecul- 
iarly competent  body  for  the  discharge  of  such  legislative 
functions.  To  such  a  body  all  city  bills  might  be  usefully 
referred.  But  to  refer  the  bills  which  one  party  in  the 
legislature  has  passed  to  a  mayor  whom  perhaps  another 
party  has  elected,  would  obviously  tend  to  contests,  to  par- 
tisan scheming,  and  to  distrusts  highly  unfavorable  to  Home 
Rule.  What  could  more  tend  to  vicious  partisan  intensity 
in  mayoralty  elections,  to  inflate  the  self-conceit  and  arro- 
gance of  a  headstrong  party  nominee  for  mayor,  than  to  tell 
him  that  he  cannot  only  remove  at  pleasure  every  head  of 
a  department,  and  appoint  his  successor  as  he  pleases,  but 
that  he  can  defeat  every  proposed  law  for  the  city,  unless 
it  be  enacted  twice  over  by  the  legislature  ? 

4.  Such  increased  powers  conferred  upon  mayors  makes 
them  potent  partisan  forces  both  in  state  and  city  politics. 
Of  the  two  hundred  members  of  the  legislature  of  New 
York  in  1896,  eighty-five  were  elected  from  three  cities,  and 
it  was  thought  necessary  to  provide,  in  its  last  amended  con- 
stitution, in  substance,  that  the  cities  of  New  York  and 
Brooklyn,  which  united  are  much  less  than  the  Greater  New 
York,  should  not  together  have  more  than  one-half  of  the 
state  senators,  and  that  no  one  city  should  elect  more  than 
a  third  of  them. 

The  party  dominant  in  these  cities  will  apparently  be  able 
to  raise  more  money  for  carrying  elections,  and  to  use  it 


1  Such,  in  substance,  was  the  case  under  Mayor  Strong  in  1895.  He  had  to 
deal  with  the  bill  we  have  just  cited,  giving  himself  an  absolute  power  of  removal, 
within  a  very  few  days  after  his  taking  office,  and  to  pass  upon  161  separate  bills 
for  New  York  City  within  five  months  from  that  time ! 


268  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

more  diabolically,  than  all  the  rest  of  the  state.  Which,  in 
the  near  future,  will  be  the  greater  political  force,  the  gov- 
ernor of  the  state  of  New  York  or  the  mayor  of  New  York 
City?  Which  will  dictate  the  election  of  the  governor  and 
dominate  the  legislature,  the  state  boss  or  the  city  boss? 
If  minority  representation  in  cities  is  not  established  before 
their  power  is  much  increased,  the  rural  population  of  the 
state  of  New  York  will  apparently  act  a  very  inferior  part  in 
its  government  —  and  this  reasoning  is  applicable  in  several 
states. 

5.  It  is  much  to  be  regretted  that  whatever  hearings  are 
to  be  had  in  cities  upon  bills  affecting  them  should  not  take 
place  before  they  are  passed  by  the  legislature.     If  the  city 
is  opposed  to  pending  bills,  why  not  ascertain  the  fact  at 
once  and  directly  without  the  waste  of  time  and  labor,  to 
say  nothing  of  the  demoralizing  log-rolling   and   possible 
corruption  which  attend  the  passage  of  city  bills?     There 
is  something  almost  grotesque,  after  requiring  a  legislature 
of  two  hundred  members  to  spend  a  long  time  in  framing 
and  passing  a  bill  relating  to  a  great  city,  in  allowing  an 
inexperienced,  party-elected,  politician  mayor,  perhaps  for 
mere  party  reasons,  to  nullify  the  whole  proceeding  by  a 
mere  disapproving  letter  to  be  sent  to  that  body.     What 
could  more  tend  to  convert   great-city  mayors    into  semi- 
kingly,    partisan    despots,    or  to  make    state    legislatures 
ridiculous  ? 

6.  Strength  for  the  support  of  an  enlarged  Home  Rule 
and  a  non-partisan  city  administration  must  be  most  largely 
found  among  the  most  liberal  and  enlightened  members  of 
the  legislature.     They  will  favor  a  form  of  city  government 
in  which  all  opinions  and  interests  are  fairly  represented  in 
the  city  councils.     It  is  only  for  the  establishment  of  such  a 
council  that  opposing  parties  can  reasonably  be  expected  to 
cooperate.     A  city  government,  therefore,  in  which  a  non- 
partisan  council  is  paramount  is  obviously  that  which  can  be 
most  easily  established  and  maintained. 


FUNCTIONS  OF  CITY  COUNCILS  AND  MAYORS      269 


VII 

We  can  now  see  that  there  is  a  fundamental  difference — 
.  alike  in  theory,  method,  and  purpose  —  between  a  city  gov- 
ernment in  which  a  non-partisan  council  is  the  paramount 
power,  and  a  city  government  in  which  the  mayor — elected 
by  a  party  majority  —  is  the  paramount  power.  The  first  is 
based  on  public  opinion,  the  second  on  party  opinion  ;  the 
first  naturally  seeks  to  promote  the  public  interests  ;  the 
second  naturally  seeks  to  promote  party  interests  ;  the  first 
cares  nothing  for  the  party  opinions  of  the  municipal  ser- 
vants, the  second  —  save  as  civil  service  reform  prevents  it 
—  requires  their  opinions  to  be  those  of  the  victorious  party ; 
the  first  disregards  the  platforms  of  state  and  national  par- 
ties, the  second  brings  these  platforms  into  city  elections, 
and  seeks  to  carry  these  elections  by  party  influence ;  the 
first  makes  removals  only  for  cause,  the  second  makes  them 
for  party  advantage  ;  one  kind  of  government  naturally  en- 
forces the  merit  system,  the  other  the  spoils  system.  One 
of  them  strongly  tends  to  suppress  party  rule  and  to  prevent 
state  intermeddling  in  city  affairs ;  the  other  intensifies  and 
perpetuates  both  these  evils. 

As  the  council  remains  a  continuous  body  —  a  majority  of 
its  members  continuing  over  every  election  —  it  will  supply 
the  trained  experience  needed  for  carrying  on  the  adminis- 
tration consistently,  intelligently,  and  economically.  The 
continuous  council  keeps  the  city  constantly  supplied  with  a 
body  of  experienced  men  in  the  control  of  its  affairs  ;  the 
autocratic  mayoralty  puts  the  administration  into  the  hands 
of  a  succession  of  inexperienced  party  leaders.  Such  a  coun- 
cil will  be  strong  enough  to  make  a  reasonable  resistance  to 
the  partisan  schemes  and  patronage-mongering  demands  of 
victorious  parties  and  bosses ;  an  autocratic  mayoralty  will 
constantly  enforce  these  schemes  and  demands. 

City  government  in  which  the  council  is  paramount  will 
naturally  act  upon  a  comprehensive  policy  and  move  on  in ,.' 
broadly  sweeping  curves,  always  duly  responsive  to  changes 


270  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

I  in  public  opinion  as  shown  by  the  elections.  City  govern- 
ment under  which  a  party-elected  mayor  is  paramount  will 
naturally  advance  in  zigzag  lines,  constantly  courting  the 
temporary  party  majorities,  and  always  yielding  to  the  vary- 
ing demands  of  state  and  national  parties. 

A  paramount  council  would  require  the  police  force,  for 
example,  to  be  made  as  independent  as  possible  of  city  poli- 
tics and  elections;  an  autocratic  mayoralty  would  require, 
on  the  contrary,  that  every  new  mayor  should  appoint  the 
head  of  this  force  —  as  has  always  been  the  case  under  the 
Brooklyn  charter  —  to  the  end  that  he  and  his  party  may 
control  it  for  their  common  advantage.  Finally,  government 
under  the  lead  of  a  council  would  gradually  suppress  party 
discrimination  and  control  in  every  part  of  the  city  adminis- 
tration, while  a  government  under  the  lead  of  a  party-elected 
autocratic  mayor  would  make  that  discrimination  and  control 
absolute  and  universal.  It  would  enforce  party  tests  at  the 
gates  of  every  city  office  ;  it  would  regard  party  spirit  as  a 
potential,  motive  force  in  city  administration  ;  it  would  look 
forward  to  an  endless  series  of  party  contests  in  the  future 
as  the  great  source  of  municipal  virtue — as  Tammany  now 
does  in  the  Greater  New  York. 


VIII 

1.    All  good  business  managers  know  how  essential  it  is 
to  have  able  and  experienced  men  associated  as  directors,  or 
trustees  —  irrespective  of  their  political  or  religious  opinions 
—  with  presidents  in  the  management  of  great  business  cor- 
porations.    They  generally  secure  for  such  managers  men 
much  superior  to  those  who,  in  the  main,  control  our  munici- 
pal corporations,  though  the  affairs  of  the  latter  are  by  far 
f  the  most  difficult.      Yet,  many  men  seem  to  think  that  a 
\  mayor   suddenly  brought   into   his   office,  and   very  likely 
/  utterly  inexperienced  in  city  administration,  may  be  safely 
V    intrusted  with  its  complete  control,  unaided  by  assistants 
^corresponding  to  a  board  of  directors  or  trustees. 

Let  us  glance  at  some  facts.     If  we  should  strip  one  of 


FUNCTIONS  OF  CITY  COUNCILS  AND  MAYORS      271 

our  great  municipal  corporations  of  all  its  legislative  powers 
it  would  still  have  administrative  functions  large  enough  to 
be  the  business  of  at  least  ten  great  business  corporations  : 
(1)  the  care  of  the  water  supply  ;  (2)  the  cleaning  of  the 
streets  ;  (3)  the  drainage  system  ;  (4)  the  construction  and 
control  of  docks  and  piers  ;  (5)  the  making  and  repair  of  the 
streets  ;  (6)  the  construction  and  charge  of  public  build- 
ings ;  (7)  the  extinguishment  of  fires  ;  and  if  our  supposed 
great  city  shall  obtain  the  power  secured  by  the  great  cities 
of  Europe,  we  might  add,  (8)  the  supply  and  management 
of  gas  and  electricity  ;  (9)  the  care  of  a  system  of  public 
baths,  lodging-houses,  and  workhouses  ;  (10)  the  provision 
and  control  of  public  libraries.  And  after  these  ten  cor- 
porations had  been  carved  out,  there  would  still  be  left 
the  vast  departments  of  health,  of  police,  of  prisons,  of 
charity,  of  education,  of  ordinance-making,  and  of  justice 
and  legislation. 

Now,  if  these  ten  business  departments  were  handed  over 
in  a  great  city  each  to  a  separate  business  corporation  —  as 
most  of  them  might  be  with  public  advantage,  unless  we  can 
improve  our  city  governments  —  we  may  assume  it  as  certain 
that  each  corporation  would  be  managed  by  directors,  to  say 
the  least,  as  competent  and  reputable  as  the  officers  who 
generally  control  all  the  vast  affairs  of  great  American 
cities. 

The  political  and  religious  opinions  of  these  directors 
would  be  disregarded ;  they  would  hold  their  places  long 
enough  to  become  skilled  and  efficient  managers  of  their  cor- 
porate affairs ;  these  managers  would  appoint  their  officers  and 
employees  regardless  of  their  religion  or  politics  ;  they  would 
retain  them  by  reason  of  their  merit  so  long  as  they  were 
efficient.  They  would  not,  every  two  or  three  years,  go 
outside  their  boards  for  party  reasons  and  bring  in  an  inex- 
perienced man  to  be  the  head  of  the  corporation.  They 
would  —  unless  they  could  find  a  better  elsewhere  —  promote 
the  most  competent  director  or  trustee  to  be  president.  So 
it  is  with  banks,  trust  companies,  railroad  companies,  and 
the  other  large  corporations  in  which  sagacity  and  non- 


272  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

/  partisan  business  methods  achieve  their  greatest  triumphs. 

\  The  directors  and  trustees  hold  the  president  responsible  to 

/  themselves.     They  would  decide   as  to  the  policy  of  the 

.  corporation.    They  remove  presidents  who  are  unfit  for  their 

/  places.      Yet  many  people  —  sensible  about  most  things  — 

)  seem  to  think  that  vast  municipal  corporations  can  be  suc- 

(  cessfully  managed  in  utter  disregard  of  all  the  lessons  of 

business  experience.     The  skill  and  virtue  of  professional 

politicians   according  to  the  theories   of  these   people  are 

all  that  is  needed. 

2.  Good  citizens  who  would  have  no  confidence  in  a  bank 
or  a  trust  company  which  had  not  a  competent  board  of 
directors  to  select  a  president,  and  to  give  steadiness  and 
wisdom  to  the  corporate  management,  seem  to  think  that 
a  single  party-elected  mayor,  unskilled  in  municipal  affairs, 
embarrassed  by  many  election  promises,  and  beset  by  a 
horde  of  politicians  clamoring  for  spoils,  can  single-handed 
not  only  manage  the  whole  government  of  a  vast  city,  but 
become  a  potent  force  for  its  improvement.  We  can  hardly 
think  a  good  municipal  system  to  be  very  near  at  hand 
when  we  see  many  men,  sensible  on  most  subjects,  accepting 
views  so  preposterous  concerning  city  affairs. 

There  has  been  no  ground  for  surprise  when  we  have 
seen  our  city  councils  and  our  mayors,  —  such  as  we  have 
had,  —  generally  baffled,  overmatched,  and  coerced  by  the 
abler  managers  of  our  well-officered  business  corpora- 
tions. 

What  right  has  a  great  city  to  expect  its  affairs  to  be  well 
managed  if  it  fails  to  put  its  ablest  and  worthiest  men  in 
charge  of  them,  or  fails  to  keep  them  there  long  enough  to 
thoroughly  understand  them?  These  affairs  are  the  most 
dignified  and  important  interests  intrusted  to  corporations. 
It  is  intrinsically  an  honor  to  control  them.  Men  of  the 
highest  character,  patriotism,  and  ambition  would  naturally 
aspire  to  seats  in  councils  having  charge  of  them,  if  the  ways 
into  these  bodies  were  honorable,  and  the  opportunities  for 
useful  service  there  were  free  and  adequate. 

There  are  men   who,  compelled  to   admit   that   councils 


FUNCTIONS  OF   CITY  COUNCILS  AND  MAYORS      273 

are  necessary,  yet  tell  us  that  able  and  trustworthy  men 
cannot  be  secured  for  members,  thus  in  substance  declaring 
that  we  are  incompetent  for  good  local  self-government  and 
have  no  right  to  expect  it ;  for  it  cannot  be  denied  that  our 
cities  contain  many  men  competent  for  membership  in  the 
councils  we  need.  How  we  can  bring  them  into  these  bodies 
we  shall  consider  in  the  next  chapter. 

IX 

3.  One  other  view  of  the  effects  of  a  paramount  and  auto- 
cratic mayoralty  deserves  attention.  When  the  wealth  of  our 
cities  shall  be  vastly  increased  and  the  population  of  some 
of  them  shall  be  expressed  in  millions,  the  management  of 
city  elections  and  the  bestowal  of  patronage  will  become  a 
stupendous  and  fearful  power  under  the  party  system  —  a 
political  force  in  politics  hardly  yet  imagined.  In  carrying 
it  into  effect,  there  will  be  presented  to  our  great  city  popula- 
tion such  a  demoralizing  exhibition  of  despotism  and  injustice 
as  does  not  now  exist  in  any  other  enlightened  nation  — 
hardly  even  Russia  or  Turkey.  Machination  will  be  more 
than  even  before  substituted  for  reason,  influence  for  merit, 
subserviency  to  arbitrary  power  for  the  true  spirit  of  free- 
men. Morality,  justice,  superior  character,  and  capacity 
will  become  more  and  more  disassociated  in  the  thoughts 
of  the  people  from  all  conceptions  of  city  government.  The 
ominous  separation  and  repulsion  which  now  so  largely  exist 
between  the  politician  and  official  classes  on  one  side  in  our 
cities,  and  their  foremost  and  noblest  inhabitants  on  the 
other,  will  be  disastrously  widened. 

f     It  has  already  been  shown  in  cities  where  an  autocratic 
)  mayoralty  has  prevailed  that  it  prevents  any  free  discussion/  -       -f 
)of  city  administration  in  official  circles.     No  officer  is  inde- YJ 
^pendent  enough  to  criticise  such  a  mayor.     Officers  who  hold  w*^    I  J 
their  places  by  his  favor,  and  are  therefore  the  mere  creations  CWtt^lO* 
of  his  will,  have  neither  the  temper  nor  the  courage  forrt)   j^^t*. 
arraigning  any  policy  which  he  supports,  or  exposing  any 
wrongful  acts  of  which  he  is  guilty.     We  have  seen  that 


274 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 


even  under  the  city-party  system  the  simple  boss  becomes  a 
tyrant  so  dreaded  that  no  party  man  dares  confront  him. 
But  when,  in  the  near  future,  the  boss  shall  also  be  made  a 
mayor  —  autocratic  by  law  —  he  will  become  such  a  munici- 
pal despot  as  no  American  city  has  yet  seen,  and  no  Euro- 
pean city  would  endure,  or  can  comprehend.  There  will  be 
no  municipal  authority  which  can  call  him  to  account,  and 
much  less  investigate  his  administration.  Indeed,  the  simple 
fact  that  he  is  made  an  autocratic  mayor  excludes  the  pro- 
priety and  possibility  of  all  provisions  for  his  responsibility 
to  the  people. 

4.  It  is  of  profound  significance  that  under  the  city -party 
and    autocratic-mayoralty    system    of    Tammany    and    the 
Brooklyn  charter,  there  have  not  only  never  been  any  pro- 
ceedings against  the  worst  acts  of  mayors,  but  there  has 
never  been  any  real  criticism  of  their  acts  by  any  city  offi- 
cers.    No  imperial  or  feudal  despotism  has  ever  more  com- 
pletely  than   this   system   suppressed    all    free   debate,   or 
imposed  a  more  servile  and  disgraceful  silence  upon  mu- 
nicipal subordinates  concerning  their  executive  chief.     We 
have  already  reared  a  generation  of  partisan  officers  in  our 
great  cities  who  think  it  a  duty  to  their  party  to  betray 
their  duty  to  the  city  by  concealing  the  wrongdoings  of  its 
mayors,  before  whom  they  fawn. 

5.  A  continuous  council,  constituted  as  we  have  proposed, 
would  apparently  contain  members  independent  enough  to 
criticise  the  bad  policy  of  mayors,  and  sufficiently  experi- 
enced in  city  affairs  to  do  it  intelligently  and  effectively. 
With  the  great  and  conflicting  interests  of  the  city  repre- 
sented in  this  body,  we  may  well  believe  that  its  debates 
would  be  instructive  and  earnest,  and  that  they  would  con- 
tribute much  to  public  enlightenment  about  city  affairs.     It 
is  not  too  much  to  say  that  good  local  government  is  not 
possible  —  it  is,  indeed,  chimerical  to  expect  it  —  in  a  great 
city  without   independent  public   debates  in  a  responsible 
municipal  council,  in  which  the  action,  and  especially  the 
wrongful  action,  and  neglects  of  all  its  officers — of  its  mayor 
not  less  than  its  policemen  —  shall  be  fearlessly  examined 


FUNCTIONS  OF  CITY  COUNCILS  AND  MAYORS      275 

and  fittingly  brought  before  the  people.  Hardly  any  stand- 
ing committee  of  such  a  body,  in  a  great  city,  could  be  more 
important  than  that  which  should  have  a  duty  to  inquire  and 
report  concerning  inefficiency  and  malversation  in  office  — 
especially  on  the  part  of  the  mayor. 


•J7»)  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 


CHAPTER  XI.  —  CONCERNING  THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  MEM- 
BERSHIP OP  A  CITY  COUNCIL 

General  considerations  bearing  upon  the  problem.  No  generally  accepted 
principles  or  model  on  the  subject.  Some  important  facts  and  assumptions 
stated.  The  great  objects  in  view.  Fundamental  provisions  for  a  council.  How 
the  forty-six  Aldermen  should  be  elected  and  their  terms  of  office.  City  Alder- 
men and  District  Aldermen.  Village  Councils.  The  Classification  of  Aldermen. 
Aldermen  to  be  selected  by  Free  Nominations  and  Free  Voting.  Some  objections 
answered.  The  utility  of  having  these  two  classes  of  Aldermen  considered.  How 
Free  Voting  gives  much,  though  not  complete,  minority  representation.  Old 
ward  and  assembly  districts  will  be  broken  up.  A  general  view  of  the  council 
as  so  far  constituted.  It  is  complete  for  legal  action,  but  probably  insufficient  to 
arrest  party  domination.  How  councils  may  be  further  improved.  Appointed 
Aldermen  defined ;  the  advantage  of  having  them  appointed  by  the  council. 
Great  need  of  inducing  worthy  men  to  enter  city  councils.  Why  better  men  in 
the  councils  of  European  cities  than  in  those  of  United  States. 

Honorary  Aldermen  defined.  The  need  and  advantage  of  having  them.  The 
manner  of  choosing  them.  Would  give  dignity  and  wisdom  to  the  councils.  The 
question  of  salaries.  The  secretary  of  the  council  and  his  term  of  office.  Why 
the  council  should  be  a  single  body.  Concerning  the  transition  period  between 
partisan  and  non-partisan  city  government. 

THE  proper  constitution  for  a  city  council  is  undoubt- 
edly the  most  difficult  of  city  problems.1  We  can  hardly 
hope  to  propose  the  best  possible,  but  the  suggestion  of  one 
that  is  definite  in  outline  and  purpose  will  give  precision  to 
what  we  have  to  say,  and  present  principles  and  methods  in 
such  practical  application  to  structure,  and  with  such  defi- 
nite reference  to  objects  and  subjects,  as  will  most  contribute 
to  the  usefulness  of  the  discussion.  Probably  many  more 
readers  would  accept  our  proposals  if  they  were  more  indefi- 
nite ;  but  the  time  has  come  when  something  more  than 
generalities  is  required.  Definite  constructive  methods  are 
greatly  needed.  If  we  may  not  hope  that  a  single  city  will 
accept  our  plan,  it  is  not  perhaps  too  much  to  trust  that  it 
may  aid  more  competent  minds  in  devising  a  better  one. 

1  As  to  meaning  of  Council,  see  pp.  246,  247. 


CONSTITUTION  AND  MEMBERSHIP  OF  CITY  COUNCIL    277 

A  city  council  should  not  be  based  on  theory  or  specula- 
tion, but  on  facts  and  sound  principles.  It  should  be  in  har- 
mony with  American  constitutions  and  social  life,  and  it 
should  be  framed  in  the  light  of  the  world's  best  municipal 
experience.  While  accepting  everything  good  in  American 
municipal  methods,  we  should  allow  neither  a  false  national 
pride,  nor  a  pervading  and  seductive  spoils  system,  to  make 
us  blind  to  the  experience  of  the  older  nations.  Surely  there 
is  some  structure  of  government  which  is  better  than  others 

—  which  in  general  is  the  best  —  for  American  cities  and 
villages.     We  may  need,  under  peculiar  conditions,  to  de- 
part widely  from  our  ideal,  but  it  should  always  be  clearly 
defined  in  our  thought. 

The  structure  of  municipal  government  is  so  complicated 

—  so  many  considerations  are  involved  in  any  just  estimate 
of  a  single  remedial  suggestion  —  that  it  is  hoped  the  reader 
will  not  pass  final  judgment  until  he  has  considered  each 
suggested  provision  in  combination  with  the  others.     The 
question,  for  example,  whether  mayors  should  be  elected  by 
city  councils  —  as  we  shall  propose  —  cannot  be  wisely  de- 
cided until  we  know  how  these  bodies  are  to  be  constituted, 
and  what  are  to  be  their  powers,  as  well  as  those  of  mayors. 

2.  We  have  seen  that  there  is  no  distinctly  American 
municipal  system  —  certainly  none  which  commands  general 
respect  —  nor  is  there  any  American  city  so  conspicuously 
well  governed  as  to  be  a  fit  model  for  the  others.  The  con- 
structive power  of  the  American  mind  has  never  yet  been,  in 
any  thorough  way,  applied  to  municipal  government,  though 
it  has  given  birth  to  a  motley  variety  of  city  charters.  Yet 
it  cannot  be  assumed  that  the  people  who  devised  the  consti- 
tutional systems  of  the  nation  and  the  states  are  incompetent 
to  deal  with  their  municipal  problems.  Great  city  problems, 
as  we  have  seen,  are  of  very  recent  development,  and  have 
only  just  begun  to  arrest  the  general  attention  of  the  Ameri- 
can people.  In  fact,  only  a  small  proportion  of  them  have 
yet  considered  these  problems  on  the  basis  of  principle,  or 
are  well  informed  as  to  the  instructive  lessons  which  the 
long  municipal  experience  of  Europe  can  teach  us. 


278  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

It  does  not  follow  that  a  municipal  system  would  be  suc- 
cessful on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic  merely  because  it  has 
succeeded  on  the  other.  Yet  there  is  much  that  is  common 
in  both  the  governmental  and  business  needs  of  cities  under 
monarchies  and  under  republics.  France  has  found  very 
limited  changes  to  be  needful  in  her  municipal  system  by 
reason  of  her  becoming  a  republic.  The  American  people 
are  surely  enlightened  enough  to  learn  from  European  expe- 
rience such  useful  lessons  as  it  can  supply,  and  to  adapt  them 
to  their  own  needs  in  a  manner  consistent  with  their  consti- 
tutional and  social  conditions. 

3.  There  are  a  few  fundamental  principles  and  purposes 
which  we  hope  the  reader  will  constantly  keep  in  mind  in 
considering  our  suggestions :  (1)  there  should  be  such  fre- 
quency of  elections  and  such  numbers  of  elected  officers  as 
are  needed  to  enable  the  people  to  compel  the  government  to 
conform  to  their  wishes,  but  there  should  not  be  elections  — 
as  has  apparently  been  the  case  —  merely  because  parties 
desire  them,  or  their  managers  make  gains  from  them ; 

(2)  that  to  all  city  elections  in  which  more  than  one  officer 
of  the  same  kind  is  to  be  elected  at  once  in  the  same  political 
division,  the  methods  of  Free  Nomination  and  Free  Voting 
should  be  applied,  —  thus  enabling  all  voters  to  be  repre- 
sented and  each  of  them  to  bestow  his  ballots  as  he  pleases  ; 

(3)  that  municipal  commissions  and   boards — as  now  we 
have  them  —  should  be  gradually  superseded  by  transferring 
their  powers  to  city  councils,  —  except  that  certain  of  their 
powers,  which  are  in  their  nature  executive,  may  be  conferred 
upon  mayors ;  (4)  that  mayors  should  possess  the  appropriate 
executive  powers,  after  the  general  analogy  of  the  powers  of 
presidents  and  governors ;  (5)  that  the  councils  should  pos- 
sess the  appropriate  legislative-  or  ordinance-making  powers 
after  the  general  analogy  of  a  congress  or  a  legislature ; 
(6)  that  the  paramount  need  and  purpose  in  organizing  city 
councils  are  to  construct  city  governments,  in  which  public 
opinion  —  which  springs  from  the  whole  body  of  the  people 
and  not  mere  party  opinion  —  shall  prevail.     Not  only  party 
majorities,  but  all  the  great  elements  of  public  opinion, 


CONSTITUTION  AND  MEMBERSHIP  OF  CITY  COUNCIL    279 

should  be  represented  in  the  councils.  We  should  seek  to 
the  utmost  to  prevent  mere  party  divisions  and  contests  in 
these  bodies. 

It  is  assumed  that  contests  between  party  opinion  and 
public  opinion  —  between  party  interests  and  public  inter- 
ests—  will  continue  with  diminishing  fierceness  for  a  con- 
siderable time  even  after  reform  methods  have  begun  to 
prevail  in  our  municipalities ;  and  we  therefore  propose  an 
organization  for  city  councils  under  which  that  contest  can 
go  on  in  a  manner  tending  to  restrain  party  monopoly,  and 
in  a  way  most  favorable  for  the  triumph  of  public  opinion 
and  the  promotion  of  the  general  welfare. 

4.  We  intend  to  enable  the  friends  of  non-partisan  city 
government  to  unite  their  forces  at  once,  according  to  the 
most  favorable  conditions  for  victory,  under  the  proposed 
system,  and  to  intrench  themselves  in  —  and  enable  them  to 
hold  most  easily — the  official  positions  which  they  may  gain. 
Municipal  reforms  have  been  very  short-lived,  largely  be- 
cause the  new  officers  it  has  elected  have  been  compelled 
to  act  under  a  system  which  has  strongly  favored  city -party 
domination. 

The  partisan  and  politician  classes  engage  in  city-party 
contests  largely  through  the  influence  of  party  spirit,  the 
hopes  of  office  and  spoils,  and  the  love  of  power.  The  men 
who  will  be  the  strength  of  a  non-partisan  city  government 
based  on  public  opinion  are  sure  to  be  of  a  class  who  vote 
mainly  from  more  disinterested  and  patriotic  motives. 

It  is  important,  therefore,  to  devise  —  and  we  have  tried 
to  devise  —  methods  which  shall  diminish  the  inducements 
of  the  first  class  of  voters  to  be  active  in  city  politics,  while 
at  the  same  time  making  it  easier  for  citizens  of  the  better 
class  to  unite  their  ballots,  —  and  offering  them  stronger  in- 
ducements to  vote.  These  results  will  be  attained  in  the 
degree  that  the  selfish  rewards  which  follow  political  vic- 
tories are  suppressed,  and  voting  for  patriotic  and  unselfish 
reasons  shall  be  made  less  burdensome  and  more  effective. 

Noble  men  are  active  not  only  for  charity  and  benevo- 
lence, but  for  great  political  reforms,  from  disinterested  and 


280  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

altruistic  motives,  and  all  the  more  active  when  they  can  see 
that  their  efforts  are  likely  to  be  efficacious.  Under  a  good 
city  council,  we  think  many  such  men  who  are  now  repelled 
by  our  party  system  —  thinking  it  almost  useless  to  vote  — 
would  take  an  active  part  in  city  politics  and  administra- 
tion ;  for  they  would  be  able  to  see  that  their  exertions 
would  not  be  useless.  We  look  upon  this  view  of  the 
subject  as  one  of  profound  importance ;  and  in  judging  of 
the  merits  of  our  suggestions  it  is  hoped  that  the  reader  will 
consider  their  tendency  in  these  particulars. 

5.  We  shall  not  find  it  practicable  to  notice  the  peculiar 
constitutional  provisions  of  different  states,  nor  can  we  enter 
into  details  as  to  the  number  of  members  of  the  council  ap- 
propriate for  small  cities  as  compared  with  large  ones,  the 
number  proposed  being  thought  sufficient  for  the  latter. 

In  reference  to  these  explanations,  we  submit  the  follow- 
ing fundamental  provisions  for  a  city  council : 


There  should  be  no  election  for  city  officers  oftener  than 
once  in  two  years. 

II 

Every  person  eligible  for  a  city  office  may  be  selected  to 
fill  it  regardless  of  the  district  or  section  of  the  city  in  which 
he  may  reside.1 

1  This  provision,  we  think,  would  be  favorable  to  the  choice  of  the  most  com- 
petent officers.  Professional  politicians — who  favor  autocratic  mayors  —  will 
object  to  it  on  the  ground  that  city  officers  should  have  an  intimate  knowledge  of 
localities  and  their  residents.  They  do  not  seem  to  see  how  fatal  this  objection 
is  to  their  main  theory  that  the  mayor  should  be  allowed  to  rule  the  whole  city. 
He  is  assumed  by  them  to  know  every  detail  of  its  business  and  needs  in  every 
section  and  district.  Further,  this  objection  practically  declares  the  voters  to 
be  incompetent  to  judge  as  to  whom  they  want  for  their  officials.  Why  should 
not  the  voters  of  a  city  be  allowed  if  they  wish  to  choose  for  one  of  their  officers 
—  especially  if  he  will  become  a  resident  among  them  —  even  a  non-resident 
who  has  rendered  distinguished  service  as  a  city  officer  in  some  other  city,  —  a 
recognized  practice  in  Europe.  The  voters  who  are  competent  to  decide  as  to 
a  candidate's  character  and  capacity  are  certainly  competent  to  decide  whether 
his  residence  is  of  importance. 


CONSTITUTION  AND  MEMBERSHIP  OF  CITY  COUNCIL    281 


III 

There  should  be  a  mayor  with  an  official  term  of  two 
years.1  He  should  have  the  appropriate  executive  powers 
and  duties  of  his  office,  as  will  be  more  fully  explained. 

IV 

There  should  be  a  city  council,  to  be  a  single  body,  which 
should  have  the  appropriate  legislative  powers  and  duties, 
which  will  be  further  defined.  This  council  should  be  com- 
posed of  forty-six  members,  to  be  designated  Aldermen,  who 
should  be  elected  by  the  people,  and  of  several  additional 
members  to  be  selected  as  hereinafter  explained. 


V 

Ten  of  these  forty-six  Aldermen  should  be  elected  on  gen- 
eral ticket,  that  is,  by  the  general  vote  of  the  city  at  large, 
and  they  should  be  known  as  City  Aldermen.  Their  term  of 
office  should  be  four  years.2  We  should  regard  ten  as  too 

1  A  term  of  only  two  years,  which  largely  prevails,  is  suggested  on  the 
assumption  that  the  mayor  is  to  be  chosen  by  the  council  —  a  choice  which 
would  be  simple  and  inexpensive.    In  case  he  should  be  elected  by  the  people, 
we  think  the  term  should  be  longer,  so  as  to  avoid  as  far  as  possible  the  great 
expense,  and  the  electioneering  and  patronage-mongering  corruption  incident  to 
such  elections.    The  terms  of  the  mayors  of  Philadelphia,  St.  Louis,  and  the 
Greater  New  York  are  four  years.    In  many  small  cities  the  term  is  only  one 
year,  but  in  a  number  of  the  large  cities  it  is  three  years.    1  Bryce,  Am.  Comic., 
595. 

2  The  proportion  between  the  number  of  Aldermen  to  be  elected  from  the  city 
at  large  and  the  number  to  be  elected  from  the  districts,  as  here  proposed,  does 
not  differ  much  from  American  precedents  on  the  subject.    Under  the  Brooklyn 
charter,  which  we  have  examined,  there  were  seven  Aldermen  elected  by  the  city 
at  large.    The  ten  City  Aldermen  to  be  first  elected  should  be  so  classified,  after 
the  manner  of  classifying  United  States  senators,  that  the  terms  of  five  of  them 
should  expire  in  two  years  and  the  other  five  in  four  years.    Thereafter  five  City 
Aldermen  would  be  elected  biennially.    There  are  two  reasons  for  having  the 
terms  of  City  Aldermen  four  years  while  those  of  District  Aldermen  are  to  be  six 
years :  (1)  the  former  elections  are  likely  to  be  most  salutary  and  to  involve  large 
municipal  issues ;  (2)  the  having  of  the  diverse  terms  will  do  most  to  baffle  mere 
selfish  and  partisan  calculations  and  intrigue. 


282  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

few  Aldermen  to  be  elected  at  large,  were  it  not  for  the 
appointed  Aldermen  to  be  proposed.1 

VI 

Thirty -six  of  these  forty-six  Aldermen  should  be  elected 
from  districts  —  nine  to  be  elected  from  each  of  four  dis- 
tricts. These  thirty-six  Aldermen  should  be  known  as  Dis- 
trict Aldermen,  and  their  term  of  office  should  be  six  years. 
For  the  purposes  of  their  election,  the  city  should  be  divided 
into  four  districts  of  as  nearly  equal  population  as  practicable. 

While,  as  a  rule,  the  choice  of  well-known  and  able  candi- 
dates is  favored  by  elections  at  large,  yet  perhaps  some  voters 
may  go  to  the  polls  only  because  a  candidate  is  from  their 
own  quarter  of  the  city ;  and  in  large  cities  there  may  be 
some  rational  basis  for  local-district  representation.  Large 
election  districts  avoid  some  of  the  evils  incident  to  small 
ones.  Besides,  there  is  a  strong  bias  and  much  precedent  in 
favor  of  districts,  which  cannot  be  wholly  disregarded.2 


VII 

There  should  be  such  provisions  at  the  outset,  through 
classification,  or  drawings  by  lot,  —  as  is  the  case  in  the 
classifying  by  lot  of  the  members  of  the  United  States  Sen- 

1  In  case,  in  any  city,  there  shall  be  a  majority  of  voters  favorable  to  elections 
at  large,  we  should  prefer  to  have  twenty  City  Aldermen  elected  by  this  method, 
and  a  corresponding  redaction  in  the  number  of  District  Aldermen.    See  p.  292. 

2  It  would  be  all  the  better  if  these  districts  were  independent  of  the  old  ward 
and  assembly  district  divisions  in  which  the  politicians  have  long  been  elaborately 
organized  and  intrenched.    It  hardly  need  be  said  that  in  case  of  most  very  large 
cities  the  number  of  District  Aldermen,  as  well  as  of  districts  for  their  elections, 
might  be  less.    In  quite  small  cities,  where  local  needs  are  familiar  to  all,  the 
elected  Aldermen  should  all  be  elected  on  general  ticket.    In  this  event,  however, 
their  term  should  be  six  years,  and  they  should  be  so  classified  that  only  one- 
third  of  them  would  be  elected  every  alternate  year.    But  in  no  case  should  less 
than  three  Aldermen  be  elected  at  the  same  time,  so  that  the  method  of  non- 
partisan,  Free  Voting  may  be  effectively  enforced.    In  villages,  where  only  the 
simplest  form  of  council  may  be  needed,  it  might  be  composed  of  nine  Village 
Aldermen  elected  at  large,  whose  terms  should  be  of  such  length  and  so  classified 
that  one-third  would  be  elected  each  year  —  or  each  alternate  year.    Party  gov- 
ernment could  hardly  be  established  under  such  a  system. 


CONSTITUTION  AND  MEMBERSHIP  OF  CITY  COUNCIL    283 

ate,  —  that  the  terms  of  one-third  of  these  thirty-six  District 
Aldermen  will  expire  every  two  years.  This  would  result 
in  the  election  of  twelve  District  Aldermen  and  five  City 
Aldermen  biennially;  that  is,  in  the  renewal  every  alternate 
year  of  the  mayor  and  seventeen  out  of  the  forty-six  members 
of  the  council  to  be  elected  by  the  people. 

VIII 

The  nomination  and  election  of  both  of  these  classes  of 
Aldermen  should  be  according  to  the  methods  of  Free  Nomi- 
nations and  Free  Voting,  as  we  have  explained  them,  and, 
consequently,  every  nomination,  so  far  as  the  law  will  take 
any  notice  of  it,  must  be  made  by  a  certificate  signed  by  not 
more  than  twenty -five  electors.  The  voting  for  each  class  of 
Aldermen  will  be  by  a  single  ballot  paper  supplied  by  the 
city  authorities,  and  containing  the  names  of  all  the  candi- 
dates of  the  same  class  to  be  voted  for  at  the  same  time. 
Against  the  name  of  each  candidate  the  voter  will  mark  in 
figures  the  number  of  votes  he  wishes  to  give  him,  and  every 
voter  will  be  free  to  cast  as  many  votes  as  there  are  City  or 
District  Aldermen  to  be  elected  at  the  same  time  ;  that  is 
five  votes,  after  the  first  election,  for  City  Aldermen,  and 
three  votes  for  District  Aldermen,  and  to  distribute  them 
among  the  candidates  according  to  his  sense  of  duty.1 

It  is  quite  likely  that  mere  politicians,  on  one  hand,  and 
radical  reformers  on  the  other,  may  ask :  Why  not  try  only 
the  better  of  the  two  methods,  that  of  allowing  the  voter 
five  ballots,  or  that  of  allowing  him  only  three  ?  We  answer : 
How  can  we  tell  which  is  the  better  in  the  present  state  of 
American  experience  and  opinion,  until  we  try  both  ?  And 

1  We  should  thus  have  the  principle  of  Free  Voting  applied  both  in  its  most 
limited  manner,  and  also  in  a  manner  more  extended.  We  secure,  in  the  election 
of  City  Aldermen,  some  of  the  advantages  of  a  large  choice  among  candidates  — 
in  making  which  the  most  intelligent  voters  are  most  competent  to  act  wisely  in 
the  general  interest  of  the  city.  The  District  Aldermen  are  to  he  elected  in  a  man- 
ner which,  while  it  largely  defeats  mere  party  control,  and  will  make  some  real 
minority  representation  possible,  does  not  go  beyond  well-tested  American  prece- 
dents, —  indeed,  not  so  far  as  the  successful  experiments  in  Pennsylvania.  See 
Ch.  IX. 


284  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

what  better  method  of  trial  than  elections  side  by  side,  at 
the  same  time  ?  We  have  seen  that  in  two  states  the  three- 
ballot  method  has  been  salutary.1 


IX 

Before  proceeding  to  the  additional  membership  of  the 
council  which  is  desirable,  it  will  be  well  to  consider  some- 
what the  two  classes  of  Aldermen  we  have  already  pro- 
posed. 

The  City  Aldermen.  —  In  electing  five  Aldermen-at-large, 
to  be  called  City  Aldermen,  once  in  two  years,  for  terms  of 
four  years,  an  opportunity  will  be  afforded  for  giving  con- 
spicuous expression  to  public  opinion  concerning  large  ques- 
tions of  city  policy,  in  which  the  people  may  take  a  deep 
interest.  In  these  elections  the  city  will  speak  as  a  whole, 
and  there  would  seem  to  be  little  opportunity  for  sections 
or  parties  to  bargain  with  each  other  under  the  method  of 
Free  Voting.  So  long  as  party  divisions  shall  be  kept  up  in 
regard  to  city  affairs,  each  party  will  probably  make  great 
efforts  to  secure  a  majority  in  the  elections.  These  efforts, 
however,  must  spring  rather  from  party  spirit  and  the  desire 
of  demonstrating  a  superior  number  of  party  adherents  than 
from  any  hope  of  gaining  much  in  the  way  of  offices, 
spoils,  or  the  control  of  the  council  —  as  we  shall  soon  see. 
As  Free  Voting  will  give  every  elector  five  ballots,  and  allow 
him  to  bestow  them  as  he  pleases,  no  party,  save  under  pecul- 
iar conditions,  will  be  likely  to  elect  more  Aldermen  than 
are  due  to  the  number  of  its  adherents,  and  generally  each 

1  See  Ch.  IX.  We  shall,  in  the  next  chapter,  show  that  in  England  and  Scot- 
land the  giving  of  the  voter  more  than  five  ballots  has  also  been  salutary.  We 
propose  to  try  which  is  the  best  of  two  good  things.  It  will  be  noticed  that  a 
much  larger  number  of  voters  will  be  required  to  elect  a  City  Alderman  than 
to  elect  a  District  Alderman,  and  hence  more  complete  provisions  for  minority 
representation  are  important  in  the  former  case  than  in  the  latter.  We  may 
say  here  that  the  reform  charter  for  New  York  City,  which  passed  the  legis- 
lature in  1872,  but  which  the  Tammany  Governor,  Hoffmann,  defeated  by  his 
veto  (see  pp.  237,  238),  provided  for  five  city  districts,  from  each  of  which  nine 
Aldermen  were  to  be  elected  at  once,  and  every  voter  was  to  have  nine  votes 
which  he  could  distribute  among  the  candidates  as  he  should  prefer. 


CONSTITUTION  AND  MEMBERSHIP  OF  CITY  COUNCIL    285 

party  will  be  able  to  elect  that  number,  provided  its  candi- 
dates are  as  worthy  as  the  others. 

But,  more  important  still,  the  non-partisan,  independent 
voters  —  all  those  who  prefer  good  Aldermen  to  mere  party 
victory  —  can  by  uniting  generally  secure  the  representation 
which  justly  belorgs  to  their  number ;  or  they  may  use 
their  power,  so  far  as  they  think  best,  for  the  election  of 
the  best  candidates  nominated  by  others.  We  have  seen 
that  one  more  than  one-sixth  of  the  voters  can  by  uniting 
elect  their  candidate.1  Minority  representation  will  thus  be 
in  a  considerable  measure  secured  in  electing  the  City  Alder- 
men. It  is  obvious  that  mere  partisan  reasons  and  merce- 
nary inducements  for  voting  in  these  elections  will  be  made 
much  weaker  than  they  would  be  if  the  mere  majority  could, 
as  under  the  party  system  of  voting,  elect  all  of  the  five  City 
Aldermen.  As  bearing  on  the  question  of  spoils  and  party 
control,  it  should  be  noticed  that  only  five  of  the  ten  City 
Aldermen  are  to  be  elected  in  the  same  year. 

2.  On  the  other  hand,  is  it  not  equally  obvious  that  all 
citizens  who  vote  and  are  active  in  the  city  elections  from 
the  most  patriotic  and  disinterested  motives,  will  be  stimu- 
lated to  greater  exertions  by  the  fact  that  these  elections 
will   generally  give   them  the  representation  due  to  their 
numbers  ?     Here  we  see  the  first  illustration  of  the  impor- 
tant fact,  to  which  we  have  called  attention,  that  the  very 
method  of  voting  may  be  made  to  encourage  and  attract  the 
best  voters,  and  to  discourage  and  baffle  the  worst.     May 
we  not  reasonably  expect  that  more  voters  —  more  at  least  of 
those  who  vote  for  the  most  unselfish  and  patriotic  reasons  — 
will  go  to  the  polls  at  such  elections  than  would  go  there  at 
elections  when  none  but  the  party  majority  can  secure  any 
representation?     Is  it  too  much  to  hope  that  this  right  of 
Free  Voting  may  be  used  to  place  some  able  and  indepen- 
dent City  Aldermen  in  the  council  and  to  keep  them  there 
for  a  long  time  ? 

3.  We  do  not  attach  supreme  importance  to  an  exact 

i  See  Ch.  IX. 


280  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

representation  of  the  numbers  holding  different  opinions,  or 
believe  it  possible  to  secure  it,  yet  an  approximation  to  this 
result  is  practicable,  and  would  be  highly  salutary.  It 
would  defeat  the  despotism  of  the  party  majority ;  it  would 
make  the  boss  impossible;  it  would  make  the  mercenary 
vote  largely  unsalable ;  it  would  destroy  the  profits  of 
managing  the  business  of  city  politics. 

Suppose,  for  example,  the  whole  number  of  city  voters 
to  be  73,000,  of  whom  31,000  support  the  candidates  of  one 
party,  25,000  those  of  a  second  party,  and  2000  of  a  third 
party,  while  there  are  15,000  non-partisan  or  independent 
electors  who  will  vote  for  the  best  candidates  irrespective 
of  mere  party  interests.  Under  our  party  system,  it  would 
be  possible  for  the  31,000  to  elect  their  five  aldermanic  can- 
didates, and  for  the  other  42,000  voters  to  be  left  unrepre- 
sented.1 But  under  Free  Voting,  while  the  two  larger 
parties  would  be  fortunate  if  they  could  elect  four  City 
Aldermen,  the  non-partisan  voters  could  certainly  elect  one 
of  them,  9126  votes  being  enough  for  this.  They  could 
also  cause  the  election  of  some  of  the  best  candidates  nomi- 
nated by  any  party  —  they  having  more  than  5000  votes  to 
spare  for  this  purpose,  after  electing  their  own  candidate  — 
however  impossible  in  practice  it  may  generally  be  to  make 
all  of  them  available  to  the  utmost.  Obviously,  each  party 
would  incline  to  put  up  worthy  candidates  whom  conscien- 
tious, independent  voters  could  support. 

4.  Is  it  too  much  to  assume  that  this  method  of  electing 
the  two  classes  of  Aldermen  would  exclude  mere  party  domi- 
nation, and  bring  into  city  councils  men  quite  different  from 
those  whom  American  cities  have  generally  elected  to  such 
bodies?  The  bitterness  with  which  mere  politicians,  parti- 
sans, and  all  bosses  oppose  this  method  of  voting  shows  their 
answer  to  this  question.  Votes  would  doubtless  be  some- 
times so  bestowed  among  the  five  candidates  for  City  Alder- 
men as  to  fall  much  short  of  the  ideal  representation  which 
is  possible.  Objections  on  this  score  are  likely  to  come 

i  See,  on  this  subject,  Ch.  IX. 


CONSTITUTION  AND  MEMBERSHIP  OF  CITY  COUNCIL    287 

(1)  from  radical,  though  patriotic  and  conscientious,  re- 
formers who  sometimes  fail  to  secure  the  greatest  good 
possible  because  they  insist  on  ideal  perfection  at  the  out- 
set ;  and  (2)  from  radical  partisans  and  politicians,  who 
insist  that  the  strongest  party  should  be  able  to  elect  all 
the  candidates.  We  have  seen  that  the  first  of  these  ob- 
jectors will  tell  us  there  are  several  forms  of  cumulative 
voting  which  would  give  a  more  complete  representation. 
"We  need  not  dispute  about  the  facts.  But  all  of  them  are 
too  complicated  for  the  present  state  of  public  opinion, — 
their  zealous  advocates  dispute  among  themselves,  —  and 
nothing  will  do  so  much  to  enlighten  that  opinion  as  en- 
forcing the  easier  methods  we  propose. 

District  Aldermen.  —  Only  a  few  words  of  explanation  are 
needed  concerning  the  election  of  the  three  District  Alder- 
men every  alternate  year,  from  each  of  the  four  Aldermanic 
districts.  Their  six  years'  term  of  office  insures  an  official 
experience  on  the  part  of  these  officers  adequate  for  learning 
how  to  manage  the  city  business  wisely.  As  one-third  of 
them  is  to  be  renewed  at  every  biennial  election,  no  unwise 
policy  can  long  prevail  through  their  votes.  There  are  some 
reasons  which  favor  elections  in  great  cities  from  a  small 
number  of  large  districts.  There  may  be  local  interests  of  a 
peculiar  kind  important  enough  to  arouse  strong  sectional 
jealousies.  A  feeling,  however  unfounded,  prevails  largely 
to  the  effect  that  elections  in  districts  are  more  under  the 
control  of  the  people  than  elections  at  large.  .If  we  have 
four  districts,  it  can  be  said  that  more  of  the  candidates 
will  be  personally  known  to  the  voters.  On  the  whole, 
it  seems  to  be  wise,  at  first,  to  defer  largely  to  the  feelings 
in  favor  of  such  districts  which  may  be  decisive  of  early 
reform. 

In  electing  three  District  Aldermen  at  once  from  each  dis- 
trict, by  the  method  of  Free  Voting,  it  is  likely,  so  long 
as  parties  shall  think  it  worth  while  to  exert  themselves 
in  city  elections,  that  each  of  the  two  larger  parties  in 
the  districts  will  generally  be  able  to  elect  one  of  the  three 
District  Aldermen,  and  that  the  most  non-partisan  voters  will 


288  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

be  able,  if  not  always  to  elect  the  third  from  their  own  ranks, 
to  at  least  effectively  and  very  usefully  admonish  both  parties 
of  the  need  of  nominating  good  candidates.  If,  for  example, 
the  voters  of  the  two  great  parties  and  of  the  class  which 
will  vote  more  or  less  independently  of  parties,  are  respec- 
tively 9000,  7000,  and  3000  in  a  district,  it  is  easy  to  see 
that  no  party  is  likely  to  elect  more  than  one  of  its  candi- 
dates without  the  aid  of  the  non-partisan  vote,  and  that  this 
vote  may  be  a  very  salutary  power.  Both  parties  would 
make  nominations  with  a  view  to  win  it.1 

2.  By  this  method  of  voting,  the  old  party  ward  and 
assembly  district  organizations  and  intrenchments  will,  to 
a  large  extent,  be  made  useless.  In  councils  so  elected  men 
standing  for  opposing  theories,  policies,  and  interests,  in  the 
same  districts,  and  well  informed  concerning  them,  will  con- 
front each  other  on  the  floor  of  the  council.  We  must  think 
that  debates  will  be  more  intelligent,  earnest,  and  useful 
under  such  a  representation  than  they  have  been  under  the 
old  party  system  according  to  which  only  the  representatives 
of  one  party  or  interest  in  a  district  appear  in  the  council. 
It  is  worthy  of  notice  that,  as  only  a  third  of  all  the  District 
Aldermen  are  to  be  elected  at  the  same  time,  little  patronage 
or  spoils  is  likely  to  be  the  fruit  of  a  victory ;  so  that  while 
all  the  motives  for  patriotic,  unselfish  voting  are  left  in  full 
force,  those  which  impel  the  partisan,  mercenary,  and  venal 
voter  will  be  rendered  largely  inefficacious.  The  influences 
which  support  the  system  of  party  leaders  would  seem  to  be 
in  large  measure  suppressed  by  this  method  of  electing  the 
council. 

General  View  of  the  Council.  —  Looking  at  the  council  as 
thus  far  made  up,  and  to  the  manner  of  getting  into  it,  we 
see  that  the  principal  departures  from  American  precedents 
are  (1)  Free  Nominations,  (2)  Free  Voting,  and  (3)  minority 

*  The  constitution  of  New  York  as  amended  in  1894  (Art.  XIV.  Sec.  2),  in  ref- 
erence to  conventions  for  amending  the  constitution,  provides  for  the  election  of 
three  delegates  from  each  Senate  district  of  the  state,  and  for  eighteen  delegates 
from  the  state  at  large,  —  thus  approving  much  of  the  theory  we  have  adopted,  — 
but  unfortunately  it  contains  no  provisions  for  Free  Voting  or  minority  represen- 
tation. 


CONSTITUTION  AND  MEMBERSHIP  OF  CITY  COUNCIL    289 

representation ;  that  is,  a  representation  of  the  whole  people 
and  all  their  interests,  irrespective  of  parties,  instead  of  a 
mere  representation  of  party  majorities. 

It  seems  quite  clear  that  if  no  political  party  should  take 
any  action,  as  such,  concerning  these  aldermanic  elections,  the 
people  could  easily  go  forward  and  elect  the  members  of  the 
council  under  the  methods  proposed.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
parties  and  their  accustomed  agencies  should  conspire  to  do 
their  utmost  to  control  the  elections,  the  non-partisan  inde- 
pendent voters  could  elect  the  candidates  due  to  their  num- 
bers. As  the  ballots  would  be  supplied  at  public  cost, 
very  little  money  would  be  required  for  election  expenses. 
Elections  would  be  much  more  simple,  easy,  and  inex- 
pensive than  elections  under  the  old  party  system  ;  for  all 
the  complex  machinery  for  party  enrolments  and  nomi- 
nations, and  all  questions  as  to  their  regularity,  would  be 
avoided. 

2.  There  are  likely  to  be  objections  to  such  a  council 
based  upon  two  opposing  theories,  which  deserve  some  atten- 
tion. (1)  On  one  side,  it  will  be  said  that  the  council  will  be 
rigid  —  that  it  cannot  be  readily  enough  made  to  conform  to 
changing  opinions  among  the  people.  If  by  changing  opin- 
ions are  meant  opinions  concerning  national  party  issues  as 
declared  in  party  platforms,  we  are  glad  to  think  such  a 
council  would  probably  take  little  notice  of  them.  The  exe- 
cution of  a  sound  and  consistent  municipal  policy,  and  the 
doing  of  the  public  work  of  a  city,  require  some  steadiness 
and  consistency  of  management  —  an  advance  in  broadly 
curving  lines,  and  according  to  well-planned  and  systematic 
methods. 

The  wise  changes  of  municipal  policy  which  show  them- 
selves in  the  non-partisan  vote  of  a  city  are  pretty  sure  to 
affect,  in  a  corresponding  degree,  the  opinions  of  the  mem- 
bers of  its  council.  It  has  been  one  of  our  municipal  evils 
that  our  city  officers,  even  if  honest,  have  not  had  the  moral 
courage  or  the  legal  power  needed  to  support  the  public 
interests  effectively  against  sudden,  partisan,  and  mercenary 
combinations.  It  is  only  towns  and  small  villages,  whose 


290  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

affairs  are  very  simple,  that  can  get  along  with  annually 
elected  officers.  It  needs  to  be  repeated  that  the  larger  the 
city,  the  longer  the  experience  required  on  the  part  of  its 
officers  for  the  management  of  its  affairs.  The  aldermen 
who  remain  over  each  election  will  be  able  to  prevent  a 
sudden  revolution,  but  they  are  not  very  likely  to  withstand 
any  strong  and  salutary  expression  of  public  opinion  in  an 
election. 

2.  On  the  other  side,  it  may  be  said  that  the  council  will 
be  too  weak  to  avoid  a  complete,  damaging  surrender  to  the 
party  which  may  have  a  majority  in   a  biennial   election. 
There  is  certainly  room  for  diverse  opinions  on  this  point, 
and  we  may  doubtless  learn  much  from  experience.     But  let 
it  be  remembered  that  the  newly  elected  aldermen  can  hardly 
all  belong  to  the  same  party.     A  clear  party  triumph  in  the 
council  would  require  the  votes  of  members  of  a  party  who 
had  been  several  years  in  the  body,  and  men  thus  situated 
do  not  generally  incline  to  a  revolutionary  policy. 

3.  Nevertheless,  we  must  think  there  is  more  danger  that  a 
council,  constituted  as  we  have  suggested,  and  without  other 
members,  would  be  too  weak  to  stand  with  adequate  stability 
for  the  public  interest,  and  against  party  interests  and  selfish 
combinations,  —  especially  for  the  next  few  years  after  its 
creation,  —  than   there  is  that  it  would  be  strong  enough, 
or  inclined,  to  withstand  public  opinion  in  the  interest  of 
domination  by  itself.     Indeed,  we  are  so  impressed  with  the 
need   of   fortifying  the  council,  especially  in   large   cities, 
against  partisan  assaults,  and  of  bringing  into  their  mem- 
bership men  who  will  more  fully  represent  public  opinion 
and  public  interests,  that  we  shall  propose  a  third  class  of 
aldermen,  novel  in  this  country,  though  justified  by  a  vast 
experience  elsewhere,  —  a  class  of  aldermen  to  be  chosen  by  the 
council  itself. 

4.  But  before  we  do  this,  we  trust  the  reader  will  notice 
these  points :  (1)  that  the  council,  as  thus  far  constituted, 
is  complete  and  legally  sufficient  for  its  duties,  at  least  accord- 
ing to  American  standards;  (2)  that  it  is  in  no  way  dependent 
for  discharging  its  functions,  in  a  legal  sense,  upon  the  third 


CONSTITUTION  AND  MEMBERSHIP  OF  CITY  COUNCIL    291 

class  of  aldermen  to  be  proposed ;  and  (3)  that  this  third 
class  is  proposed  only  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  into  the 
council  members  who  will  increase  its  wisdom  and  non- 
partisan  spirit,  and  give  it  more  of  the  courage,  business 
capacity,  and  independence  needed  for  withstanding  partisan 
aggression  and  political  scheming. 

The  need  and  utility  of  this  third  class  of  aldermen  — 
especially  in  the  early  stages  of  the  enforcement  of  a  non- 
partisan,  municipal  system — may  be  easily  illustrated.  Par- 
ties and  their  managers  will  make  desperate  struggles  at  the 
outset  —  as  they  did  when  civil  service  reform  methods  began 
to  impose  effective  restraints  —  to  break  down  the  new  sys- 
tem. They  will  nominate  intense  partisans  for  aldermen  who 
are  bitterly  opposed  to  a  non-partisan  council.  For  a  time, 
possibly  a  majority  of  the  aldermen  may  be  bitter  partisans 
of  different  parties.  The  residue  of  the  members  will  very 
likely  represent  the  non-partisan,  independent  members  of  the 
community  —  whom  these  opposing  partisans  dislike  perhaps 
more  than  they  do  each  other.  For  a  time,  such  antagonistic 
elements  would  be  unfavorable  both  to  just  and  patriotic 
action  by  the  council,  and  to  the  friendly  cooperation  of  its 
members  —  though,  before  long,  the  futility  of  this  passionate 
kind  of  action  would  be  recognized,  and  it  would  unques- 
tionably be  discontinued.1  Nevertheless,  it  seems  wise  to 
bring  into  the  council  a  few  additional  members — to  be  chosen 
by  the  elected  members  of  the  body  —  not  merely  for  such 
temporary  reasons,  but  for  those  more  important  and  abiding, 
which  will  soon  appear.  As  these  additional  members  should 
and  would  be  selected  by  a  two-thirds  —  or  a  three-fifths — 
majority  vote  of  the  council,  —  and  according  to  the  methods 
of  Free  Nominations  and  Free  Voting,  —  it  is  hardly  possible 
that  they  should  be  men  of  partisan  or  radical  opinions. 

1  See  ou  this  point  the  results  of  experience  in  Germany,  Ch.  XIII.  pp.  360, 361. 
The  author,  during  his  service  as  a  Civil  Service  Commissioner,  found  that  such 
young  men  as  entered  the  puhlic  service  ready  to  wrangle  over  party  theories 
soon  appreciated  the  folly  of  such  conduct,  and  learned  to  work  peaceably  side 
by  side  in  the  public  departments  —  as  the  conduct  of  our  letter  carriers  and 
customs  revenue  officials,  selected  through  civil  service  examinations,  now  con- 
stantly shows. 


292  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

They  must  be  men  of  moderate  and  reasonable  opinions  to 
command  such  a  majority. 

Can  there  be  any  doubt  that  it  would  be  a  great  gain  to 
put  into  the  council  say  ten  members  who  hold  a  position 
between  the  conflicting  elements  in  the  body,  and  have  not 
won  their  way  into  it  through  a  popular  contest?  They 
would  naturally  be  peacemakers  between  the  extremes. 
Having  received  their  membership  from  a  majority  of  the 
whole  body,  their  influence  would  naturally  be  used  for  har- 
monious action  and  a  reasonable,  non-partisan  policy.  We 
shall  reserve  the  vast  experience  which  justifies  these  ap- 
pointed aldermen  until  after  we  have  stated  the  manner 
of  choosing  them,  and  we  hope  the  reader  will  reserve  his 
judgment. 

X.     Appointed  Aldermen 

1.  The  council  should,  for  reasons  just  stated,  appoint  into 
its  own  body,  after  the   first  biennial   election,   ten   other 
aldermen,  to  be  known  as  Appointed  Aldermen,  for  the  term 
of  four  years,  the  same  being  in  addition  to  the  forty-six 
elected  Aldermen,  and  making  the  council  consist  of  fifty-six 
members,  each  of  whom  will  have  the   same   powers   and 
duties.1 

As  such  a  method  of  choosing  municipal  legislators  finds 
no  extensive  precedents  in  the  United  States,  and  from  its 
mere  novelty  may  fail  to  receive  the  thoughtful  considera- 
tion of  those  worthy  conservatives  who  distrust  everything 
new,  we  hasten  to  promise  them  a  justification  of  it  by  a 
larger  and  more  satisfactory  practical  experience  than  can 
be  cited  in  the  United  States  in  favor  —  perhaps  we  may 
say — of  any  municipal  method  of  doing  anything  whatever. 

2.  It  has  long  been  the  American  practice  on  the  part  of 
city  councils  for  them  to  fill  the  vacancies  in  their  own  mem- 

1  The  ten  members  first  appointed  should  be  so  classified,  according  to  the 
method  before  explained,  that  the  term  of  five  of  them  shall  expire  at  the  end  of 
two  years,  and  thereafter  five  of  the  Appointed  Aldermen  will  retire  biennially  — 
making  the  council  consist  of  sixty  members  after  the  first  two  years.  We  might 
properly  speak  of  these  aldermen  as  Elected  Aldermen,  but  it  will  be  convenient 
to  refer  to  them  as  Appointed  Aldermen,  in  order  to  distinguish  them  as  a  class. 


CONSTITUTION  AND  MEMBERSHIP  OF  CITY  COUNCIL    293 

bership.  This  practice  covers  the  only  real  question  of 
principle  which  our  suggestion  involves  —  the  question  as 
to  selecting  legislative  officers  by  legislative  officers.  We 
would  merely  extend  the  principle  to  the  selection  of  five 
new  members  biennally.1  The  constitution  of  New  York, 
as  amended  in  1894,  declares  that  city  officers  may  be  elected 
by  the  people,  or  may  be  appointed  as  the  legislature  shall 
direct.  The  legislature  may  therefore  vest  the  appointment 
of  any  and  all  city  officers  in  any  other  city  officers,  save 
where  the  constitution  has  otherwise  specifically  provided. 
The  same  principle  is  also  extended  to  county  officers.2 
Here  both  the  principle  and  the  policy  we  have  suggested 
have  an  ample  constitutional  basis. 

It  seems  almost  obvious  that  members  of  city  councils  who 
are  familiar  with  the  authority  and  multifarious  duties  of 
these  bodies  must  be  especially  well  qualified  to  decide  who 
are  most  fit  to  be  made  members.  The  real  question  as  to 
the  wisdom  of  conferring  the  suggested  appointing  power, 
therefore,  turns  upon  the  probability  of  its  being  exercised 
in  good  faith  in  the  public  interest.3 

3.  Let  us  consider  this  probability.  To  insure  fairness 
and  complete  publicity  in  appointing  these  aldermen  and  to 
enable  public  opinion  and  the  public  press  to  be  effective, 
written  nominations  for  the  places  to  be  filled  should  be 
required  to  be  made  by  certificate  signed  by  five  members 
of  the  council  in  analogy  to  the  certificates  required  under 
the  methods  of  Free  Nomination  as  we  have  explained  them. 
These  nominations  for  Appointed  Aldermen  should  be  placed 
upon  the  public  records  of  the  council  at  least  ten  days 

1  While  these  pages  are  being  written  (1896) ,  a  New  York  State  Commission, 
appointed  by  the  governor,  has  reported  a  bill  for  the  government  of  cities 
which  provides  not  only  for  the  council  filling  vacancies  in  its  own  body,  but  for 
its  filling  all  vacancies  in  any  of  the  elective  offices  of  cities.    Const.,  Art.  X. 
Sec.  2. 

2  Const.  New  York,  Art.  X.  Sec.  2. 

8  It  may  be  said,  with  much  truth,  that  the  need  and  utility  of  having  Appointed 
Aldermen  are  much  greater  in  large  cities  —  whose  affairs  are  complicated — than 
in  small  ones.  Yet  in  England  —  which  has  tested  the  utility  of  Appointed  Alder- 
men for  more  than  sixty  years  —  they  are  provided  for  even  in  the  smallest  of 
her  more  than  three  hundred  cities. 


294  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

before  the  nominees  can  be  voted  for.  Every  member  of 
the  council  should  be  required  to  vote  on  their  election. 
Each  member  will,  of  course,  have  a  right  to  cast  as  many 
votes  as  there  shall  be  candidates  to  be  elected,  and  may 
distribute  them  as  he  pleases.  The  five  candidates  —  the  ten 
at  the  first  election  —  having  the  largest  number  of  recorded 
votes  should  be  declared  elected.1 

These  provisions,  we  hope,  are  well  adapted  for  bringing 
into  the  council  a  class  of  candid,  reasonable  men,  opposed 
to  all  partisan  extremes,  who,  feeling  indebted  to  the  vote 
of  the  council  itself,  will  be  likely  to  use  their  influence  in 
favor  of  a  liberal,  broad,  and  conciliatory  policy,  in  harmony 
with  public  opinion  and  the  public  interests  —  rather  than  for 
advancing  partisan  projects  or  unworthy  combinations.2 

4.  There  are  reasons  of  a  very  different  and  very  decisive 
kind  which  call  for  the  choice  of  these  appointed  aldermen 
by  the  council.  Grave  evils  in  our  city  affairs  have  resulted 
from  the  fact  that  our  aldermen  have  been,  in  the  main, 
representatives  of  mere  parties,  factions,  and  partisan  and 
mercenary  interests.  They  should  be  made  to  represent,  as 
far  as  possible,  the  vast  business  interests  and  the  higher 
sentiments  of  our  cities, — their  commerce,  their  financial 
institutions,  their  industrial  experience,  their  artistic  and 
educational  interests,  the  altruistic  feelings  which  gave  birth 
to  our  institutions  of  charity  and  benevolence. 

Municipal  administration  has  been  so  largely  regarded  as 
a  matter  of  party  politics  and  as  the  doing  of  mere  coarse 
work  that  vast  numbers  of  citizens  have  hardly  considered 
it  as  having  any  relations  with  these  higher  things.  These 
matters  are  not  generally  thought  to  need  any  representa- 

1  In  order  to  prevent  Appointed  Aldermen  being  selected  in  reference  to  their 
anticipated  votes  for  officers  soon  to  be  chosen  by  the  council,  they  should  not  be 
allowed  to  participate  in  such  choice  within  two  or  three  months  next  following 
their  own  appointment. 

2  As  it  might  happen  —  naturally  enough  by  the  contrivance  of  the  party  major- 
ity to  serve  its  own  ends — that  only  one  or  two  places  among  the  Appointed  Alder- 
men would  be  arranged  to  be  filled  at  the  same  time,  it  should  be  provided  that 
when  there  are  not  as  many  as  three,  to  be  appointed  at  the  same  balloting,  a 
four-fifths  vote  of  the  council  should  be  required  to  appoint  a  nominee  —  thus 
generally  preventing  a  mere  party  majority  choosing  its  favorites. 


CONSTITUTION  AND  MEMBERSHIP  OF  CITY  COUNCIL    295 

tion  ;  their  influence  is  hardly  regarded  as  becoming  in  a 
city  council ;  the  men  who  fitly  represent  them  are  not 
likely  to  be  considered  by  those  who  make  nominations 
according  to  our  party  methods.  Most  of  the  citizens  best 
endowed  for  sharing  in  this  higher  representation  would,  for 
various  reasons,  decline  —  some  from  mere  modesty,  some 
from  a  dislike  of  all  political  contention,  some  from  inability 
to  meet  the  election  expenses,  and  some  from  the  bad  repute 
of  our  familiar  city  councils — to  stand  for  popular  election. 
Yet  some  of  them  would,  nevertheless,  gladly  take  seats  in 
councils  if  quietly  chosen  by  their  members,  and  asked  to 
serve  from  a  sense  of  duty.  Of  course  mere  politicians  and 
bosses  will  oppose  such  representation. 

Men  well  qualified  for  special  and  highly  important  duties 
in  city  councils  —  men,  for  example,  connected  with  educa- 
tion, art,  charity,  and  practical  science,  who  might  not  be 
sufficiently  well  known  in  political  circles  to  be  available  for 
popular  election — might,  nevertheless,  be  brought  by  appoint- 
ment into  the  council,  and  might  regard  it  as  an  honor  to 
serve  there.  Who  can  doubt  that  the  members  of  a  non- 
partisan  council,  responsible  for  good  government,  and 
naturally  desiring  to  add  dignity  to  their  own  body,  would 
gladly  appoint  members  competent  to  deal  with  the  most 
difficult  and  scientific  parts  of  the  administration?  They 
would  certainly  be  members  of  a  kind  of  which  there  is  great 
need  in  American  cities.1 

How  can  the  councils  of  our  cities  ever  be  made  competent 
to  deal  wisely  with  matters  connected  with  their  highest 
culture  and  their  noblest  sentiments,  if  those  most  competent 
to  act  upon  such  subjects  are  repelled  both  by  the  ill-repute 
of  these  bodies  and  the  vicious  methods  of  entering  them? 
We  certainly  cannot  afford  to  neglect  any  honorable  methods 

1  See  the  chapters  on  the  Government  of  European  Cities  for  proofs  of  the 
advantages  of  having  such  classes  of  men  in  our  city  councils  (pp.  345,  346,  358- 
364) .  While  these  pages  are  being  written  (1896) ,  the  cultivated  people  of  New 
York  City  have  been  compelled  to  go  to  Albany  and  procure  a  special  law  to  pre- 
vent their  partisan,  incompetent  City  Council  from  authorizing  the  erection  of 
objectionable  statuary  in  their  great  public  park.  The  New  York  Charter  of  1897 
provides  for  a  City  Commission  on  Art.  See  Sees.  633-637. 


296  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

of  improving  them  which  have  been  found  salutary  in  the 
best-governed  cities  of  the  world. 

5.  It  may  be  difficult  at  first  to  induce  the  most  desirable 
citizens  to  enter  the  councils,  even  if  they  are  thus  appointed. 
But  when  such  an  honorable  way  shall  be  opened  to  them, 
we  may  believe  that  patriotic  motives  and  an  enlightened 
public  opinion  will  be  effective  persuasions  for  entering  upon 
it.     When  a  few  worthy  men  shall  have  accepted  seats  there 
others  of  their  class  will  be  glad  to  join  them,  as  the  experi- 
ence of  other  countries  seems  to  prove.     When  the  council 
is  open  to  such  citizens,  they  must  enter  it  or  disgracefully 
keep  silent   under   the   rule  of   blackmailers   and   corrupt 
politicians.     Professor  Commons  expresses  the  opinion,  in 
which  we  fully  concur,  that  if  an  open  and  honorable  way 
should  be  provided  for  the  cooperation  of  the  best  citizens 
in  the  government  of  American  cities,  their  councils  would 
soon  be  honored  and  enlightened  by  their  presence.     He 
declares  that  "  it  is  generally  agreed  that  the  government  of 
English  and  German  cities  is  superior  to  that  of  American 
cities.      Public   officials   are   renowned   for    their   honesty, 
efficiency,    and    economy    of    their    administration.      The 
municipal  councils  include  the   best  and  most  intelligent 
citizens.  .  .  .M1 

6.  Why  is  it  that  in  the  cities  of  no  country  do  its  best 
citizens  contribute  more  liberally  in  private  ways  for  educa- 
tion, charity,  and  benevolence  than  in  the  United  States, 
while  in  no  enlightened  country  do  such  men  do  so  little, 
officially,  to  mould  and  administer  the  local  governments  by 
which  these  matters  are  profoundly  affected?      Who  can 
doubt  that  the  base  and  partisan  conditions  of  securing  mu- 
nicipal offices  are  among  the  chief  causes  of  this  anomaly? 

In  view  of  these  considerations,  the  reader  must  see  the 
profound  importance  of  using  every  legitimate  means  which 
will  tend  to  bring  the  best  men  into  the  city  council.  He 
has,  perhaps,  been  asking  himself  why  there  should  not  be 
a  law-making  service  in  this  body ;  a  condition  of  eligibility 
to  the  mayoralty.  It  might,  we  think,  with  great  utility  be 

i  Pro.  Rep.,  pp.  203,  208,  209. 


CONSTITUTION  AND  MEMBERSHIP  OF  CITY  COUNCIL    297 

provided  that  no  man  should  be  eligible  for  nomination  as 
mayor  who  has  not  served  for  at  least  two  years  as  a  member 
of  the  city  council  within  the  last  three  years.  Apparently, 
such  a  provision  would  have  these  effects  :  It  would  dignify 
and  honor  the  council  in  popular  estimation;  it  would 
strongly  tend  to  bring  into  its  membership  all  men  of  capacity 
and  honorable  ambition  who  aspire  to  the  highest  office  in 
the  gift  of  their  city;  it  would  defeat  secret  and  sudden 
schemes  for  foisting  little,  incompetent  politicians  into  this 
great  office ;  it  would  enable  the  people  to  know  what  sort 
of  men  were  candidates  for  mayor ;  it  would  be  a  salutary 
proclamation  of  the  will  of  the  people  not  to  have  their  chief 
executive  affairs  intrusted  to  any  man  who  has  not  an  ade- 
quate practical  knowledge  of  them,  and  has  not  shown  a 
real  interest  in  their  administration.  It  will  soon  appear 
that  the  mayors  of  the  best-governed  cities  of  Europe  are, 
with  great  advantage,  elected  from  among  the  members  of 
the  city  councils,  and  by  its  vote.  Whatever  can  be  said 
against  having  the  mayors  elected  by  the  councils,  every 
fair-minded  man  must  admit  that  any  person  who  has  not 
ability  enough  to  gain  a  seat  in  the  council,  and  patriotism 
enough  to  serve  there  for  two  years,  is  not  fit  to  be  the 
mayor  of  a  city.  May  we  not  hope  the  time  is  not  remote 
when  it  will  be  considered  a  piece  of  unpatriotic  and  auda- 
cious impudence  for  any  party  boss  or  politician  to  propose  a 
person  for  mayor  who  is  not  well  experienced  in  city  affairs 
—  who  has  shown  more  interest  in  his  party  than  in  his  city  ? 

XI.    Honorary  Aldermen 

1.  The  more  we  consider  the  subject  the  more  we  are  im- 
pressed with  the  supreme  need  of  bringing  the  ablest  and 
best  men  into  the  city  councils.  Our  confidence  that  the 
methods  already  suggested  would  contribute  much  to  this 
result  should  not  blind  us  to  their  defects.  It  is  one  of  them 
that  they  lack  provisions  for  bringing  into  the  councils  the 
valuable  advice  of  men  —  mainly  ex-officers  —  who  have  had 
the  most  instructive  experience  in  municipal  administration. 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

The  presence  of  a  few  of  them  would  add  much  both  to  the 
wisdom  and  the  dignity  of  these  bodies. 

An  attempt  to  reenforce  the  council  from  this  quarter  is 
only  a  continuance  of  the  policy  we  have  urged  from  the 
beginning  —  that  of  securing  the  most  competent  city  officers 
possible.  Let  us,  therefore,  offer  some  further  suggestions, 
not  so  much  as  being  immediately  practicable,  but  as  now 
profitable  for  consideration,  and  which  —  we  trust  —  will  be 
found  practicable  in  no  remote  future,  when  city  government 
shall  more  largely  command  the  attention  of  thoughtful 
Americans  and  a  more  enlightened  public  opinion  shall 
prevail.  What  we  are  to  propose  is  not  so  much  a  further 
addition  to  the  governing  officials  in  the  council,  as  the 
reinforcement  of  the  body  by  elements  which  will  add  to  its 
wisdom,  its  dignity,  its  non-partisan  spirit,  and  its  command 
of  public  respect  and  confidence  —  elements  to  be  supplied 
by  a  small  number  of  members,  say  from  five  to  twelve,  to 
be  known  as  Honorary  Aldermen. 

They  should  be  mainly  ex-municipal  officers  ;  they  should 
not  be  under  sixty  years  of  age  ;  they  should  have  had  great 
official  experience  which  would  give  them  large  non-partisan 
capacity  for  usefulness  in  a  municipal  legislature;  they  should 
receive  no  salary;  they  should  have  the  amplest  authority  for 
advice,  suggestions,  and  debate  in  the  body,  but  they  should 
not  vote.1 

2.  The  same  classes  of  persons  who,  a  few  years  ago, 
showed  the  methods  of  civil  service  reform  to  be  utterly 
impracticable,  chimerical,  and  useless  —  according  to  their 
theories  —  will  very  likely  bring  similar  charges  against 
these  suggestions.  They  believe  that  a  partisan  favorite  — 
a  hustling,  young  politician,  and  assembly  district  leader, 

1  Perhaps  the  most  valid  objection  to  their  voting  would  be  the  danger  that 
they  might  in  that  eveut  be  chosen  by  reason  of  their  political  opinions,  an  objec- 
tion which  might  perhaps  be  sufficiently  removed  if  they  could  not  vote  within  a 
year  after  their  being  given  seats  in  the  council. 

The  official  term  of  Honorary  Aldermen,  we  think,  should  not  be  more  than  two 
or  three  years.  They  are  competent  for  their  duties  at  the  outset,  and  are  not 
likely  to  long  remain  very  efficient,  but  if  they  do,  they  can  be  reflected.  It 
seems  desirable  that  the  possibility  of  being  an  Honorary  Alderman  of  the  city 
council  should  be  open  to  many  ex-city  officers  of  a  high  grade. 


CONSTITUTION  AND  MEMBERSHIP  OF  CITY  COUNCIL    299 

nominated  in  a  secret  primary,  and  elected  by  a  partisan 
vote  —  is  a  much  more  desirable  member  of  a  city  council 
than  an  ex-officer  of  the  city,  wise  from  experience,  whose 
honorable  official  career  commands  the  admiration  of  a  whole 
city  and  has  caused  the  members  of  the  council,  regardless 
of  party,  to  desire  the  honor  of  his  presence  among  them. 
Doubtless  there  are  many  partisan  voters  who  would  prefer 
the  boss  should  choose  twenty  members  of  the  council  rather 
than  have  distinguished  official  merit,  which  the  council 
might  wish  to  honor,  gain  a  single  one  of  its  seats. 

3.  Many  good  citizens  will  undoubtedly  at  first  hesitate 
at  the  novelty  of  our  suggestion,  and  think  it  too  incompat- 
ible  with   American   precedents   to  be  very  soon,  if   ever, 
adopted.     We  cannot  be  surprised  at  this,  but  venture  to 
think  the  proposal  will  stand  the  test  of  reflection.     Who 
will  deny  that  it  would  be  a  gain  to  any  city  council  to  have 
among  its  members  respected  ex -judges,  ex-mayors,  ex-comp- 
trollers, ex-police  justices,  ex-district  attorneys,  or  ex-police, 
tax,  school,  fire,  health,  or  dock  commissioners,  or  superin- 
tendents, of  the   character   the   council  would   select  ?     A 
moment's   reflection  will   suggest   the   valuable   knowledge 
such  officers  would  bring  to  the  debates  and  investigations 
of  the  council,  and  how  much  some  of  them  would  add  to  its 
dignity.1     Would  it  be  unwise  even  to  confer  the  offices  just 
referred  to  upon  the  understanding  that  the  men  who  have 
held   them   are,  after  their  retirement,  under   an  honorary 
obligation  to  serve  a  short  term  in  the  council,  if  able,  and 
called  upon  to  do  so  ? 

4.  Such  aldermen  would  be  all  the  more  useful  because 
they  would  enter  the  council  at  that  mature  age  when  the 
fires  of  party  spirit  and  ambition  would  have  ceased  to  burn, 
when  men  naturally  and  unambitiously  seek  places  of  quiet 
and  honorable  usefulness  and  the  respect  of  all  their  fellow- 
citizens.     Inquiry,  we  think,  would  show  that  a  large  major- 
ity of  such  ex-officers  who  have  returned   to  private  life 

1  Why  should  not  an  officer  like  the  late  Commissioner  Waring  of  New  York, 
who  has  rendered  invaluable  service  to  a  city,  be  allowed  to  take  part  in  the 
debates  of  its  council  ? 


300  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

with  the  respect  of  the  people,  have  become  wearied  and 
disgusted  by  the  folly  and  pernicious  effects  of  party  and 
corrupt  contention  over  city  affairs. 

In  a  healthy  condition  of  municipal  life,  men  of  honorable 
ambition  and  a  patriotic  sense  of  duty  naturally  desire  such 
positions  as  we  propose  for  them.  Citizens  who  have  re- 
cently left  official  places  of  active  labor  generally  desire  a 
useful  and  honorable  connection  with  the  public  service 
which  will  afford  them  the  opportunity  of  making  their  rich 
experience  beneficial  to  their  fellow-citizens.  They  generally 
have  leisure  for  serving  the  public.  Some  of  them  have  a 
strong  desire  to  be  instrumental  in  supplying  defects,  which 
they  best  know,  in  the  municipal  laws  and  ordinances,  and  to 
aid  in  the  suppression  of  abuses  and  vicious  methods  which 
they  are  the  most  competent  to  set  forth.  Why  should 
they  not  have  the  opportunity  ?  Why  should  not  the  people 
have  the  benefit  of  their  experience  ?  When  city  ordinances 
are  being  framed,  or  bills  are  being  prepared  for  the  legisla- 
ture, why  should  not  city  councils  have  among  their  mem- 
bers men  who  have  long  served  as  judges,  justices,  district 
attorneys,  mayors,  comptrollers,  school  superintendents,  and 
heads  of  great  departments  ? 

5.  The  bringing  into  city  councils  of  the  men  most  compe- 
tent to  hold  seats  there  is  justly  regarded  as  among  the  most 
difficult  and  grave  of  all  municipal  problems  in  the  United 
States.  We  are  sure  our  readers  will  not  thoughtlessly  dis- 
miss any  suggestions  which  tend  to  such  a  result,  and  we 
beg  to  advise  them  that  in  the  next  two  chapters  we  shall 
ask  their  attention  to  evidence  that,  in  some  of  the  best-gov- 
erned cities  of  the  world,  the  kind  of  wisdom  and  experience 
we  would  thus  bring  into  our  city  legislatures  has  been  a 
part  of  the  elevating  and  abiding  force  by  which  good  city 
government  has  been  secured. 

Monarchies  and  aristocracies  have  some  ways  of  enlist- 
ing wealth,  learning,  and  high  social  position  on  the  side 
of  the  government  which  are  not  available  in  a  republic,  but 
surely  republics  should  not  allow  such  governments  to  sur- 
pass them  in  their  methods  of  utilizing,  for  high  govern- 


CONSTITUTION  AND  MEMBERSHIP  OF  CITY  COUNCIL    301 

mental  purposes,  the  invaluable  experience  and  wisdom  which 
have  been  developed  in  their  own  public  service.  A  great 
end  of  all  government  is  to  bring  the  best  and  most  capable 
men  into  the  official  service  and  give  them  a  real  liberty 
while  there  to  be  useful  to  the  people.  No  other  residents 
of  American  cities  are  so  much  interested  as  the  poorest  and 
the  most  unprotected  of  their  inhabitants  in  having  in  the 
city  councils  the  kind  of  men  whom  they  would  make  Hon- 
orary Aldermen,  —  the  men  most  independent  for  resisting 
the  corrupt  and  despotic  methods  of  parties,  and  best  in- 
formed concerning  the  most  wronged  and  most  unprotected 
classes. 

6.  The  best  manner  of  choosing  Honorary  Aldermen  may 
be  open  to  some  doubt.  It  is  important  to  prevent  their 
being  chosen  for  party  purposes,  or  for  impairing  the  balance 
of  power  between  the  mayor  and  the  council.  Perhaps  it 
would  be  a  good  provision  to  allow  the  mayor  to  fill  one  or 
two  vacancies  among  these  Honorary  Aldermen  by  appoint- 
ments to  which  a  two-thirds  majority  of  the  members  of  the 
council  should  not  by  their  vote  object ;  and  also  to  allow 
the  council  to  fill  any  such  vacancy  by  an  election  in  which 
three-fourths  of  its  members  should  concur.  There  are 
obvious  advantages  in  having  two  ways  open  to  these  honor- 
ary seats.  When  vacancies  are  not  thus  filled  they  should 
be  filled  as  vacant  seats  are  to  be  filled  among  Appointed 
Aldermen. 

It  would  be  no  just  matter  of  surprise  —  in  view  of  the 
bad  reputation  of  American  city  councils  —  if  these  places 
of  honor  should  at  first  be  little  sought  by  the  men  most 
competent  to  fill  them.  We  must  count  upon  gradually 
raising  these  bodies  to  their  legitimate  position  of  respect 
and  dignity  —  as  we  shall  soon  find  that  other  nations  have 
raised  them  —  until  such  honorary  seats  are  much  desired.1 

1  The  study  of  municipal  government  is  too  little  developed  in  the  United 
States  to  warrant  the  anticipation  of  more  than  somewhat  remote  practical 
results  from  methods  of  the  nature  we  shall  now  suggest.  Nevertheless,  we 
venture  the  opinion  that  the  time  is  not  very  distant  when  great  American  cities 
will  allow,  for  illustration,  ex-presidents  of  chambers  of  commerce,  and  of  Bar 
associations,  and  also  great  municipal  benefactors  Honorary  seats,  if  not  in  the 


302  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

7.  European  cities  have  demonstrated  the  great  utility  of 
such  committees  as  are  referred  to  in  the  last  note.  The 
city  of  Berlin,  for  example,  is  said  to  have  250  committees  — 
somewhat  analogous  to  that  created  for  Boston  —  composed 
of  about  ten  thousand  members  who  aid  the  city  govern- 
ment by  their  cooperation  as  a  part  of  its  regular  machinery. 
The  influence  of  this  cooperation  by  the  people  seems  to  be 
excellent.1  City  parties  and  all  mere  politicians  and  bosses 
will  of  course  oppose  these  suggestions ;  nevertheless,  we 
venture  to  think  that  in  no  remote  future  some  of  them  will 
be  carried  into  effect  with  great  public  advantage.2 

city  council,  yet  seats  in  some  sort  of  executive  bodies  which  will  take  an  effec- 
tive part  in  municipal  administration.  The  last  Ex-President  of  the  New  York 
City  Chamber  of  Commerce,  Mr.  Charles  S.  Smith,  has  rendered  distinguished 
services  for  the  city  of  New  York,  and  he  would  be  a  valuable  member  of  a  city 
council.  The  late  Charles  L.  Brace,  the  founder  and  manager  of  the  Children's  Aid 
Society  of  the  city  of  New  York,  did  more  which  honors  the  city,  and  has  been  use- 
ful to  it,  than  was  done  by  perhaps  any  one  of  its  officers  during  his  generation. 
Miss  Louisa  Lee  Schuyler,  the  founder  and  chief  director  of  the  New  York  State 
Charities  Aid  Association,  has  done  more  to  improve  the  charity  administration  of 
the  city  and  state  of  New  York  than  was  done  for  it  by  any  mayor  of  her  time. 
Mrs.  Josephine  Shaw  Lowell  has  demonstrated  a  very  high  and  useful  capacity  for 
philanthropic  city  administration.  Two  women  have  been  chosen  members  of 
the  City  Council  of  London,  though  in  advance  of  any  law  providing  for  their 
election.  Mr.  Quincy,  the  mayor  of  Boston  (1897),  perhaps  finding  need  for  a 
wisdom  or  civic  devotion  of  a  higher  kind  than  that  which  her  elections  had 
brought  into  her  council,  has  recently  formed  a  non-partisan  committee  of  private 
citizens  for  aiding  the  municipal  administration,  and  also  an  Advisory  Board  for 
visiting  city  charities.  It  is  composed  of  representatives  from  the  Board  of 
Trade,  the  Chamber  of  Commerce,  the  Clearing  House  Association,  the  Merchants' 
Association,  the  Real  Estate  Exchange,  and  several  other  business  associations 
of  the  city.  He  has  also  appointed  a  private  board  of  visitors,  composed  of  per- 
sons of  both  sexes,  for  inspecting  public  institutions.  This  committee  holds 
bi-weekly  meetings  with  the  mayor,  and  he  has  found  its  cooperation  very  use- 
ful. It  is  now  considering  important  city  problems,  and  the  mayor  of  Boston 
desires  that  the  charter  proposed  for  the  city  shall  contain  provisions  for  making 
such  committees  a  part  of  the  regular  machinery  of  city  government.  (Addresses 
Mayor  Quincy,  January,  1896,  pp.  4-9 ;  do.,  1897,  pp.  30  and  46.)  It  is  obvious  that 
such  a  non-partisan  business  body  to  cooperate  with  the  mayor  is  utterly  repug- 
nant to  the  whole  theory  of  an  autocratic  mayoralty,  and  is  in  the  very  spirit  of 
our  suggestion  for  a  city  council  in  which  all  the  great  business  interests  of  the 
city  are  to  be  represented. 

1  See  Ch.  XIII. 

2  See  Annals  Am.  Acad.  Pol.  and  Soc.  Science,  September,  1896,  pp.  197,  198 ; 
and  Commons's  Prop.  Rep.,  204. 


CONSTITUTION  AND  MEMBERSHIP  OF  CITY  COUNCIL    303 

XII 

The  subject  of  salaries  for  members  of  city  councils  de- 
serves some  notice.  The  general  view  in  the  United  States 
that  public  officers  should  be  paid  for  their  services  naturally 
tends  to  the  conclusion  that  if  city  aldermen  are  not  paid, 
the  public  has  no  right  to  much  service  at  their  hands  and 
that  they  may  justly  secure  a  compensation  in  some  way  of 
their  own.  Very  small  cities  and  villages  will,  perhaps,  never 
need  to  pay  salaries  to  the  members  of  their  councils.  All 
the  people  know  what  they  do,  and  popular  thanks  and  the 
honor  of  holding  office  may  be  sufficient  to  secure  good  offi- 
cers. But  the  reasons  seem  to  be  decisive  in  favor  of  paying 
salaries  to  the  Aldermen  of  other  cities  —  if  not  a  full  com- 
pensation for  the  work  they  do,  yet  sufficient  to  enable  an 
excellent  class  of  men  of  limited  means  to  give  more  time  to 
the  municipal  service  than  they  can  afford  to  bestow  gratui- 
tously. There  is  need  that  the  councils  should  be  working 
bodies,  and  that  the  members  should  give  much  more  time  to 
city  affairs  than  has  generally  been  the  case  in  American 
cities.  The  examples  of  English  and  German  Aldermen  in 
these  regards  may  be  studied  with  much  advantage  by 
American  Aldermen.1 

It  may  not  infrequently  happen  that  the  question  whether 
a  citizen  peculiarly  competent  for  the  office  of  alderman  will 
accept  it  will  depend  on  the  fact  whether  it  will  give  him 
the  small  salary  he  would  need.  If  it  be  said  that  some  of 
the  most  patriotic  citizens  would  be  more  likely  to  accept 
seats  in  the  council  provided  no  salary  were  offered,  we  may 
suggest  that  they  can  always  hand  the  salary  over  to  some 
city  charity.  The  payment  of  a  compensation  is  generally 
found  necessary  and  useful  for  securing  the  attendance  at 
meetings  even  on  the  part  of  the  rich  directors  of  our  great 
city  banks  and  trust  companies  —  none  the  less  in  substance 
a  salary,  because  it  is  in  the  form  of  a  payment  cash  in  hand 
at  every  directors'  meeting.  On  the  whole,  both  justice  and 
wisdom  seem  to  require  the  payment  of  a  moderate  salary  — 

i  See  Chs.  XII.  and  XIII. 


804  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

say  from  $100  to  $2000  a  year  —  to  the  members  of  city 
councils.1 

XIII 

The  matter  of  the  clerk  or  secretary  of  the  council 
deserves  some  notice.  The  designation  of  secretary  is  the 
most  descriptive  and  desirable.  As  the  council  is  made  a 
continuous  body,  the  old  theory  of  a  short  term  for  this 
officer  will  no  longer  have  even  a  specious  appropriateness. 
The  office  of  secretary  under  the  councils  proposed  will  be 
one  of  considerable  dignity  and  great  practical  importance, 
requiring  a  man  of  much  capacity  and  experience  to  dis- 
charge its  functions.  He  should  have  no  active  relations 
with  city  party  politics.  It  will  be  of  great  practical  im- 
portance that  he  should  be  familiar  with  the  records,  usages, 
and  administrative  methods  of  all  parts  of  the  city  depart- 
ments. The  fact  that  in  New  York  City,  and  under  the 
American  party  system  generally,  the  city  clerk  is  usually 
an  active  leader  of  a  party,  or  political  faction,  while  in 
English  cities  the  clerk  of  the  council  is  a  non-partisan, 
competent,  and  trusted  to  draft  city  bills  and  ordinances, 
and  to  supervise  other  important  matters,  illustrates  two 
profoundly  different  municipal  systems.  It  hardly  need  be 
said  that  the  public  interests  require  that  the  Secretary  of 
the  Council  should  not  be  appointed  or  removed  for  party 
reasons,  but  should  remain  in  office  as  long  as  he  is  both 
faithful  and  efficient.  It  hardly  need  be  said  that  many 
reasons  of  convenience,  economy,  and  propriety  require  that 
he  should  be  both  selected  and  removed  by  the  council 
itself. 

XIV 

The  question  whether  a  city  council  should  be  a  single 
body  or  should  have  two  chambers  is  one  of  considerable 

1  But  there  should  be  a  rigid  rule  requiring  the  reduction  of  a  small  fixed  sum 
from  the  salary  for  every  case  of  omission  to  attend  at  a  council  meeting,  —  or  any 
part  of  it,  —  and  there  should  be  a  record  on  its  minutes  of  every  such  omission. 
No  member  whose  failures  to  attend  have  exceeded  a  fifth  of  all  the  meetings 
should  be  eligible  for  nomination  as  mayor. 


CONSTITUTION  AND  MEMBERSHIP  OF  CITY  COUNCIL    305 

importance,  as  to  which  there  has  been  much  diversity  of 
opinion  in  the  United  States.  As  municipal  councils  in 
this  country  have  been  moulded  to  a  large  extent  after  the 
analogy  of  Congress  and  state  legislatures,  it  is  not  strange 
that  they  have  often  been  given  a  bicameral  form,  though 
they  might  with  quite  as  much  fitness  have  followed  the 
analogy  of  town  meetings  of  which  village  and  city  councils 
have  been  the  legitimate  successors.  The  controlling  reasons 
which  require  that  Congress  and  state  legislatures  should 
have  two  chambers,  do  not,  as  we  have  shown,  exist  in  city 
affairs.  The  most  important  matters  before  those  bodies 
involve  questions  of  policy  and  justice  very  differently  affect- 
ing geographical  sections  and  diverse  productions  and  inter- 
ests, by  reason  of  which  national  and  state  representation 
itself  is  largely  geographical.  Careful  comparisons  of  the 
conflicting  interests  and  the  diverse  productions  of  widely 
separated  regions  are  essential. 

In  a  city  council  the  whole  representation  —  confined  to 
a  narrow  sphere  subordinate  to  the  law-making  power  — 
relates  to  a  region,  open  before  the  eyes  of  all  its  members, 
which  is  generally  not  larger  than  a  town,  and  which,  as  a 
town,  was  governed  by  a  single  assembly.  The  main  repre- 
sentation needed  by  a  city  is  that  of  miscellaneous  popula- 
tions, business  interests,  and  social  conditions  everywhere 
superimposed  within  the  same  narrow  space,  —  a  representa- 
tion which,  as  we  have  seen,  requires  not  two  chambers  but 
Free  Voting.  A  great  part  of  the  action  of  a  city  council 
must  relate,  not  so  much  to  legislation,  as  to  the  management 
of  business  affairs,  to  investigations  of  official  malfeasance, 
to  the  raising  and  disbursing  of  moneys,  to  the  doing  of  the 
city  work.  Two  houses  needlessly  complicate  and  obstruct 
such  functions. 

Sudden  and  inconsiderate  doings  can  be  prevented  by  rules 
of  procedure  and  the  requirement  of  large  majorities  for  ac- 
tion. Men  living  along  the  same  streets,  who  are  interested 
in  different  kinds  of  business  and  city  improvements,  and 
who  belong  to  different  churches,  parties,  and  social  grades, 
should  meet  in  the  same  council  chamber  face  to  face,  and 


806  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

engage  in  the  same  debates.  In  the  main,  experience  seems 
to  have  justified  this  view  of  the  subject,  though  Boston, 
Philadelphia,  and  St.  Louis  have  bicameral  councils.  In 
all  the  cities  of  the  state  of  New  York  the  councils  are  single 
bodies,  save  in  the  new  Greater  New  York.1  It  seems  that 
of  the  17  American  cities  having  more  than  200,000  inhabit- 
ants each,  the  council  of  11  of  them  is  a  single  body ;  of  the 
376  American  cities  having  a  population  of  more  than  8,000 
each,  294  have  a  council  which  is  a  single  body;  and  so  has 
almost  every  one  of  the  1600  other  American  cities.2 

In  no  enlightened  nation  of  continental  Europe  does  there 
seem  to  be  a  single  city  which  has  a  bicameral  council. 
Among  the  more  than  three  hundred  cities  of  Great  Britain, 
there  is  not  one  that  has  a  council  which  is  not  a  single 
body. 

XV 

Some  considerations  closely  connected  with  the  creation 
of  a  non-partisan  council  in  a  city  may  be  mentioned  here. 
The  transition  from  city-party  domination  to  any  form  of 
non-partisan  city  government  will  present  considerable  diffi- 
culties. Public  justice  and  the  public  interests  will  require 
that  the  new  city  governments  shall  be  framed  without  regard 
to  mere  party  advantage,  and  in  a  way  which  in  its  practical 
effects  will  be  fair  to  all  parties.  A  dominant  party  in  a 
legislature  will  find  it  no  easy  matter  to  act  in  this  spirit. 
It  may  be  the  part  of  wisdom  sometimes  not  to  attempt  radi- 
cal changes  in  all  the  departments  of  a  city  government  at 
once,  but  to  place  a  few  departments  at  first,  and  then  more 
and  more  after  experience,  upon  a  non-partisan  basis,  until 
the  complete  transition  shall  be  accomplished. 

The  fundamental  theory  and  framework  of  a  good  munici- 
pal system  may  be  outlined  in  the  beginning  by  statesman- 
like men  who  have  carefully  studied  the  municipal  experience 
of  the  most  enlightened  nations  ;  but  the  detailed  structure 
and  the  exact  definition  of  the  powers  of  the  departments 

1 1  Bryce,  Am.  Com.,  p.  632. 

8  Jancs's  Problem  of  City  Government,  p.  166. 


CONSTITUTION  AND  MEMBERSHIP  OF  CITY  COUNCIL    307 

and  officers  can  be  best  set  forth  after  public  debates  in 
a  competent  council,  and  perhaps  after  some  experiments  as 
to  the  effects  of  particular  methods  in  practice.  It  would 
therefore  seem  wise,  after  agreeing  upon  the  fundamental 
theory  and  framework  of  the  new  government,  to  confer 
upon  the  council  such  general  powers  as  will  enable  it  to 
regulate  details  and  define  the  duties  of  minor  officers. 
A  charter  should  contain  a  statement  of  general  principles 
and  should  confer  general  powers,  in  conformity  to  which 
cities  should  be  allowed  to  regulate  their  own  affairs.  A 
charter  should  not  be  a  code  of  ordinances,  or  embarrass  the 
making  of  them  by  the  council  according  to  the  provisions 
of  the  charter.  It  seems  to  be  highly  desirable  that  the 
new  charter  and  municipal  code  should  provide  for  bringing 
into  the  new  council  and  departments,  at  least  for  a  limited 
period,  the  most  competent  and  reputable  of  the  officers 
under  the  superseded  system.  Such  a  policy  will  not  only 
greatly  facilitate  the  transition  from  one  system  to  another, 
but  insure  the  new  government  at  the  outset  some  meritori- 
ous officers  of  tried  experience.1 

2.  We  cannot  doubt  that  our  suggestions  for  a  city  coun- 
cil will  be  criticised  as  being  too  complicated  —  and  certainly 
a  mayoralty  despotism  is  much  more  simple.  This  criticism 
will  come  largely  from  two  classes,  —  the  mere  politicians  who 
favor  absolute  party  rule,  and  the  superficial  thinkers  who 
never  comprehend  the  inevitable  complications  of  great-city 
administration  or  the  grave  difficulties  in  the  way  of  avoid- 
ing these  evils.  Still,  we  hope  the  candid  reader,  on  careful 
reflection,  may  think  that  by  getting  rid  of  the  party  and 
primary  system  for  nominations  and  elections,  by  electing 
fewer  officers,  by  suppressing  the  numerous  commissions  and 
boards,  by  superseding  many  small  districts,  and  by  having 
the  mayor  elected  by  the  council  —  as  we  shall  suggest  —  the 
proposed  plan  for  a  council  would  not  only  largely  super- 

1  Since  these  pages  were  written,  the  partisan  legislature  of  New  York,  appar- 
ently in  the  hope  of  party  advantage,  has  disregarded  all  such  suggestions  in 
creating  the  Greater  New  York  City  charter  and  government,  with  results  thus 
far  equally  indefensible  and  unfortunate,  which  will  be  considered  in  our  final 
chapter. 


808  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

sede  the  vicious  machinery  of  city  government,  but  would 
really  make  it  more  simple,  as  well  as  diminish  both  its 
cost  and  its  corruptions.  We  have  not  hoped  to  satisfy 
those  who  seriously  think  either  that  an  autocratic  mayor 
or  city-party  domination  is  desirable.  A  despotic  govern- 
ment is  naturally  more  simple  than  one  based  on  justice  and 
rational  liberty.  Everywhere  the  administration  of  cities  is 
complicated  and  manifold  in  practical  methods  much  in  the 
degree  that  it  is  salutary  and  enlightened. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN      309 


CHAPTER    XII.  —  THE    METHODS    AND    PRACTICAL   RESULTS 
OF   MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT   IN   GREAT   BRITAIN 

Large  English  experience  in  city  government.  Bad  city  government  in  Eng- 
land before  1835.  City  interests  had  been  sacrificed  to  national  party  interests. 
Municipal  corporation  act  of  1835.  It  enlarged  Home  Rule,  suppressed  city-party 
domination,  and  greatly  improved  city  government.  The  city  council  which  the 
law  provided  for  elects  the  mayor  and  practically  controls  the  government.  The 
English  Mayor  Purposes  of  law  of  1835.  The  council  with  great  advantage 
chooses  some  of  its  own  members.  Composition  of  the  city  councils  and  the 
official  terms  of  the  members.  Considered  an  honor  to  be  a  member  of  an  English 
city  council.  Corruption  and  partisan  despotism  no  longer  exists  in  British  cities. 
Party  tests  for  city  offices  discarded.  English  and  American  city  theories  con- 
trasted. Theory  that  our  more  enlarged  suffrage  makes  English  experience 
inapplicable.  Relation  of  civil  service  reform  to  municipal  reform. 

The  consolidated  municipal  corporation  act  of  1882.  The  local  government  act 
of  1888  reaffirms  the  non-partisan  principles  of  law  of  1835.  Local  government 
of  London  under  law  of  1888.  Provisions  against  corrupt  use  of  money  in  city 
elections.  The  city  council  of  London  and  character  of  its  government.  What  it 
has  done  for  London.  The  local  government  act  of  1894.  Effects  of  non-partisan 
city  government  on  the  voters.  The  city  governments  of  England  more  demo- 
cratic and  republican  than  those  of  the  United  States.  The  governments  of 
Manchester,  Birmingham,  and  Glasgow,  and  what  they  have  done.  Relative  cost 
of  city  government  in  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.  Few  special  city  laws 
and  far  less  litigation  in  Great  Britain  than  United  States  as  to  city  affairs. 
The  British  police  system  and  the  police  force  of  her  cities.  Conclusions  from 
English  municipal  experience. 

FROM  considering  our  subject  on  the  basis  of  American 
constitutions  and  principles,  we  turn  to  the  experience  of 
the  older  nations.  Though  every  nation  should  frame  its 
municipal  system  in  the  spirit  of  its  own  constitution  and 
social  life,  yet  from  the  very  nature  of  municipal  govern- 
ment its  appropriate  methods  must  have  much  in  common 
in  all  enlightened  countries.  England  in  recent  years  has 
tried  important  experiments  in  the  government  of  cities, 
with  the  result  that  her  old  municipal  system,  which  we 
inherited,  has  been  largely  transformed  and  vastly  improved. 
Municipal  government  has  long  commanded  the  thoughtful 
attention  of  English  statesmen,  while  American  statesmen 
have  lamentably  neglected  the  subject.  The  recent  munici- 


810  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

pal  legislation  of  England  has  been  framed  in  the  light  of 
the  best  experience  of  continental  Europe,  while  that  of  the 
United  States  has  rarely  taken  any  notice  of  the  improved 
methods  of  governing  foreign  cities.  As  early  as  1835, 
when  there  were  but  a  very  few  cities  in  the  United  States, 
there  were  178  municipal  corporations  in  England  and  Wales 
alone ;  and  since  that  time  —  the  urban  population  having 
constantly  increased  faster  than  the  rural  —  there  have  been 
125  such  corporations  added,  with  the  result  that  in  1891 
more  than  11,000,000  of  the  English  people,  aside  from  the 
residents  of  London,  were  living  in  302  cities,  one-third  of 
the  whole  population  of  England  residing  in  cities  of  a  popu- 
lation of  over  100,000  each,  and  nearly  another  third  in  those 
of  a  population  of  over  10,000  each.1  In  such  facts  we  can 
see  how  naturally  the  municipal  problem  long  ago  became 
seriously  important  in  England. 

Prior  to  1835,  the  governments  of  English  cities2  had  gen- 
erally been  as  partisan,  corrupt,  and  despotic,  and  the  char- 
ters and  laws  controlling  them  were  almost  as  divergent,  as 
such  governments  and  laws  now  are  in  the  United  States. 
The  municipal  condition  was  both  a  public  scandal  and  a 
national  peril.8  National  parties  and  great  party  managers 
in  England  had  prostituted  municipal  powers,  sacrificed  the 
interests  of  cities,  and  controlled  local  administration  largely 
for  their  own  advantage,  and  anything  like  true  Home  Rule 
did  not  at  that  time  exist.  Professor  Goodnow  tells  us  that 
"  the  municipal  organization  was  so  bad,  as  the  result  of  the 
prostitution  of  municipal  institutions  in  the  interests  of  the 
national  politics  of  the  country  .  .  .  that  the  care  of  the  poor, 
the  sanitary  administration  .  .  .  and  that  of  the  schools  .  .  . 
were  put  into  the  hands,  not  of  the  municipal  authorities, 

1  Shaw's  Municipal  Government  in  Great  Britain,  pp.  14,  15,  an  instructive 
work  of  great  value  which  every  one  interested  in  city  government  should  read. 
Dr.  Shaw  has  since  published  a  similar  volume  on  municipal  government  in  Con- 
tinental Europe.    To  distinguish  citations  from  the  former  the  name  of  the  work 
is  followed  by  "  G.  B." 

2  Cities  in  England  are  often  referred  to  as  boroughs,  or  even  as  towns,  the 
City  Clerk  being  sometimes  designated  the  Town  Clerk.    Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B. , 
p.  33. 

8  Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  p.  26. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN   GREAT  BRITAIN      311 

but  of  authorities  established  by  special  legislation.  .  .  . 
Under  the  system  of  special  charters  municipal  government 
had  been  sacrificed  to  national  politics.  .  .  ."  1 

This  reads  like  a  description  of  American  experience  in 
our  day.  It  is  worthy  of  special  notice,  here,  that  these  chief 
evils  of  the  American  municipal  system — party  control,  the 
prostitution  of  municipal  affairs  for  the  advantage  of  their 
managers,  and  the  denial  of  Home  Rule  —  were  developed  in 
England  more  than  sixty  years  ago,  when  hardly  anything 
like  general  or  popular  suffrage  existed,  and  the  aristocracy 
and  the  crown  were  dominant.  It  is  thus  demonstrated  that 
parti/  government  in  cities,  and  not  universal  suffrage,  was 
the  primary  and  controlling  cause  of  these  evils. 

English  suffrage  has  been  vastly  extended  during  the  very 
period  in  which  we  shall  find  that  these  evils  have  been  re- 
moved mainly  through  the  suppression  of  party  control  and 
the  establishment  of  non-partisan  business  methods  in  the 
government  of  English  cities.  All  this  improvement  was 
accomplished  when  mayors  were  elected,  as  they  now  are  in 
England,  not  by  the  people,  but  by  the  city  councils,  and 
these  bodies  were  the  dominating  power  in  city  governments 
—  facts  of  obvious  importance,  when  we  come  to  consider 
how  mayors  should  be  chosen. 

A  thorough  parliamentary  investigation,  in  which  patriotic 
and  sagacious  statesmen  took  part,  was  made  into  the  sources 
of  these  evils,  and  concerning  the  best  methods  of  city  gov- 
ernment elsewhere ;  with  the  result  that  an  elaborate  law, 
the  celebrated  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1835,  moved 
in  Parliament  by  Lord  John  Russell,  was  enacted.2  It  is  a 
model  of  sagacious  and  comprehensive  legislation,  and  a 
noble  achievement  of  non-partisan  statesmanship.3 

Dr.  Shaw  justly  says  :  "  This  act  of  1835  is  the  most 
signally  important  piece  of  legislation  in  all  the  history 
of  modern  city  governments  .  .  ,  and  though  there  has 

1  Goodnow's  Home  Rule,  pp.  14,  242-244;  Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  p.  26. 

2  Eng.  Stat.,  1835,  Ch.  76. 

8  There  had  been  a  law  ofl  the  subject  enacted  in  the  same  spirit  for  Scotland 
in  1833,  and  one  followed  for  Ireland  in  1840.  The  great  suffrage  reform  law  of 
1832  had  facilitated  municipal  reform. 


812  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

been  much  additional  legislation,  the  general  plan  of  1835 
remains  unchanged,  because  experience  has  given  it  the 
stamp  of  thorough  approval."1  It  is  a  law,  in  fact  a  sort  of 
municipal  code,  of  269  sections,  applicable  to  all  the  munici- 
pal corporations  of  England  except  London.  It  therefore 
not  only  superseded  the  need  of  special  charters,  but  made 
interpretations  by  the  courts  generally  applicable  to  all  cities 
except  London,  thus  in  the  outset  avoiding  such  multifari- 
ous special  litigation  as  has  arisen  in  the  United  States  out 
of  our  numerous  special  charters. 

2.  We  have  space  for  referring  only  to  the  fundamental 
provisions  of  this  remarkable  law,  and  must  confine  ourselves 
mainly  to  its  bearings  upon  parties,  party  government,  and 
Home  Rule.  It  has  greatly  facilitated  the  extension  of  Home 
Rule,  —  a  Home  Rule  which  is  much  broader  in  English 
than  in  American  cities,  and  it  deserves  the  careful  study  of 
those  who  favor  such  rule.  Professor  Commons  thinks  that 
the  superiority  of  English  municipal  administration  has 
facilitated  the  granting  of  these  larger  powers  for  self-gov- 
ernment.2 

Almost  the  whole  of  the  vast  power  to  be  exercised  under 
this  law  is  conferred  upon  a  single  body  called  the  council. 
Three-fourths  of  its  members,  designated  councillors,  are  to 
be  elected  by  the  people,8  and  the  rest  of  them,  designated 
aldermen,  and  equal  in  number  to  one-third  of  the  council- 
lors, are  appointed  —  or  we  might  say  elected  —  into  its  own 
membership  by  the  council  itself.  But  both  classes  of  mem- 
bers —  councillors  and  aldermen  —  sit  together  as  one  body. 
They  have  equal  rights  —  neither  acting  as  a  separate  class, 
but  each  as  equal  members  of  the  same  legislative  chamber. 

The  one  body  of  mayor,  aldermen,  and  councillors  —  con- 

1  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  p.  225.    Goodnow's  Home  Rule,  pp.  242,  244. 

2  Pro.  Rep.,  p.  204. 

8  These  elections  take  place  in  wards,  bat  as  the  law  allows  residents  of  any 
ward  to  be  elected  —  and  such  is  a  frequent  practice  —  the  representation  is  sub- 
stantially that  of  the  city  at  large.  The  law  allows  a  considerable  liberty  in 
cities  as  to  the  number  of  councillors  to  be  elected,  as  there  may  be  from  twelve 
to  sixty-four  of  them  according  to  the  size  or  needs  of  the  city.  The  discretion 
thus  allowed  the  cities  illustrates  the  largo  Home  Rule  powers  accorded  to  them. 
Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  p.  58. 


METHODS  AND   RESULTS  IN   GREAT  BRITAIN      313 

stituting   the   council  —  is   made  the   municipal  governing 
authority. 

The  official  term  of  the  councillors  is  three  years,  and  they 
are  so  classified  that  one-third  of  them  goes  out  each  year. 
The  official  terms  of  the  aldermen  are  six  years,  and  one- 
half  retire  every  third  year.  Such  terms  of  office  obviously 
give  great  stability  to  the  council,  make  it  a  continuous  body, 
and  cause  mere  party  control  to  be  extremely  difficult.  This 
provision  for  the  appointment  of  one-fourth  of  the  members 
of  the  council  by  the  council  itself  has  been  found  so  salutary 
that  it  has  been  incorporated  into  all  extensions  of  England's 
municipal  system,  and  has  now  been  enforced  for  more  than 
sixty  years. 

3.  The  council  elects  the  mayor  annually  from  among  its 
own  members,  and  he  is  its  presiding  officer  or  speaker. 
There  seems  to  have  never  been  a  mayor  elected  by  popular 
vote  in  Great  Britain.  The  council  possesses  the  power  of 
appointment  and  removal,  and  takes  responsible  control  of 
all  parts  of  the  municipal  administration,  supervising  it 
through  its  standing  committees.  The  council  also  makes 
all  the  ordinances  or  by-laws,  —  in  other  words,  it  possesses 
and  exercises  the  whole  legislative  or  ordinance-making 
power  of  the  municipality  ;  and  this  power  is  much  more 
comprehensive  than  that  allowed  to  American  cities.1 

The  mayor  has  no  veto  power,  but,  as  the  presiding  officer 
of  the  council,  he  naturally  has  great  influence  over  its  pro- 
ceedings. He  is  not  elected  to  bring  in  a  new  policy,  to  rep- 
resent a  party,  or  to  dominate  the  council,  but  to  preside  in 
its  meetings,  and  to  take  the  lead  in  carrying  its  policy  into 
effect.  No  one  under  this  law  can  reach  the  mayoralty  until 
he  has  won  the  approval  of  the  members  of  the  council  by 
service  among  them.  The  mayor,  says  Dr.  Shaw,  is  a  "  man 
who  has  served  his  town  (city)  with  ability  and  zeal  as 
councillor  and  alderman."  2  The  members  of  the  council  — 


1  But  the  power  of  the  council  does  not  extend  to  judicial  affairs.    In  England 
no  judicial  officers  are  elected,  but  all  such  officers,  even  justices  in  cities,  are 
appointed — a  method  which  keeps  them  out  of  partisan  politics. 

2  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  pp.  53,  54. 


314  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

representing  as  they  do  all  classes  of  the  people  and  serving 
as  they  generally  do  many  years  in  their  offices  —  are  famil- 
iar with  city  affairs  and  interests,  and  are  regarded  as  most 
competent  to  decide  who  is  fittest  among  their  members  to 
have  the  lead  for  the  advancement  of  good  government. 
Hence  the  reason  why  they  elect  the  mayor  and  from  their 
own  membership.  The  practice  of  electing  mayors  from  the 
council  strongly  tends  to  bring  able  men  into  that  body. 

The  practical  work  of  the  city  is  carried  on  by  a  body  of 
skilled  officials  who  are  appointed  and  retained  for  merit  in 
the  main  irrespective  of  party  considerations.  The  mayor 
serves  on  committees,  is  the  official  head  of  the  governmental 
action  of  the  city,  and  has  various  incidental  powers.  His 
office  is  one  of  great  honor  and  dignity.  Standing  commit- 
tees of  the  council  have  special  authority  and  duties  in  the 
supervision  of  different  branches  of  the  administration  in 
connection  with  which  they  are  very  active.1 

4.  It  is  obvious  that  such  a  system  tends  to  concentrated 
vigor  and  harmony  throughout  the  administration  ;    yet  it 
allows  the  people  to  constantly  mould  it  according  to  their 
views  by  bringing  new  members  into  the  council.     We  can 
better  judge  of  the  merits  of  such  a  municipal  system  after 
we  have  looked  into  its  practical  effects.     It  hardly  need  be 
said  that  it  would  be  easy  to  increase  the  power  of  the  mayor 
to  any  desirable  extent,  should  the  other  parts  of  the  English 
system  be  approved.     But,  before  considering  this  matter,  it 
will  be  useful  to  study  the  manifold  variety  of  powers  exer- 
cised by  mayors  in  the  great  cities  of  continental  Europe,  a 
subject  which  will  receive  our  attention  in  the  next  chapter.-1 

5.  Among  the  purposes  of  the  law  of  1835  these  seem  to 
be  pretty  clear :  (1)  to  arrest  mere  party  control  of  cities 
and  to  govern  them  through  public  opinion,  —  a  result  which 
the  classification  of  the  terms  of  office  and  the  choice  of  one- 

i  Mun.  Oov.  O.  B.,  pp.  27-32,  46,  til-78. 

3  An  amendment  to  the  law  of  1835,  made  in  1882,  allows  the  council  to  select 
a  mayor  outside  its  own  membership.  This  enables  mayors  of  small  cities  who 
have  shown  efficiency  to  be  elected  mayors  of  large  cities,  as  is  sometimes  the  case 
also  in  continental  Europe.  But  Dr.  Shaw  says  "  the  practice  remains  as  before 
in  England."  Mun.  Oov.  0.  B.,  p.  31. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN      315 

fourth  of  the  members  of  the  council  by  the  other  members  of 
the  body  greatly  facilitates  —  as  we  have  before  explained  ; J 
(2)  to  bring  the  mayor  and  councils  into  harmonious  and 
vigorous  cooperation  ;  (3)  to  avoid  a  mere  partisan  election 
of  mayors  ;  (4)  to  secure  experience  and  skill  on  the  part  of 
city  officials  by  keeping  them  an  adequate  time  in  office ;  and 
(5)  to  prevent  the  gaining  of  control  of  a  city  government 
as  the  result  of  any  single  victory  by  a  party  or  faction. 
For  it  is  plain  that  two  successive  victories  at  the  polls  are 
necessary  to  change  a  majority  of  the  members  of  the  council, 
and  that  one-half  of  the  aldermen  can  be  changed  only  once 
in  three  years  ;  yet  public  opinion  can  always  be  a  potential 
force  with  this  non-partisan  council.  These  provisions  nat- 
urally discourage,  as  they  baffle,  the  efforts  of  party  managers 
to  make  city  government  promptly  serviceable  for  their  own 
ends  by  capturing  patronage  as  the  result  of  a  single  party 
victory.  Parties,  if  they  get  their  candidates  elected,  cannot, 
says  Professor  Goodnow,  make  use  of  their  power  for  party 
ends. 

6.  This  unique  experiment  of  non-partisan  city  govern- 
ment was  speedily  successful.  Party  despotism  and  corrup- 
tion in  city  affairs  were  in  the  main  promptly  suppressed  and 
have  never  been  reproduced.  The  selection  of  aldermen  by 
councillors  brought  worthy  and  able  men  into  the  municipal 
service,  and  the  six  years'  term  for  aldermen  gave  them 
experience  adequate  for  devising  a  large,  wise,  and  consistent 
municipal  policy.2  The  council  and  the  mayors  have  cooper- 
ated harmoniously  in  the  execution  of  such  a  policy  in  ways 
we  have  no  space  for  explaining  in  detail,  but  we  shall  present 
the  general  results. 

To  serve  in  the  city  council  soon  came  to  be  regarded  as 
both  an  honor  and  a  duty  by  citizens  generally,  and  such  has 
been  the  accepted  view  down  to  the  present  time.  No  truth, 
more  than  this,  deserves  the  thoughtful  consideration  of  the 
friends  of  municipal  reform  in  the  United  States.  "  To  be  a 

1  See  Ch.  IX. 

2  Dr.  Shaw  has  shown  the  good  results  from  this  method  of  electing  the 
aldermen  by  the  councillors.    Mun.  Gov.  Cont.,  p.  315. 


816  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

member  of  the  .  .  .  council,"  says  Dr.  Shaw,  "  is  to  hold  a 
position  of  honor,  a  position  which  no  man  affects  to  despise  ; 
.  .  .  the  councils  are  almost  universally  in  high  repute.  .  .  . 
The  councillors  as  a  rule  are  representatives  of  the  best 
elements  of  business  life.  They  are  men  of  intelligence, 
character,  and  of  practical  conversance  with  affairs.  .  .  . 
By  the  common  consent  ...  of  the  community  none  but 
men  of  worth  who  have  made  their  way  to  a  good  stand- 
ing among  their  neighbors  are  regarded  as  eligible  for 
the  council.  .  .  .  The  whole  system  is  favorable  to  the 
election  and  retention  of  capable  and  honest  men. " 1  He  does 
not  doubt  that  numerous  individual  facts  might  be  arrayed 
against  this  view  —  but  nevertheless  says  it  is  just  as  a 
whole. 

"  It  is  generally  agreed,"  says  Professor  Commons,  "  that 
the  government  of  English  .  .  .  cities  is  superior  to  that 
of  American  cities.  Public  officials  are  renowned  for  their 
honesty,  efficiency,  and  the  economy  of  their  administration. 
The  municipal  councils  include  the  best  and  most  intelligent 
citizens  who  serve  without  salary."2  Mr.  Conkling  refers 
to  "  the  superiority  of  the  rulers  of  English  cities  over  those 
of  the  New  World."8  Mr.  Fox  says  "the  curse  of  the 
spoils  system  .  .  .  seems  to  have  been  thoroughly  stamped 
out  in  England."* 

7.  Under  the  reformed  system,  the  cities  of  England  have 
been  governed,  not  mainly  by  their  partisans  or  by  party 
opinion,  but,  with  small  exceptions,  by  competent  citizens 
and  by  public  opinion.  During  the  more  than  sixty  years  in 
which  the  municipal  system  established  in  1835  has  pre- 
vailed, no  great  scandal  or  corruption  has  disgraced  the 
administration  of  English  cities.  That  there  have  been 
minor  abuses  and  various  attempts  at  party  dictation  in 
English  cities  under  the  new  system  is  undoubtedly  true. 
Yet  the  general  facts  have  been  these  :  that  for  more  than 
sixty  years  municipal  government  in  England  has  been  non- 
partisan  ;  that  is,  has  been  far  more  honest,  economical,  and 

*  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  pp.  63,  64.  a  Pro.  Rep.,  p.  203. 

•  City  Gov.,  p.  216.  *  Fox's  London  Council,  p.  90. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN      317 

efficient  there  than  it  has  been  in  the  United  States ;  that  it 
has  been  managed  by  competent  and  upright  men  with  little 
regard  for  party  politics  ;  that  the  English  people  are  satis- 
fied with  it,  and  regard  its  form  in  the  main  as  beyond  con- 
troversy ;  that  hardly  any  part  of  the  public  administration 
of  England  has  been  purer,  abler,  and  more  respectable  than 
that  of  her  cities,  and  much  the  same  may  be  said  of  Scot- 
land. Dr.  Shaw x  shows  how  completely  the  national  par- 
ties of  England  have  failed  in  their  attempts  to  capture  or 
dominate  her  city  governments.  Mr.  Bryce,  the  author  of 
the  American  Commonwealth,  says,  "with  us  in  England  or 
Scotland,  it  makes  little  or  no  difference  to  which  political 
party  the  person  chosen  to  be  mayor  or  provost  belongs.  .  .  .  "2 
8.  Nevertheless,  the  horde  of  our  scheming  city  politi- 
cians and  partisans,  more  or  less  excusable  by  reason  of 
their  ignorance  of  municipal  history,  loudly  declare  that 
parties  alone  can  give  us  good  city  government,  and  that  the 
attempt  to  profit  by  English  experience  is  to  ape  the  vicious 
methods  of  an  aristocracy.  We  are  frequently  admonished 
by  many  good  people  that  universal  suffrage,  which  doubt- 
less makes  our  problem  more  difficult,  is  the  primary  cause 
of  our  municipal  evils,  and  that  the  only  hope  of  reform  is 
through  party-elected  mayors,  wielding  despotic  —  if  we 
should  not  say,  semi-royal  —  power.  Yet  the  simple  truth 
is  that,  in  the  sixty  years  within  which  the  great  municipal 
reform  of  England  has  been  matured,  suffrage  has  been 
made  more  than  threefold  more  extensive  relative  to  the 
number  of  the  people  there  than  it  was  in  1835,  and  mere 

1  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  pp.  46-52. 

2  Contemporary  Review,  November,  1897,  p.  751.    The  London  Council,  which 
controls  interests  almost  vast  and  diverse  enough  to  form  a  basis  of  legitimate 
parties  confined  to  city  issues,  has  shown  some  tendency  toward  such  results,  the 
inchoate  organizations  being  known  as  Progressives  and  Moderates.     Under 
governments  like  those  of  the  English  cities  no  danger  need  be  apprehended  from 
such  divisions.    Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  pp.  250-252.    Even  a  New  York  boss  and  a  Tam- 
many machine  could  not  get  enough  patronage  and  spoils  out  of  such  a  govern- 
ment to  keep  vicious  city  parties  alive.    Besides,  a  city  party  based  on  principle 
and  real  municipal  issues  is  legitimate  and  would  do  no  serious  damage.    In  the 
election  for  the  London  Council  in  the  winter  of  1898,  neither  party  gained  any 
decided  advantages,  and  the  result  was  favorable  to  non-partisan,  municipal 
interests. 


818  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

aristocracy  and  royalty  are  now  far  less  potential  than  they 
were  at  that  date.  English  city  government,  as  we  shall 
soon  show,  now  gives  better  protection  to  the  poor  and 
humble  than  do  the  city-party  governments  of  American 
cities.  No  autocratic  mayor,  no  mayor  elected  by  the  peo- 
ple, no  city-party  government,  had  any  part  in  achieving 
this  great  English  reform.  Nevertheless,  American  Repub- 
licans and  Democrats  are  clamoring  for  such  prescriptive, 
party  rule  and  for  such  autocratic,  semi-royal  mayors  for 
their  cities  as  neither  England  nor  any  enlightened  monarchy 
would  tolerate. 

9.  It  has  been  often  said  that  the  experience  of  England, 
in  the  government  of  cities,  is  inapplicable  to  the  cities  of  the 
United  States  because  in  the  former  suffrage  is  more  restricted 
than  in  the  latter.  This  is  a  very  superficial  statement  of 
the  matter.  Had  it  been  declared  that  the  greater  expan- 
sion of  suffrage  in  the  United  States  than  in  England  has 
much  increased  the  difficulty  of  municipal  reform,  and  has 
made  more  drastic  remedies  essential  for  suppressing  party 
despotism  and  personal  corruption  in  American  cities,  the 
declaration  would  have  been  quite  true.1  This  truth  does 
not  make  that  experience  and  the  methods  which  it  illus- 
trates inapplicable,  but  merely  inadequate  —  leaving  it  neces- 
sary that  they  be  supplemented  by  further  remedial  measures 
of  the  nature  we  have  proposed.  The  more  illiterate  and 
degraded  persons  are  allowed  to  vote,  the  more  serious  is 
the  municipal  problem,  the  more  easily  demagogues  and 
bosses  can  prevail,  the  more  readily  city  officers  can  betray 
city  interests  and  prostitute  municipal  authority.  If  we  were 
to  allow  the  franchise  to  mere  children  and  tramps,  —  to 
prisoners  in  their  cells  and  to  immigrants  on  arriving  at  the 
docks, — is  it  not  plain  that  every  one  of  the  precautions  taken 
by  England,  as  well  as  those  in  addition  which  we  have 
suggested,  would  be  made  all  the  more  indispensable  ?  Those 
who  think  that  our  popular  suffrage  cannot  be  trusted  to 

1  This  view  of  the  matter  is  finding  acceptance  with  oar  most  thoughtful 
students  of  municipal  science.  Speech  of  Horace  E.  Doming,  Lou.  Conf.  Pro- 
ceedingt,  May,  1897,  p.  100. 


METHODS   AND  RESULTS  IN  GREAT   BRITAIN      319 

elect  a  council  which  is  competent  to  elect  a  mayor,  strangely 
enough  think  it  can  be  trusted  to  elect  the  mayor  directly. 
The  difference  between  the  franchise  in  English  and  Ameri- 
can cities  is  much  less  than  seems  to  be  generally  supposed. 
The  municipal  franchise  in  England  is  broad  enough,  says 
Dr.  Shaw,  "  to  include  every  family  that  lives  or  does  busi- 
ness in  a  town  (i.e.  city),  except  those  who  are  paupers. 
The  acceptance  of  public  relief  disfranchises  only  for  the 
following  elections."1  It  is  said  that  "in  New  York  one 
person  in  six  is  a  voter,  in  Glasgow  one  in  nine,  in  Berlin 
one  in  eleven."  France  has  a  wider  municipal  suffrage  than 
Germany  or  England.2 

10.  A  more  comprehensive  and  rigid  enforcement  of  the 
methods  of  civil  service  reform,  ballot  reform,  and  corrupt 
practice  reform  in  the  national  administration  of  England 
than  in  the  administration  of  American  states  has  made 
municipal  reform  easier  in  the  former  than  in  the  latter; 
but  all  this  has  been  done  by  methods  equally  appropriate 
in  both  countries.  It  is  an  interesting  fact  —  so  salu- 
tary had  been  the  English  municipal  system  established  in 
1835  —  that  party  patronage  in  cities  had  been  largely  elimi- 
nated by  it  before  the  civil  service  reform  methods  began 
to  prevail  about  twenty  years  later  ;  and  these  methods  have 
had  only  a  limited  part  in  mere  municipal  administration  — 
absolutely  as  they  have  prevailed  in  national  affairs.3 


1  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  p.  30. 

2  Commons's  Pro.  Rep.,  pp.  202,  203. 

8  Yet,  civil  service  reform  examinations  were  introduced  into  parts  of  the 
administration  essentially  municipal  earlier  and  have  had  a  more  important 
effect  than  perhaps  might  he  inferred  from  some  of  Dr.  Shaw's  language.  See 
Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  p.  66.  These  examinations  were  introduced  into  the  poor-law 
and  educational  administration  with  very  salutary  effects,  as  early  as  1834. 
Eaton's  Civ.  Service  in  Great  Britain,  p.  157.  Nevertheless,  the  alleged  inap- 
plicability of  English  experience  to  American  cities  remains  available  for  two 
classes  of  persons  disposed  to  make  the  most  of  it :  (1)  for  those  who  hope  to  aid 
our  party  system  by  appealing  to  prejudice  against  English  methods;  and 
(2)  for  those  who,  lacking  the  patriotic  devotion  needed  to  stand  up  for  a  non- 
partisan  and  difficult  reform,  welcome  every  specious  excuse,  however  intrinsically 
absurd,  for  neglecting  it. 


820  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

II 

In  1882,  when  this  law  of  1835  had  remained  in  its  main 
features  unchanged  for  forty-seven  years,  the  subject  of 
municipal  government  again  received  much  consideration 
in  England  —  coining  before  Parliament  in  reference  to  a 
general  revision  of  municipal  laws.  City  government  in 
other  countries  was  carefully  investigated  in  aid  of  improv- 
ing English  laws  on  the  subject,  —  Englishmen,  unlike  many 
American  politicians,  seeming  to  be  willing  to  learn  some- 
thing useful  from  other  nations.  The  result  was  the  enact- 
ment in  that  year  of  an  elaborate  Municipal  Code  largely 
based  on  the  law  of  1835,  which  deserves  the  careful  study 
of  every  friend  of  municipal  reform.1 

This  act  left  the  fundamental  provisions  of  the  law  of 
1835  —  the  terms  of  office,  the  mode  of  selecting  the  members 
of  the  council,  the  method  of  choosing  the  mayor  and  alder- 
men, and  of  carrying  on  the  city  government  —  unchanged, 
because  no  better  results  could  be  expected  from  different 
methods.  Six  years  later,  an  English  law  provided  for  a 
considerable  measure  of  local  self-government  in  English 
counties,  and  London  was  made  a  county  for  the  purposes  of 
the  act.2  The  authority  conferred  by  it,  which  is  in  sub- 
stance municipal,  is  to  be  exercised  in  each  county  by  a 
council  made  up  of  councillors  and  aldermen  —  the  former 
choosing  the  latter.  The  methods  of  selecting  them,  their 
terms  of  office  and  their  modes  of  action  are,  in  principle 
and  very  nearly  in  details,  identical  with  the  provisions  cited 
from  the  acts  of  1835  and  1882.  The  chairman  of  the  County 
Council  —  the  equivalent  of  a  mayor  —  is  made  elective  by 
the  council  itself.  The  same  purpose  of  relying  upon  public 
opinion  and  a  patriotic  sense  of  duty,  and  of  excluding  party 
control  shown  by  the  former  laws,  thus  reappears  in  the 
latter.8 


1  Known  as  the  "  Consolidated  Municipal  Corporations  Act."    Laws,  1882, 
Ch.  L.,  an  act  of  257  sections,  filling  97  pages  of  the  statutes. 
9  Local  Government  Act,  Laws  1888,  Ch.  XLI. 
*  Goodnow's  Comp.  Adm.  Law,  pp.  251-257. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN      321 

2.  The  new  local  government  for  London  was  established 
in  1889,  under  this  law  of  1888,  which  confers  ample  munici- 
pal powers.     The  municipal  franchise  of  London,  says  Dr. 
Shaw,  "  includes  every  one  who  rents  a  place  for  his  family, 
even  if  it  be  only  a  small  room  in  the  garret  or  cellar  of  a 
tenement  house  ,  >  .  .  the  chief  disqualifications  are  receipt 
of  public  alms  and  failure  to  pay  rates  which  have  fallen 
due  ;  "  and  any  male  resident  of  the  metropolis  who  is  en- 
titled to  vote  is  eligible  to  election.     If  so  comprehensive  a 
franchise  does  not  make  a  basis  for  all  the  difficulties  of  city- 
party  government  in  American  municipalities,  it  goes  very 
far  toward  it.     A  resident  in  any  part  of  London  may  be 
elected  to  the  council  by  any  of  its  districts  ;  and  the  same 
rule  prevails  in  other  English  cities  —  this  general  liberty 
being  regarded  as  favorable  to  the  bringing  of  able  and  well- 
known  men  into  the  city  councils  and  being  approximately 
the  equivalent  of  elections  at  large.1 

3.  The  provisions  against  the  corrupt  use  of  money  in 
city  elections  in  England  are  much  more  stringent  than  the 
corresponding  provisions  in  the  United  States.    For  example, 
in  no  event  may  a  candidate  for  the  London  Council  expend 
more  than  $125  upon  his  election  and  three  pence  in  addi- 
tion for  each  voter  above  the  first  five  hundred.     These 
expenditures  must  be  made  through  authorized  agents,  who 
must  make  itemized  reports  to  the  candidates,  and  the  latter 
must  render  a  complete  return  of  the  expenses  incurred  in 
his  election.2 

4.  It  would  be  interesting  to  set  forth  in  detail  the  prac- 
tical effects  of  this  non-partisan,  London  system,  but  our 
limits  forbid  more  than  a  very  few  facts.     In  no  English 
city  were  the  difficulties  to  be  overcome  in  the  way  of  reform 
greater  than  in  London ;  and  everywhere  the  triumph  of  the 
non-partisan  system  seems  to  have  been  as  complete  as  in 
the  metropolis.      The  London  Council  is  composed  of  118 
councillors  elected  by  the  people  for  terms  of  three  years, 
one-third  being  renewable  each  year.     These  councillors  are 
authorized  to  elect  into  their  own  body  nineteen  other  members 

1  Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  pp.  36,  222,  242-246.  2  Ibid.,  p.  246. 

T 


822          THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

known  as  aldermen,  for  terms  of  six  years,  according  to  the 
methods  we  have  before  explained.  "The  first  London 
Council,"  says  Professor  Shaw,  "  possessed  as  high  an  aver- 
age of  ability  and  distinction  as  the  House  of  Commons." 
All  administrative  powers  are  vested  in  the  council.  It 
elects  the  mayor.  It  works  through  standing  committees, 
each  of  which  supervises  some  branch  of  the  administration.1 
Two  women  were  elected  among  its  members,  and  one  was 
appointed  as  alderman  of  the  first  council,  but  it  has  since 
been  decided  that  they  were  ineligible.2 

These  methods  of  selecting  the  members  of  the  council 
not  only  brought  into  it  men  representing  all  classes  and 
the  great  business  interests,  but  also  men  of  large  experi- 
ence and  high  character  and  capacity  who  added  much  to 
its  prestige.  Mr.  Fox,  who  has  made  a  careful  study  of  the 
London  Council  system,  says  that  the  choice  of  aldermen 
by  the  councillors  makes  it  "  possible  to  call  into  the  munici- 
pal service  men  of  larger  experience  and  expert  knowledge, 
who  would  not  care  to  enter  into  the  turmoil  of  popular 
election  contests,  but  who  are  ready  to  heed  the  call  of  the 
municipal  council,"  —  a  result  which  we  have  suggested  as 
very  natural.  He  tells  us  that,  through  this  means,  the 
first  council  gained  several  invaluable  members.  Among 
them  were  Mr.  Farrer,  the  eminent  economist,  who  was  for 
many  years  Secretary  of  the  National  Board  of  Trade,  and 
Lord  Welby,  formerly  permanent  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 
Dr.  Shaw  expresses  much  the  same  views  as  to  the  useful- 
ness of  the  experienced  men  thus  brought  into  the  councils.8 

*  Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  pp.  242-246. 

*  See  George  L.  Fox's  article,  Tale  Review,  May,  1895  — an  excellent  account  of 
the  council.    Englishwomen  of  capacity  take  an  active  part  in  municipal  reform. 

*  Mun.  Gov.  in  Cont.  Europe,  p.  315.    The  author  has  thoroughly  discussed 
this  subject  with  Dr.  Shaw,  and  the  latter  has  authorized  him  to  print  the 
following  as  a  part  of  this  note:  "He  is  quite  ready  to  admit  that,  with  gen- 
eral ticket  elections  and  a  system  of  minority  representation  under  conditions 
prevailing  in  the  United  States,  some  plan  such  as  the  author  advocates  might 
prove  exceedingly  advantageous.    Certainly  Mr.  Shaw  would  disclaim  any  inten- 
tion to  have  his  position  on  that  subject  appear  to  be  opposed  to  Mr.  Eaton's, 
and  he  would  be  entirely  ready,  in  future  editions  of  his  own  book,  to  make 
qualifications  which  would  avoid  any  seeming  difference  of  view,  in  so  far  as 
the  lessons  to  be  derived  from  English  experience  are  concerned." 


METHODS   AND   RESULTS   IN   GREAT  BRITAIN      323 

It  is  as  unimaginable  that  such  men  should  be  willing  to  be 
members  of  American  city  councils  as  now  constituted,  as  it 
is  that  the  partisan  managers  of  their  affairs  should  fail  to 
fiercely  oppose  their  election. 

5.  The  membership  of  the  city  council  of  London  seems 
to  have  fairly  represented  its  people.  John  Burns,  the  great 
labor  leader,  many  plain  citizens,  eminent  bankers  and  mer- 
chants, able  writers,  members  of  the  nobility,  and  Mr.  Frith, 
the  distinguished  London  reformer,  sat  together  at  the  coun- 
cil board.  Its  first  chairman,  or  mayor,  was  Lord  Rose- 
bery,  late  English  Prime  Minister ;  its  first  vice-chairman 
was  the  eminent  scientist  and  statesman,  Sir  John  Lubbock ; 
its  deputy  chairman  was  Mr.  Frith. 

The  council  was  not  an  ornamental,  but  a  remarkably 
laborious,  body  of  men  —  and  they  served  without  salaries. 
Many  of  them  gave  most  of  their  "time  to  the  municipal 
service,  while  the  whole  body  .  .  .  composed  of  men  who  for 
the  most  part  had  private  business  or  professional  duties  .  .  . 
gave  an  average  of  one-third  of  their  working  time  to  coun- 
cil and  committee  meetings  and  to  labors  connected  with  the 
public  affairs." 

Here  we  have  striking,  and  we  may  add  encouraging,  evi- 
dence of  the  fact  that  busy  men  are  ready  to  serve  the  city 
faithfully  and  patriotically,  if  they  are  allowed  an  honorable 
opportunity  of  doing  so,  and  the  disgrace  in  which  partisan 
politics  have  involved  city  affairs  shall  be  removed.  One 
committee,  —  that  on  Parks,  and  a  fairly  typical  instance,  — 
says  Dr.  Shaw,  held  in  the  first  year  210  meetings.  Nor 
are  these  the  most  remarkable  facts.  "At  the  end  of  its 
three  years'  work,  the  first  London  Council  had  so  conducted 
itself  that  its  friends  could  say,  without  contradiction,  that 
through  all  these  years  of  administrative  labors,  as  complex 
and  confusing  as  ever  fell  to  any  governing  body  in  the 
world,  not  one  breath  of  scandal,  no  shadow  of  a  shade  of 
personal  corruption,  has  attached  to  a  single  member  of  the 
council."1  "Up  to  this  time  (1896),"  says  Mr.  Fox,  "the 

1  Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  pp.  242-249. 


824          THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

record  of  the  council,  so  far  as  corruption  is  concerned,  is 
practically  stainless."  And  so,  we  may  add,  it  is  up  to  1898. 
Such  are  some  of  the  results  of  a  municipal  system  which 
does  not  make  an  autocrat  of  the  mayor,  elect  him  by  a  party 
vote,  or  cause  the  rich  and  prominent  citizens  to  do  little  or 
nothing  but  "hold  him  responsible  for  good  city  govern- 
ment "  —  which  they  never  get. 

6.  If  we  are  not  ready  to  admit  that  a  non-partisan  system 
which  produces  such  results  deserves  our  serious  study,  it 
must  apparently  be  because  we  are  content  under  our  munic- 
ipal shame,  or  have  surrendered  to  utter  despair.    We  ought, 
then,  to  be  willing  to  admit  virtues  either  in  a  monarchy,  or  in 
the  English  people,  which  the  people  of  the  United  States 
have  no  hope  of  ever  rivalling.     Though  the  despair   and 
demoralization  which  our  old  party  system  has  caused  might, 
for  a  time,  prevent  so  salutary  results  in  the  United  States, 
can  any  true  American  doubt   that   his  fellow-countrymen 
are  able,  in  the  long  range  under  a  non-partisan  system,  to 
rival  the  best  achievements  of  Englishmen  in  municipal  gov- 
ernment ? 

7.  At  the  second  election  of  the  London  Council,  held  in 
1892,  men  of  the  same  high  character  and  capacity,  as  at  the 
first   election,   were   chosen.      The   non-partisan   principles 
upon  which  the  council  is  based  again  triumphed,  sixty  per 
cent  of  the  former  members  having  been  reflected.     There 
was  nothing  like  a  party  victory  achieved,  though  the  coun- 
try was  agitated  by  strong  party  feelings,  and  a  parliamen- 
tary election  was  expected  soon.     In  six  of  the  fifty-eight 
voting  constituencies  of  London  there  were  not  even  con- 
tests at  the  polls,  so  controlling  was  public  opinion.1 

It  is  the  opinion  of  Dr.  Shaw  that  the  practice  which  pre- 
vails in  other  English  cities,  of  reelecting  good  members  of 
the  councils,  term  after  term,  irrespective  of  party  politics, 
will  become  the  practice  of  London  —  an  opinion  which 

1  Under  the  English  Municipal  Code,  when  by  reason  of  the  candidates  being 
satisfactory,  or  no  more  being  nominated  than  there  are  places  to  be  filled,  no 
voting  takes  place,  the  law  providing  that  such  nominees  shall  be  declared 

••;••.•:••  i. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN      325 

seems  to  be  justified  by  the  last  elections  of  a  London  Coun- 
cil in  1895  and  in  1898. l  The  ability  of  the  council  elected 
in  1895  is  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  two  of  its  members 
have  just  been  given  seats  in  Lord  Salisbury's  Cabinet. 
"The  personnel  of  all  the  councils,"  says  Mr.  Fox,  "has 
been  notable  and  of  high  quality,  and  in  each  council  several 
ex-members  of  Parliament  have  had  seats." 


Ill 

1.  We  can  only  refer  in  the  most  general  way  to  the  compre- 
hensive measures,  well  explained  by  Dr.  Shaw,  which  the 
London  Council  is  now  engaged  in  executing  for  the  im- 
provement of  London  —  measures  the  adoption  of  which  in 
any  American  city  would  begin  a  new  municipal  era.  The 
policy  of  the  council  for  improving  the  health,  the  recrea- 
tion, the  morality,  and  the  comfort  of  the  laboring  popula- 
tion, as  well  as  for  the  better  treatment  of  the  insane,  are 
comprehensive  and  enlightened. 

New  York  City  has  lately  opened  several  very  small  parks 
in  the  densely  populated  sections  of  the  city,  but  the  acts  of 
the  London  Council  in  this  regard  make  these  New  York 
reforms  seem  trifling  indeed.  For  example,  it  has  removed 
more  than  five  thousand  people  and  more  than  seven  hun- 
dred buildings  from  fifteen  acres  of  ground,  and  upon  most 
of  this  ground  it  proceeded  to  open  new  streets  and  build 
model  houses.  The  residents  of  an  American  city  could 
hardly  see  what  this  council  has  done  for  the  improvement 
of  the  playgrounds  and  parks  of  London  without  wonder,2 
if,  indeed,  without  envy  and  something  like  despair. 

The  provision  which  the  London  Council  has  made  for 
the  rational  amusement  of  the  people  seems  to  far  transcend 
anything  of  the  kind  ever  attempted  in  an  American  city : 
250  cricket  pitches  where  6000  matches  have  been  annually 
played;  300  tennis  courts  annually  used  by  over  100,000 
players ;  and  75  football  grounds  where  about  5000  games 

1  Shaw's  Mun,  Gov.  G.  B.,  p.  250. 

2  Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.,  pp.  288-320. 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

are  annually  played :  these  are  illustrations  mentioned  by 
Mr.  Fox. 

The  council  is  highly  effective,  he  says,  in  securing  proper 
legislation  for  London,  "standing  as  the  champion  of  the 
many,  and  especially  of  the  poor,  against  the  vested  interests 
and  private  greed."  Another  result  of  the  management  of 
the  council  lias  been  remarkable.  Its  business  methods  have 
been  so  good  that  it  has  quite  generally  been  able  to  do  the 
city  work  by  its  own  workmen  at  less  cost  than  would  be  the 
result  of  having  it  done  by  contractors  who  secured  it  through 
competitive  bids  ;  and  such  seems,  to  a  large  extent,  to  be 
the  case  in  other  English  cities.1 

Mr.  Fox  tells  us  that  the  council  has  done  much  to 
awaken  the  sense  of  "  civic  duty  and  municipal  patriotism 
in  the  citizeng  of  London,  .  .  .  while  to  young  men  who 
look  forward  to  a  political  career,  efficient  service  in  the 
council  is  an  excellent  pathway  to  the  House  of  Commons." 
Professor  Commons  has  noticed  the  tendency  of  non-partisan 
city  government  to  develop  public  spirit. 

2.  When  such  have  been  the  consequences  of  non-partisan 
methods  in  city  government,  we  cannot  be  surprised  at  the 
English  system  of  Free  Voting  and  Free  Nominations  which 
we  have  described.2    But  we  may  well  think  it  more  natural 
that  a  republic  rather  than  a  monarchy  should  have  given 
birth  to  methods  so  liberal  and  just.     In  voting  for  mem- 
bers of  the  school  board  of  London,  each  voter  may  cast 
five  ballots  ;  and  in  electing  the  members  of  the  school  board 
of  Glasgow  he  may  cast  fifteen  ballots,  and  distribute  them 
as  he  pleases.8     In  other  cities  the  number  of  his  votes  will 
be,  as  they  are  in  London  and  Glasgow,  the  same  as  the 
number  of  the  officers  to  be  elected  at  the  same  time  —  being 
different  in  different  cities. 

3.  Our  references  to   the   municipal   codes   of   England 
which  have  made  special  charters  needless  would  be  imper- 
fect without  some  reference  to  the  elaborate  local  govern- 
ment act  of  1894. 4     This  comprehensive  law,  bringing  under 

l  Shaw's  Mun.  Oov.  O.  B.,  pp.  315,  316.  «  See  Ch.  IX. 

»  Shaw's  Mun.  Oov.  O.  B.,  pp.  40,  305-308.  *  Laws.  1894.  Ch.  73. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN   GREAT  BRITAIN      327 

uniform  provisions  the  fifteen  thousand  parishes  and  other 
English  jurisdictions  below  the  grade  of  cities,  applies  to 
them,  so  far  as  their  needs  require,  the  non-partisan  princi- 
ples and  methods  which  we  have  considered.  It  provides 
for  local  councils  with  considerable  authority  for  Home 
Rule.1  A  law  similar  to  this,  for  the  uniform  government 
of  the  villages  and  towns  of  our  American  states,  would  be 
a  great  public  blessing  by  avoiding  vast  numbers  of  special 
laws  and  much  needless  litigation.  This  law  not  only 
makes  judicial  decisions  interpreting  its  general  principles 
applicable  to  all  jurisdictions  appropriately  subject  to  them, 
but  it  authorizes  the  summary  submission  of  disputed  ques- 
tions to  courts  mentioned  in  the  act.  Section  70  declares 
that  "  if  any  question  arises  or  is  about  to  arise  as  to  whether 
any  power,  duty,  or  liability,  etc.,  .  .  .  under  the  law  is 
vested  as  it  purports  to  be,  the  council  may  cause  the  ques- 
tion to  be  summarily  submitted  to  the  High  Court,  which, 
after  hearing  such  evidence  and  parties  as  it  thinks  just, 
may  decide  the  question."  This  seems  to  be  a  very  conven- 
ient and  useful  way,  though  hardly  known  in  the  United 
States,  of  determining  doubts  as  to  the  meaning  of  municipal 
codes,  which  can  be  made  to  avoid,  by  timely  decisions,  much 
vexatious  uncertainty  and  expensive  litigation. 

4.  We  have  considered  the  theoretical  reasons2  which 
seem  to  make  it  probable  that  a  non-partisan  city  govern- 
ment, based  on  business  needs  rather  than  on  parties,  would 
diminish  the  inducements  to  vote  and  to  be  active  in  city 
politics  on  the  part  of  the  most  depraved  and  venial  classes. 
In  the  experience  of  England  we  find  these  anticipations 
verified.  Comparing  the  English  with  the  American  sys- 
tem, Dr.  Shaw  says  "there  is  much  less  in  the  English 
system  ...  to  tempt  unworthy  men  into  the  council  for 
purposes  of  gain,  .  .  .  very  remote  chances  of  profit  through 
contracts  or  jobbery  of  any  kind."3  "The  exploitation  of 
the  votes  of  the  ignorant,  vicious,  and  indifferent  in  English 
cities  by  demagogues  or  party  agents  is  so  extremely  difficult 

i  Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  Cont.  Europe,  p.  1(54.  2  See  Ch.  IX. 

*Mun.  Gov.  (?.£.,  p.  55. 


828  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

that  it  does  not  count  for  anything  at  all  in  the  election 
results.  .  .  .  The  residents  of  the  slums,  .  .  .  though  reg- 
istered by  the  public  officers,  .  .  .  do  not  care  about  voting, 
and  are  a  neglected  field  so  far  as  political  missionary  work 
goes."1  And  what  more  natural  than  this?  Vile  and  cor- 
rupt voters  will  not  go  to  the  polls  for  any  honest  or 
patriotic  purpose.  When  neither  the  council  itself  nor  any 
considerable  patronage  or  spoils  can  be  captured  as  the 
result  of  a  single  party  victory,  the  party  managers  will  not 
pay  the  vile  classes  to  go  and  vote.  Under  party  govern- 
ment, in  most  American  cities,  it  is  party  money,  party 
patronage,  party  bribery,  party  coercion,  and  party  agents 
which  cause  the  vast  majority  of  the  vile  voters  to  go  to  the 
polls,  who  but  for  such  influences  would  never  appear  there. 
Few  lessons  which  the  experience  of  the  older  nations  can 
teach  us  better  deserve  our  profound  attention  than  this. 
It  shows  us  how  some  of  the  evils  incident  to  universal 
suffrage  may  be  greatly  mitigated,  and  how  we  may  make 
the  higher  public  opinion  more  potential  in  American  cities.2 


IV 

Were  it  not  for  a  false  and  unfortunate  belief  on  the  part 
of  many  Americans  that  their  own  cities  are  as  well  gov- 
erned as  those  of  any  other  country,  and  a  self-conceit  on 
the  part  of  some  of  them  which  will  accept  no  proof  to  the 
contrary  short  of  a  demonstration,  we  would  gladly  omit 
further  reference  to  municipal  government  in  England. 

There  seems  to  be  a  prevalent  belief  in  the  United  States 
that  what  is  apparently  most  superior  in  the  city  govern- 
ments of  Europe  is  devised  for  the  advantage  of  the  aristo- 

1  Man.  Gov.,  pp.  45,  77.    Careful  inquiries  made  by  the  writer  during  several 
months'  sojourn  in  England  have  led  him  to  the  same  conclusions  as  those 
expressed  by  Dr.  Shaw. 

2  The  sanitary  and  police  administration  of   English  cities  —  to  be  subse- 
quently considered  —  deserve  the  careful  study  of  American  municipal  reformers. 
Nearly  thirty  years  ago  the  author  investigated  sanitary  administration  in  Eng- 
land in  endeavoring  to  qualify  himself  for  drafting  the  bill  which  became  the 
New  York  Metropolitan  Health  Act  of  1866,  and  he  was  much  indebted  to  Eng- 
lish precedents. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN      329 

cratic  classes.  This  is  an  unwarranted  assumption.  The 
facts  are  that,  in  the  main,  the  municipal  methods  of  the 
foremost  city  governments  in  Europe,  and  especially  those 
of  England,  are  democratic  in  theory  and  republican  in  their 
tendency ;  they  are  conceived  and  executed  in  a  spirit  favor- 
able to  universal  education,  comfort,  and  safety,  promoted 
at  the  public  expense  —  even  in  a  degree  as  yet  hardly  at- 
tained by  any  American  city,  and  rarely  imagined  by  men 
who  are  almost  blind  to  what  is  good  in  other  nations.  Pro- 
fessor Commons,  speaking  of  English  and  German  cities,  says 
"they  have  promoted,  much  further  than  American  cities, 
many  public  services,  for  the  wants  of  the  .  .  .  masses,  such 
as  parks,  .  .  .  baths,  water-supply,  and  many  others."1 

We  shall,  by  reason  of  such  considerations,  state  in  some 
detail  facts  which  illustrate  the  governmental  action  of  Eng- 
lish cities,  selecting  for  this  purpose  three  cities,  —  Man- 
chester, Birmingham,  and  Glasgow,  —  not  because  they  are 
peculiar,  but  because  they  may  fairly  speak  for  the  others. 
We  hope  the  city  reader,  as  he  proceeds,  will  compare  the 
doings  of  these  cities  with  the  municipal  achievements  at 
his  own  doors,  asking  himself  whether  the  kind  of  city  gov- 
ernment, of  which  these  doings  are  the  result,  is  not  one 
suitable  for  an  American  city. 

Manchester. — It  is  a  city  which  has  a  population  not  much 
exceeding  five  hundred  thousand  inhabitants,  being  not  far 
from  the  size  of  Baltimore.  It  has  a  council  of  the  kind  we 
have  explained,  and  the  council  elects  the  mayor  from  its 
own  members.  The  supervision  of  the  city  administration 
—  as  in  other  English  cities  —  is  directly  in  charge  of  vari- 
ous standing  committees  of  the  council,  of  each  of  which  the 
mayor  is  ex-officio  chairman.  Manchester  has  long  operated 
its  own  Gas  Works,  not  merely  making  gas  for  its  public 
supply,  but  for  private  use  at  low  rates.  These  Works  not 
only  pay  interest  on  the  investment,  but  a  large  profit  into 
the  city  treasury.  The  city  also  supplies  electricity  both 

1  Pro.  Rep.,  pp.  203,  204.  Mr.  Frank  M.  Loomis,  in  an  instructive  essay,  rec- 
ognizes the  democratic  spirit  of  the  legislation  referred  to  in  the  text.  Lou.  Conf. 
for  Good  City  Gov.,  May,  1897,  p.  114. 


330  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

for  public  and  private  use  ;  it  —  through  its  waterworks  — 
operates  a  station  for  the  supply  of  hydraulic  power ;  to  the 
great  advantage  of  its  people,  the  city  manages  the  munic- 
ipal markets  and  abattoirs,  from  which  a  large  revenue  is 
derived ;  *  more  than  forty  miles  of  lines  of  city  railway — 
on  which  cheap  rates  are  insured  to  laborers  —  are  the  prop- 
erty of  the  city  of  Manchester,  which  derives  more  than  ten 
per  cent  annual  interest  from  its  investment  in  them. 

The  city  has  comprehensive  arrangements  for  the  burial  of 
the  dead  in  its  own  cemeteries,  where  the  poor  can  have 
burial  at  reasonable  rates.  Dr.  Shaw  says  Manchester  "  has 
met  the  problem  of  garbage  more  successfully  than  any  other 
city  of  the  world."  It  maintains  public  assembly  rooms,  in 
different  parts  of  the  city,  which  are  rented  for  any  proper 
purpose  at  reasonable  rates ;  the  corporation  has  a  noble  city 
hall  —  which  it  built  economically  and  without  causing  scan- 
dal—  at  a  cost  of  $5,000,000;  the  city  has  several  other 
town  halls  which  are  rented;  it  has  eight  public  baths, 
constructed  at  a  cost  of  nearly  $100,000  each,  and  con- 
nected with  each  of  them  is  a  public  gymnasium,  and  some 
of  these  establishments  have  also  assembly  rooms. 

The  city,  by  taxation,  has  provided  public  libraries  which 
contain  250,000  volumes  distributed  in  some  fifteen  branch 
libraries  open  from  early  morning  until  10  P.M.,  and  some  of 
them  are  supplied  with  the  city  periodicals  and  newspapers. 
The  city  supports  (1)  technical  schools  for  the  instruction  of 
workingmen's  sons  in  crafts  and  industries ;  (2)  a  school  of 
art  and  design;  (3)  technical  schools  covering  instruction 
in  spinning  and  weaving,  in  literary  and  commercial  sub- 
jects, in  elementary  science,  and  in  many  practical  subjects, 
including  dressmaking.  Manchester  supports  a  municipal 
Art  Gallery  ;  it  provides  music  for  its  parks ;  it  employs  an 
organist  who  gives  frequent  concerts  in  the  Great  Hall  of 
the  Municipal  Building ;  and  lastly,  it  may  be  mentioned 

1  We  believe  it  would  be  disastrous  for  American  cities  to  attempt  such  public 
works — and  others  we  shall  refer  to  as  common  in  the  cities  of  England  —  until 
municipal  government  shall  secure  a  superior  class  of  city  officers  in  the  United 
States. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN   GREAT   BRITAIN      331 

that  Manchester  has  recently  furnished  $25,000,000  toward 
completing  a  great  ship  canal,  opened  in  1894,  in  aid  of  its 
commerce.1  In  1895  Manchester  completed  what  is  said  to 
be  the  most  magnificent  storage  warehouse  in  the  world  to 
be  used  in  connection  with  that  great  undertaking.2 

Birmingham.  —  Its  population  of  over  450,000  is  not  far 
from  that  of  Boston.  The  city  of  Birmingham  owns  the  mu- 
nicipal Gas  Works  —  acquired  at  a  cost  of  nearly  $10,000,000 
—  which  give  a  supply  of  gas  at  moderate  rates,  and  pay  a 
large  annual  profit  to  the  city  treasury.  Under  a  compre- 
hensive law,  the  city  recently  acquired  about  90  acres  of 
land  covered  with  about  4000  houses  in  the  worst  part  of 
the  city,  and  has  caused  improved  buildings  to  be  erected 
in  their  place  with  great  gain  to  the  public  health ;  the  city 
has  erected  and  rents  model  cottages ;  it  has  a  successful 
sewage  farm  of  1500  acres ;  it  has  many  furnaces  for  con- 
suming its  garbage;  it  manufactures  fertilizers,  and  owns  and 
operates  about  40  canal  boats  for  their  transportation  and 
sale ;  it  consumes  its  coarser  garbage  in  about  50  furnaces ; 
it  maintains  cemeteries  similar  to  those  of  Manchester; 
under  its  admirable  sanitary  administration  the  annual 
death  rate  of  the  city  has  been  reduced  to  twenty  in  a 
thousand  or  less;  it  maintains  public  baths  on  a  large 
scale,  even  providing  Turkish  baths  for  those  willing  to 
pay  for  their  use  ; 3  the  city  has  provided  a  public  library 
of  200,000  volumes,  with  many  branches ;  it  has  a  munici- 
pal Art  Gallery ;  it  maintains  a  central  School  of  Art  with 
several  branches,  some  of  them  mainly  for  night  schools  for 
the  working  classes ;  the  city  has  well-equipped  technical 

1  Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  G.  S.,  pp.  145-167. 

2  Annals  Am.  Acad.  Pol.  and  Soc.  Sci.,  November,  1896,  p.  152. 

8  An  elaborate  report  made  in  1897  by  a  committee  appointed  by  Mayor  Strong 
of  New  York  strikingly  illustrates  the  priority  and  the  great  superiority  of  English 
cities  in  the  matter  of  public  baths  and  other  agencies  for  promoting  public  clean- 
liness, health,  and  comfort.  It  says  that  Liverpool  had  public  baths  in  1828 ;  that 
an  English  law  was  passed  for  the  creation  of  such  establishments  in  1846 ;  that 
New  York  City  did  not  have  free  public  baths  until  1870 ;  that  the  public  baths  and 
washhouses  of  Newington,  England,  —  a  place,  perhaps,  of  which  the  reader  has 
never  heard,  —  are  such  as  no  public  bathing  establishments  in  the  United  States 
have  even  approximated  to. 


:,32  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

schools ;  it  owns  street  railways,  operated  by  horses  and  by 
steam,  the  admirable  regulation  of  which  Dr.  Shaw  says 
"would  amaze  an  American  community."  Birmingham 
owns  the  city  markets,  which  are  a  source  of  profit.  Speak- 
ing of  city  expenditure  as  a  whole,  Dr.  Shaw  says  it  has 
"been  made  more  advantageous  by  far  than  any  private  firms 
or  companies  could  have  effected  it.  .  .  ,M1  We  have  before 
called  attention  to  the  general  fact  that  city  governments  in 
England  are  able,  through  their  own  employees,  to  do  the 
city  work  at  less  cost  than  private  contractors  can  do  it  — 
a  result  of  far-reaching  significance,  and  a  fact  almost  un- 
imaginable in  the  United  States. 

Glasgow.  —  It  could  supply  us  with  facts  similar  to  those 
given  relating  to  Manchester  and  Birmingham,  but  we  can- 
not spare  the  space  for  them,  and  shall  select  those  of  a 
different  character.  The  city  clerk  of  Glasgow,  instead 
of  being  a  cunning  partisan  manager,  is  an  eminent,  widely 
known  authority  concerning  municipal  law  and  history,  who 
advises  the  city  council,  drafts  the  city's  bills,  and  takes 
charge  of  them  while  they  are  pending  in  Parliament. 
Glasgow  was  formerly  a  city  conspicuous  for  its  crowded 
tenement  houses  and  its  high  death  rate.  Its  recent  sani- 
tary policy  has  been  enlightened  and  salutary.  The  city 
has  a  vigorous  system  of  "  female  visitation "  among  the 
poor;  not  only  are  all  milk-shops  registered  by  the  city, 
but  the  farms  from  which  milk  is  supplied  for  them  are 
registered  and  inspected.  The  city  maintains  "sanitary 
washhouses,"  where  articles  likely  to  spread  disease  are 
disinfected  and  cleansed;  it  has  provided  a  house  of  "re- 
ception," where  persons  may  stay  while  the  disinfections  of 
their  homes  are  made ;  under  a  sanitary  system  thus  illus- 
trated, the  death  rate  of  the  city  has  been  steadily  decreasing. 
The  city  owns  a  farm  and  seven  hundred  railway  wagons 
used  in  aid  of  its  very  successful  street-cleaning  opera- 
tions, the  materials  from  which  are  distributed  into  fifteen 
counties ;  the  city,  several  years  ago,  purchased  eighty -eight 
acres  of  houses  and  lands  in  its  worst  quarters,  laid  out  many 
i  Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  0.  B.,  pp.  168-193. 


METHODS   AND   RESULTS   IN   GREAT   BRITAIN      333 

new  streets,  widened  others,  and  erected  much  better  build- 
ings upon  them  at  an  outlay  of  about  $10,000,000 ;  it  has 
also  built  many  improved  tenement  houses  —  zeal  for  the 
health  and  comfort  of  the  people  having,  perhaps,  for  a  time 
gone  beyond  the  dictates  of  financial  thrift. 

The  city  has  provided  several  large  model  lodging  houses, 
which  are  a  great  success,  both  financially  and  in  aid  of 
morality  and  order ;  it  has  five  large  establishments  for 
public  bathing,  at  which  the  water  is  kept  at  a  uniform  tem- 
perature through  the  year,  and  each  has  connected  with  it 
an  extensive  and  amply  equipped  washhouse  for  use  by  the 
families  of  the  poor,  who  pay  a  trifling  sum  for  this  provision 
in  their  behalf. 

"  The  police  force  of  Glasgow  —  which  no  mayor  controls 
and  no  part}'  boss  or  politician  meddles  with  —  is,"  says  Dr. 
Shaw,  "  of  excellent  character,  and  as  a  rule  is  faithful ;  .  .  . 
it  is  universally  praised  by  the  citizens ;  and  complaints  .  .  . 
such  as  one  hears  in  any  American  city  are  unknown.  ..." 

"All  the  slaughtering  in  Glasgow  is  done  in  the  public, 
municipal  slaughter  houses,  .  .  .  and  the  city  owns  public 
markets  "  as  well,  which  yield  a  net  income.  The  city  has 
almost  wholly  escaped  scandals  and  the  imputations  of  job- 
bery in  connection  with  its  contracts.1  Within  the  last  two 
years  the  city  of  Glasgow  has  erected  a  "  Family  Home  "  in 
aid  of  certain  classes  of  the  deserving  poor,  which  is  now  in 
successful  operation ;  and  it  has  also  purchased  the  city 
railways,  which  it  now  operates  at  a  profit,  though  the  fares 
for  workingmen  have  been  reduced.  The  city  makes  its 
own  gas  and  sells  it  at  so  low  a  rate  that  many  families  have 
abandoned  stoves  and  use  gas  for  cooking  purposes.2 


We  cannot  enter  much  into  the  relative  cost  of  city  gov- 
ernment in  England  and  the  United  States.  Dr.  Shaw 
says  that  the  citizens  of  English  towns  —  meaning  cities  — 

1  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  pp.  69-144. 

2  Annals  Am.  Acad.  Pol.  and  Soc.  Set.,  November,  1896,  pp.  149-151. 


334  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

"obtain  far  more  than  Americans  for  the  money  they  pay 
to  the  taxgatherer  is  a  proposition  too  obvious  to  admit  of 
any  discussion."  l  It  is  hardly  within  the  scope  of  our  in- 
quiry to  attempt  to  estimate  the  relative  number  of  munici- 
pal laws,  or  the  amount  of  litigation  which  has  grown  out 
of  them  in  recent  years,  in  the  two  countries.  We  have  seen 
that  the  English  municipal  codes  to  a  great  extent  super- 
sede the  need  of  special  city  laws,  and  that  municipal  litiga- 
tion is  reduced  to  a  minimum.2 

After  some  inquiry,  we  think  it  would  be  safe  to  say  that 
within  the  past  twenty  years  there  have  been  from  thirty  to 
fifty  times  as  many  pages  of  municipal  laws  enacted  in  the 
state  of  New  York  as  in  Great  Britain,  and  that  the  com- 
parative amount  of  litigation  arising  out  of  municipal  matters 
in  the  two  jurisdictions  has  been  much  in  the  same  pro- 
portion. 

VI 

A  few  words  should  be  added  concerning  the  British  police 
system.  We  have  referred  only  to  the  police  force  of  Glas- 
gow, but  what  is  said  of  it  is  in  substance  applicable  to 
policemen  throughout  Great  Britain,  who  seem  to  have  no 
relations  with  party  politics.  "The  complaints  and  suspi- 
cions," says  Dr.  Shaw,  "so  commonly  directed  against  the 
police  authorities  of  American  cities  are  almost  unknown  in 
England.  At  least  they  exist  only  in  a  very  slight  measure." 
That  such  were  the  facts  a  few  years  ago,  and  that  policemen 
commanded  general  confidence  and  respect,  the  writer  is 
convinced  from  his  own  investigations. 

There  is  another  view  of  the  British  police  force  which 
should  be  mentioned  here,  and  it  will  receive  further  notice 
in  a  subsequent  chapter.  The  members  of  this  force,  like 
the  judges,  are  regarded  as  being,  in  a  large  way,  national 
officers,  and  consequently  the  regulations  controlling  them 

1  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  p.  320. 

3  Mr.  Conklin  tells  us  that  no  two  of  the  charters  of  the  32  cities  in  the  state  of 
New  York  are  alike ;  that  each  has  a  different  method  of  bookkeeping ;  that  in 
ten  years  — 1880  to  1890  —  the  charter  of  New  York  City  was  amended  390  times 
and  that  of  Brooklyn  1<J6  times.  City  Gov..  pp.  17,  18. 


METHODS   AND   RESULTS   IN  GREAT   BRITAIN       335 

are  —  like  the  criminal  law — required  to  be  in  their  lead- 
ing provisions  uniform  for  all  cities.  There  is,  in  England, 
a  general  law  or  code  on  the  subject,  with  special  pro- 
visions applicable  to  peculiar  needs  and  conditions.  Few 
things  can  be  clearer  than  the  right  and  duty  of  the  state  to 
see  that  the  police  laws,  as  well  as  the  criminal  laws,  are 
everywhere  fairly  and  uniformly  enforced.  England  as  a 
nation  acts  on  this  view,  requiring  the  police  force  in  every 
city  to  be  up  to  the  fixed  standard  of  capacity,  discipline, 
and  fidelity  which  she  prescribes  —  a  requirement  which  she 
enforces  not  only  by  a  vigorous  system  of  national  inspec- 
tion but  by  insisting  on  adequate  reports  to  the  central 
authority.  She  makes  the  payment  of  the  portion  of  the 
compensation  of  this  force  which  the  nation  itself  pays  de- 
pendent upon  the  force,  in  each  locality,  being  kept  up  to 
this  standard.1 

We  are  not  without  some  fear  that  we  may  be  thought 
partial  toward  England.  On  the  contrary,  no  reader  could 
be  more  delighted  than  we  should  be  if  the  comparison  could 
be  made  more  favorable  to  the  United  States.  It  has  been  a 
disagreeable  duty  to  set  forth  facts  humiliating  to  American 
pride,  but  these  facts  need  to  be  more  generally  known. 
Professor  Goodnow,  of  Columbia  University,  —  a  careful 
student  of  municipal  affairs,  —  referring  to  the  municipal 
system  of  England,  says  "  her  example  should  encourage  us 
to  follow  in  her  footsteps ;  for  nowhere  else,  it  may  be  said, 
is  municipal  government,  at  the  present  time,  more  success- 
fully administered,  and  nowhere  else  are  the  tasks  it  has 
taken  upon  itself  to  perform  of  greater  magnitude."2 

In  dismissing  the  municipal  reform  policy  of  Great  Britain, 
we  may  keep  in  mind  these  facts  :  (1)  that  one  of  its  objects 
was  to  remove  evils  which  had  arisen  under  party  govern- 
ment in  her  cities  ;  (2)  that  the  remedies  she  has  applied 
have  been  in  their  nature  non-partisan,  and  have  constantly 
tended  to  eliminate  party  domination  ;  (3)  that  the  reformed 
system  she  has  established  has  made  it  possible  and  safe  to 

1  Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  p.  67. 

2  Mun.  Home  Rule,  p.  267. 


336  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

more  and  more  extend — and  she  has  more  and  more  extended 
—  the  sphere  of  Home  Rule;  (4)  that  in  no  way,  apparently, 
has  party  or  its  methods  been  an  efficient  force  in  accom- 
plishing the  reform  —  the  strength  of  its  support  having 
been  the  non-partisan  public  opinion  of  the  people  ;  (5)  that 
nominations  for  city  councillors  and  other  officers  are  now 
made  by  certificates  and  not  by  party  primaries,  and  that 
party  tests  are  not  applied  in  city  affairs  ;  (6)  that  in  every 
city  the  central  and  paramount  authority  has  been  —  and 
now  is  —  the  city  council  having  a  single  chamber,  some  of 
whose  members  having  been  elected  by  the  people,  and  some 
of  them  having  been  appointed  by  the  council  itself  ;  (7)  that 
these  members  having  long  terms  of  office — ranging  from 
three  to  six  years  —  are  so  classified  that  no  single  popular 
election  is  likely  to  insure  to  any  party  the  control  of  the 
council ;  (8)  that  the  council  elects  the  mayors  from  among 
its  own  members ;  (9)  that  a  mayor  elected  by  popular  vote, 
or  having  autocratic  powers,  has  been  unknown  in  Great 
Britain  since  the  reform  of  her  municipal  system  in  1835 ; 
(10)  that  practical  results  of  such  methods  have  been  to 
establish  the  best  municipal  administration  in  the  world,  and 
to  make  it  substantially  independent  of  national  party  poli- 
tics ;  (11)  that  the  English  people  find  their  municipal  sys- 
tem so  satisfactory  that  they  do  not  regard  it  as  likely  to  be 
fundamentally  changed,  or  now  make  any  exertions  for  such 
a  purpose. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN  CONTINENTAL  EUROPE    337 


CHAPTER    XIII.  —  THE  METHODS   AND   PRACTICAL   RESULTS 
OF  MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT   IN   CONTINENTAL  EUROPE 

The  tendency  of  government  in  its  cities  generally  democratic  or  liberal. 
Their  governments  have  valuable  lessons  for  us.  French  municipal  codes.  Elec- 
tions by  general  ticket.  French  city  councils.  They  elect  the  mayor  and  his 
assistants.  Functions  of  French  councils  and  mayors.  Character  and  capacity 
of  French  councils.  (1)  French  city  government  compared  with  American. 
French  police  system.  French  schools.  Pawnshops  and  savings  banks.  Gov- 
«rninent  of  Paris.  Its  council.  Difference  between  French  and  English  mu- 
nicipal systems.  Good  administration  in  Paris.  It  has  able  officers.  Party 
politics  largely  excluded.  Skilful  persons  who  aid  the  city  officers.  Some  illus- 
trations of  the  results  of  the  city  government  in  Paris.  (2)  City  government  in 
Spain.  Its  city  councils  elect  the  mayors.  (3)  City  governments  in  Italy.  City 
councils  elect  mayors  from  their  own  body.  The  appointing  power.  Foremost 
citizens  take  part  in  city  government.  Some  illustrations  of  the  Italian  city  sys- 
tem. (4)  City  government  in  Austria.  Rapid  growth  of  Buda-Pesth.  City 
council  of  Vienna.  Its  members  elect  the  mayor.  Executive  committee  elected 
by  council,  which  has  great  powers.  The  municipal  system  of  Hungary.  Coun- 
cils elect  mayors.  (5)  City  government  in  Belgium  and  Holland.  The  city 
councils  are  as  in  most  European  cities  elected  for  terms  of  six  years.  The  king 
(or  his  government)  appoints  mayor  from  the  council.  The  council  and  not 
mayor  has  the  appointing  power.  The  cities  of  Belgium  have  more  party  politics 
than  those  of  any  European  country — yet  less  than  those  of  United  States. 
Drastic  laws  concerning  suffrage  in  Belgium.  (6)  The  municipal  system  of  Hol- 
land closely  analogous  to  that  of  Belgium.  (7)  The  city  government  of  Ham- 
burg. Its  council.  It  elects  a  Senate  which  chooses  the  mayor  and  administra- 
tive Bureaus.  (8)  Cities  of  Germany.  They  are  generally  prosperous  and  their 
governments  good.  Berlin  a  characteristic  city.  Its  council.  It  elects  the  mayor 
subject  to  Emperor's  approval.  It  has  members  analogous  to  the  Honorary  Alder- 
men we  have  proposed.  The  city  government  is  non-partisan,  economical,  and 
able.  How  private  citizens  aid  the  city  administration.  The  government  effi- 
cient, and  why.  Its  educational  system.  Its  sewage  and  sanitary  systems.  Its 
methods  concerning  the  poor.  Its  financial  condition.  European  city  govern- 
ments compared  with  American. 

IN  the  most  enlightened  countries  of  continental  Europe, 
government  in  recent  years  has  advanced  toward  liberty  and 
common  justice  in  no  sphere,  perhaps,  so  rapidly,  as  in  that 
of  municipal  affairs.  In  some  particulars  it  is  quite  appro- 
priate for  a  democracy,  and  in  others  not.  In  the  municipal 
administration  of  France  and  Germany,  for  example,  we  shall 
find  methods  enforced  which  are  more  largely  in  the  spirit  of 


338  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

kindly  care  for  the  poor  and  humble  than  the  methods  which 
generally  prevail  in  the  United  States  ; l  while,  at  the  same 
time,  these  nations  maintain  a  control  over  some  high  city 
officers  which  we  should  regard  as  unwarranted.  Neverthe- 
less, in  various  particulars,  the  cities  of  continental  Europe  are 
allowed  a  larger  power  of  self-government  than  American 
cities  possess. 

In  Germany,  a  mayor  can  hardly  gain  his  place  without 
the  approval  of  the  state  executive,  and  in  France,  mayors 
are  in  various  ways  subordinate  to  prefects,  who  are  appointed 
by  the  national  government.  Yet  it  may  be  doubted  whether, 
even  in  these  countries,  the  power  of  municipal  officers  to 
promote  true  municipal  interests  is  so  much  impaired  by 
state  interference,  as  the  power  of  such  officers  to  promote 
such  interests  in  the  United  States  is  impaired  by  party 
intermeddling  and  domination.  Party  tests  for  subordinate 
officers  are  almost  as  completely  eliminated  in  most  of  the 
enlightened  cities  of  continental  Europe  as  they  are  in 
English  cities. 

There  is  much  that  is  useful  to  be  learned  from  the  gov- 
ernments of  these  continental  cities,  especially  by  reason  of 
the  different  conditions  under  which,  as  independent  nations 
with  diverse  races  of  people,  they  have  reached  common 
conclusions. 

France  has  comprehended  the  vast  advantages  of  a  general 
municipal  code  applicable  to  all  her  cities  and  to  all  minor 
political  divisions  under  the  name  of  communes  —  which  seem 
to  include  such  minor  jurisdictions  as  would  be  called  towns 
and  villages  in  the  United  States.  France  has  more  than  thirty- 
six  thousand  of  these  communes.  In  recent  years,  the  salu- 
tary effects  of  English  municipal  codes  have  attracted  the 
attention  of  French  statesmen,  and  they  have  apparently 
regarded  them  as  being  as  desirable  in  a  republic  as  in  a 
monarchy.  In  1884,  France  repealed  numerous  municipal 
laws  and  enacted  a  general  municipal  code  applicable  to  her 
communes — its  provisions  being  so  framed  that  such  of  them 
as  are  appropriate  for  all  the  communes  apply  to  all,  while 

i  Commons's  Pro.  Rep.,  pp.  203-208. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS   IN   CONTINENTAL  EUROPE    339 

such  as  are  only  fit  for  regulating  the  smaller  apply  only  to 
them.  There  seem  to  be  provisions  for  several  communes 
cooperating  in  the  management  of  their  affairs.1  Thus  unity 
and  harmony  —  aside  from  Paris  —  were  given  to  the  whole 
municipal  system  of  France ;  the  need  for  special  charters 
was  avoided  ;  and  judicial  decisions  affecting  the  construc- 
tion of  municipal  law  became  generally  applicable  to  all  the 
cities  of  France. 

The  code  provided,  as  a  general  rule,  that  each  commune 
should  have  a  council  composed  of  a  single  chamber  whose 
members  —  varying  in  number  in  reference  to  the  popula- 
tion of  the  commune  —  were  made  elective  at  large  ;  that  is, 
by  general  ticket  for  the  term  of  four  years,  without  classifi- 
cation of  terms,  at  separate  municipal  elections.  "  The 
French  statesmen,"  says  Dr.  Shaw,  "have  recognized  the 
fact  .  .  .  that  elections  by  general  ticket  secure  a  higher 
average  degree  of  character  and  ability  in  municipal  councils 
.  .  .  than  the  plan  of  one-name  districts."2 

It  is  obvious  that  the  safeguards  —  in  connection  with 
the  elections,  and  with  the  terms  of  office  —  against  party 
domination  in  French  cities  are  by  no  means  so  adequate  as 
they  are  in  English  cities  —  the  members  of  French  councils 
not  being  classified,  and  therefore  leaving  it  possible  for  a 
party  to  choose  all  members  of  the  body  at  a  single  election. 
But  we  shall  soon  see  that  civil  service  examinations  for 
filling  city  offices — perhaps  more  rigorously  applied  in 
French  than  in  English  cities  —  have  been  very  effective 
against  such  evils.  It  may  be  noted  here  that  France, 
in  her  laws  applicable  to  her  political  divisions  most  analo- 
gous to  American  counties,  has  provided  for  councils  — 
single  chambers  —  having  large  control  for  local  self-govern- 
ment. Their  members  are  chosen  for  terms  which  clearly 

1  Wilcox's  Study  City  Gov.,  p.  68.    Paris,  by  reason  of  its  peculiar  needs  and 
relations,  has  been  excepted  from  French  codes,  as  London  had  been  excepted 
from  the  earlier  English  codes. 

2  Municipal  Government  in  Continental  Europe,  p.  172.    This  volume  of  Dr. 
Shaw's  is  a  worthy  companion  of  his  valuable  work  on  English  municipal  govern- 
ment.   In  citing  it  the  letters  "  Cont."  will  be  used  instead  of  "  G.  B. "  to  distin- 
guish it. 


340  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

disclose  a  purpose  of  preventing  both  sudden  changes  of 
policy  and  mere  party  control,  for  they  are  elected  for  a  term 
of  six  years,  —  the  same  as  members  of  the  English  county 
councils,  —  and  one-half  of  them  retire  every  third  year.1 

2.  The  French  municipal  councils  choose  the  mayor  and 
his  assistants  or  adjuncts  from  their  own  body.  This  is  a 
departure  from  the  English  method  mainly  in  the  choice  by 
rthe  council  of  assistants  for  the  mayor.  The  republican 
J  statesmen  of  France  seem  to  comprehend  —  as  well  as  the 
statesmen  of  England  —  the  fact  that  to  elect  a  mayor  by 
popular  vote  is  inevitably  to  impose  upon  a  city  both  a  party- 
elected  mayor,  and,  in  the  main,  party  government,  and  con- 
sequently to  perpetuate  party  contention  for  city  control. 
Suffrage  in  France  is  nearly  as  extensive  as  it  is  in  the 
United  States. 

We  may  say,  generally,  that  the  election  of  mayors  by 
popular  vote  is  as  unknown  in  France  —  or  indeed  anywhere 
in  Europe — as  it  is  in  England.  The  mayors  in  France 
preside  in  the  councils  and  are — aside  from  Paris  —  the 
direct  executive  heads  of  the  municipalities.  The  French 
council  appoints  standing  committees  for  the  supervision  of 
departments  and  important  subjects,  of  which  committees 
the  mayor  is  ex  officio  chairman  —  though  one  of  his  assistants, 
assigned  by  him,  may  be  the  active  chairman.  In  the  main, 
a  French  mayor,  subject  to  the  prefect,  exercises  the  appoint- 
ing power,  though  there  are  specific  provisions  on  the  sub- 
ject limiting  the  mayor's  authority. 

It  hardly  need  be  said  that  a  mayor  elected  by  a  council 
from  its  own  members,  —  liable  to  be  removed  by  central 
authority,  required  to  have  his  appointments  approved  by 
the  prefect  of  his  department,  and  deprived  of  nearly  all 
patronage  by  the  civil  service  examinations  —  is  not  likely 

5  to  attempt  to  play  and  cannot  play  the  partisan,  despotic 
part  of  a  party-elected  American  mayor.  As  compared  with 
the  English  system,  the  French  system  makes  the  mayor 

1  Comparative  Administrative  Law,  Vol.  I.  p.  277.  This  work  by  Professor 
Goodnow  of  Columbia  College  is  s  valuable  addition  to  our  governmental  liter- 
ature. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN  CONTINENTAL  EUROPE    341 

more  important  and  the  council  less  important,  but  Dr.  Shaw 
says  that  in  both  the  council  "  is  the  central  and  important 
fact,"  and  he  thinks  the  tendency  in  France  is  toward  the 
English  system.  Professor  Goodnow  says  that  "  in  France 
the  municipal  council  regulates  by  its  deliberations  the  affairs 
of  the  commune."  1 

In  expressing  a  general  view,  Dr.  Shaw  says,  "  the  munici- 
pal councils  of  France  fairly  reflect  the  prevailing  standards 
of  personal  honesty  and  uprightness,  that  .  .  .  the  intelli- 
gence of  the  community  is  very  well  represented,  .  .  .  but 
that  in  the  present  decade  the  French  councils  have  been  less 
substantial  and  responsible  bodies  than  those  of  the  large 
English  and  German  towns  (cities),  while  far  superior  in 
these  qualities  to  those  of  American  cities  of  corresponding 
size."2  Such  results  might  have  been  anticipated  from  the 
failure  of  the  French  code  to  authorize  Free  Voting,  to  clas- 
sify the  members  of  their  councils,  or  to  provide  for  mem- 
bers elected  by  themselves,  into  their  own  body,  which  would 
have  secured  greater  stability  and  a  better  representation  of 
the  minority. 

3.  It  is  not  difficult  to  find  practical  illustrations  of  the 
superiority  of  administration  in  the  cities  of  France,  as  com- 
pared with  that  of  American  cities.  So  much  of  the  mon- 
archical methods  of  France  in  regard  to  the  police  force 
remains  that  one  would  think  it  might  be  at  least  as  readily 
used,  as  is  the  police  force  of  American  cities,  by  party  man- 
agers for  party  purposes.  That  the  French  government, 
through  its  prefects,  does  sometimes  make  this  force  effec- 
tive for  party  ends  seems  to  be  beyond  question.  But  the 
admirable,  non-partisan  examinations  for  entering  it,  and  for 
promotion  in  it,  prevent  its  being  dominated  by  party  spirit, 
or  servile  to  politicians  —  save  in  rare  crises.  Dr.  Shaw 
tells  us  that  no  minister  has  for  many  years  attempted  "  any 
seriously  objectionable  use  of  the  Parisian  police  system  for 
improper  political  purposes."  The  police  system  was,  in 
1854,  modelled  on  that  of  London;  and  we  may  add  that 

1  Proceedings  Lou.  Conf.,  1897,  p.  72. 

2  Mun.  Gov.  Cont.,  pp.  163-180. 


342  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

the  best  features  of  the  police  system  of  New  York  were 
derived  from  the  same  source  a  few  years  later.  "  The 
police  system  of  France,  as  it  exists  to-day,  ...  is  manned 
from  top  to  bottom  by  officers  who  have  entered  the  service 
upon  examination  for  fitness  and  have  been  promoted  for 
merit.  .  .  .  The  honesty  and  faithfulness  of  these  police- 
men are  matters  of  common  testimony.  The  discipline  of 
the  service  is  strict  and  the  duties  are  arduous,  while  the  pay 
is  exceedingly  moderate."  1 

4.  There   is  much  for  which  we  have  no  space  in  the 
organization  and  government  of  the  police  force  of  Paris,  as 
well  as  in  that  of  London,  which  would  richly  reward  the 
careful  study  of   the  friends  of   municipal   reform  in   the 
United  States.     All  the  means  by  which  an  admirable  police 
force  has  been  secured  in  each  of  those  cities  are  available  for 
us.    But  when  we  remember  that  despite  all  the  anxiety  and 
shame  lately  caused  by  the  demonstrated  corruption  and  par- 
tisan tyranny  in  the  police  administration  of  New  York  City, 
there  was  very  little  study  of  the  police  systems  of  the  best- 
governed  cities  of  Europe,  —  nor  has  there  been  since,  —  we 
may  well  fear  that  the  reform  of  American  police  methods 
will  not  be  as  prompt  and  easy  as  some  sanguine  people  im- 
agine. 

5.  Some  matters  connected  with  the  public  school  system 
and  public  savings  banks  in  French  cities  are  worthy  of  notice. 
Throughout  France  primary  instruction  is  obligatory  and 
free.     School  books  and  various  appliances  needful  in  school 
are   gratuitously  supplied  —  and  in  parts  of  France  meals 
and  sometimes   clothes  —  for   poor   children.     "  In   all  im- 
portant towns,  moreover,  one  finds  schools  of  the  fine  arts 
and  of  artistic  designing  supported  by  the  municipalities, 
.  .   .  while  the  commercial  schools  .  .   .  are  found  in  every 
town  of  importance.  .  .  .     The  laws  for  compulsory  atten- 
dance of  the  schools  are  remarkably  well  enforced  —  the  num- 
ber of  children  growing  up  uninstructed  being  less  than  one 
per  cent. 

"  There   are   public  pawnshops  ...  in  more  than  forty 

i  Mun.  Oov.  Con/.,  pp.  39,  40. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN   CONTINENTAL   EUROPE    343 

„  .  .  cities  and  towns  of  France,  .  .  .  for  the  accommoda- 
tion of  those  in  pecuniary  distress.  Savings  banks  .  .  .  are 
to  be  found  in  all  important  towns.  ..."  In  1894  there 
were  of  municipal  savings  banks  and  their  branches  more 
than  two  thousand  in  all,  in  which  deposits  could  be  made. 
For  every  six  men,  women,  and  children  in  France  Dr.  Shaw 
tells  us  there  is  a  municipal  savings  bank  account,  the  aver- 
age value  of  which  exceeds  a  hundred  dollars ;  and  that,  in- 
cluding postal  savings  banks  altogether,  there  is  a  savings 
bank  account  for  every  four  and  a  half  of  all  the  people  in 
France.1 

6.  We  have  no  space,  nor  is  it  needful  for  our  purpose,  to 
attempt  any  general  exposition  of  the  complicated  govern- 
ment of  Paris,  yet  certain  parts  of  it  should  be  noted.  Paris, 
the  only  city  in  France  without  a  mayor,  is  a  yet  more  splen- 
did illustration  than  the  city  of  Washington  of  the  fact  that 
the  theory,  generally  accepted  in  the  United  States,  that 
there  can  be  no  prosperous,  well-governed  city  without  a 
dominating  mayor,  is  quite  untenable.  Dr.  Shaw  presents 
Paris  as  the  "  typical  modern  city."  Its  successful  govern- 
ment, managed  in  the  main  by  a  city  council,  has  developed 
attractions  which,  to  the  immense  pecuniary  advantage  of 
its  inhabitants,  have  drawn  to  itself  vast  numbers  of  sojourners 
from  many  nations. 

Yet  it  is  not  only  without  any  mayor,  but  the  chief  execu- 
tive authority  is  divided  between  two  officers,  —  the  prefect 
of  the  Seine  and  the  prefect  of  the  police,  —  both  of  whom 
are  appointed  by  the  national  government,  as  are  also  the 
commissioners  who  govern  Washington.  One  of  these  pre- 
fects is  at  the  head  of  the  ordinary  business  administration, 
and  the  other  is  at  the  head  of  police  administration,  with 
important  and  effective  relations  with  the  police  courts. 
The  alleged  necessity  of  one-man  power  in  a  city  is  as  com- 
pletely disproved  at  Paris  as  it  is  at  Washington,  or  was  at 
Rome  under  her  two  consuls. 

Paris  has  a  city  council  with  large  discretionary  power 
over  finances  and  taxation,  and  it  indirectly  controls  most  of 
i  Mun.  Gov.  Cont.,  pp.  122,  199-204. 


344  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

the  departments  of  administration  and  the  "  construction  of 
public  works."  This  council,  a  single  chamber,  consists 
of  eighty  members  elected  in  subdivisions  of  the  city  for 
the  term  of  three  years.1  It  hardly  need  be  said  that  these 
provisions  supply  far  less  effective  safeguards  against  party 
interference  and  domination  than  are  supplied  by  the  Eng- 
lish municipal  system.  Dr.  Shaw  thinks  this  Paris  council 
superior  to  the  councils  of  great  American  cities,  and  that 
it  would  be  still  better  if  elected  on  general  ticket  for  the 
whole  city.2 

The  most  marked  differences  between  the  municipal  sys- 
tem of  England  and  that  of  France  are  these  :  (1)  Under 
the  French  system  the  members  of  the  council  are  not  clas- 
sified ;  (2)  it  does  not,  like  the  English  system,  provide  for 
the  elected  members  of  the  council  appointing  additional 
members  into  their  own  body ;  (3)  it  provides,  as  the  Eng- 
lish system  does  not,  for  the  election  by  the  council  of  sev- 
eral assistants  of  the  mayor  in  the  discharge  of  his  duties  ; 
(4)  the  French  system  concedes  to  the  mayor,  whom  in  both 
countries  the  council  elects,  larger  powers  than  the  English 
mayor  is  allowed.  We  have  seen  that  the  methods  of  con- 
stituting municipal  councils  and  governing  cities  in  England 
had  largely  suppressed  party  domination  and  patronage- 
mongering  before  civil  service  examinations  had  been  estab- 
lished in  that  country.  But  in  France,  the  methods  of  civil 
service  reform  seem  to  have  been  the  most  efficient  means 


1  This  council,  in  the  main  a  legislative  body,  seems  to  be  very  active  — hold- 
ing sessions  from  eighty  to  ninety  times  a  year.    Wilcox's  Study  City  Gov.,  p.  146. 

2  We  cannot,  therefore,  be  surprised  by  the  fact  that  efforts  have  been  recently 
made  from  time  to  time  to  improve  the  municipal  system  of  Paris.    It  is  only  a 
few  years  since  a  committee  of  its  council  made  a  report  upon  the  subject  which 
proposed  important  changes.    The  new  plan  made  the  council  consist  of  one  hun- 
dred and  nine  members  to  be  elected  for  three  years,  one-third  to  retire  annually 
—  as  is  the  case  in  England  —  and  for  their  election  upon  general  ticket.    The 
proposed  council  was  to  elect  from  its  own  membership  a  mayor  and  also  eight 
adjuncts  or  assistants,  which  were  to  form  an  executive  corps  or  committee  — 
obviously  a  considerable  approximation  toward  the  municipal  methods  of  Eng- 
land.   The  appointing  power,  under  this  plan,  was  to  be  in  the  mayor  and  his 
assistants.    Dr.  Shaw  thinks  this  scheme  indicates  the  tendency  of  European 
thought  on  the  subject  —  a   tendency  toward  the  English  municipal  system. 
Man.  Gov.  Cont.,  pp.  15-19. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS   IN   CONTINENTAL  EUROPE    345 

for  such  suppression.  The  strict  examinations  in  France 
for  gaining  entrance  and  promotion  in  the  municipal  service 
have  been  the  main  source  of  its  fidelity  and  non-partisan 
efficiency.1 

Dr.  Shaw  has  recently  made  a  careful  study  of  adminis- 
trative methods  and  municipal  officials  in  Paris  and  other 
French  cities,  and  his  conclusions  are  worth  citing.  After 
referring  to  occasional  interference  by  national  parties 
through  prefects  2  and  to  some  bureaucratic  methods  of  roy- 
alty which  yet  survive,  he  says  that  "  it  remains  true  that 
the  execution  of  the  varied  municipal  business  of  the  French 
metropolis  is  in  the  hands  of  a  marvellously  well-trained  and 
faithful  body  of  public  servants.  .  .  .  The  popular  educa- 
tional system  of  Paris  .  .  .  furnishes  a  constant  stream  of 
suitable  applicants  for  places  in  the  various  municipal  and 
civil  services.  All  admissions  are  based  upon  appropriate 
and  impartial  examinations.  Promotions  are  made  upon 
approved  principles  within  the  ranks  ;  .  .  .  removals  from 
the  service  are  not  made  upon  arbitrary  grounds.  Political 
considerations  have  nothing  to  do  with  municipal  employment. 
.  .  .  There  is  every  incentive  to  fidelity.  .  .  .  France," 
he  says,  "might  accept  the  sway  of  a  military  dictator," 
without  breaking  up  the  administrative  force  of  Paris, 
"  which  includes  policemen,  firemen,  school-teachers,  street- 
cleaners,  bookkeepers,  civil  engineers,  architects,  .  .  .  who 
are  altogether  out  of  politics."  It  need  not  involve  a  single 
change  in  the  personnel  of  the  tens  of  thousands  of  men  who 
make  up  the  administrative  organization  of  Paris,  save  the 
two  prefects.8 

Paris,  he  says,  "has  at  its  command  a  larger  and  more 
brilliant  array  of  engineering  and  architectural  talent  than 
all  the  important  cities  of  the  United  States  can  show  "  ;  and 

1  We  have,  therefore,  in  the  suggestions  submitted  for  an  American  city  gov- 
ernment, endeavored  to  profit  by  the  experience  of  both  France  and  England. 

2  "  Nothing,"  he  declares,  "could  be  farther  from  the  truth  than  to  assume 
that  the  great  power  vested  in  the  prefect  means  any  looseness  or  corruption  in 
the  ordinary  administration  of  the  police  system."    Mun.  Gov.  Cont.,  p.  40. 

8  Mun.  Gov.  Cont.,  pp.  29-32.  Here  we  may  see  what  is  meant  by  taking  a 
city  administration  out  of  party  politics  and  governing  it  by  public  opinion. 


34G  THE   GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

that  many  a  small  European  town  "  is  better  supplied  in  this 
respect  than  many  a  large  American  city."1 

Such  are  the  methods  of  municipal  administration  in  a 
republican  city  of  Europe  —  no  dominating  party -elected 
mayor,  no  party  tests  for  office,  no  patronage  to  be  won  by 
party  majorities,  no  apparent  sphere  for  great  city  bosses  or 
little  city  politicians  and  ringsters. 

7.  The  well-trained  officers  to  whom  we  have  referred  are 
aided  in  Paris  by  a  considerable  number  of  skilled  persons  of 
high  character  and  attainments  whom  the  council  selects, 
but  who  are  not  perhaps  strictly  officers,  and  who  are  not 
paid   salaries.     Yet   they  are  semi-officials  who   add   great 
moral  strength,  dignity,  and  intelligence  to  the  city  admin- 
istration.    They  perform  services,  especially  in  connection 
with  the  sanitary,  scientific,  artistic,  and  educational  affairs 
of  the  city,  which  are  analogous  to  those  which  we  have  sug- 
gested as  attainable  through  the  selection  of  honorary  mem- 
bers of  American  city  co'uncils.     They  are  a  connecting  link 
between  the  men  who  represent  the  higher  intelligence,  cul- 
ture, and  activities  of  the  city,  with  the  men  who  administer 
its  detailed  business  affairs — uniting  both  in  harmonious  and 
salutary  cooperation. 

8.  We  have  space  for  only  slight  suggestions  of  the  results 
which  have  naturally  sprung  from  a  government  so  ably  offi- 
cered and   so  free   from   partisan   domination.     Paris   has 
probably  the  finest  market  system  in  the  world,  and  the  best 
managed  for  the  advantage  of  the  common  people.     Besides 
the  vast  central  market  of  about  twenty-two  acres,  the  city 
maintains  covered,  retail,  public  markets  in  all  parts  of  the 
city  —  nearly  a  hundred  of  them  altogether.     The  concen- 
tration of  slaughtering  in  municipal  abattoirs  —  which  began 
in  New  York  in  1867  —  was  accomplished  in  Paris  early  in 
the  century. 

There  is  a  system  of  savings  banks  for  the  public  schools 

1  Man.  Gov.  Cont.,  pp.  54,  90.  Yet  during  1896  another  architectural  commis- 
sion was  added  to  the  skilled  administrative  force  of  Paris.  Annul.  Am.  Acad. 
Pol.  and  Soc.  Set.,  November,  1896,  p.  154.  "  It  is  not  strange  that  danger- 
ously high  buildings  are  not  allowed  in  European  cities."  Mun.  Gov.  Cont., 
pp.  90,  281. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN  CONTINENTAL  EUROPE    347 

of  Paris  ;  the  attendance  upon  the  free  instruction  for  chil- 
dren between  six  and  fourteen  years  of  age  is  compulsory ; 
books  and  other  materials  are  largely  supplied  at  the  public 
expense  ;  and  some  of  the  poor  children  are  provided  a  warm 
meal  at  the  schools ;  there  is  kindergarten  teaching  for  small 
children ;  manual  training  and  the  rudiments  of  design  are 
a  part  of  common  school  instruction ;  the  city  council  votes 
money  for  the  expenses  of  school  vacation  trips  of  the  chil- 
dren into  the  country. 

The  city  council  also  contributes  to  instruction  in  the 
sciences  and  industrial  arts  on  a  large  scale.  Under  its 
management  especial  workingmen's  libraries  in  aid  of  the 
industrial  arts  have  been  established,  and,  in  connection 
with  them,  lecture  courses  are  provided.  The  public  schools 
are  supplied  with  their  own  libraries,  and  certain  classes  of 
the  books  may  be  taken  away  by  the  pupils  for  reading  at 
their  homes.  Besides  these,  additional  public  libraries  are 
supported  at  the  public  expense  for  the  use  of  the  people. 
We  cannot  enter  into  details  concerning  the  various  methods 
through  which  the  city  of  Paris  encourages  the  high  artistic 
and  scientific  instruction  which  has  greatly  helped  to  make 
it,  perhaps,  the  most  attractive  city  of  the  world,  and  to 
cause  millions  of  foreign  money  to  be  annually  expended 
within  its  borders.1  In  considering  such  facts,  illustrating  a 
superiority  in  so  many  directions,  it  is  not  easy  to  decide 
whether  a  non-partisan  city  government  in  charge  of  an 
able  council  and  of  administrators  whom  no  party  controls, 
is  most  remarkable  for  its  economical  advantages,  its  benevo- 
lent purpose,  its  educational  wisdom,  or  its  guarantee  of 
public  order,  prosperity,  and  justice. 

II 

Spain  is  not  a  country  to  which  we  would  naturally  turn 
for  valuable  lessons  in  municipal  government.  Yet  she  has 
a  municipal  system  which  is  worthy  of  some  notice.  In 
regard  to  the  fundamental  organization  for  municipal  Home 

i  Mun.  Gov.  Gont.,  pp.  90-127. 


848  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

Rule,  Spain  has  reached  much  the  same  conclusions  as  most 
of  the  enlightened  nations  of  Europe.  The  chief  municipal 
authority  for  local  administration  is  vested  in  a  city  council 
whose  members  —  varying  in  number  from  five  to  thirty-nine 
according  to  city  population  —  are  elected  for  four  years  on 
general  ticket,  one-half  of  them  retiring  every  alternate  year 
—  an  organization  to  some  extent  more  favorable  to  non- 
partisan  government  than  that  of  France.  The  council 
chooses  one  of  its  own  members  to  be  alcalde  (mayor),  who 
is  its  president  and  the  chief  executive  officer  of  the  jurisdic- 
tion. In  the  large  Spanish  cities  the  mayor  has  several 
assistants  selected  by  the  council  —  analogous  to  the  assist- 
ants thus  selected  to  aid  the  mayors  in  France.  The  minor 
courts  of  justice  seem  to  be  largely  regulated  by  the 
Spanish  city  councils.  It  is  obvious  that  under  such  a 
system  mere  partisan  control  of  city  affairs  is  made  more 
difficult  than  it  is  in  most  American  cities.  No  popular 
election  of  mayor  causes  such  constant  party  contests  as 
occur  in  American  cities. 

Ill 

Italy  has  not  had  a  very  favorable  experience  for  develop- 
ing municipal  wisdom,  yet  she  can  apparently  teach  American 
states  some  lessons  they  would  do  well  to  study.  In  1889 
the  Italian  Parliament  enacted  a  municipal  code  for  the  gov- 
ernment of  cities  and  communes  —  its  varied  provisions  being, 
in  some  of  their  appropriate  parts,  adapted  to  the  whole  range 
of  municipalities  from  the  largest  to  the  smallest.  Dr.  Shaw 
declares  this  code  to  be  "  an  excellent  example  of  clear  and 
scientific  legislation  .  .  .  ,"  —  and,  therefore,  we  may  add, 
an  invaluable  prerequisite  for  good  municipal  government, 
which  few  American  states  possess,  and  the  value  of  which 
the  people  of  most  of  them  do  not  seem  to  appreciate.  This 
code  has  superseded  special  charters,  and  has  put  municipal 
government,  in  cities  of  approximate  population,  on  a  common 
basis.  For  each  of  the  jurisdictions  regulated  by  the  code 
there  are  provisions  for  a  council,  the  number  of  the  mem- 
bers of  which  vary  through  five  grades,  from  fifteen  for  the 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS   IN   CONTINENTAL   EUROPE     349 

smallest  to  eighty  for  the  largest.  It  would  seem  that  this 
code  has  left  little  need  for  special  charters. 

The  members  of  the  Italian  councils  are  chosen  for  a 
term  of  five  years  upon  general  ticket,  and  are  so  classified 
that  one -fifth  of  their  number  is  renewed  annually  —  pro- 
visions which  give  much  experience  to  the  administration, 
and  make  a  complete  party  capture  of  the  government  at  a 
single  election  apparently  impossible.  In  the  larger  jurisdic- 
tions, the  electors  can  vote  for  only  four-fifths  of  the  members 
of  the  council  to  be  elected  at  the  same  time  —  and  thus 
apparently  a  limited  though  very  inadequate  minority  repre- 
sented is  insured.  The  mayor  is  elected  by  the  council  itself 
from  among  its  own  membership  for  a  term  of  three  years.1 
The  council  not  only  elects  the  mayor  from  its  own  member- 
ship, but  also  a  standing  executive  committee  composed  of 
from  two  to  eight  members,  as  may  be  appropriate  for  the 
city  population  —  a  committee  closely  analogous  to  the 
mayor's  adjuncts  or  assistants  in  French  cities.  The  mem- 
bers of  this  committee  are  chosen  for  two  years,  one-half  of 
them  retiring  annually.  The  mayor  presides  both  in  the 
council  and  in  the  executive  committees.  The  latter  body 
has  the  appointing  power  and  is  responsible  for  its  doings 
to  the  full  council,  to  which  its  action  must  be  reported  for 
review. 

The  great  municipal  changes  recently  made  in  Rome  have, 
perhaps,  been  too  much  influenced  by  national  action  to 
make  them  fair  illustrations  of  the  effects  of  the  new  mu- 
nicipal system,  which,  are  however,  shown  in  other  cities  —  in 
Milan,  Turin,  and  Genoa,  for  example.  Taking  Milan  for 
illustration,  Dr.  Shaw  says  that  it  "  has  won  the  right  to  be 
enrolled  with  the  well-administered  cities  of  the  world "  ; 
that  its  affairs  are  in  the  hands  of  its  most  enlightened  citi- 
zens ;  that  its  population  has  increased  thirty  per  cent  in 
the  ten  years  previous  to  1894,  while  its  death  rate  has  been 

1  But  in  jurisdictions  with  a  less  population  than  ten  thousand  the  king,  by 
his  prefects,  nominates  the  mayor,  —  in  supposed  deference  to  the  wishes  of  the 
councils, — perhaps  a  provident  provision  among  a  people  so  poorly  educated  as 
many  of  the  Italians. 


850  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

steadily  diminishing.  He  says  that  "in  all  the  vigorous 
activity  which  marks  ...  its  municipal  government  .  .  . 
the  foremost  citizens  take  the  leading  part,"  and  that  the 
"  municipal  government  of  Milan  is  said  to  have  kept  itself 
above  so  much  as  the  suspicion  of  jobbery  or  corrupt 
methods." 

It  is  interesting  to  note,  at  Milan,  a  similar  fact  to  that 
which  we  found  so  significant  in  England,1  —  the  fact  that 
the  people  are  often  so  satisfied  with  the  nominees  for  city 
offices  that  they  elect  them  year  after  year  by  mere  nomina- 
tion, without  needing  to  take  the  trouble  to  go  to  the  polls. 
In  1892,  for  example,  of  44,594  registered  voters  in  Milan, 
only  14,177  actually  voted.  Such  results  of  government  by 
public  opinion,  which  really  makes  the  nominations,  are  all 
the  more  remarkable  when  shown  among  two  peoples  so  very 
unlike  as  the  English  and  the  Italians. 

We  have  no  space  for  further  details,  but  we  may  add  that 
the  measures  now  (1897)  being  taken  by  the  city  of  Naples 
for  improving  its  sanitary  condition  and  the  houses  of  the 
people  are  among  the  largest  ever  entered  upon  by  any  city. 
Its  complete  execution  —  the  estimated  cost  of  which  is  said 
to  be  $100,000,000  —  will  require  the  property,  in  whole  or 
in  part,  of  more  than  7000  proprietors  to  be  taken ;  the 
area  of  the  improvements  includes  271  old  streets,  of  which 
144  are  to  be  abolished  entirely  and  127  are  to  be  retained 
and  widened  ;  about  90,000  people  are  to  be  unhoused,  and 
17,000  habitations  and  62  churches  are  doomed  to  be  taken.2 
These  facts  may  well  be  pondered  by  those  who  think  that 
European  cities  are  stagnant,  or  that  it  requires  a  party 
government  in  American  cities,  led  by  a  party-elected 
mayor,  in  order  to  do  great  things.  This  is  certainly  a 
courageous  and  wonderful  work  to  be  undertaken  by  a 
city  of  450,000  inhabitants,  even  when  its  government  is 
non-partisan  and  in  the  control  of  its  ablest  and  worthiest 
citizens. 

i  See  Ch.  XII. 

»  Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  Con*.,  pp.  262-266,  284. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN  CONTINENTAL  EUROPE    351 

IV 

1.  Austria  and  Hungary  are,  perhaps,  not  countries  in 
which  we  should  have  anticipated  striking  examples  of  mu- 
nicipal growth,  yet  few  cities,  in  recent  years,  have  excelled 
Vienna  and  Buda-Pesth  in  their  development.  Dr.  Shaw  re- 
gards the  changes  in  Vienna  since  1860  as  almost  rivalling 
those  of  Chicago,  and  as  being,  on  various  accounts,  "the 
world's  most  notable  example  of  a  splendidly  appointed  me- 
tropolis." He  says  that  Buda-Pesth  is  now  four  or  five  times 
as  populous  as  it  was  in  the  middle  of  the  current  century; 
that  it  has  had  the  most  rapid  growth  in  recent  years  of  any 
European  capital,  and  that  it  has  now  the  full  magnificence 
of  a  splendid  city. 

Various  provisions  of  the  old  aristocratic  system  of  Austria 
still  prevail  in  her  cities.  For  example,  citizens  must  be 
twenty-four  years  of  age  before  they  can  vote  in  Vienna, 
and  that  only  one  in  about  twenty-five  of  the  city  popula- 
tion possess  that  privilege.  Such  provisions  connected  with 
such  growth  and  prosperity  show  that  universal  suffrage  and 
extreme  democratic  methods  are  at  least  not  the  sole  elements 
of  municipal  greatness. 

It  is  an  interesting  fact  that  in  Vienna  where  the  municipal 
voters  are  only  about  sixty  thousand,  in  French  cities  where 
suffrage  is  almost  as  broad  as  in  American  cities,  and  in  the 
cities  of  England  where  suffrage  has  limits  near  midway 
between  these  extremes,  the  fundamental  organization  and 
powers  of  the  city  authorities  are  substantially  the  same. 
The  central  authority  in  Vienna  is  a  city  council  of  138 
members.  They  are  elected  for  a  term  of  six  years  ;  and 
one-third  of  them  retires  every  two  years  —  provisions 
closely  like  those  in  English  cities,  and  which  render  strict 
party  government  impossible.1  The  mayor  (Burgomaster) 
is  chosen  by  the  council,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the 
Emperor,  from  its  own  members  for  a  term  of  six  years. 
He  is  the  presiding  officer  of  the  body  and  the  executive 

1  We  need  not  notice  some  peculiar  provisions  for  electing  these  members  by 
certain  classes  of  voters. 


352  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

head  of  the  city  administration.  There  are  two  vice-Burgo- 
masters elected  for  terms  of  three  years.  The  council  also 
selects  the  members  of  a  small  body,  over  which  the  mayor 
presides,  in  the  nature  of  an  executive  committee.  This 
committee  carries  on  the  details  of  the  administration,  selects 
the  appointees  to  fill  the  offices,  —  which  the  council  creates, 
—  and  reports  all  its  doings  to  the  council,  all  this  being 
much  according  to  the  methods  of  the  municipal  government 
in  Italy.  The  executive  work  is  carried  on  under  permanent 
expert  officials. 

The  method  of  creating  the  city  council  brings  into  its 
membership  men  of  varied  learning  and  distinction,  —  even 
statesmen  of  national  and  international  repute,  —  yet  a  ma- 
jority of  its  members  are  business  men.  The  council,  whose 
members  serve  without  pay,  seems  to  have  very  large 
authority  for  Home  Rule  without  the  need  of  much  special 
legislation.  It  "  is  in  the  full  control  of  the  general  affairs 
of  the  city,  including  its  finances  and  its  plans  and  policies, 
.  .  .  and  it  carries  on  its  work  through  standing  commit- 
tees. .  .  ."! 

2.  The  government  of  Hungary  has  but  an  imperfectly 
developed  municipal  system,  yet  her  large  cities  have  mu- 
nicipal councils  which  are  the  controlling  force  in  her 
local  affairs.  The  councils  choose  the  mayors,  assistants, 
and  magistrates  for  terms  of  six  years  ;  these  officials  are 
members  of  the  council ;  and,  aided  by  executive  committees, 
they  carry  on  the  work  of  administration.2 


Though  Belgium  and  Holland  have  not  so  important 
municipal  lessons  for  us  as  some  other  countries  supply,  yet 
their  experience  deserves  attention.  Each  appropriate  local 
division  in  Belgium  has  its  own  elected  council,  the  number 

1  Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  Cent.,  pp.  413-417.    It  is  an  interesting  fact  that  this  aris- 
tocratic city  system  of  Vienna  provides  for  local  control  in  different  parts  of  a 
city,  which  seems  to  be  more  democratic  than  perhaps  anything  of  the  kind  in 
American  cities. 

2  Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  Cont.,  pp.  410-417,  435-449. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN  CONTINENTAL  EUROPE    353 

of  members  of  which  vary  from  nine  to  thirty  or  more,  in 
reference  to  population.  They  are  elected  on  general  ticket 
for  terms  of  six  years,  and  are  so  classified  that  one-half  of 
them  are  chosen  every  third  year  —  provisions  which,  like 
those  of  the  other  European  countries,  are  a  great  obstacle 
in  the  way  of  mere  party  government.  The  mayor  (Burgo- 
master) is  appointed  by  the  king  (or  in  substance  by  the 
government  of  the  day),  from  the  members  of  the  council. 
The  mayor  has  not  any  fixed  term,  and  he  is  the  presiding 
officer  of  the  council.  Several  assistants  of  the  mayor  are 
also  appointed  —  their  numbers  having  reference  to  popula- 
tion—  from  the  members  of  the  council  for  terms  of  six 
years.  The  mayor  and  these  assistants  form  a  standing 
executive  board  for  supervising  municipal  work.  This  board 
seems  to  be  charged  with  the  local  execution  of  the  general 
laws,  and  in  this  particular  is  quite  unique.  The  Belgian 
mayor,  unlike  the  French  mayor,  does  not  exercise  the  ap- 
pointing power  —  that  power  being  in  Belgium,  as  is  the 
case  in  England,  exercised  by  the  council  itself.  The  Belgian 
mayor  —  apparently  in  his  relation  as  the  appointee  of  the 
king  —  has  authority  over  the  police.  As  the  king,  in  exer- 
cising his  appointing  power,  does  it  through  the  government 
of  the  day,  —  which  represents  the  national  party  majority, — 
it  is  plain  that  we  have,  in  Belgium,  a  nearer  approximation 
than  exists  in  any  other  European  country  to  the  despotic, 
party  elected  American  mayor;  but  as  the  Belgian  mayor 
has  not  the  appointing  power  and  the  members  of  the  council 
have  classified  terms,  he  has  by  no  means  the  ability  of  an 
American  autocratic  mayor  to  make  himself  a  party  despot.1 

*  Belgium  enforces  a  very  drastic  requirement  for  the  exercise  of  municipal 
suffrage.  There  are  examinations  for  ascertaining  whether  the  citizen  has  the 
educational  qualification  required  for  voting  —  apparently  a  very  just  and  salu- 
tary provision.  Since  1895  no  one  has  been  allowed  to  vote  in  municipal  elections 
if  under  thirty  years  of  age,  or  unless  he  has  been  a  resident  of  the  place  for  three 
years.  Certain  classes  of  voters  above  thirty-five  years  of  age  are  allowed  more 
than  one  vote,  the  additional  votes  being  based  on  the  facts  of  their  being  "  fam- 
ily men,"  taxpayers  to  a  certain  amount,  or  real  estate  owners.  Belgium  has 
some  regulations  of  voting  by  the  illiterate  classes  which  might  perhaps  be 
adopted  with  advantage  in  other  countries.  Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  Cont.,  pp. 
218-225. 

2A 


354  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

2.  In  Holland,  there  is  a  council  in  all  cities,  and  for 
towns  of  considerable  size  —  the  number  of  the  members  of 
which  vary  with  the  population.  The  official  term  of  these 
members  is  six  years,  and  they  are  so  classified  that  one- 
third  of  them  are  renewed  biennially.  The  reader  must  have 
noticed  that  these  provisions,  with  small  variations  in  details, 
are  almost  universal  among  the  enlightened  nations  of 
Europe.  There  is  a  property  or  taxpaying  qualification  for 
suffrage  in  Holland.  The  mayor  —  appointed  by  the  crown 
for  the  term  of  six  years  —  is  the  presiding  officer  of  the 
council.  The  council  appoints  certain  assistants  of  the 
mayor,  who,  with  him  as  their  head,  constitute  a  sort  of 
executive  committee  having  charge  of  the  municipal  depart- 
ments, and  exercise  the  power  of  appointment  and  removal 
in  a  way  analogous  to  the  practice  under  the  French  system. 
The  mayor  generally  holds  his  office  for  a  long  time.  As 
the  representative  of  the  king,  he  controls  the  police  —  as 
is  the  case  in  Belgium.  This  seems  to  be  a  limited  survival 
of  that  royal  authority  which,  in  more  despotic  times,  was 
general  in  the  executive  sphere  —  yet  an  authority  hardly 
greater  than  our  city-party  system  confers  upon  its  autocratic 
mayors  in  its  retrogression  toward  royal  despotism. 

VI 

The  governmental  methods  of  the  city  of  Hamburg  are 
especially  interesting  as  an  example  of  a  government  which, 
in  substance,  combines  the  powers  of  an  American  state  with 
those  of  a  mere  municipality. 

Though  Hamburg  is  a  member  of  the  imperial  confed- 
eration of  Germany,  it  is  free  to  manage  its  local  affairs. 
The  city  is  primarily  governed  by  a  House  of  Burgesses  — 
which  may  be  fitly  designated  a  council  —  of  160  members. 
Eighty  members  of  the  council  are  elected  by  the  equal 
suffrages  of  the  taxpaying  citizens  ;  and  this  suffrage  ap- 
proximates universality.  Of  the  other  eighty  members, 
one-half  are  elected  by  the  householders  of  Hamburg,  and 
the  remaining  forty  are  chosen  in  a  peculiar  manner  by  a 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS   IN  CONTINENTAL   EUROPE    355 

special  electorate  made  up  of  judges,  of  certain  dignitaries 
of  state,  of  members  of  guilds,  and  of  corporate  bodies  —  the 
intention  seeming  to  be  to  secure  a  representation  of  the 
judicial  and  non-partisan  wisdom,  the  administrative  experi- 
ence, and  of  the  great  business  interests  of  the  city.  May 
we  not  feel  that  such  a  representation  is  a  sort  of  precedent 
for  Honorary  Aldermen  in  American  city  councils? 

It  is  worthy  of  notice  that  in  this  independent  city  there 
is  much  that  is  fundamental,  in  connection  with  its  council, 
which  confirms  the  results  of  all  European  experience.  The 
members  of  the  council,  like  those  of  nearly  all  European 
councils,  are  elected  for  a  term  of  six  years,  and  they  are 
so  classified  that  one-half  of  them  are  renewed  every  third 
year.  Persons  who  are  elected  members  of  the  council  are 
required  by  law  to  serve  in  that  capacity. 

From  this  point  the  government  of  Hamburg  begins  to  be 
more  peculiar.  The  council  elects  for  life  eighteen  members 
of  another  body,  which  seems  to  combine  to  some  extent  the 
functions  of  both  a  Senate  and  a  Board  of  Administrative 
Control.  We  may  call  it  a  Senate,  but  we  need  not  enter 
into  particulars  as  to  its  powers.  It  is  enough  for  our  pur- 
pose to  say  that  this  Senate  elects  the  mayor,  whose  official 
term  is  two  years,  from  among  its  own  members,  and  that 
he  is  the  presiding  officer  of  the  body,  which  is  generally 
composed  of  the  foremost  citizens. 

The  office  of  mayor  of  Hamburg  is  one  of  great  dignity, 
and  he  holds  a  high  place  in  the  estimation  of  its  people. 
There  are  several  administrative  bureaus,  or  boards,  under 
the  direction  of  the  Senate,  with  a  senator  at  the  head  of 
each. 

Here  is  a  city  government  —  and  we  may,  perhaps,  say 
a  state  government  also  —  which  manages  its  own  affairs 
successfully  by  methods  that  leave  little  opportunity  for 
party  rule,  and  were  plainly  intended  to  make  such  rule 
impossible.  If  we  must  think  that  too  much  is  conceded 
to  mere  property  interests  in  Hamburg,  and  that  there  is 
too  much  independence  of  popular  forces  in  her  Senate,  we 
should  not  forget  that  she  contended  nobly  and  successfully 


356  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

for  municipal  Home  Rule,  and  for  some  republican  principles, 
when  wild  Indians  were  roaming  where  New  York  now 
stands.  A  comparison  of  the  senators  of  Hamburg  with 
New  York  aldermen  might  cause  statesmen  to  think  that 
the  younger  city  may  yet  learn  something  useful  from  the 
older,  while  rejecting  all  life  tenures  for  municipal  officers. 
If  Hamburg  has  solved  the  municipal  problem  by  methods 
which  seem  excessively  conservative,  they  have  saved  her 
in  the  main  from  the  scandals  and  corruptions  which  have 
discredited  the  excessively  democratic  and  partisan  methods 
which  have  prevailed  in  American  cities.  Much  as  we  may 
object  to  some  undemocratic  features  in  the  government  of 
Hamburg,  they  do  not  seem  to  have  been  unfavorable  to  her 
prosperity.  Previously  about  the  size  of  Boston  and  Balti- 
more, Hamburg  —  in  the  fifteen  or  twenty  years  prior  to 
1890  —  seems  to  have  increased  her  population  nearly  twice 
as  much  as  Boston,  and  fully  twice  as  much  as  Baltimore.1 

VII 

1.  Though  Germany  has  no  municipal  code  applicable  to 
all  her  cities  which  can  be  compared  with  those  of  England, 
France,  and  Italy,  yet  she  has  excellent  municipal  laws  which 
are  broadly  applied,  and  are  so  well  enforced  as  to  deserve  our 
careful  attention.  Professor  Commons  says,  "  It  is  generally 
agreed  that  the  government  of  ...  German  cities  is  superior 
to  that  of  American  cities.  Public  officials  are  renowned  for 
their  honesty,  efficiency,  and  the  economy  of  their  administra- 
tion. .  .  .  The  municipal  councils  include  the  best  and  most 
intelligent  citizens.  .  .  ."2  Dr.  Shaw  says  German  cities 
"have  grappled  with  the  new  municipal  problems  .  .  .  and 
have  solved  them  far  more  promptly  and  completely  than 
American  cities  have  done."  And  as  an  illustration,  he  says 
"the  maintenance  of  streets  in  general  is  so  much  better 
than  anything  in  America  that  comparisons  are  humiliating, 
even  .  .  .  the  Dresden  streets  being  much  superior  to  those 

1  Shaw's  Mun.  Oov.  Cont.,  pp.  293,  384-387. 
*  Pro.  Rep.,  p.  203. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN   CONTINENTAL   EUROPE    357 

of  our  one  exceptional  city,  Washington.  .  .  ."*  We  must 
not  attribute  this  superiority  to  a  fixed  order  and  inactive 
life  in  these  old  cities.  "  Berlin,  in  the  past  twenty-five 
years,  has  added  as  many  actual  new  residents  as  has  Chi- 
cago—  Berlin  being  about  four  times  as  large  as  it  was 
in  1860."  Its  enterprise  appears  in  the  fact  that  it  used 
asphalt  on  its  streets  more  than  twenty  years  ago.2  "  Since 
the  war  with  France  the  whole  municipal  organization  has 
undergone  revision.  .  .  .  With  admirable  thoroughness, 
.  .  .  the  work  of  reform  has  been  carried  on  in  every 
department."3 

No  one,  perhaps,  of  the  German  cities  is  more  characteristic 
of  all  the  others  than  Berlin ;  and  as  its  government  includes 
those  provisions  which  are  most  worthy  of  our  study  we 
shall  make  them  the  chief  subjects  of  comment.  The  work 
of  improving  the  municipal  system  began  in  Prussia  under 
a  law  of  1808,  which  seems  to  have  been  regarded  as  a  great 
achievement  of  statesmanship  ever  since.  Professor  Gneist* 
tells  us  that  the  financial  self-government  of  Berlin  was 
placed  in  the  charge  of  a  council,  elected  by  its  citizens,5 
which  controls  its  affairs,  manages  it  external  relations, 
draws  up  the  ordinary  budget  for  the  year,  and  allows 
extraordinary  expenses,  thus  exercising  large  ordinance- 
making  and  Home  Rule  powers,  and  avoiding  the  need  of 
much  special  legislation.  These  powers  are  to  a  large 
extent  separated  from  those  of  administration,  which  are 
in  the  hands  of  what  Professor  Gneist  calls  the  Court  of 

1  Colouel  Waring  of  New  York  seems  to  have  found  street  cleaning  in  Berlin 
up  to  his  own  high  standards.    See  his  Report  on  Street  Cleaning,  1897,  pp.  24-27. 

2  Mun.  Gov.  Cont.,  pp.  293,  297,  335. 
8  Pollard's  Study  Mun.  Gov.,  p.  6. 

4  We  are  much  indebted  to  an  authoritative  article  by  this  eminent  statesman, 
who  has  given  much  study  to  the  city  government  of  Berlin,  published  in  the 
English  Contemporary  Review,  December,  1884. 

6  There  is  a  property  qualification  for  voting  in  Berlin  which  excludes  a  consid- 
erable number  of  the  citizens  from  the  polls.  The  whole  body  of  the  taxpaying 
electors  —  numbering  in  1884,  according  to  Professor  Gneist,  185,195 — was  di- 
vided into  three  classes,  each  class  paying  one-third  of  the  taxes  and  being 
entitled  to  elect  one-third  of  the  members  of  the  City  Council;  and  this  method, 
still  continuing  in  Berlin,  is  analogous  to  that  which  is  said  to  prevail  in  some 
other  German  cities. 


358  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

Mayor  and  Aldermen,  but  which  for  convenience  we  may 
call  the  Administrative  Board.1 

The  council  elects  the  mayor  of  Berlin,  subject  to  the 
approval  of  the  king,  for  a  term  of  twelve  years.  The  mayor 
is  the  official  head  both  of  the  council  and  of  the  Adminis- 
trative Board.  The  council  also  elects  thirty-two  aldermen, 
twelve  of  whom,  chosen  for  the  term  of  the  mayor,  are  paid  a 
salary,  and  the  rest  of  whom,  chosen  for  a  term  of  six  years, 
serve  without  pay.2  Dr.  Shaw  says  the  councillors  of  Berlin 
—  and  apparently  of  Prussian  cities  generally  —  are  elected 
for  six  years,  and  that  one-third  of  the  seats  are  vacated  and 
refilled  every  two  years.  Professor  Gneist  tells  us  that  the 
paid  members  of  the  council  include  men  of  great  experi- 
ence and  technical  skill  in  the  various  branches  of  municipal 
administration,  and  that  the  positions  of  unpaid  members  — 
positions  somewhat  analogous  to  those  we  have  proposed  for 
Honorary  Aldermen  —  are  considered  highly  honorable,  are 
sought  by  intelligent  and  distinguished  citizens,  and  that 
their  presence  in  the  board  "imparts  to  the  whole  body 
of  aldermen  that  spirit  of  manly  independence  which  has 
proved  most  beneficial  in  stormy  times." 

Dr.  Shaw  confirms  the  view  of  Professor  Gneist  as  to  the 
salutary  influence  of  these  members.8  The  effectiveness  of 
these  non-partisan  members  of  the  city  councils  deserves  our 
attention.  "  Municipal  councillors,"  says  Dr.  Shaw,  "  are  as  a 
rule  very  excellent  citizens;  it  is  considered  a  high  honor  to  be 
elected  to  the  council.  Membership  is  a  title  of  dignity  that 
merchants,  professional  men,  and  scholars  are  usually  eager  to 
hold.  .  .  .  The  sentiment  toward  these  positions  is  much 

1  Some  writers  speak  of  the  members  of  this  Board  of  Administration  as  being 
a  board  of  magistrates  said  to  be  thirty  in  number, — fifteen  only  of  whom  are 
paid  salaries  and  give  their  whole  time  to  the  city.     We  need  not  enter  into 
the  peculiar  relations  between  the  council,  the  mayor,  and  this  board.    Pollard's 
Mun.  Gov.  (Berlin),  p.  8.    The  council,  says  Dr.  Shaw,  appoints  associates  of  the 
mayor  in  the  administration,  who  are  known  as  "  City  Magistrates,"  and  have 
the  charge  of  many  details  of  city  government.    Atlantic  Monthly,  June,  1897, 
p.  736. 

2  Dr.  Shaw,  writing  subsequently  to  Professor  Gneist,  speaks  of  this  board  or 
"  magistracy  "  as  composed  of  thirty-four  members.    Mun.  Gov.  Cont.,  p.  317. 

«  Mun.  Gov.  Cont.,  pp.  311,  317,  318. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN  CONTINENTAL  EUROPE    359 

the  same  in  Germany  as  in  Great  Britain.  .  .  .  The  reelec- 
tion of  good  councillors  term  after  term  is  common  in  both 
countries.  .  .  .  The  presence  of  men  eminent  .  .  .  for 
expert  knowledge  is  another  of  the  characteristics  of  the 
German  councils.  .  .  .  The  councils  form  themselves  into 
standing  committees  for  working  purposes.  .  .  .  There  are 
in  Berlin  .  .  .  about  seventy-five  '  citizen  deputies '  who  are 
selected  by  the  council  for  their  fitness  to  serve  as  associates 
on  committees  charged  with  the  oversight  of  various  munici- 
pal interests.  .  .  .'?1  This  matured  method  of  non-official 
cooperation  in  municipal  administration  —  of  which  we  have 
seen  a  small  beginning  in  Boston  —  has  been  highly  salu- 
tary in  its  effects  in  Berlin  and  throughout  German  city 
government. 

No  American  can  fail  to  be  impressed,  if  he  is  not  humili- 
ated, by  the  broad  contrast  between  the  membership  of  Ger- 
man and  American  city  councils.2  If  this  difference  be  not 
mainly  due  to  party  rule  in  American  cities,  and  its  exclusion 
from  German  cities,  to  what  is  it  due?  Are  Americans 
inferior  to  Germans  in  capacity  and  patriotism  ? 

Professor  Gneist  tells  us  that  governments  thus  consti- 
tuted have  been  able  to  resist  party  attacks,  and  to  manage 
the  affairs  of  German  cities  in  their  own  interests.  We  can- 
not fail  to  recall  the  steady  persistence  in  laws  for  the  elec- 
tion by  English  councils  of  members  into  their  own  body, 
and  we  may  perhaps  see,  in  the  value  of  these  Berlin  aldermen 
similarly  elected,  the  advantages  likely  to  spring  from  such 
Appointed  and  Honorary  Aldermen  in  American  councils  as 
we  have  suggested.3 

It  is  a  striking  example  of  the  sound,  non-partisan,  theories 
and  interests  which  prevail  in  German  cities  that,  when  a  few 
years  ago  a  new  mayor  was  needed  for  Berlin,  a  man  who 
had  distinguished  himself  as  mayor  in  a  smaller  city  was,  by 
reason  of  his  fitness,  selected  for  the  office.  He  came  to 

1  Nun.  Gov.  Cont.,  pp.  311-313. 

2  "  The  tendency  toward  the  distrust  of  American  city  councils  has  become  so 
strong  that  in  some  cities  tho  name  'Alderman '  is  an  opprobrious  title."    Wilcox, 
Study  City  Gov.,  p.  146. 

»  See  Ch.  X. 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

Berlin  as  its  mayor ;  and,  as  illustrating  the  dignity  of  the 
mayoralty  office,  we  may  add  that  the  new  mayor  had  been 
President  of  the  National  Diet  of  Germany.  It  requires  a 
sanguine  faith  to  imagine  the  imitation  of  such  an  example 
on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic.1 

2.  There  is  almost  no  opportunity  for   party  patronage 
under  the  governments  of  German  cities,  for  non-partisan 
tests  for   office   are   everywhere   enforced ;    public   opinion 
requires  a  tenure  of  good  behavior  and  efficiency ;  and  re- 
movals of  subordinates  for  party  reasons  are  nowhere  allowed. 
The  council  has  a  standing  committee  in  regard  to  appoint- 
ments and  removals,  which,  as  regulated  under  the  German 
system,  are  not  very  different  practically  from  the  methods 
under  the  English  system. 

3.  At  first,  the  German  system  seems  to  be  excessively 
official  —  to  separate  the  people  too  widely  from  the  govern- 
ment.    But,  in  practice,  such  is  hardly  the  fact.     The  people 
of  Berlin,  for  example,  take  a  much  larger  and  more  active 
part  than  the  people  of  American  cities  in  the  public  admin- 
istration of  city  affairs,  a  result  made  possible  and  natural 
by  the  exclusion  of  party  control.     The  members  of  the 
council  not  only  take  part  in  administrative  details  some- 
what after  the  manner  of  the  members  of  the  English  city 
councils,  but  they  and  the  members  of  the  Administrative 
Board  appoint  for  such  purposes  a  body  of  "  distinguished 
citizens,"  whom  Professor  Gneist  calls  "  select  citizens,"  to 
take  part  with  the  members  of  the  council  in  city  adminis- 
tration.    He  says  these  "  select  citizens  "  often  show  them- 
selves the  most  active  and  influential  members  of  committees 
for  city  service.     It  is  regarded  as  an  honor  to  be  desig- 
nated as  a  member  of   one  of  these  committees,  and  it  is 
held  to  be  a  sacred  duty  of  citizenship  to  serve  on  them. 
Dr.  Shaw  says  of  Berlin  that  "  there  are  between  two  and 
three  thousand  citizens  who  serve  the  municipality  in  con- 
junction  with    regularly   salaried   officials."     It   is   almost 

1  Mr.  Conkling  tells  us  how  mnch  he  was  impressed  with  the  difference 
between  the  dignified  mayor  of  Berlin  whom  he  met,  and  the  politician  whom  he 
had  left  as  mayor  of  New  York  City.  City  Got;.,  p.  28. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN   CONTINENTAL   EUROPE    361 

unimaginable  in  a  party-governed  American  city  that  there 
should  be  so  large  and  patriotic  a  cooperation. 

4.  In  Berlin  —  as  in  London  —  we  have  results  in  marked 
contrast   with    those   presented  in   American   cities   where 
autocratic  powers  are  given  to  party -elected  mayors.     Lead- 
ing American  citizens  make  party  relations  an  excuse  for 
doing   very   little    for   good   city   government.      Professor 
Gneist   says  that   in   Berlin  the  few  political  wire-pullers 
chosen  to  represent  a  party  in  a  short  time  either  assimilate 
themselves  to  the  spirit  of  self-sacrifice  or  "disappear  from 
the  assembly,  .   .   .  and  that  the  animosities  of  party  get 
gradually  blurred  and  finally  blotted  out  altogether,  in  the 
common  toil  of  daily  work  for  the  interests  of  the  commu- 
nity "  —  significant  words  which  those  may  well  ponder  who 
doubt  the  power  of  cooperation  according  to  non-partisan  city 
methods  to  develop  a  spirit  which  will  treat  city  interests  as 
paramount  to  party  interests.     It  is  this  feeling  developed  in 
a  non-partisan  city  council  which  helps  to  make  it  a  fit  body 
to  elect  aldermen  into  its  own  membership  and  to  choose 
mayors.     Professor  Gneist  declares  that  the  administration 
of  Berlin  "  is  a  practical,  economical,  and  honest  application 
of  the   public  means."     "Municipal   financiering,  in   Ger- 
many," says  Dr.  Shaw,  "  is  a  high  art.     It  unites  thrift  and 
minute  economy  with  broad  liberality.  .   .  .     The  German 
taxpayer  .  .  .  sees   everywhere   about  him   the   beneficent 
results  of  public  expenditures  carefully  and  wisely  made."1 

5.  Another  result  of  this  non-partisan  system  in  Berlin 
deserves  the  especial  attention  of  the  rich  residents  of  Amer- 
ican cities.     For  Professor  Gneist  tells  us  that  the  wealthy 
men  of  Berlin  not  only  pay  a  higher  rate  of  taxes  than  others 
but  "  that  their  personal  activity  for  the  benefit  of  the  com- 
munity exceeds  that  of  the  small  taxpayers  ;  .  .  .  the  higher 
contributions  of  taxes  correspond  ...  to  the  higher  share 
of   personal    services    in   the   administration.  .  .  ."       The 
neglect  of  the  rich  men  in.  the  United  States  to  take  the  most 
active  part  in  the  government  of  cities  is  as  notorious  as  it 
is  discreditable.      Is  the  explanation  to  be   found   in  the 

i  Mun,  Gov.  Cont.,  pp.  330,  376. 


362  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

assumption  that  the  rich  men  are  less  patriotic  in  republics 
than  they  are  in  monarchies?  Or  shall  we  seek  it  in  the 
fact  that  despotic  and  corrupt  party  rule  in  American  cities 
alarms  and  repels  such  men  —  often  causing  them  to  purchase 
their  safety  by  bribing  party  leaders,  and  to  slink  from  their 
duties  into  degrading  inaction  ? 

6.  It  is  interesting  to  turn  from  these  views  of  a  Euro- 
pean statesman  to  the  conclusions  reached  by  a  competent 
American  investigator.  Dr.  Shaw  says,  "  It  is  not  strange 
that  the  American  observer  should  at  first  be  most  impressed 
by  the  splendid  efficacy  of  German  city  governments  in  the 
prosecution  of  public  works  and  enterprises.  This  is  largely 
due,  of  course,  to  the  superb  and  continuous  organization  of 
the  executive  administration.  .  .  .  The  city  council,  rep- 
resenting the  people's  will,  is  renewed  by  instalments  .  .  . 
and  nothing  like  an  abrupt  or  capricious  change  of  policy  is 
ever  probable.  Consequently  it  is  possible  to  make  long 
plans,  to  proceed  without  haste,  to  distribute  burthens 
through  periods  of  years,  to  consult  minute  economies,  and 
to  make  a  progress  .  .  .  which  has  more  to  show  for  every 
half-decade  than  could  be  possible  under  our  spasmodic 
American  methods.  .  .  .  On  this  plan  the  magnificent 
public  works  of  Berlin  have  proceeded."  He  says  that 
between  1870  and  1890  "$100,000  accomplished  more  for 
the  making  of  permanent  good  streets  in  Berlin  than  ten 
times  this  sum  accomplished  in  New  York  in  the  same 
years,"  and  that  despite  all  the  street  improvements  since 
made  in  the  latter  city,  the  comparison  of  its  streets  with 
those  of  Berlin  "is  only  a  little  less  painful."  .  .  .  "Nothing 
accounts  for  this  difference  except  the  superiority  of  sound 
business  methods  in  Germany  over  wasteful,  political  methods 
in  America.  Throughout  all  Germany  the  public  works 
departments  .  .  .  are  busy  carrying  out  the  mandates  of 
their  municipalities  ..."  and  not,  we  may  add,  in  manipu- 
lating elections,  in  obeying  bosses,  or  in  carrying  out  the 
orders  of  state-party  majorities  expressed  in  innumerable, 
crude,  special  laws.1 

*  Mun.  Gov.  Cont.,  pp.  331-337. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN  CONTINENTAL  EUROPE    363 

VIII 

1.  If  we  turn  from  material  constructions  to  education, 
Berlin   and   most    German   cities   can   teach   us   important 
lessons.      Berlin   maintains   not   only   public   markets,  but 
trade  schools  where  mechanics  and  artisans  are  instructed.1 
"  They  have,"  says  Dr.  Shaw,  "  made  elementary  education 
universal   and   compulsory.      They  have   introduced  much 
manual    training    and    physical    culture    into  their   school 
courses,  and   are  many   years   in   advance   of   our   Ameri- 
can cities  in  adopting  the  quality  of  instruction  to  the  prac- 
tical ends  that  common  school  education  ought  to  serve." 
.   .  .  "In  addition  they  have  amply  provided  for  the  higher 
education.  .  .   .     German  cities  provide  trade  schools."     In 
Berlin  there  are  thousands  of  "reputable  citizens  who  are 
responsibly  and  intimately  connected  with  the  city's  educa- 
tional system.  ...     I  am  sure,"  he  says,  "that  so  far  as 
elementary  education  is  concerned  our  American  cities  have 
more  to  learn  from  the  methods  and  results  attained  by 
German  cities  than  we  have  to  teach  to  them.     Our  prog- 
ress must  be  along  their  paths."2     Why  should  we  be  sur- 
prised at  these  widely  varied  superiorities  in  German  cities 
when  we  consider  their  stable,  non-partisan,  business  methods, 
the  able  and  experienced  men  whom  their  city  system  places 
at  the  head  of  city  affairs,  and  compare  them  with  the  man- 
agement of  American   cities  whose   affairs  are   constantly 
involved  in  the  fluctuations  and  corruptions  of  party  war- 
fare, —  every  victory  in  which  may  give  a  city  a  new  set  of 
inexperienced,  partisan  leaders  who  constantly  seek  to  make 
city  administration  useful  to  themselves  and  their  party? 

2.  We  have  little  space  for  evidence,  more  decisive  than 
mere  opinions,  as  to  the  relative  merits  of  the  city  govern- 
ment  of    Berlin,   New   York,    Chicago,   and    Philadelphia. 
Berlin  is   about  four  times   as  large   as   it  was   in   1860, 
being    now    (1896)   apparently    more    populous   than   any 
one  of  those  cities.     It  has  lately  constructed  a  marvellous 

1  Pollard's  Study  Mun.  Gov.  (Berlin),  pp.  119, 131. 

2  Mun,  Gov.  Cont.,  pp.  331-377. 


864  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

and  beneficent  system  for  the  disposal  of  its  sewage,  —  hav- 
ing abandoned  for  this  purpose  the  river  that  runs  through 
the  city,  —  and  constructed  what  Dr.  Shaw  says  is  the  most 
perfect  drainage  system  in  the  world,  through  which  sewage 
is  distributed  over  more  than  thirty-seven  square  miles  of 
municipal  farms  which  the  city  owns  —  with  admirable  sani- 
tar}r  results,  and  a  good  prospect  that  the  whole  investment 
will  be  profitable  even  in  a  mere  pecuniary  sense.  Berlin 
and  about  two-thirds  of  the  large  German  cities  supply 
their  own  gas,  with  pecuniary  gain  to  the  consumers. 

Berlin,  like  New  York  City,  has  a  vast  tenement  house 
population;  but  in  the  former  the  process  of  depopulating 
the  congested  districts  has  already  begun,  and  comprehen- 
sive plans  on  the  subject,  based  on  ample  investigations,  are 
said  to  be  ready  for  execution. 

Berlin  has  erected,  on  a  large  scale,  municipal  cattle  mar- 
kets which  are  under  its  control  —  a  manifest  protection 
both  against  unwholesome  food  and  extortionate  prices. 
The  city  has  also  provided  municipal  lodging-houses  and 
workhouses  in  the  execution  of  a  friendly  policy  toward 
the  destitute  and  the  unfortunate,  and  several  German 
cities  have  even  provided  a  system  of  insurance  against 
sickness.  In  a  similar  spirit  Dr.  Shaw  speaks  of  the  emi- 
nent success  of  the  German  cities  "in  bringing  thousands 
upon  thousands  of  the  best  citizens  into  active  service  in 
connection  with  the  administration  of  poor  relief.  ..." 

Berlin  and,  we  believe,  other  large  German  cities  have 
established  savings  banks,  administered  by  public  authority, 
in  aid  of  the  care  and  safety  of  the  earnings  of  the  humble 
classes — the  system  of  Berlin  providing  seventy-five  or  more 
receiving  offices  which  are  used  by  more  than  four  hundred 
thousand  city  depositors.  For  the  same  purposes  German 
cities  seem  to  have  quite  generally  provided  municipal  pawn- 
shops where  the  poor  may  seek  relief  in  times  of  distress.1 

1  Referring  to  such  beneficent  provisions,  quite  beyond  the  scope  and  obviously 
incompatible  with  the  conditions  of  city-party  government  in  the  United  States, 
Dr.  Shaw  says,  "One  can,  with  very  little  imagination,  read  whole  chapters 
descriptive  of  good  service  rendered  to  the  poor  in  times  of  emergency,  and  of 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN   CONTINENTAL  EUROPE    365 

Mr.  Pollard  tells  us  that  while  Berlin  has  poverty  it  has 
no  slums ;  that  street  cleaning  and  the  removal  of  refuse  is 
mainly  done  at  night,  that  the  city  is  better  lighted  than 
any  in  Europe  —  save  Paris — gas  being  used  as  an  aid  in 
preventing  crime,  and  that  separate  lavatories  for  males  and 
females  with  attendants  in  charge  are  established  at  suita- 
ble places  in  the  thoroughfares  in  aid  of  cleanliness  and 
comfort.1 

3.  This  larger  sphere  of  municipal  Home  Rule  in  German 
cities  —  as  compared  with  that  of  American  cities  —  does 
not  appear  to  have  resulted  in  disastrous  investments.  Dr. 
Shaw  tells  us  that  the  financial  position  of  German  cities  is 
absolutely  unassailable.  Whatever  he  may  think  of  some 
details  of  German  methods,  the  great  advantages  of  eliminat- 
ing party  divisions  from  city  administration,  and  of  bringing 
able  and  worthy  men  into  the  control  of  city  affairs,  has 
been  demonstrated.  The  facts  we  have  presented  seem  to 
make  it  clear :  (1)  that  local  government  in  the  continental 
cities  of  Europe  is  accompanied  by  a  liberal  and  sagacious 
treatment  of  the  poor  and  the  humble  which  is  worthy  of 
our  imitation ;  (2)  that  the  sphere  and  authority  for  Home 
Rule  in  these  cities  is  much  broader  than  in  American 
cities ;  (3)  that  the  men  who  hold  municipal  offices  in  con- 
tinental cities  are  as  a  rule  much  superior  to  the  men  who 
generally  hold  such  offices  in  the  United  States ;  (4)  that 
the  business  policy  of  those  cities  exhibits  more  statesman- 
ship and  business  foresight  than  prevails  in  American  cities ; 
(5)  that  the  establishment  of  non-partisan  councils  and  the 
selection  of  mayors  by  them  has  facilitated  the  suppression 
of  party  rule,  and  the  bringing  of  citizens  of  high  character 
and  ability  into  the  municipal  service  ;  (6)  that  the  coopera- 
tion on  a  large  scale  between  municipal  officers  and  worthy 
and  patriotic  citizens  in  private  life,  in  aid  of  good  adminis- 
tration, is  a  remarkable  example  of  the  good  effects  of  the 

public  protection  against  the  class  of  sharks  who,  in  our  American  cities,  prey 
almost  unrestrictedly  upon  the  distress  of  the  tenement  house  population."  Mun. 
Gov.  Cont.,  pp.  331-375. 

1  Pollard's  Mun.  Gov.  (Berlin),  pp.  43,  44,  52. 


866  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

non-partisan  city  system  —  and  a  cooperation  practically  im- 
possible under  the  city-party  system. 

4.  At  the  end  of  the  last  chapter  we  found  that  these 
important  facts  had  been  established:    (1)  that  the  reform 
in  the  English  municipal  system  had  not  been  made  by  any 
party,  but  was  an  achievement  of  public  opinion,  and  mainly 
for  the  suppression  of  abuses  which  city-party  domination 
had  in  the  main  caused;    (2)  that  the  city  council  was  the 
centre  and  the  most  efficient  part  of  the  reformed  city  gov- 
ernment of  Great  Britain;    (3)  that  the  council,  in  every 
city,  elects  the  mayor  and  holds  him  to  a  salutary  responsi- 
bility;   (4)  that  a  mayor  elected  by  popular  vote  has  been 
unknown  in  the   municipal   experience   of   Great   Britain ; 

(5)  that  in  the  progress  of  municipal  improvement  there, 
the  power  of  the  city  council  has  constantly  increased,  and 
that   of  party  and   patronage   has   constantly  diminished; 

(6)  that  mayors  and  councils  have  cooperated  harmoniously 
and  vigorously  for  good  city  government,  and  that  any  con- 
siderable change  in  the  reform  system  is  regarded  as  both 
undesirable  and  improbable. 

5.  And  now,  after  we  have  considered  the  governments 
of  the  most  enlightened  cities  of  continental  Europe,  we  may 
affirm,  as  to  them,  most  of  these  statements.     It  is  worthy 
of  notice  that  no  matter  how  different  the  people  to  which 
these  cities  belong,  how  diverse  the  forms  of  their  national 
government,  or  how  peculiar  their  developments  have  been, 
all  of  them  have  reached  in  the  main  the  same  conclusions 

C  on  these  points :  (1)  that  a  city  council  elected  by  the  people 

i    is  the  most  essential  and  important  part  of  a  good  city  gov- 

(    ernment ;  (2)  that  this  council  should  be  a  single  body ; 

{\  (3)  that  the  mayor  should  be  chosen  by  the  council,  and 

>  generally  from   among  its   own  members,  rather   than   by 

popular  vote  ;    (4)  that  the  terms  of  the  members  of  the 

council  should  be  so  classified  that  only  a  portion  of  them  — 

generally  one-third — will  be  elected  biennially.1 

In  no  European  city,  under  modern  municipal  systems 

1  To  this  fourth  conclusion,  there  is  an  exception  in  France,  as  we  have 
explained,  which  apparently  is  not  likely  to  be  of  long  continuance. 


METHODS  AND  RESULTS  IN  CONTINENTAL  EUROPE    367 

has  the  mayor  been  elected  by  the  vote  of  the  people  or  party 
majority  —  and  very  rarely  otherwise  chosen  than  by  the 
city  council.  It  is  only  the  party-oppressed  cities  of  the 
United  States  which  are  seeking  relief  —  as  the  degenerate 
cities  of  medieeval  Italy  sought  it  —  by  the  establishment  of 
despotic  power  in  a  mayor,  which  the  monarchies  have  all 
discarded.  Every  European  nation  free  enough  to  develop 
a  good  municipal  system  has  regarded  the  establishment  of 
a  non-partisan  city  council,  the  election  of  a  mayor  by  this 
body,  and  the  suppression  of  party  rule  in  cities  as  the  three 
paramount  conditions  of  good  city  government  —  and  they 
have  in  the  main  secured  it. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  peculiar  municipal  distinctions  of 
the  United  States  are  these :  (1)  the  failure  to  establish 
such  councils ;  (2)  the  development  of  party  rule  and  the 
spoils  system  in  cities ;  (3)  the  enforcement  of  party  tests 
for  city  offices ;  (4)  the  prostitution  of  city  administration 
for  party  ends;  (5)  the  election  of  mayors  by  city-party 
majorities ;  and  (6)  a  failure  to  secure  good  or  even  tolerable 
city  government. 


368  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 


CHAPTER    XIV.  —  CONCERNING   THE   ELECTION    OF    MAYORS 
AND  THEIR  POWERS   AND   FUNCTIONS 

Various  methods  of  electing  mayors.  European  and  American  compared. 
Early  American  mayors  appointed.  Growth  of  the  city-party  system  for  electing 
them.  English  suppression  of  the  party  system.  Origin  of  American  commis- 
sions. Why  present  American  councils  incompetent  to  choose  mayors.  The 
mayor  as  the  speaker  of  the  council.  Why  the  new  councils  we  propose  will  be 
competent.  European  experience  ou  this  point.  A  city  mainly  a  business  cor- 
poration. Directors  are  the  councils  of  business  corporations.  They  choose  their 
chief  executive.  Choosing  of  the  mayor  should  be  a  case  of  promotion.  Com- 
petency of  council  for  selecting  mayor.  Need  of  a  vice-mayor.  His  duties. 
Manner  in  which  councils  should  choose  the  mayors.  Advantages  of  having 
council  choose  them.  Council  a  continuous  body.  True  relations  between  mayors 
and  councils.  Why  mayor  should  be  allowed  the  veto  power.  Special  duties 
of  mayors.  Division  of  appointing  and  removing  power  between  mayor  and 
council.  Foreign  experience  on  the  subject.  The  national  constitution  as  a 
precedent  for  cities.  Three  classes  of  municipal  servants  desirable.  The  Major 
Service,  the  Minor  Service,  and  the  Labor  Service  defined  and  considered.  As  to 
appointments  and  removals  in  each.  Better  protection  needed  for  city  laborers 
and  minor  officers.  Certain  fundamental  principles  involved.  No  removals  at 
pleasure  to  be  allowed.  Reasons  for  all  removals  should  be  stated. 

Why  mayor's  appointments  should  require  confirmation.  Precautions  against 
abuses  in  connection  with  appointments  and  removals.  Mayor's  power  of  removal 
considered.  Cause  of  removal  to  be  stated.  Right  of  explanation  and  defence 
by  those  sought  to  be  removed  defined.  Limited  right  of  appeal  to  council  from 
mayor's  order  of  removal.  Right  to  remove  should  be  same  during  all  parts  of 
mayor's  term.  Notice  of  intention  to  remove.  Concerning  appeals  from  removals 
in  the  Major  City  Service.  Removals  in  the  Minor  City  Service  and  appeals  there- 
from. Relation  of  mayor  to  vice-mayor  and  assistant  mayors.  The  objection 
mere  politicians  and  partisans  are  sure  to  make.  Concerning  the  best  method 
of  removing  mayors. 

1.  ACCORDING  to  generally  accepted  theories  there  are  but 
two  methods  of  electing  mayors,  —  one  to  have  them  elected 
by  the  people,  the  other  to  have  them  elected  by  the  city 
council ;  and  to  these  we  shall  address  ourselves.1 

1  It  would  be  possible  to  provide  for  their  election  by  the  people  subject  to  the 
condition  that  if  no  candidate  shall  have  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  at  the  first 
ballot,  the  council  should  make  a  choice  from  among  the  three  candidates  having 
the  most  votes;  or  to  provide  that  the  people  should  choose  the  mayor  from 
among  the  members  of  the  council  who  have  served  in  this  body  for  the  two  or 
three  years  immediately  previous  to  the  election.  Each  method  would  have 
some  advantages. 


THE   ELECTION  OF   MAYORS   AND   THEIR   POWERS    369 

We  have  considered  much  experience  according  to  both 
these  methods,  and  have  found  city  governments  so  much 
superior  in  cities  where  mayors  are  selected  by  the  council 
as  to  be  quite  decisive  in  its  favor  if  no  collateral  considera- 
tions were  involved.  We  are  aware  of  no  well-informed 
American  who  does  not  admit  the  great  superiority  of 
municipal  government  in  European  cities  where  mayors  are 
chosen  by  the  city  councils. 

If  the  results  of  experience  in  European  cities  presented 
in  the  last  two  chapters  had  been  attained  in  an  equal  num- 
ber of  American  cities  whose  mayors  had  been  chosen  by 
their  councils,  the  reader  would  probably  regard  the  question 
as  to  the  better  method  of  electing  mayors  as  already  settled. 

2.  While  all  sensible  and  candid  voters  will  finally  decide 
this  question,  quite  aside  from  national  bias,  this  element 
has  doubtless  strength  enough  with  many  people  to  require 
some  notice  here.  If  the  European  nations  had  conferred  au- 
tocratic powers  upon  their  mayors,  —  giving  them  authority 
kingly  in  its  nature,  —  nothing  would  be  more  natural  than 
that  republicans  should  attribute  such  a  policy  to  royal  and 
aristocratic  sympathies  and  precedents.  But  the  very  re- 
verse is  the  fact :  the  autocratic,  semi-royal  mayors  are  all 
on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic  ;  the  truly  republican  mayors, 
and  the  truly  representative  city  councils,  —  with  ample 
powers  for  Home  Rule  and  for  electing  mayors,  —  are  all  on 
the  other  side.  Strong  and  enlightened  indeed  must  have 
been  the  public  opinion  which  has  compelled  kingdoms  and 
empires  to  discard  much  of  the  fundamental  theory  upon 
which  their  national  governments  are  based  by  placing  the 
choice  of  mayors  in  the  hands  of  city  councils  elected  by  the 
people.  We  have  seen  that,  in  recent  years,  the  elevation  of 
municipal  administration  in  Europe  has  tended  to  make  her 
city  governments  republican  and  democratic  in  spirit,1  while, 
in  the  United  States,  party  supremacy  —  degrading  munici- 
pal affairs  —  has  tended  to  make  her  city  rulers  both  partisan 
and  despotic.  To  increase  party  power,  we  have  been  giving 
kingly  authority  to  mayors  whom  the  parties  and  not  the 

i  See  Chs.  XII.  and  XIII. 
2u 


370  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

people  elect ;  to  improve  city  government  in  the  common 
interest  of  the  people,  those  nations  have  denied  mayors  such 
powers  and  have  given  them  to  councils  whom  the  people  and 
not  the  parties  elect. 

8.  A  clear  illustration,  which  England  can  supply,  of  the 
cause  of  these  anomalies  will  aid  the  solution  of  the  main 
questions  before  us.  We  have  seen  that  before  1835  English 
cities  were  despotically  ruled  by  her  great  parties  —  in  which 
royalty  was  a  mighty  force  —  and  that  to  the  service  of  these 
parties  city  interests  were  habitually  prostituted.1  We  have 
also  seen  that  the  reforms  then  made  provided  for  non-par- 
tisan city  councils  of  a  nature  that  rendered  party  rule  in 
cities  practically  impossible.  Their  councils  were  to  elect 
the  mayors  —  and  to  elect  them  from  among  their  own  mem- 
bers—  a  provision  which  would  obviously  greatly  increase 
both  the  non-partisan  efficiency  of  the  mayor  and  the  prestige 
and  power  of  the  council.  No  party  under  such  provision 
could,  by  carrying  a  single  popular  election  of  a  mayor,  get 
control  of  the  city  administration,  or  capture  patronage  and 
spoils.  Non-partisan  city  government — government  by  pub- 
lic opinion  —  was  thus  practically  established  in  England, 
and  it  has  now  been  enforced  for  more  than  sixty  years. 
We  have  seen  how  it  has  been  since  strengthened  by  Free 
Nominations,  Free  Voting,  and  Civil  Service  Reform.2 

4.  In  the  United  States  there  has  been  no  similar  experi- 
ence. 

The  first  city  governments  in  the  United  States  were  not 
merely  based  on  English  precedents  —  they  were  under  Eng- 
lish charters.8  Many  persons  have  a  theory  —  perhaps  quite 
generally  accepted  without  reflection  —  that  there  was  a 
definite  and  original  American  method  of  city  government, 
a  creation  of  our  early  statesmen.  This  view  is  unwarranted. 
When  these  statesmen  did  their  original  and  noble  work  of 
creating  constitutions  for  the  nation  and  the  state,  the  mu- 
nicipal problems  had  not,  as  we  have  shown,  arisen  —  the 
importance  of  mayoralty  elections  in  great  cities  was  unim- 

1  See  p.  49;  Mun.  Borne  Rule,  pp.  8,  242-245.          2  See  Chs.  XII.  and  XIII. 
•  Mun.  Home  Rule,  p.  2. 


THE   ELECTION   OF  MAYORS  AND   THEIR   POWERS    371 

aginable.1  Our  largest  municipalities  were  little  more  than 
large  villages  —  the  three  largest  cities  having  a  population 
of  less  than  100,000.2  The  very  limited  harmony  that  exists 
in  our  municipal  methods  is  more  the  result  of  overpowering 
partisan  forces  than  of  conclusions  drawn  from  a  study  of 
municipal  principles. 

5.  The  municipal  precedents  we  have  from  the  times  near- 
est to  our  great,  original  statesmen  suggest  the  appointment 
of  mayors  by  councils,  rather  than  their  election  by  the 
people.  The  first  mayors  of  Philadelphia  were  appointed  — 
sometimes  by  the  city  council.  The  people  of  Philadelphia 
were  first  authorized  to  elect  their  mayors  in  1839.  Until 
1822,  the  mayors  of  New  York  City  were  appointed  by  the 
governor  and  the  state  council.  Later  they  were  chosen  by 
the  aldermen.  The  New  York  constitution  of  1821  pro- 
vided for  the  choice  of  mayors  by  city  councils,  and  the 
mayor  of  New  York  City  was  not  elected  by  its  voters  until 
1834.  In  Boston,  the  mayor  was  made  elective  by  the  people 
in  1822.3 

.  When  American  cities  began  to  be  a  considerable  political 
force,  their  control  was  naturally  sought  by  political  parties. 
As  parties  became  more  highly  organized  and  powerful,  they 
more  and  more  enforced  party  tests  for  city  offices,  and  used 
their  city  domination  to  aid  state  and  national  elections. 
This  was  the  case  in  New  York  City  as  early  as  1807,  but 
serious  municipal  corruption  did  not  begin  until  after  mayors 
had  become  elective  by  popular  vote.4  The  spoils  system  had, 
before  1835,  become  well  developed  in  several  of  the  leading 
states.  It  was  in  1833  that  Senator  Marcy  of  New  York  made 
his  celebrated  declaration  in  the  national  Senate  that  "  to  the 
victors  belong  the  spoils."  At  this  time,  party  rule  and  fierce 
partisan  contests  over  city  affairs  were  perhaps  about  equally 
the  curse  both  of  American  and  English  cities.  This  was 
two  years  before  England  adopted  her  great  non-partisan, 

1  See  Introductory  Chapter.  2  See  p.  6. 

3Conkling's  City  Gov.,  pp.  28,  29;   N.  Y.  Const.,  1821,  Art.  4;  Goodnow's 
Comp.  Am.  Law,  Mun.  Home  Rule,  pp.  2-5 ;  Mun.  Prob.,  p.  2. 
4  1  Hammond's  Pol.  History  of  New  York,  pp.  236,  238. 


o7_  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

municipal  reform  law  of  1835,  which  overturned  party  rule 
in  her  cities.  The  main  difference  in  the  two  countries,  so 
far  as  municipalities  were  concerned,  was  that  while  city 
governments  were  much  in  the  same  way  dominated  in  both 
by  national  parties,  there  was  in  England  a  non-partisan, 
public  opinion  which  demanded,  and  soon  established,  a  non- 
partisan,  municipal  system,  while  there  was  a  much  less 
enlightened  public  opinion  on  the  subject  in  the  United 
States  —  a  fact  which  Professor  Goodnow  recognizes. 

From  1835,  the  municipal  ways  of  the  two  countries  began 
to  diverge  from  each  other,  the  one  under  the  guidance  of 
public  opinion  —  which  the  English  reform  law  of  that  year 
intrenched  —  and  the  other  under  the  control  of  party  opin- 
ion, which  steadily  tended  to  become  despotic  in  American 
municipalities.1  We  have  referred  to  various  attempts  to 
restrain  this  tendency,2  and  are  now  ready  to  deal  with  it 
directly  on  the  basis  of  principle,  so  far  as  the  mayor  is 
concerned. 

6.  As  England  was  resolved  to  suppress  party  despotism 
in  her  cities,  she  made  her  mayors  elective  by  her  city  coun- 
cils rather  than  by  popular  vote.     For  she  saw  that  a  popu- 
lar election  of  the  mayor  would  inevitably  be  his  election  by 
a  party  majority,  and  would  perpetuate  city-party  govern- 
ment —  facts  which  we  have  considered  on  the  basis  both  of 
facts  and  principle.      This  non-partisan  policy  of  England 
has  naturally  led  to  a  large  appointing  and  removing  power 
in  the  council,  and  the  requirement  that  the  mayor  himself 
shall  be  chosen  by  the  council  from  among  its  own  members. 

7.  It  should  be  noticed  here  that  the  American  system  of 
municipal   commissions  had  its  origin  in  a  wish  to  check 
the  power  of  autocratic  mayors  elected  by  popular  vote  —  the 
autocratic  mayoralty  system.     In  1857,  when,  we  believe,  the 
first  police  commission  was  created,  the  Democratic  mayor, 
Wood,  of  New  York  City,  was  such  a  mayor,  and  he  had 
control  of  its  police  force.     The  most  non-partisan  and  en- 

1  Mun.  Home  Rule,  p.  8. 

2  Among  them,  Civil  Service  Reform,  Ballot  Reform,  Free  Nominations,  Free 
Voting,  and  Minority  Representation. 


THE   ELECTION   OF   MAYORS  AND   THEIR  POWERS    373 

lightened  sentiment  wished  to  limit  his  power  for  the  same 
reason  that  it  now  opposes  the  autocratic  mayoralty  system. 
The  partisan  Republicans  wished  to  do  the  same  thing,  but 
for  very  different  reasons.  They  desired  for  themselves 
the  police  patronage  of  the  mayor.  From  this  commission, 
the  system  of  bi-partisan  commissions  seems  to  have  been 
developed.  The  increasing  power  of  an  enlightened  public 
opinion  soon  compelled  the  representation  of  both  parties 
upon  the  commissions.  The  evils  of  bi-partisan  commissions 
—  great  as  they  are  —  are  probably  much  less  than  would 
arise  under  commissions  composed  of  active  adherents  of  a 
single  party. 

Parties  are  not  utterly  hostile  to  bi-partisan  commissions, 
for  under  them,  they  can  grasp  and  share  all  the  patronage 
and  spoils.  Yet  Tammany  and  all  bosses  and  unscrupulous 
politicians  —  when  they  are  themselves  in  majority  —  greatly 
prefer  autocratic  mayors  to  bi-partisan  commissions  —  for 
the  simple  reason  that  they  prefer  the  whole  patronage  and 
spoils  to  half  of  them. 

8.  Tammany  and  the  whole  horde  of  politicians  and  spoils- 
men were  therefore  delighted  to  welcome  the  recent  theory 
of  autocratic  mayors,  —  a  new  birth  from  municipal  despair. 
It  was  something  like  a  reversion  to  party  despotism  under 
Mayor  Wood,  and  was  admirably  adapted  to  intrench  their 
system  of  municipal  government,  and  make  party  rule  per- 
manent. It  was  only  natural  that  they  should  idealize  the 
virtues  of  an  autocratic  mayoralty,  and  unite  in  augmenting 
its  powers  —  under  the  new  charter  for  the  Greater  New 
York.  But  nothing  in  our  municipal  history  is  more  remark- 
able than  the  fact  that  the  zealots  for  this  recent  theory  have 
succeeded  in  throwing  such  a  glamour  over  the  subject  that 
many  non-partisans  and  independent  voters  have  been  de- 
luded and  misled  until  they  have  come  to  regard  autocratic 
mayors  as  effective  agencies  for  municipal  reform. 

From  this  review  of  the  facts,  it  is  clear  that  autocratic 
mayors  elected  by  a  popular  party  vote  are  not  an  original 
or  salutary  outgrowth  of  republican  principles,  but  are  an 
illegitimate  result  of  party  usurpation  and  despotism  which 


374  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

strongly  tends  to  degrade  and  perpetuate  party  government 
in  cities. 

II 

1.  It  should  be  said,  without  hesitation,  that  such  city  coun- 
cils as  American  cities  have  recently  had,  bodies  in  which 
little  more  than  parties  and  factions  have  been  represented, 
would  not  be  fit  bodies  for  choosing  mayors.  But  the  pro- 
posed new  councils  are  very  different  bodies.  In  them  all 
the  great  interests  and  sentiments  of  importance,  as  well  as 
all  parties,  may  be  fairly  represented.  Their  members  are 
to  have  long,  classified  terms  of  office.  A  large  majority  of 
them,  when  called  upon  to  elect  a  mayor,  will  have  served  a 
long  time  in  the  council  —  some  for  nearly  six  years,  some  for 
nearly  four  years,  others  for  more  than  two  years.  It  would, 
therefore,  be  a  body  of  great  experience,  apparently  well 
qualified  for  such  an  election.  The  great  question  is  this : 
Would  it  not  be  better  to  have  the  mayor  himself  elected  by 
this  body  rather  than  by  the  majority  of  a  party  ? 

The  answer  to  be  given  to  this  question  will,  apparently, 
depend  largely  on  the  answer  the  reader  would  give  this 
further  question :  Does  he  wish  to  perpetuate  party  govern- 
ment in  cities,  or  does  he  wish  to  suppress  it  ?  It  is  hardly 
possible  that  a  council  thus  constituted  could  agree  on  the 
choice  of  a  mere  party  zealot  for  mayor,  or  that  it  should 
fail  to  choose  one  who,  like  itself,  could  be  representative 
of  public  opinion,  especially  as  much  more  than  a  mere 
majority  of  votes  is  to  be  required  for  his  election.  On  the 
score  of  capacity  to  make  a  wise  selection  for  mayor,  it  can 
hardly  be  denied  that  those  who  have  served  several  years 
together  in  the  council  are  most  competent  to  make  a  choice 
from  among  their  fellow-members. 

The  mayor  is  to  be  the  presiding  officer,  the  speaker,  of  the 
council.  In  the  latter  capacity,  he  will  have  large  authority 
in  regard  to  its  proceedings  and  committees.  Now,  it  is  a 
conspicuous  and  suggestive  fact,  based  on  vast  experience, 
that  legislative  bodies  generally,  indeed  almost  universally, 
select  the  most  able  and  honorable  among  their  members  for 


THE   ELECTION   OF  MAYORS  AND   THEIR   POWERS    375 

their  presiding  officers.      Their  pride  and  self-respect,  not 
less  than  their  duty,  prompt  this.1 

2.  It  is  worthy  of  notice  that   it  has  been  within  the 
period  since  mayors  have  been  elected  by  the  people  that  the 
greater  municipal  abuses  have  been  developed  in  the  United 
States,  while  in  the   cities  of   England,  and  in  European 
cities  generally,  within  the  same  period  —  while  mayors  have 
been  elected  by  city  councils  —  the  greatest  municipal  abuses 
have  been  suppressed.2 

3.  In  favoring  the  election  of  mayors  by  the  councils,  we  are 
not  obliged  to  stand  on  theory  or  the  experience  of  American 
cities  alone.     The  uniform  experience  for  more  than  sixty 
years,  in  the  more  than  three  hundred  cities  of  England,  — 
the  nation  of  our  race  whose  government  is  most  similar  to 
our  otvn,  —  proves,  not  only  that  this  method  of  election  is 
generally  salutary,  but  that  there  are  neither  practical  diffi- 
culties nor  evil  results  from  its  enforcement.     This  experi- 
ence is  confirmed  by  that  of  all  the  enlightened  cities  of 
continental  Europe.3 

1  There  is  nothing  in  the  election  of  an  executive  officer  by  a  legislative  body 
which  is  open  to  either  a  practical  or  a  constitutional  objection.    Two  presidents 
of  the  United  States  have  been  elected  by  Congress.    If  it  be  said  that  of  late  the 
choice  of  United  States  senators  has  in  many  cases  been  unsatisfactory,  it  can  be 
easily  shown  that  the  abuses  developed  have  had  their  origin  in  the  partisan 
methods  which  control  the  election  of  members  of  the  legislature,  and  that  the 
remedy  is  to  be  found  not  in  the  election  of  senators  by  the  people,  but  in  the 
suppression  of  the  spoils  system,  and  in  the  Free  Nominations  and  Free  Voting 
which  will  secure  a  just  representation  of  the  people  in  the  legislatures  and  not  of 
parties  merely. 

2  It  may  be  said,  in  the  way  of  objection  on  the  basis  of  principle,  that,  if  the 
councils  should  elect  mayors,  legislatures  should  elect  governors,  and  Congress 
should  elect  presidents.    There  is  a  superficial  plausibility  in  this  statement,  but 
its  lack  of  force  as  an  argument  is  easily  shown.     (1)  City  government  deals 
mainly  with  business  and  administration,  Congress  and  legislatures  mainly  with 
political  principles  and  party  issues ;  (2)  the  latter  bodies  are  fit  spheres  for  party 
action,  while  the  cities  are  not ;  (3)  the  difference  between  the  two  spheres  of 
action  is  so  great  as  to  require  that  city  councils  should  be  single  chambers,  while 
Congress  and  legislatures  should  be  bi-cameral  bodies.    Besides,  the  supporters 
of  autocratic  mayors  and  perfunctory  councils  can  hardly  urge  such  arguments 
with  consistency,  for  American  constitutions  allow  no  autocratic  presidents  or 
governors,  no  appointments  at  their  mere  pleasure,  but  requires  all  important 
nominations  to  be  confirmed  by  the  senates,  which  are  the  state  and  national 
councils. 

s  See  Chs.  XII.  and  XIII. 


876  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

It  will,  perhaps,  bo  conceded  by  most  men,  outside  the 
circles  of  mere  politicians  and  partisans,  that  if  we  had 
such  councils  as  those  well-governed  cities  possess,  it  would 
be  better  that  they  should  elect  the  mayors.  This  admis- 
sion practically  concedes  the  whole  question  of  principle 
involved,  and  illustrates  the  transcendent  importance  of  the 
proper  constitution  of  these  bodies  to  which  we  have  given 
so  much  attention. 

4.  It  will  aid  a  sound  view  of  the  question  before  us  if 
we  keep  in  mind  the  fact  that  a  city  is  not  so  much  a  political 
body  as  a  business  corporation,  by  reason  of  which  it  is  fitly 
classed  in  constitutions  and  laws  as  a  "  municipal  corpora- 
tion." While  we  must  regard  it  as  having  considerable 
political  and  governing  powers,  we  cannot  safely  forget  its 
essential  nature  and  paramount  functions  as  a  corporation. 
It  is  in  the  very  nature  of  corporations,  to  which  all  that 
prosper  conform  in  their  methods,  to  have  a  paramount 
council,  whether  called  trustees  or  directors,  and  that  this 
body  should  select  the  chief  executive,  whether  he  be  desig- 
nated a  president,  a  managing  director,  or  a  mayor.  We 
have  seen  that  corruption,  inefficiency,  and  failures  of  a  seri- 
ous kind  began  in  American  cities  after  the  corporate  and 
business  method  of  choosing  mayors  by  councils  had  been 
abandoned  and  the  political  and  partisan  method  of  elect- 
ing them  by  popular  vote,  or  parties,  had  been  substituted. 
An  essential  step  toward  legitimate  municipal  government 
seems  to  be  a  return  to  the  true  corporate  method  of  elect- 
ing mayors. 

All  well-managed  corporations  avail  themselves  of  the 
valuable  experience  developed  in  their  own  official  service, 
by  filling  their  high  official  places  by  promoting  the  most 
meritorious  officers  from  the  places  below.1  This  practice 
prevails  as  much  when  a  presidency  as  when  a  lower  place  is 


1  A  mere  business  corporation  may  sometimes  with  advantage  go  outside  its 
own  subordinates  for  a  high  officer ;  and  so  might  a  municipal  corporation  bat 
for  the  danger  of  vicious  party  influence.  We  have  seen  how  the  English  and 
German  laws  now  allow  this,  though  the  former  at  first  forbade  it  when  party 
influence  was  dangerously  strong.  See  Chs.  XII.  and  XIII. 


THE  ELECTION  OF  MAYORS  AND  THEIR  POWERS    377 

to  be  filled.  The  filling  of  a  mayoralty  is  as  fit  a  case  for 
such  a  promotion  as  the  filling  of  a  presidency  of  a  bank  or 
of  a  trust  company ;  and  one  is  as  properly  the  act  of  a  city 
council  as  the  other  is  of  a  board  of  trustees  or  directors. 
But  for  the  perverted  control  of  our  municipal  corporations 
for  party  ends  —  rather  than  for  business  ends  —  and  the 
partisan  blindness  of  American  politicians,  we,  like  all  the 
other  enlightened  people,  would  so  regard  the  matter. 

5.  The  more  we  consider  the  constitution,  powers,  and 
functions  of  the  "council,  the  clearer  its  capacity  and  fitness 
for  choosing  the  mayor  appear.  It  is  to  be  composed  of  the 
best  citizens  that  can  be  placed  in  its  membership  by  methods 
of  election  the  most  favorable  to  the  choice  of  able  and 
worthy  men  who  will  fairly  represent  all  city  interests. 
Their  six  and  four  years'  terms  of  office  will  give  them  an 
official  experience  long  enough  to  enable  them  to  understand 
both  the  affairs  of  the  city  as  a  whole  and  the  needs  of  all  its 
departments.  Who  so  well  as  the  members  of  the  council 
can  know  the  member  of  their  own  body  most  fit  to  be  their 
speaker  and  the  mayor  ?  If  we  comprehend  the  powers  to 
be  conferred  on  the  council,  it  will  seem  unnatural  to  doubt 
their  capacity  for  choosing  a  mayor. 

Let  us  glance  at  them.  The  legislative  powers  now  dis- 
tributed among  many  commissions  and  boards  are,  with  small 
exceptions,  to  be  devolved  upon  the  council ;  to  them  are  to 
be  added 'much  larger  legislative  powers  for  municipal  Home 
Rule  ;  in  the  exercise  of  these  legislative  powers  the  council 
is  to  consider  all  bills  affecting  the  city  before  they  are  pre- 
sented in  the  legislature ;  the  council  —  we  hope  —  is  to  choose 
members  of  the  state  senate  who  are  to  specially  represent 
the  large  policy  and  the  interests  of  the  city ;  the  council  is 
to  delimit  the  departments  and  bureaus  and  define  the  powers 
and  duties  of  all  the  officers  —  in  conformity  to  the  charter. 
The  powers  given  by  law  to  the  mayor  himself,  so  far  as  they 
are  not  definite  and  specific,  may  be  affected  by  this  action  of 
the  council ;  the  vast  authority  of  determining  the  measure 
and  disposition  of  the  city's  expenditures  and  of  fixing  the 
salaries  of  its  official  servants  will  belong  to  the  city  council 


878  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

—  save  as  qualified  by  the  mayor's  veto  ;  it  will  be  the  high 
function  of  the  council  to  frame  all  city  ordinances  ;  through 
its  committees,  it  will  be  its  duty  to  investigate  all  city  abuses 

—  including  those  in  the  mayor's  own  department  —  as  Con- 
gress investigates  abuses  under  the  president ;  all  the  higher 
appointments  by  the  mayor  will  be  subject  to  the  approval  of 
the  council ;    it  will  have  a  responsible  part  in  connection 
with  the  impeachment  and  removal  of  the  mayor  and  all  the 
principal  officers  of  the  city  ;  all  the  doings  of  the  city  will 
be  within  the  legitimate  sphere  of  the  debates  and  the  cares 
of  the  council. 

It  seems  obvious  that  a  body  having  such  large  and  essential 
powers  must  —  rather  than  the  mayor  —  be  looked  upon  as 
the  paramount  municipal  authority,  which  most  guides  the 
policy  of  the  city,  and  is  most  responsible  for  its  good  gov- 
ernment— and  such  is  the  view  of  our  best  municipal  authori- 
ties.1 

It  is  the  continuous,  stable  council,  representing  the  people 
and  public  opinion,  —  and  not  the  mayor  representing  first  one 
party  and  then  another,  —  which  by  its  constant  policy  must 
uphold  the  just  claims  of  the  city  against  the  state  and  the 
nation,  which  must  cause  the  city  to  maintain  an  enlightened 
and  consistent  attitude  toward  its  own  interests  and  honor, 
as  well  as  toward  the  great  forces  of  charity,  morality,  educa- 
tion, and  religion. 

It  seems  almost  absurd  to  think  that  a  council  competent 
for  such  functions  —  or  trusted  by  any  city  with  them  —  will 
not  be  a  competent  body  for  choosing  a  mayor.2 

1  Goodnow's  Mun.  Prob.,  p.  308;  Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  0.  B.,  pp.  62,  63;  and  see 
a  thoughtful  paper  by  Frank  M.  Loomis  of  Buffalo,  Proceedings  of  Lou.  Cong., 
etc.,  1897,  p.  112. 

2  It  is  desirable  that  the  council  should  also  choose  an  assistant  mayor,  or 
better  designated  a  vice-mayor,  to  take  the  mayor's  place  when  he  is  not  able  to 
act,  and  to  till  it  when  vacant  until  a  successor  shall  be  elected,  the  election  to 
be  subject  to  the  same  conditions  we  shall  suggest  as  to  choosing  a  mayor.    There 
might  be  an  advantage  in  having  more  than  one  vice-mayor  in  very  large  cities. 
We  have  seen  that  mayors  in  the  continental  cities  of  Europe  have  several 
assistants.    A  true  vice-mayor  would  be  hardly  more  a  mayor's  assistant  than  a 
vice-president  is  a  president's  assistant,  or  a  lieutenant-governor  is  a  governor's 
assistant.    There  may  be  occasions  of  doubt  or  exigency  when  the  existence 
of   a  vice-mayor  would   avoid   mischievous   uncertainty  and   wrangling.      He 


THE   ELECTION  OF  MAYORS  AND   THEIR  POWERS    379 

6.  As  it  is  probable  that  the  most  potent  and  vicious 
influences  which  may  affect  the  members  of  the  council  in 
their  choice  of  a  mayor  will  have  their  origin  and  strength 
outside  of  the  body,  —  in  parties,  factions,  and  mercenary 
combinations,  —  opportunities  for  success  by  suddenly  bring- 
ing forward  their   favorites  and  influencing  their  election 
should  be  excluded  to  the  utmost.     To  this  end  a  formal 
certificate  of  nomination,  to  be  signed  by  five  members  of 
the  council  and  made  a  part  of  its  public  records,  should  be 
required  to  be  made  as  to  each  candidate  in  order  to  make 
his  nomination  for  mayor  valid.     These  nominations  by  cer- 
tificate should  be  made  publicly  ten  or  fifteen  days  before  a 
candidate  can  be  voted  for  as  mayor  —  so  as  to  give  ample 
time  for  public  opinion  to  make  itself  effective.    Every  mem- 
ber of  the  council  should  be  required  to  have  his  vote  re- 
corded on  the  election  of  a  mayor. 

7.  We  have  called  attention  to  the  tendency  of  the  re- 
quirement that  all  mayors  shall  be  elected  from  among  the 
members  of  the  council  to  bring  able  men  of  honorable  ambi- 
tion into  this  body.     We  may  here  add  that  it  will  also 
greatly  limit  the  sphere  and  facility  of  intrigues  and  corrup- 
tion in  the  choice  of  mayors  —  and  all  the  more  so  by  reason 
of  the  requirements  that  every  mayoralty  candidate  must 
have  served  at  least  two  years  in  the  council.    Who  will  say 
that  the  man  who  has  not  patriotism  enough  to  render  this 
service  for  the  public  is  fit  for  the  highest  office  in  the  gift 
of  his  city?     Who  will  believe  that  the  member  of  the  coun- 
cil who  has  not  capacity  and  fidelity  enough  to  have  made 
a  good  record  in  the  council  can  ever  be  elected  mayor  by  the 
votes  of  his  fellow-members  ? 


might  be  made  chairman  of  a  principal  committee,  which  would  give  him  a 
large  experience  in  administration.  His  term  of  office  should  be  three  years,  a 
year  longer  than  that  of  the  mayor,  so  that  the  election  of  both  will  not  occur  at 
the  same  time.  The  vice-mayor  would  remain  to  act  pending  any  delay  in  the 
election  of  a  mayor.  Before  condemning  a  vice-mayor  on  the  score  of  novelty, 
we  hope  the  reader  will  consider  what  is  subsequently  said  on  the  subject.  Con- 
gress declares  by  law  who  shall  be  president  when  neither  the  president  nor  the 
vice-president  is  available. 


380  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

III 

If  from  the  principles  involved  in  the  election  of  mayors 
by  councils  we  turn  to  some  of  its  incidental  effects,  they  will 
be  found  important. 

(1)  It  is  almost  needless  to  say  that  a  vast  expenditure  of 
money  and  time,  and  much  intrigue  and  vicious  manipula- 
tion incident  to  his  popular  election,  would  be  avoided.     It 
may  well  be  doubted  whether,  if  the  councils  elected  the 
mayors,  the  vicious  and  needless  partisan  organizations  in 
cities  which  do  most  to  degrade  their  politics,  and  which 
thrive  on  managing  nominations  and  elections,  could  long 
maintain  themselves  —  whether,  indeed,  the  party  system  for 
managing  city  affairs  could  long  survive.    If  mayoralty  elec- 
tions generally  involved  contests  of  principle,  so  that  their 
influence  was  educational  and  morally  elevating,  the  large 
sum  of  money  which  they  cost  would  not  be  too  much  to 
pay  for  them ;  but  it  is  by  no  means  clear  that  the  majority 
of  the  mayoralty  elections,  with  the  party  action  which  pre- 
cedes and  follows  them,  are  not  as  a  whole  demoralizing. 
We  have  seen  what  degrading  influences  and  vast  sums  of 
money  are  used  for  buying  nominations,  coercing  and  brib- 
ing voters,  and  hustling  them  to  the  polls.1 

(2)  The  election  of  the  mayor  by  the  council  seems  likely 
to  promote  a  harmonious  and  vigorous  cooperation  between 
the  two  authorities;  yet,  as  we  shall  soon  see,  the  mayor 
will  have  ample  power  for  protecting  his  department  and 
making  his  authority  salutary  and  effective.     He  will  in 
fact  stand  as  the  expression  of  the  policy  of  the  council, 
whose  support  he  will  naturally  have  in  his  efforts  for  car- 
rying it  into  effect.     It  would  result  from  this  that  city 
government  would  be  one  of  harmony  and  great  strength 
for  resisting  vicious  combinations,  and  carrying  a  compre- 
hensive practical  policy  into  effect.     Through  such  an  or- 
ganization, English  and  continental  cities  have  been  able 
to  achieve  those  noble  works  which,  as  we  have  seen,  are 
on  a  scale  so  much  larger  than  anything  of  the  kind  which 

i  Chs.  IV.,  V.,  and  VI. 


THE  ELECTION  OF  MAYORS  AND  THEIR  POWERS    381 

has  been  yet  attempted  in  the  United  States.  In  every 
crisis  the  mayor  would  have  the  council  behind  him  to 
give  him  courage,  wisdom,  and  strength ;  nevertheless  his 
veto  power  and  his  authority  over  appointments  and  re- 
movals would  cause  his  office  to  be  one  of  great  influence 
and  dignity.  To  make  the  mayor  and  the  council  equal 
and  rivals  is  to  enfeeble  the  government  and  to  place  it  at 
the  mercy  of  the  boss,  the  politicians,  and  the  corruptionists. 
We  have  seen  how  different  are  likely  to  be  the  spirit 
and  policy  of  a  continuous,1  non-partisan  council  from  the 
spirit  and  policy  of  an  inexperienced  mayor,  who  has  been 
suddenly  borne  to  his  place  on  the  waves  of  a  city-party 
election,  in  which  probably  some  irrelevant  issues  of  national 
politics  may  have  been  decisive.  He  brings  in  an  element 
of  vicious  contention  and  weakness  unknown  in  the  city 
councils  of  other  enlightened  nations.  "  Municipal  govern- 
ments elsewhere  than  the  United  States,"  says  Dr.  Shaw, 
"  after  having  constituted  a  ruling  body,  do  not  erect  a  sepa- 
rate one-man  power  and  give  it  the  means  to  obstruct.  .  .  . 
The  embarrassments  and  opportunities  growing  out  of  this 
divided  responsibility  are  among  the  principal  causes  of 
the  comparative  failure  of  city  government  in  the  United 
States."  a 

IV 

1.  We  have  seen  that  it  is  the  duty  and  practice  of 
Congress  and  legislatures  to  investigate  through  their 
committees  and  report  upon  the  doings  of  the  executive 
departments  —  even  those  of  presidents  and  governors.  It 
should  be  the  duty  of  city  councils  to  discharge  analogous 
functions  in  regard  to  mayors  as  well  as  all  city  depart- 
ments. As  it  is  the  duty  of  the  lower  House  of  Congress 
to  impeach  and  bring  to  trial  a  delinquent  president,  so  it 
should  be  the  duty  of  a  city  council  to  have  an  appropri- 

1  The  reader  is  asked  to  keep  in  mind  the  fact  that  hardly  more  than  one-third 
of  the  members  of  the  council  are  to  be  chosen  at  any  one  election,  so  that  it  is 
legally  a  continuous  body,  the  advantages  of  which  are  very  great.  See  Chs. 
XII.  and  XIII. 

»  Mun.  Gov.  O.  B.,  pp.  62,  63. 


882  THE   GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

ate  part  in  impeaching  and  bringing  to  trial  a  delinquent 
mayor.  The  theory  that  a  mayor  may  do  as  he  pleases, 
unless  his  party  arraigns  him,  and  that  he  shall  be  respon- 
sible to  no  city  authority,  but  only  to  the  courts,  for  statu- 
tory crimes,  or  to  the  governor,  is  as  repugnant  to  all  the 
analogies  and  conditions  of  public  safety  as  it  is  to  the 
fundamental  conceptions  of  republican  government.  It 
could  hardly  find  acceptance  among  an  enlightened  people 
whose  views  of  city  government  had  not  been  distorted  by 
habits  of  thought  born  of  desperate  municipal  conditions 
and  perverted  party  conceptions. 

The  irresponsible  power  allowed  to  mayors  and  the  denial 
of  essential  powers  to  councils  have  not  only  impaired  the 
mayor's  sense  of  responsibility  to  the  people  and  made  that 
to  party  and  the  boss  controlling,  but  have  caused  city 
parties  and  their  managers  to  become  more  and  more  law- 
less and  tyrannical.  The  politician  class  and  the  rest  of 
the  people  are  becoming  more  and  more  separated  —  falling 
more  and  more  into  diverging  grades  of  municipal  civiliza- 
tion, under  which  the  mayor  is  a  despot  under  the  laws,  and 
the  boss  is  a  despot  outside  and  in  defiance  of  the  laws. 

2.  If  we  really  desire  that  our  mayors  should  have  auto- 
cratic powers,  they  may  as  easily  be  given  them  when  elected 
by  the  council  as  when  they  are  elected  by  popular  vote. 
All  that  would  be  needed  would  be  these  words  at  the 
beginning  of  the  state  code  for  the  government  of  cities: 
"All  the  municipal  authority  herein  conferred  shall  be 
vested  in  the  respective  mayors  of  the  cities  of  this  state." 
In  contrast  with  such  a  municipal  theory,  we  may  place 
the  theory  upon  which  the  national  constitution  is  based. 
.The  first  words  of  the  first  article  of  this  constitution  are 
these :  "  All  legislative  powers  herein  granted  shall  be  vested 
in  a  Congress  of  the  United  States  ..."  which  is  the  national 
council.  If  for  the  last  six  of  those  words  we  substitute 
these  other  three  words,  "the  city  councils,"  the  clause, 
thus  amended,  might  be  wisely  made  the  first  words  in 
every  state  municipal  code. 

Yet  there  can  be  no  complete  and   absolute   separation 


THE  ELECTION  OF  MAYORS  AND   THEIR  POWERS    383 

of  legislative  from  executive  power.  Under  the  national 
constitution,  the  president  exercises  legislative  authority 
whenever  he  vetoes  a  bill,  and  the  Senate  exercises  execu- 
tive authority  whenever  it  confirms  a  nomination  by  the 
president.  We  cannot,  therefore,  settle  the  question  whether 
a  given  power  should  go  to  the  mayor,  or  to  the  council,  by 
merely  deciding  whether  it  is,  in  its  nature,  a  legislative 
power  or  an  executive  power ;  for  there  are  some  other 
matters  to  be  considered,  and  especially  the  relations  of 
these  powers  to  parties.1 


3.  The  question  whether  mayors  should  be  allowed  a  veto 
power  —  substantially  such  as  belongs  to  the  president  and 
governors  —  is  one  of  importance.     In  the  nature  of  things, 
there  seems  to  be  no  good  reason  why  mayors,  as  well  as 
presidents  or  governors,  should  not  have  this  power.      It 
cannot  fairly  be  said  to  be  a  power  for  obstruction.     It  is 
really  a  power  which  tends  to  secure  careful  deliberation 
and  large  majorities.     It  is  all  the  more  useful  when  legis- 
lative bodies,  as  is  the  case  with  our  councils,  are  to  consist 
of  only  a  single  chamber.      The  possession  of  this  power 
would  certainly  be  an  addition  to  the  legitimate  dignity  and 
responsibility  of  the  mayor's  office  which  is  desirable,  making 
it  more  attractive  to  men  of  high  character  and  honorable 
ambition.      The  usual  veto  authority  in  the  mayor  would 
give  him  a  voting  power,  against  a  measure,  equal  to  the 
votes  of  one-sixth  of  the  members  of  the  council. 

4.  It  is  the  special  duty  of  a  mayor,  as  the  chief  executive 

1  We  attach  more  importance  to  these  relations  than  is  apparently  attributed 
to  them  by  Professor  Goodnow.  Mun.  Prob.,  pp.  186, 187.  While  a  president  and 
a  governor  must  stand  as  the  expression  of  a  political  policy,  a  mayor's  position 
in  this  regard  is  very  different.  He  cannot,  as  we  have  seen,  legitimately  repre- 
sent one  party  more  than  another.  It  is  true,  as  Professor  Goodnow  says,  that, 
in  a  limited  way,  the  mayor  represents  or  acts  for  the  state,  but  in  a  much  more 
direct  and  larger  way,  he  represents  the  city.  If,  by  reason  of  the  former  repre- 
sentation, he  should  be  treated  as  a  political  officer  and  be  elected  by  a  party 
vote,  the  same  reasoning  would  be  applicable  not  only  to  the  chief  of  police  but 
to  all  policemen.  They  all  largely  act  as  agents  of  the  state  —  more  largely  and 
directly  so  than  the  mayor. 


384  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

officer  in  a  city  and  as  the  head  of  the  executive  departments, 
to  stand  for  their  legal  rights  and  to  insist  on  their  being 
allowed  to  exercise  the  special  powers  conferred  by  the  laws. 
As  the  head  of  the  executive  administration,  he  should  have 
a  special  care  that  official  duties  are  fairly  apportioned  to 
each  executive  officer,  that  salaries  are  reasonable,  that  good 
appointments  are  made,  that  promotions  and  removals  are 
for  just  causes,  that  discipline  is  adequate,  that  executive 
methods  are  harmonious  and  effective,  that  responsibility  is 
fairly  awarded,  that  praise  and  blame  are  justly  bestowed 
among  the  officers  and  employees  of  the  city.1  It  will  also 
be  among  the  duties  of  the  mayor  to  be  active  for  bringing 
the  whole  body  of  the  municipal  servants  into  harmonious, 
vigorous,  and  economical  cooperation ;  to  expose,  and  do 
his  utmost  to  bring  to  judgment,  all  malfeasance  in  office ; 
to  insist  on  ordinances  being  enforced;  to  withstand  all 
aggressions  by  the  council  upon  the  functions  of  the  execu- 
tive ;  to  insist  on  justice  to  all  executive  subordinates ;  to 
suggest  wise  measures  of  policy  ;  to  give  warning  of  impend- 
ing dangers  affecting  the  city  —  explaining  such  matters  in 
his  annual  messages  to  the  council,  and  giving  clear  and  full 
expositions  of  city  affairs  and  interests.  These  are  high 
and  far-reaching  functions  —  inviting  to  a  noble  ambition  — 
which  if  rightly  used  will  make  the  office  of  mayor  one  of 
great  power,  usefulness,  and  dignity. 

5.  Legislative  bodies  are  too  much  inclined  to  excuse 
themselves  from  responsibility  for  the  maladministration 
which  they  may  have  caused,  and  they  sometimes  unjustly 
censure  executive  officials.  On  the  other  hand,  executive 


1  We  do  not  mean  that  the  mayor  should  have  a  controlling  authority  over 
these  matters,  but  that  they  are  matters  to  which  he  should  give  his  especial  and 
active  attention,  rather  than  to  party  politics  —  not  hesitating  to  use  his  veto 
power  in  their  behalf.  We  cannot  agree  with  those  who  think  mayors  elected  by 
the  people  should  have  paramount  powers  for  organizing  the  methods  of  adminis- 
tration, or  that  they  are  likely  to  know  its  needs  better  than  many  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  council  who  have  served  from  four  to  six  years.  We  have  seen  that 
party-elected  mayors  may  know  nothing  of  the  needs  of  administration  when 
elected,  and  may  come  to  their  offices  trammelled  by  many  promises  of  places 
for  votes.  Professor  Goodnow's  Mun.  Prob.,  pp.  234, 235.  He  has  considered  the 
appropriate  powers  of  mayors. 


THE  ELECTION  OF  MAYORS  AND  THEIR  POWERS    385 

officials  are  liable  to  favor  too  large  salaries  and  too  numer- 
ous executive  officers.  The  best  administration  is  likely  to 
be  secured  when  investigations  and  the  exposure  of  abuses 
are  provided  for  on  the  part  of  both  the  legislative  and  the 
executive  departments.  The  possession  of  a  veto  power  by 
mayors  would  tend  to  such  a  result,  giving  them  an  oppor- 
tunity in  their  veto  messages  to  vindicate  their  action  in 
the  council  and  before  the  people.  The  council  can  always 
speak  through  the  public  reports  of  its  investigating  com- 
mittees. 

6.  On  the  other  hand,  we  must  not  forget  that  the  great 
work  of  municipal  regeneration  in  Great  Britain  has  been 
achieved  not  only  without  her  mayors  having  several  of  the 
considerable  powers  we  propose  to  confer  upon  American 
mayors,  but  without  their  having  any  veto  whatever.1 


VI 

1.  The  other  questions  as  to  the  division  of  power  between 
mayors  and  councils  relate  mainly  to  appointments,  employ- 
ments, promotions,  and  removals.  We  have  space  for  only 
a  very  general  view  of  the  subject.  For  brevity,  we  shall 
sometimes  refer  to  all  these  powers  under  the  designation  of 
the  "  appointing  power,"  though  some  parts  of  it,  including 
judicial  appointments,  will  be  elsewhere  considered. 

There  is  no  generally  accepted  system  in  the  United 
States,  but  very  great  contrariety,  in  regard  to  the  vesting 
and  exercise  of  the  appointing  power.  There  is  perhaps  no 
American  city  which  has  been  so  successful  in  its  use  of  this 
power  as  to  make  it  fit  for  a  model.  It  would  therefore  be 
unprofitable  to  enter  upon  any  exposition  of  the  multifarious 
and  unsatisfactory  experiments  of  American  cities  on  the 
subject. 

These  experiments  have  had  a  broad  range,  from  nomina- 

1  Shaw's  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  pp.  60,  62.  Nevertheless,  we  believe  the  measure 
of  power  we  have  proposed  for  the  mayor  will  be  found  salutary.-  It  follows  the 
analogies  of  American  constitutions.  Besides,  public  opinion  in  the  United  States 
is  so  favorable  to  giving  this  measure  of  power  to  the  chief  city  executive  that  it 
might  much  delay  municipal  reform  to  refuse  it. 
2c 


386  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

tions  by  mayors  to  be  confirmed  by  councils,  to  appointments 
by  mayors  as  autocrats  at  their  mere  pleasure.  In  point  of 
time  they  have  extended  from  appointments  to  be  made  at 
once  upon  their  election  by  inexperienced  mayors,  as  in  New 
York  and  Brooklyn,  to  the  far  better  method  of  the  city  of 
St.  Louis,  under  which  the  mayor's  power  does  not  seem  to  be 
complete  for  appointing  until  the  third  year  of  his  term,  by 
which  time  he  may  have  learned  the  needs  of  the  city. 

2.  The  questions  at  once  arise  whether  the  appointing 
power  should  be  conferred  (1)  wholly  upon  the  mayor,  or 
(2)  wholly  upon  the  council,  or  (3)  in  part,  or  jointly,  upon 
both,  or  (4)  upon  some  new  authority  to  be  established. 

Nearly  all  that  has  been  said  in  favor  of  giving  the  mayor 
the  veto  power  is  also  applicable  in  favor  of  giving  him  a 
part  of  the  appointing  power  as  well.  It  would  certainly 
increase  the  dignity  of  his  office  and  make  it  more  inviting 
to  men  of  large  ambition  and  capacity. 

3.  The  experience  most  favorable  to  conferring  the  whole 
appointing  power  upon  the  council  is  mainly  that  of  Great 
Britain.     The  councils  in  British,  and  largely  in  other  Euro- 
pean, cities  make  both  appointments  and  removals.     Appar- 
ently, there  are  no  very  decisive  reasons,  aside  from  public 
opinion,  why  the  same  method  would  not  be  equally  success- 
ful in  American  cities,  after  good,  non-partisan  councils  shall 
have  been  established. 

Certainly  the  achievement  of  municipal  reform  in  the  abso- 
lute control  of  non-partisan  councils  in  Great  Britain,  and 
without  the  mayors  having  either  the  veto  or  the  appointing 
power,  is  a  very  significant  evidence  of  the  elevating  and 
efficient  force  of  the  British  system.  The  British  people 
seem  to  be  thoroughly  satisfied  with  the  results  of  their 
method.1 


1  Dr.  Shaw  says :  "  It  is  important  to  make  it  clear  to  American  readers  .  .  . 
that  there  is  not  in  British  cities  any  disposition  whatever  to  concentrate  the 
appointing  power  ...  in  the  hands  of  one  man  as  an  effective  way  to  secure 
responsible  administration.  There  is  nothing  in  British  organizations  or  experi- 
ence to  sustain  the  proposition  of  many  American  municipal  reformers  that  good 
city  government  can  be  secured  by  making  the  mayor  a  dictator.  .  .  .  All 
appointments  are  made  by  the  council  itself."  Mun.  Gov.  G.  B.,  pp.  78, 79, 62, 63. 


THE  ELECTION   OF   MAYORS  AND  THEIR   POWERS    387 

4.  Nevertheless,  while  strongly  opposed  to  giving  the 
mayor  autocratic  power  over  appointments,  we  must  think 
that  certain  advantages  may  come  from  giving  him  a  part  of 
this  power.  The  main,  reasons  for  this  view  have  just  been 
stated. 

The  rule  in  European  cities  is  not  merely  general  that 
mayors  should  be  elected  by  councils,  but  it  is  universal  both 
that  they  should  not  be  elected  by  popular  vote,  that  they 
should  not  have  autocratic  or  irresponsible  powers  of  ap- 
pointment or  removal,  and  that  they  should  not  be  partisan 
officers.  Such  common  conclusions  on  the  part  of  very  dif- 
ferent nations,  having  very  diverse  forms  of  government, 
seem  to  create  a  strong  presumption  in  favor  of  their  agree- 
ing methods.  Yet,  it  still  seems  to  us  that  the  appointing 
power  should  in  some  way  be  divided  between  the  council 
and  the  mayor.  There  might,  undoubtedly,  be  Assistant 
Mayors,  Administrative  Boards,  and  Boards  of  Executive 
Control  developed  out  of  the  councils  which,  in  analogy  to 
the  methods  in  the  cities  of  continental  Europe,  after  care- 
ful experiments  could  be  made  to  share  the  exercise  of  the 
appointing  power  with  salutary  results ;  but  no  distinct 
third  authority  appears  upon  which  the  appointing  power 
can  be  conferred  —  save  as  to  minor  judicial  officers.1 

VII 

1.  Turning  again,  therefore,  as  we  must,  to  American  expe- 
rience, the  most  satisfactory  precedent  is  to  be  found  in  the 
relations,  under  the  constitution  of  the  United  States,  be- 
tween the  president  and  the  Senate,  according  to  which 
his  nominations  must  be  confirmed  by  a  two-thirds  vote  of 
this  body. 

The  appointing  power  of  the  president,  as  generally  con- 
ferred by  the  constitution,  extends  from  nominations  for 
ambassadors,  judges,  and  the  heads  of  great  departments 
down  to  nominations  for  the  lowest  appointed  officials  in 
the  service  of  the  nation.  But  this  power  is  qualified  by  the 

i  See  Ch.  XVIII. 


388  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

following  language  :  "  Congress  may  by  law  vest  the  appoint- 
ment of  such  inferior  officers  as  they  may  think  proper  in 
the  president  alone,  in  the  courts  of  law,  or  in  the  heads  of 
departments."  Here  are  provisions  for  two  classes  of  officers 
to  be  appointed,  the  "  inferior  "  officers  and  the  "  superior  " 
officers,  and  for  three  classes  of  appointing  powers:  (1)  presi- 
dent, (2)  the  courts  of  law,  and  (3)  the  heads  of  depart- 
ments. 

2.  Congress  has  exercised  this  authority  in  a  very  broad 
way  and  its  action  has  contributed  much  to  the  facility  and 
orderly  methods  of  appointing  officers  in  the  national  ser- 
vice.    We  shall  do  well  to  defer  to  these  precedents.     Regu- 
lations dividing  our  municipal  service  into  two  classes  would 
avoid  embarrassing  doubts  and  establish  regular  methods  in 
the  exercise  of  the  municipal  appointing  power. 

3.  The  whole  executive  service  of  a  city  naturally  falls 
into  three  divisions:   (1)  The  Labor  City  Service;    (2)   The 
Minor  City  Service;  (3)  The  Major  City  Service  —  to  all  of 
which  the  appointing  power  extends,  and  to  each  of  which  cer- 
tain fundamental  principles  have  an  appropriate  application.1 
(1)    The  Labor  Service  of  the  city  will  be  entered  through 
being  employed  by  city  authority,  and  the  city  ordinances 
must   make    it   plain   what   places   it   includes.       (2)    The 
Minor   City   Service 2   includes,    in   every   department   and 
office,  all  the  appointed  municipal  officials  between  the  em- 
ployees  in   the    Labor   Service   and   the   members    of   the 
Major  City  Service.     The  Minor  Municipal  servants  should 
be  appointed,  not  by  the  mayor,  but  generally  by  his  ap- 
pointees, after  the  analogy  of  appointments  in  the  national 
service.     The  members  of  this  branch  of  the  service  should 
in  general  have  no  fixed  terms  of  office,  but  should  hold 
their  places,  not  during  life,  but  during  continuing  good 
behavior  and  efficiency.      But  the  mayor  and  the  council 

1  The  hiring  of  persons  for  the  Labor  Service  is  not  technically  an  appointment, 
nor  is  their  dismissal  in  a  strict  sense  a  removal ;  yet  as  a  matter  of  principle  and 
justice  they  are  such  in  an  important  sense. 

2  We  prefer  this  phrase,  rather  than  the  phrase  "  inferior  officers,"  used  in  the 
national  constitution,  for  reasons,  affecting  the  self-respect  of  the   municipal 
servants,  which  we  hope  will  commend  themselves  to  the  reader. 


THE  ELECTION  OF  MAYORS  AND  THEIR  POWERS    389 

should  have  authority,  according  to  standing  regulations, 
to  transfer  them  to  positions  in  the  service  for  which  they 
are  most  fit.1  (3)  The  Major  City  Service  should  include 
the  class  of  appointed  city  officers  above  the  grade  of  the 
Minor  Service,  and  consequently  would  embrace  the  heads 
of  departments,  and  perhaps  some  heads  of  bureaus.  They 
would  include  the  appointments  made  on  the  nomination  of 
the  mayor.  Their  terms  of  office  should  be  so  classified 
that  not  many  of  them  will  expire  at  the  time  a  new  mayor 
enters  upon  his  office,  thus  reducing  to  a  minimum  the 
influence  of  prospective  patronage  upon  mayoralty  elections. 
3.  These  conclusions  will  perhaps  seem  reasonable  in  view 
of  this  classification :  (1)  The  appointing  power,  as  to  the 
offices  of  the  Major  class,  is  so  important  as  to  require 
the  joint  wisdom  and  cooperation  of  both  the  mayor  and  the 
council  —  for  its  exercise  will  very  largely  determine  "both 
the  character  and  efficiency  of  the  city  government.  (2)  The 
exercise  of  the  appointing  power,  as  to  those  in  the  Minor 
City  Service,  should  not  require  the  action  of  either  the 
mayor  or  the  council,  in  reference  to  individual  officers,  save 
in  those  cases  where  an  alleged  injustice  brings  an  individual 
case  before  one  or  the  other  of  them  on  appeal  for  redress,  as 
subsequently  provided  for.  In  the  main,  general  ordinances 
and  rules  and  the  action  of  the  appropriate  officers  of  the 
Major  Service  must  regulate  appointments  and  removals  in 
this  branch  of  the  service  —  in  analogy  to  national  methods 
in  similar  cases.  (3)  In  the  case  of  those  in  the  Labor  Ser- 
vice, where  the  period  of  employment  may  be  short,  and  the 
numbers  of  persons  to  be  dealt  with  may  be  very  great, 
general  provisions  must  govern  all  individual  cases  ;  though 
both  the  mayor  and  the  council  should  have  a  common  duty 


1  Our  great  cities  will  probably  before  long  provide  a  system  of  retiring 
allowances  applicable  to  the  members  of  most  of  the  branches  of  the  municipal 
service  analogous  to  the  allowances  already  provided  for  in  some  American  cities 
upon  retiring  their  policemen  and  firemen  —  and  to  those  enforced  in  the  navy 
department.  The  original  terms  of  entering  the  service  could,  we  think,  be  made 
such  as  would  accumulate  a  fund  in  a  way  which  would  not  cause  the  new  system 
to  much  increase  the  cost  of  administration.  See  Eaton's  Civil  Service  in  Great 
Britain,  p.  142. 


390  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

to  take  care  that  these  provisions  are  just  to  all  classes  of 
laborers  for  the  city.  It  should  also  be  made  a  duty  of  the 
city  officers  who  employ  or  have  charge  of  laborers  to  give 
them  when  practicable  from  five  to  ten  days'  notice  of  the 
time  of  their  intended  discharge  ;  and  also,  when  requested, 
to  give  them  a  certificate — on  regular  official  blanks  —  briefly 
stating  the  reason  why  they  are  no  longer  required  or  are 
discharged.  This  would  be  not  only  an  act  of  justice  to 
the  laborers,  but  a  considerable  check  upon  an  unjustifiable 
and  partisan  treatment  of  them. 

VIII 

It  will  aid  us  in  the  apportionment  of  the  appointing 
power,  and  in  conceiving  the  responsibility  attaching  to  its 
exercise,  if  we  have  clearly  in  mind  certain  fundamental 
principles. 

(1)  This  power  is  a  power  in  trust  which  must  always  be 
exercised  for  the  common  benefit  of  the  people,  and  not  for  the 
special  advantage  of  any  part  of  them.  (2)  No  person  can  be 
rightfully  appointed,  employed,  or  promoted  in  the  city  service, 
or  removed  or  discharged  from  it,  by  reason  of  his  political 
or  religious  opinions.  (3)  The  exercise  of  this  power  should 
everywhere  be  in  conformity  to  appropriate  civil  service  laws 
and  rules  providing  for  examination  for  admissions  to  the 
Major  and  Minor  Services,  and  for  registrations  for  entering 
the  Labor  Service.  (4)  As  a  rule,  all  places  in  the  appoint- 
ive city  service,  above  the  lowest,  should  be  filled  by  the 
selection  of  some  one  within  it,  and  when  not  so  filled,  good 
reason  should  be  stated  of  record  for  not  doing  so.  (5)  No 
mayor,  member  of  a  council,  or  other  city  officer  has  a  right 
to  claim  that  his  purposes  or  motives  in  the  exercise  of  the 
appointing  or  removing  power  are  official  secrets  which  can 
properly  be  kept  from  the  people,  or  which  can  be  made  avail- 
able for  the  advantage  of  himself,  his  party,  or  any  individual. 
They  should  therefore  be  publicly  avowed,  and  may  be  made 
the  subject  of  inquiry  before  the  courts,  as  before  explained.1 

i  See  Ch.  V1H. 


THE  ELECTION  OF  MAYORS  AND  THEIR  POWERS    391 

(t>)  Justice  requires  that  the  grounds  of  removal  and  dis- 
charge should  be  given,  whenever  reasonably  requested  by 
those  affected  thereby,  and  a  refusal  to  give  such  reasons  may 
be  fairly  treated  as  prima  facie  evidence  of  an  abuse  of  offi- 
cial power,  and  of  a  willingness  to  do  injustice  to  subordi- 
nate public  servants.  There  can,  therefore,  be  no  such  right 
either  on  the  part  of  a  mayor  or  of  a  council  as  that  of  exer- 
cising the  appointing  or  removing  power  "  at  pleasure,"  or  to 
please  anybody,  the  practice  of  doing  so  being  both  perni- 
cious and  despotic  —  as  well  as  disgraceful  to  any  enlight- 
ened city. 

It  may  be  necessary  that  certain  officers  should  have  au- 
thority to  appoint  and  remove  others  in  accordance  with 
their  own  judgment  of  what  the  public  welfare  requires,  but 
the  duty  should  be  everywhere  inculcated  of  acting  in  that 
regard  solely  in  the  public  interests,  and  of  laying  before 
the  people  the  grounds  of  such  action.  No  language  can  too 
strongly  condemn  any  law  or  ordinance  which  tells  an  officer 
—  who  has  perhaps  won  his  place  in  a  party  election  by 
bribery  —  that  he  may  remove  his  subordinates  and  put  his 
partisan  followers  in  their  places  at  pleasure.  To  act  at 
pleasure  is  the  prerogative  of  a  despot.  If  the  officer  may 
act  at  his  own  pleasure,  he  may  act  according  to  the  pleasure 
of  the  boss.  No  person  is  fit  to  be  a  mayor,  or  to  hold  any 
high  municipal  office,  who  wishes  to  conceal  his  reasons  for 
making  appointments  or  removals,  or  lacks  the  moral  cour- 
age to  avow  them.  A  breach  of  the  foregoing  obligations  is 
a  fit  subject  of  public  investigation  as  provided  for  in  Chap- 
ter VIII.,  and  when  established  should,  as  far  as  practicable, 
be  punished  by  law. 

IX 

1.  For  reasons  thus  stated  we  think  that  nominations  to 
places  in  the  Major  Service  of  cities  should  be  made  by  the 
mayor  subject  to  a  public  confirmation  by  a  two-thirds  or 
three -fifths  vote  of  the  council.  The  need  of  a  public  con- 
firmation of  the  nominees  may  be  made  a  valuable  safeguard 
against  secret  bargains  and  unworthy  nominations.  The 


892  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

sessions  of  the  council,  when  nominations  are  being  consid- 
ered, should  be  public,  thus  avoiding  such  abuses  as  some- 
times attend  the  secret  sessions  of  the  United  States  Senate 
when  so  engaged.  As  many  of  these  nominations  might 
not  call  forth  any  important  opposition,  it  would  be  useful 
to  have  it  provided  that  if  there  shall  not  be  a  refusal  by 
the  council  to  confirm  a  nomination  within  ten  or  fifteen 
days  after  it  has  been  received,  it  shall  be  absolute  as  an 
appointment ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  mayor  should 
submit  two  nominations  in  succession  for  the  same  office 
which  the  council  refuses  to  approve,  it  should  have  a  right 
to  fill  the  vacancy  by  a  three-fourths  vote  for  a  candidate  of 
its  own  nomination — provisions  that  would  tend  to  prevent 
unreasonable  controversies  and  inconvenient  delays.1 

2.  As  attempts  may  be  made  to  complete  appointments 
hastily,  before  public  opinion  has  had  time  to  make  itself  rea- 
sonably effective,  it  would  be  wise  to  provide  that  the  council 
shall  not  take  a  vote  as  to  a  confirmation  within,  say,  three 
or  four  days  after  the  nomination  has  been  submitted.  A 
practice  of  the  London  Council  here  deserves  our  notice, 
which  provides  that  "  every  person  in  the  employ  of  the 
council  .  .  .  must  be  appointed  or  removed  by  the  council 
in  open  meeting  on  the  recommendation  of  the  committee 
having  the  special  departments  in  charge."2 

1  A  law  of  New  York,  Ch.  857,  Laws  1881,  is  to  some  extent  a  precedent  for 
these  provisions.     If  the  mayor  makes  a  nomination  of  a  person  not  within  the 
city  service,  he  should  be  required  to  state,  in  doing  so,  that  he  finds  no  one 
within  it  competent,  or  at  least  so  competent  as  his  nominee.    The  advocates  of 
party  rule  and  of  an  autocratic  mayoralty  will  oppose  this,  but  those  who  com- 
prehend the  importance  of  inducing  men  of  high  character  and  capacity  to  enter 
the  subordinate  places  in  the  city  service  from  reasonable  hope  of  winning  the 
higher,  will  take  a  very  different  view  of  the  matter.    As  modest  and  meritorious 
city  officers  have  often  little  political  influence  at  their  command,  we  think  there 
should  be  an  opportunity,  in  suitable  cases,  either  before  the  mayor,  prior  to  his 
making  nominations,  or  before  the  council  or  one  of  its  committees  prior  to  the 
confirmation,  for  publicly  presenting — when  the  nominee  is  not  promoted  —  the 
reasons  why  the  vacancy  should  be  filled  by  a  promotion. 

2  Fox's  London  Council,  etc.,  p.  90.    It  is  assumed  that  among  the  standing 
committees  of  American  city  councils  there  will  be  one  upon  nominations  and 
removals.    It  can  of  course  make  secret  investigations  of  fitness,  as  may  be  ap- 
propriate ;  but  it  should  be  required  in  every  case  to  report  to  the  council  its 
conclusions  in  writing. 


THE  ELECTION  OF  MAYORS  AND  THEIR  POWERS    393 


X 

1.  The  mayor  should  have  a  large  power  as  to  removals, 
but  no  right  to  remove  as  an  autocrat,  no  power  to  eject  any 
one  from  his  office  merely  to  please  himself,  his  party,  or 
anybody  else.     It  is  a  power  in  trust  to  be  exercised  only 
by  order  in  writing  for  the  general  welfare,  and  for  reasons 
to  be  stated  of  record.     He  should  have  the  same  authority 
as  to  removals  during  every  part  of  his  term,  and  alike  as 
affecting  those  nominated  by  another  mayor  and  those  nomi- 
nated by  himself.     We  have  seen  the  utter  absurdity  and 
the  vicious  partisan  intent  of  giving  him  absolute  powers  for 
making  removals  when  he  first  comes  into  office,  —  ignorant, 
perhaps,  of  its  duties,  and  trammelled  by  partisan  pledges,  — 
and  of  allowing  him  only  small,  inadequate  powers  after- 
ward, when  he   may  have  become   competent  to   exercise 
them. 

Among  all  the  bad  laws  for  American  cities,  we  must 
think  there  is  none  so  utterly  indefensible  and  pernicious  as 
those  which  allow  a  mayor  —  who  may  perhaps  have  sold 
every  head  of  a  department  for  votes  —  to  appoint  the  pur- 
chasers "  at  pleasure "  to  these  places  at  any  time  within 
four  weeks,  but  which  denies  him  a  power  to  remove  them 
except  subject  to  the  order  of  a  court. 

2.  Before  the  mayor  proceeds  to  remove  any  officer  from 
the  Major  City  Service,  he  should  cause  to  be  served  upon 
such  officer  a  notice  in  writing,  stating  definitely  the  grounds 
of  his  proposed  action,  and  should  allow  such  officer  a  rea- 
sonable opportunity  to  make  an  explanation  and  a  statement 
of  the  relevant  facts  in  self-defence  before  the  mayor  —  the 
same  to  be  made  in  writing  if  the  mayor  so  requires.     The 
notice  and  the  mayor's  action  and  decision  on  the  question 
of  removal  should  be  made  a  part  of  the  permanent  records 
of  his  office. 

If  any  officer  whom  the  mayor  may  remove  shall  not  within 
three  days  appeal  to  the  council,  or  shall  not  thereafter  prose- 
cute his  appeal  with  such  reasonable  despatch  as  the  rules  of 


394  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

this  body  will  permit,  the  decision  of  the  mayor  will  be  final. 
No  trial,  after  the  manner  of  a  court,  should  be  allowed  before 
the  council,  but  only  such  a  hearing  should  be  had  as  its  rules 
may  provide  for,  or  may  be  appropriate  for  a  legislative 
body.1  The  vote  of  a  majority  of  the  council,  after  consider- 
ing the  appeal,  reversing  or  approving  the  mayor's  action, 
shall  be  final.  In  order  to  avoid  too  numerous  and  unrea- 
sonable appeals  as  to  removals,  the  council  should  be  allowed 
by  a  three-fourths  vote  to  dismiss  an  appeal  summarily,  with- 
out any  further  consideration  of  it.2  The  right  to  appeal  to 
the  council  —  which  ordinances  must  carefully  regulate  — 
will  be  a  check  upon  the  favoritism  of  the  mayor  and  will 
lead  to  salutary  investigations.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
right  of  this  body  to  summarily  dismiss  appeals  which  seem 
to  have  no  merits,  will  apparently  prevent  such  appeals 
being  too  frequently  or  unreasonably  made.8 


XI 

1.  Public  convenience  requires  that  the  exercise  of  the 
appointing  and  removing  power  over  the  great  numbers  of 
officers  in  the  Minor  Service  of  cities  should  be  less  formal 
and  more  prompt  than  would  be  advisable  in  the  Major 

1  The  only  proceedings,  according  to  the  strict  methods  of  a  court,  which  can 
fitly  take  place  in  regard  to  the  kind  of  removals  we  are  considering  must  arise 
from  violations  of  law,  and  not  out  of  questions  of  incompetency,  or  alleged 
neglects  of  duty.  Regular  court  trials  as  to  these  matters  involve  too  much 
delay. 

3  The  subject  of  removals  is  one  of  much  intrinsic  difficulty,  as  to  which  there 
is  a  wide  diversity  of  opinion.  We  can  only  state  general  principles,  leaving 
many  important  points  unnoticed.  To  give  the  right  of  appeal  to  a  court  from 
an  order  of  removal,  or  even  a  right  of  appeal  to  a  council  if  it  be  upon  the  con- 
dition of  allowing  a  formal  trial,  or  of  observing  technical  legal  rules  of  evi- 
dence, is  practically  to  provide  for  long  litigations  and  great  embarrassment  in 
administration. 

8  If  it  should  be  thought  that  the  whole  council  is  too  large  a  body  to  deal  with 
the  least  important  of  such  appeals,  and  that  the  power  to  determine  some  of 
them  is  too  important  to  be  given  to  a  mere  standing  committee,  a  Board  of 
Appeals  could,  in  appropriate  cases,  be  constituted  by  drawing  its  members  by 
lot  from  among  the  members  of  the  council  who  have  served  in  it  two  years  or 
more,  after  the  analogy  of  the  Appointment  Boards  of  the  cities  of  continental 
Europe,  or  according  to  the  suggestions  we  have  made  as  to  the  boards  for  dealing 
with  the  appointment  and  removal  of  justices.  See  Ch.  XVII. 


THE   ELECTION   OF  MAYORS   AND   THEIR   POWERS    395 

Service.  Except  as  the  mayor  and  the  council  may  be 
given  an  appellate  authority,  neither  of  them  should  have 
any  part  —  save  through  the  enactment  of  ordinances  —  in 
making  either  appointments  or  removals  in  the  Minor  Ser- 
vice. This  power  should  generally  be  exercised  by  the 
heads  of  departments  and  officers,  as  to  their  respective 
subordinates.  The  other  provisions  suggested  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  public  interests,  and  for  securing  justice  to  the 
municipal  servants,  which  apply  to  officers  in  the  Major 
Service,  and  especially  the  provision  as  to  stating  the 
grounds  of  the  proposed  removal  and  giving  an  opportu- 
nity for  an  explanation  before  making  it,  should  be  observed 
in  regard  to  those  in  the  Minor  Service. 

2.  It  is  probable  that  after  non-partisan  councils  shall 
have  been  well  established,  it  will  be  found  practicable  and 
useful  to  provide  for  several  assistants  to  the  mayor  in  large 
cities,  in  analogy  to  such  assistants  in  the  great  cities  of 
continental  Europe.  These  assistants,  with  the  chairman 
of  some  of  the  standing  committees  of  the  council,  might 
be  made  to  constitute  a  board  upon  which  the  power,  or 
at  least  the  appellate  power,  as  to  appointments  and  re- 
movals in  the  Minor  Service  and  the  Labor  Service  might 
be  conferred. 

In  the  meantime,  as  we  are  to  have  a  vice-mayor,  author- 
ity may  be  conferred  upon  him  which  can  be  used  to  prevent 
injustice  to  members  of  the  Minor  Service  and  of  the  City 
Labor  Service  —  in  connection  with  removals.  He  should 
have  no  power  to  interfere  with  appointments,  or  to  obstruct 
the  administration,  but  merely  a  power  to  protect  the  mem- 
bers of  these  branches  of  the  city  service  who  quite  generally 
under  our  American  system  suffer  from  the  partisan  bias  and 
official  favoritism  of  their  superior  officers.  Those  in  these 
branches  of  the  service  who  regard  themselves  as  wrongfully 
removed  or  discharged  should  have  a  right  —  according  to 
appropriate  ordinances  —  to  appeal  for  redress  either  to 
the  mayor  or  the  vice-mayor.  It  should  be  the  duty  of  the 
officer  to  whom  the  appeal  may  be  made  to  look  into  the 
facts,  and,  if  he  thinks  the  matter  deserves  investigation  by 


896  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

the  council,  he  should  report  it  to  this  body,  which  should  be 
required  to  give  it  the  proper  attention.1 

The  author  is  quite  aware  of  the  scorn  with  which  mere 
partisan  politicians  and  spoilsmen  will  treat  most  of  these  sug- 
gestions made  in  the  interest  of  justice  to  municipal  servants. 
American  party  men  are  generally  too  little  accustomed  to 
the  thought  that  these  servants  have  any  claim  upon  common 
justice  and  considerate  treatment  which  they  are  bound  to 
respect.  Mere  politicians  naturally  think  that  he  who  has 
gained  his  office  through  partisan  servility  and  official  favor- 
itism may  be  justly  required  to  hold  it  as  a  feudal  vassal, 
and  be  thrust  out  at  the  mere  pleasure  of  bosses  and  auto- 
cratic mayors.  In  no  other  enlightened  cities  of  the  world 
are  their  municipal  officers  so  despotically  and  unjustly 
treated  as  are  those  of  the  cities  of  the  United  States.  If 
we  would  have  that  competent  and  worthy  class  of  mu- 
nicipal servants  essential  for  good  city  government,  we  must 
insure  them  a  tenure  of  office  and  a  just  treatment  inviting 
to  such  men  and  consistent  with  their  self-respect.  Our 
letter  carriers  —  and  the  street  sweepers  in  New  York  City 
under  Colonel  Waring  —  have  shown  us  what  excellent  ser- 
vants may  be  secured  if  we  duly  protect  them  against  the 
politicians. 

XII 

The  proper  method  of  removing  mayors  is  one  of  impor- 
tance, as  to  which  there  is  a  wide  diversity  of  opinion.  If  our 
governors  were  not  the  representatives  of  parties,  there 
would  be  some  advantage  in  giving  them  an  authority  for 

1  Those  wrongfully  removed  can ,  under  the  existing  system,  only  appeal  to  a 
private  (civil  service  reform)  association.  The  mayor  is  not  a  fit  authority  to 
have  the  sole  power  to  take  such  action,  fur  the  complainant  may  be  a  person 
wrongfully  removed  by  the  mayor's  connivance  and  by  his  own  appointee.  The 
vice-mayor  is  likely  to  be  a  more  independent  officer  than  the  mayor  for  such  a 
purpose.  We  think  salutary  results  might  come  from  allowing  a  public  servant 
refused  promotion  to  appeal  —  according  to  careful  regulations  —  to  the  vice- 
mayor,  asking  him  to  request  the  council  to  make  an  investigation  of  the  facts 
presented  —  if  in  his  opinion  they  make  it  probable  that  the  promotion  in  question 
has  been  secured  through  unjustifiable  influences,  or  that  the  complainant  has 
been  wronged  by  not  being  promoted. 


THE   ELECTION  OF  MAYORS  AND   THEIR  POWERS    397 

removing  mayors;  yet  there  would  be  these  fatal  objections: 
(1)  that  such  an  authority  would  involve  the  mayoralty  in 
party  politics,  and  (2)  that  its  exercise  would  seriously  im- 
pair the  requisite  independence  for  Home  Rule  in  cities.  To 
confer  the  power  upon  a  court  might  to  a  large  extent  take 
it  out  of  partisan  control,  but  it  would  involve  long  and 
expensive  trials  very  likely  to  last  beyond  the  term  of 
mayors. 

The  council  seems  to  be  the  most  safe  and  competent 
authority  for  the  removal  of  mayors,  for  much  the  same 
reasons  that  it  is  the  fit  body  for  choosing  them.  But  no 
removal  should  be  made  by  the  council  save  upon  definite 
charges  in  writing,  nor  until  after  an  adequate  opportunity 
for  a  public  defence;  and  to  prevent  a  removal  for  inadequate 
reasons  —  or  to  serve  party  ends  —  an  affirmative  vote  of 
three-fourths  of  the  members  of  the  council  should  be  re- 
quired to  accomplish  it.  It  might,  perhaps,  be  wise  to 
provide  that  the  Chief  Justice  of  some  high  court  should 
preside  over  the  council  when  the  removal  of  a  mayor  is  the 
subject  of  its  proceedings. 

As  an  alternative  method  of  removal,  provisions  might  be 
made  for  a  mere  impeachment  of  the  mayor  by  the  council  —  a 
two-thirds  vote  of  its  members  being  required  for  this  —  and 
for  a  hearing  before  certain  judges  and  members  of  the  coun- 
cil—  being  those  members  who  have  served  at  least  three 
years  —  to  be  selected  by  lot  according  to  provisions  we  shall 
set  forth  in  Chapter  XVII.  This  method  would  effectually 
exclude  mere  partisan  influence,  while  favoring  a  greater 
independence  on  the  part  of  mayors. 


898  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 


CHAPTER    XV.  —  CONCERNING    SCHOOL    ADMINISTRATION 
AND  SANITARY  ADMINISTRATION 

1.  Partisan  influence  and  divisions  disastrous  to  such  administration.    Why 
there  should  be  School  Boards.    State  officers  should  inspect  schools.    Boston, 
Brooklyn,  and  New  York  City  School  Boards.    School  officers  from  the  nature  of 
their  functions  should  be  non-partisan.    Why  mayors  should  not  appoint  school 
officers.    Two  distinct  branches  of  school  administration.    The  proper  composi- 
tion of  School  Boards  and  the  true  method  of  choosing  their  members.    Their 
terms  of  office.    Presidents  of  Boards  should  be  members  of  city  council.    Such 
Boards  should  appoint  school  officers.     Probable  character  of  such   Boards. 
Present  School  Board  of  New  York  City.    Good  in  particulars,  but  serious 
objections  to  it.    In  large  part  based  on  the  spoils  system. 

2.  Why  Sanitary  Administration  requires  an  Executive  Board.    Its  appropriate 
members.    Their  party  opinions  immaterial.    Duties  of  Board  of  Health.    The 
New  York  Health  Law  of  1866.    Sanitary  condition  before  its  enactment.    Its 
unique  provisions  and  practical  effects.    Need  and  utility  of  a  state  sanitary 
code.    Mistake  of  having  different  health  laws  for  cities  of  different  sizes. 

1.  IN  dealing  with  school  administration  we  must  confine 
ourselves  to  the  best  methods  of  selecting  school  officers, 
and  of  organizing  and  using  political  power.  There  are 
many  excellent  men  on  American  School  Boards,  but  their 
membership  is  believed  to  be  by  no  means  so  good  as  the 
local  communities  could  and  would  supply  but  for  partisan 
reasons.  In  some  states  there  are  very  good  school  laws 
of  general  application  to  municipalities,  but  in  others  there 
are  no  such  uniform  and  comprehensive  school  laws  as  are 
greatly  needed.  The  consequence  is  an  embarrassing  num- 
ber of  incongruous  statutes  and  diverse  methods  of  adminis- 
tration in  the  different  cities  even  in  the  same  state,  resulting 
in  needless  uncertainty,  confusion,  and  litigation.  Any  state 
which  should  adopt  a  sound  and  truly  uniform  non-partisan 
code  of  school  laws  would  render  a  valuable  service. 

We  can  consider  only  a  few  of  the  general  principles 
which  we  think  such  a  code  should  embody.  There  seems 
to  be  a  general,  and  we  think  a  well-founded,  conviction 
in  the  United  States,  (1)  that  a  municipal  department  of 


SCHOOL   AND  SANITARY  ADMINISTRATION         399 

education  cannot  be  wisely  placed  under  the  control  of  a 
single  head,  be  that  head  a  commissioner  or  a  mayor; 
(2)  that  it  should  be  managed  by  a  separate  board  or 
body  composed  of  several  members  who  need  to  have  large 
powers  more  or  less  legislative  in  their  nature ;  (3)  that 
they  should  fairly  represent  the  local  community  itself,  and 
not  merely  parties  or  a  party  majority;  and  (4)  that  the 
local  school  administration  should  be  subject  to  some  sort 
of  effective  state  inspection  and  supervision  in  the  interest 
of  harmony,  fidelity,  and  economy,  as  explained  in  the  first 
chapter.  This  view  has  been  enforced  in  England  with 
salutary  results. 

This  conviction  seems  to  be  not  only  a  repudiation  of  the 
theory  of  autocratic  mayors,  but  an  approach  toward  the 
theory  upon  which  we  have  decided  to  organize  city  coun- 
cils. Nevertheless  there  is  a  great  diversity  of  opinion  as 
to  the  proper  constitution  of  School  Boards.  In  Boston, 
for  example,  eight  members,  being  one-third  of  the  School 
Board  (called  the  School  Committee),  are  annually  elected 
by  the  people,  and  the  mayor  seems  to  have  but  limited 
functions  as  to  public  school  administration.1  In  New 
York  City  (1897),  the  autocratic  mayor  annually  appoints 
seven  of  the  twenty-one  members  of  the  Board  of  Educa- 
tion, with  the  natural  result  that  the  school  administration 
is  much  involved  in  party  politics.  The  condition  has  been 
similar  in  the  city  of  Brooklyn.  In  some  cities  the  party 
majority  elects  all  the  members  of  the  Board  of  Education, 
and  in  others  the  party-elected  mayor  appoints  all  of  them, 
thus  making  the  control  of  the  school  administration  poten- 
tially, if  not  actually,  a  party  affair.  It  is  not  very  un- 
common under  this  elective  system  for  the  choice  of  members 
of  the  School  Board  to  be  made  a  direct  party  issue,  which 
is  certainly  very  unfortunate.  We  have  seen  that,  under 
the  method  of  voting  which  largely  prevails,  it  happens 
that  even  in  large  cities,  in  which  the  adherents  of  the 
different  parties  are  nearly  equal,  one  party  may,  and  some- 
times does,  elect  every  member  of  the  Board,2  —  an  unjust 

1  Boston  Mun,  Register,  pp.  8, 164.  2  See  pp.  242-244. 


400  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

result  which  impairs  the  confidence  of  the  public  in  the 
school  system  and  increases  the  amount  of  mischievous 
party  patronage. 

A  main  reason  why  the  school  system  should  be  kept 
separate  from  the  other  parts  of  city  government  —  whether 
the  system  be  under  appointed  or  elected  School  Boards  — 
is  to  be  found  in  the  facts  that  it  has  no  legitimate  connec- 
tion with  party  politics,  and  it  is  highly  desirable  to  induce 
the  people  to  take  a  non-partisan  interest  in  its  prosperity. 
Its  administration  should  therefore  be  separated  to  the  ut- 
most from  all  party  issues  and  methods. 

We  have  seen  that  the  method  of  Free  Voting  has  long 
been  applied  to  the  election  of  School  Boards  in  England.1 

2.  The  need  of   securing  non-partisan  school  officers  of 
every  grade,  who  are  independent  enough  to  be  just  to  all 
citizens,  irrespective  of  sect  or  party,  is  very  great.      To 
make  these  officers  appointive   at  the   mere  pleasure  of  a 
party-elected  mayor  is  utterly  indefensible  on  any  ground 
of  principle  or  sound  policy.     Almost  sure  to  be  more  or  less 
partisans,  mayors  thus  elected  are  very  unlikely  to  be  inde- 
pendent  enough  of   the  managers  of  their  party  to   make 
such  appointments  for  school  officers  as  the  public  interests 
require. 

Mayors  thus  elected  are  not  usually  well  informed  as  to 
the  public  school  system.  Why  then  —  save  to  make  them 
autocratic  and  to  increase  mere  party  patronage  —  should 
mayors  go  into  an  independent  department  of  city  govern- 
ment to  appoint  its  officers  ? 

3.  Analogous  reasons  to  those  which  have   made   local 
Boards  of  Education  separate  departments  have  caused  them 
to  be  placed  under  some  supervision  at  the  hands  of  admin- 
istrative officers  of  the  state  —  in  order  to  remove  them  as 
far  as  practicable  from  local  party  interference.     "  It  is  uni- 
versally admitted,"  says  Professor  Goodnow,  "that  schools 
should  be  administered  as  free  as  possible  from  political  influ- 
ences ;  the  effort  of  the  educational  reformer  has  therefore 
been  to  decrease  the  power  of  the  legislature,  and  increase 

l  See  pp.  242,  244. 


SCHOOL  AND  SANITARY  ADMINISTRATION        401 

that  of  the  administrative  bodies  of  the  state  government 
over  schools.  ..."  Great  changes  have  been  thus  effected  ; 
school  inspections  are  now  largely  made  by  these  bodies,  and 
reports  must  be  made  by  local  school  authorities  to  them. 
He  says  no  one  can  deny  that  vast  improvements  have 
accompanied  such  changes  of  method.1  It  seems  almost  ob- 
vious that  just  to  the  extent  that  inspections  of  local  school 
administration  are  made  by  state  administrative  officers,  and 
reports  are  made  to  them  by  School  Boards,  —  which  shall 
bring  abuses  to  light,  expenditures  into  comparison,  and 
establish  harmonious,  well-matured  methods,  —  we  shall  not 
only  prevent  needless,  special  school  laws,  but  shall  put  salu- 
tary restraints  upon  party  domination,  and  patronage-monger- 
ing  on  the  part  of  mayors  and  politicians, 

4.  Administration  connected  with  the  public  schools  has 
two  distinct  branches:  (1)  the  providing  of  school  build- 
ings and  the  keeping  of  them  in  repair  and  furnished  for 
use  ;  (2)  the  devising  of  good,  educational  methods,  and 
the  management  of  public  instruction.  The  qualifications 
needed  for  controlling  one  branch  are  quite  different  from 
those  needed  for  the  other.  Neither  of  these  functions  has 
any  legitimate  relations  with  party  politics.  Yet  nothing  is 
more  natural  than  that  both  parties  and  sects  should  seek,  in 
their  own  interests,  and  from  zeal  for  their  own  dogmas,  to 
dominate  every  branch  of  school  administration. 

As  to  the  part  of  the  administration  first  mentioned,  which 
relates  to  mere  business,  there  is  no  need  that  it  should  be 
carried  on  by  a  Board  of  Education.  It  should  be  sufficient 
for  the  Board  to  make  its  needs  known  to  the  department  of 
public  works  or  buildings,  which  should  have  a  duty  —  and 
ought  to  be  competent  and  ready  —  to  supply  them,  as  the 
city  council  and  ordinances  may  direct.  This  department 
should  build,  furnish,  and  repair  schoolhouses,  as  it  builds, 
furnishes,  and  repairs  courthouses,  jails,  police  stations,  and 
prisons  —  under  a  good  municipal  system.  It  has  a  great 
body  of  skilled  laborers,  purchasing  agents,  and  mechanics 
constantly  in  its  service.  Their  employment  as  proposed 

1  Proceedings,  Louis.  Conf.  for  Good  Government,  1897,  p.  73. 

2D 


402  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF   MUNICIPALITIES 

would  obviously  harmonize  official  duties,  and  would  proba- 
bly reduce  the  cost  of  municipal  administration.  Why  should 
we  be  required  to  select  members  of  School  Boards  in  refer- 
ence to  very  diverse  functions  ?  Why  not  as  fitly  ask  judges 
to  build  their  courthouses,  as  School  Boards  to  build  their 
schoolhouses  ?  The  Boards  should,  of  course,  effectively 
advise  as  to  the  accommodations  to  be  supplied  by  these 
houses. 

5.  The  remaining  questions  calling  for  our  notice  are 
these  :  What  should  be  the  composition  of  Municipal  School 
Boards  ?  How  should  their  members  be  selected  ?  What 
should  be  their  terms  of  office?  What  should  be  their 
authority  in  regard  to  the  selection  and  removal  of  their 
subordinates  ? 

We  think  the  number  of  members  on  School  Boards  should 
be  from  nine  to  thirty-six,  —  having  reference  to  the  popu- 
lation of  the  municipality,  —  that  their  terms  of  office  should 
not  be  less  than  three  years  nor  more  than  six  years,  and 
that  they  should  be  so  classified  that  one-third  of  them  will 
be  renewed  biennially.  In  a  large  city,  a  term  of  three 
years  requires  too  many  elections,  and  does  not  secure  ade- 
quate experience  for  the  discharge  of  the  complicated  duties 
of  members  of  School  Boards. 

Assuming  an  elected  Board  to  be  composed  of  eighteen 
members,  two-thirds  of  them  should  be  elected  by  the  popu- 
lar vote  of  the  city  at  large  —  as  aldermen  at  large  are  to  be 
elected  —  for  a  term  of  six  years,  and  they  should  be  so 
classified  that  one-third  of  them  shall  retire  biennially.  The 
other  third  should  be  selected  by  the  council  —  as  nominated 
aldermen  are  to  be  chosen  —  for  a  term  of  four  years.  The 
methods  of  Free  Nomination  and  Free  Voting,  and  the  other 
analogous  provisions,  should  be  applied  to  their  selection,  as 
in  the  cases  of  electing  and  appointing  aldermen.1 

In  thus  choosing   four  members   biennially,  by   popular 

election,  —  at  which  every  elector  could  cast  four  ballots  and 

bestow  them  according  to  his  sense  of  duty,  —  a  party  could 

hardly  find  it  possible  to  grasp  the  control  of  the  Board  at 

1  See  on  these  points  Ch.  XI. 


SCHOOL   AND   SANITARY   ADMINISTRATION         403 

any  one  election.  All  large  interests  would  be  likely  to 
secure  fair  representation,  for  reasons  we  have  stated  and 
need  not  repeat.  One  more  than  one-fifth  of  the  voters,  by 
uniting  their  votes,  could  elect  a  man  who  would  fairly 
represent  themselves.1 

6.  The  selection  of  the  other  six  members  of  the  Board 
by  the  council  would  seem  to  have  important  advantages. 
We  have  given   the   reasons  why  it  is  probable  that  the 
council  would  represent  public  opinion  rather  than  mere 
party  opinion,  and  why  the  members  it  would  choose  would 
be  neither  extreme  radicals  nor  mere  partisans.     The  coun- 
cil, which,  as  we  have  seen,  must  guide  the  policy  and  con- 
trol the  expenditures  of  the  city,  is  the  natural  bond  of  union 
between   the   different   parts   of   a   municipal  government. 
Such  methods  of  constituting  School  Boards  would  appar- 
ently do  much  to  disconnect  the  choice  of  their  members 
from  mayoralty  elections  and  the  party  issues  involved  in 
them. 

7.  The  council,  which  elects  the  mayor  and  makes  all 
the  city  ordinances,  even  including  those  of  the  Board  of 
Education,  will  certainly  be  abundantly  competent  for  the 
duty  of  choosing  a  third  of  its  members.     If  the  council 
should  sometimes   select  men  for   members   of   the   Board 
who  have  served  in  its  own   body,  they  would  bring  all 
the  more  valuable   experience  and  legitimate  influence  to 
the  Board  of   Education.     As  this  Board   must  need  the 
aid  of  the  council  in  connection  with  appropriations  and 
buildings  for  school  purposes,  it  is  important  that  a  good 
understanding  should  always  exist  between  the  two  bodies. 
To  these  ends,  we  think  the  president  of  the  Board  of  Edu- 
cation should  be  ex  officio  a  member  of  the  council  with  a 
right  to  take  part  in  its  debates,  to  which  he  could  obviously 
contribute  valuable  information.      The  ordinances  relating 
to  a  Board  of  Education  must  be  complicated  in  their  pro- 
visions and  relate  to  many  important  subjects.     While  the 
council  must  be  the  paramount  authority  on  the  subject,  the 
School  Board  should  have  the  amplest  opportunity  for  being 

i  See  Ch.  IX. 


404  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

heard  before  that  body.  We  think,  therefore,  that  no  ordi- 
nance affecting  the  action  of  the  Board  should  be  adopted 
or  changed  by  the  council  until  after  the  Board  has  had  an 
opportunity  of  being  heard  before  it  upon  the  subject. 

It  is  desirable  to  do  everything  proper  for  increasing  the 
prestige,  experience,  and  dignity  of  these  Boards.  Why 
should  they  not  be  allowed  to  elect  a  few  honorary  members 
of  their  body  after  the  analogy  of  the  suggested  Honorary 
Members  of  the  council?  They  might  be  selected  from 
ex-presidents  of  colleges,  ex-school  officers,  and  ex-members 
of  the  School  Board  itself.1 

8.  Nearly  all  the  offices  of  the  school  department  below  the 
grade  of  members  of  the  School  Board  should  be  filled  on 
the  basis  of  the  Civil  Service  examinations,  the  higher  posi- 
tions being,  as  a  rule,  filled  by  promotions  from  the  lower, 
as  we  have  before  explained  as  to  other  officers.  The  Board 
of  Education,  if  at  all  competent  for  its  functions,  must  be 
by  far  the  fittest  authority  for  filling  these  places.  If  it 
should  be  thought  useful  to  have  some  of  these  officers  — 
those  perhaps  engaged  in  inspections  and  reports  —  some- 
what independent  of  the  Board,  they  might  be  either  selected 
or  confirmed  by  the  council.  To  have  them  appointed  by 
the  mayor  would  be  to  involve  their  functions  with  party 
issues  and  elections.  School  Boards  thus  constituted 
would,  apparently,  represent  the  real  interests  and  convic- 
tions of  the  community  concerning  the  schools,  and  not 
merely  those  political  conglomerations  of  forces  in  city 
elections  that  result  from  compromises  and  deals  in  which 
the  issues  of  national  and  state  politics  rather  than  school 
matters  are  taken  into  account.  In  our  School  Boards  we 
should  certainly  have  decided  convictions  and  earnest  de- 
bates about  school  affairs.  The  people  would  naturally 
take  an  increased  interest  both  in  school  elections  and  in 
school  administration.  School  superintendents  and  other 
school  officers  in  great  cities  would  feel  the  need,  under 
such  a  system,  of  regarding  the  independent  public  senti- 
ment as  to  school  affairs.  It  would  not  be  enough  to  merely 

i  See  Ch.  XL 


SCHOOL  AND   SANITARY   ADMINISTRATION         405 

court  the  favor  of  party  managers  and  majorities.  A  very 
different  class  of  men  from  those  generally  chosen  might 
be  made  members  of  School  Boards.  School  administration 
might  gain  as  much  in  intellectual  and  moral  power  as 
parties  would  lose  of  illegitimate  influence  and  vicious 
patronage. 

II 

1.  The  difference  between  non-partisan,  truly  represen- 
tative School  Boards  and  the  Boards  which  spring  from 
party  theories  and  autocratic  mayors  may  be  illustrated  by 
the  recent  legislation  of  New  York.1  A  law  of  that  state 
has  provided  for  a  new  School  Board  for  New  York  City, 
which  has  control  of  its  schools  and  school  system,  subject 
to  the  provisions  of  law  for  state  inspection.  This  statute, 
passed  when  the  reform  sentiment  which  elected  Mayor 
Strong  in  1894  was  a  considerable  force  at  Albany,  has 
some  excellent  provisions,  and  by  no  means  embodies  the 
extreme  party,  or  autocratic  mayoralty,  theories,  though  it 
is  very  seriously  impaired  by  them. 

It  provides  for  twenty-one  members  —  commissioners  —  of 
the  School  Board,  but  for  no  election  of  any  of  them.  The 
mayor  is  to  appoint  all  of  them.  A  great  addition  is  thus 
made  to  the  patronage-mongering  influences  which  are  power- 
ful in  mayoralty  elections.  Those  voters  who  are  especially 
interested  in  the  schools — but  are  not  active  party  men — have 
no  opportunity  to  unite  upon  and  elect  such  commissioners 
as  they  desire.  All  school  patronage  is  made  a  part  of  the 
vast  mass  of  patronage  and  spoils  which  the  mayor  is  to  dis- 
pense, and  which  helps  make  the  appointing  and  removing 
power  the  dominating  force  in  mayoralty  elections.  The 
selfish  sects  and  partisans  can  arrange  with  mayoralty  can- 
didates to  give  their  votes  for  promises  of  School  Commis- 
sioners and  other  school  officers.  The  whole  theory  of 
separating  the  School  Administration  from  the  party  system 
is  repudiated  by  this  law.  The  School  Commissioners,  who 
should  represent  all  classes  of  the  intelligent  people,  are 

i  Ch.  387  of  N.  Y.  Laws,  1896. 


406  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

likely  to  be  all  of  one  kind  —  responsive  either  to  the  inter- 
ests of  a  dominant  party  majority  or  of  an  autocratic  mayor. 

The  commissioners  are  to  hold  their  office  for  only  three 
years,  and  they  are  to  be  so  classified  that  the  mayor  is  to 
appoint  seven  annually.  While  this  classification  is  some 
check  upon  mere  party  domination,  it  would  be  far  better  if 
the  term  were  six  years,  for  it  would  reduce  mayoralty 
school  patronage  by  one-half,  and  would  enable  the  commis- 
sioners to  become  more  competent  for  their  duties.  But  we 
should  not  forget  that  both  mayors  and  parties  desire  the 
largest  possible  patronage,  and  this  every  year. 

If  the  New  York  law  had  been  framed  in  the  spirit  of  the 
laws  regulating  appointments  by  the  mayor  of  St.  Louis,  — 
he  not  being  allowed  full  power  to  make  them  until  the  third 
year  of  his  term,  when  he  will  have  learned  much  of  the 
needs  of  the  city,  —  it  would  be  far  less  objectionable.  The 
New  York  law  requires  the  mayor,  elected  in  November, 
to  have  his  seven  commissioners  appointed  by  the  third 
Wednesday  of  the  same  month,  —  and  they  are  to  take  office 
in  January,  —  thus  apparently  requiring  them  to  be  made 
before  the  passions  of  the  campaign  have  burned  out,  or  the 
election  pledges  of  the  mayor  have  been  forgotten. 

2.  The  law  provides  for  fifteen  school  inspection  districts 
and  for  five  inspectors  for  each,  —  also  to  be  appointed  by 
the  mayor,  —  to  be  so  classified  that  one-third  of  them  will 
be  appointed  every  year.     Why  thus  facilitate  annual  politi- 
cal appointments  which  run  through  the  whole  school  organi- 
zation ?     If  it  can  be  shown  that  the  School  Board  is  not  best 
fitted  for  such  appointments,  why  not  have  them  made  by  the 
non-partisan   city  councils  —  a   method  which  would   take 
these  officers  out  of  party  politics? 

3.  We  may  highly  approve  the  provisions  of  this  law  to 
the  effect  that  the  superintendent  of  schools  shall  not  be 
removed  save  for  cause,  or  by  a  vote  of  not  less  than  two- 
thirds  of  the  members  of  the  School  Board.     But  what  shall 
we  say  of  its  unjust,  inconsistent,  spoils-system  provisions 
which  declare  that  the  clerk   of   the   Board,  the  assistant 
superintendents,  and  the  whole  body  of  its  clerical  force 


SCHOOL  AND  SANITARY  ADMINISTRATION        407 

"  are  to  hold  their  respective  positions  during  the  pleasure  of 
the  Board"  —  that  is,  may  be  removed  by  a  bare  majority  of 
this  body,  which  may  have  just  received  seven  party  favorites 
into  its  membership  —  without  avowed  reasons,  at  mere  ca- 
price, and  perhaps  to  serve  party  ends.  These  removals  may 
be  made  without  allowing  the  officers  proposed  to  be  removed 
the  least  opportunity  of  making  any  defence  or  even  expla- 
nation. 

These  officers  are  likely  to  be  persons  of  high  intelligence 
and  sensibility,  though  if  they  are  not  it  would  be  unworthy 
of  any  enlightened  city  to  thus  treat  its  public  servants. 
Any  decent  Board  of  Education  should  be  ashamed  to  re- 
move one  of  its  officers  at  mere  pleasure,  or  for  reasons  it  is 
not  willing  to  publicly  avow  and  defend.  No  city  deserves 
a  good  school  system,  or  is  likely  to  have  one,  which  allows 
its  minor  school  officials  to  be  thus  treated.  Of  this  law  it 
may  be  said  that  no  part  of  its  provisions  would  be  violated 
if  the  mayor  should  appoint  every  commissioner  from  the 
same  party  and  for  the  avowed  purpose  of  promoting  its 
advantage,  or  if  every  one  of  the  clerical  servants  of  the 
Board  should  be  annually  discharged,  with  the  proclaimed 
intention  of  making  patronage  and  spoils  for  the  members 
of  the  Board,  their  party,  and  the  mayor.  In  a  very  large 
part  of  its  provisions,  therefore,  the  law  is  equally  in  the 
spirit  of  an  autocratic,  irresponsible  mayor,  a  despotic  parti- 
san spoils  system,  and  a  city -party  government. 

III.     Sanitary  Administration 

1.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  existence  of  a  continuous  coun- 
cil —  which  makes  all  the  ordinances  —  greatly  increases  the 
safety  of  intrusting  the  executive  direction  of  the  several 
departments  to  a  single  head.  The  experienced  council  is 
always  at  hand  to  investigate  and  redress  abuses,  to  give 
advice,  and  to  supply  wisdom  for  emergencies. 

Nevertheless,  there  are  several  departments  which,  for 
peculiar  reasons,  require  an  executive  Board  of  several  mem- 
bers for  its  head.  We  have  just  considered  one  of  them  — 


408  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

the  Board  of  Education  —  and  the  Board  of  Health  is  an- 
other. It  is  almost  too  plain  for  discussion  that  there  can 
be  no  good  Board  of  Health  without  persons  well  instructed 
in  medical  sciences  and  sanitary  administration  having  an 
important  part  in  its  management.  Yet  a  good  medical 
commissioner  may  be  utterly  incompetent  for  dealing  with 
the  legal  and  constitutional  principles,  the  rights  of  property, 
and  the  business  interests  with  which  a  Board  of  Health 
must  deal.  The  advantage,  in  a  great  city,  of  having  a 
lawyer  of  sound  judgment  —  sure  to  be  all  the  more  useful 
if  he  has  been  a  judge  —  as  one  of  the  members  of  the  Health 
Board  is  very  plain. 

As  such  a  Board  has  important  duties  in  connection  with 
light,  ventilation,  water  supply,  drainage,  and  buildings,  both 
private  and  public,  it  is  highly  desirable  to  have  among  its 
membership  a  person  specially  qualified  for  judging  of  such 
matters.  Thus  three  widely  different  qualifications,  rarely 
combined  in  the  same  person,  are  needed  upon  every  Board 
of  Health. 

Such  a  Board  can  hardly  have,  through  its  own  subordi- 
nates, the  means  of  exerting  either  the  physical  or  the  legal 
power  which  is  essential  for  supporting  the  numerous  strug- 
gles it  must  maintain  against  those  who  violate  the  duties, 
ordinances,  or  laws  it  is  bound  to  enforce.  It  consequently 
needs  to  have  a  close  alliance  with  the  police  force,  which 
is  best  effected  by  making  the  head,  or  some  high  officer 
of  this  force,  ex  officio  a  member  of  the  Health  Board.  We 
can  see  therefore  how  unwise  it  must  always  be  to  trust  the 
diverse  and  dangerous  powers  of  such  a  Board  to  any  single 
officer. 

2.  Another  class  of  reasons  lead  to  the  same  conclusions. 
No  official  powers  are  less  clearly  definable,  or  are  more 
summarily  and  secretly  exercised,  than  those  of  a  Board  of 
Health.  It  both  makes  its  orders,  and  directs  and  supervises 
their  prompt  execution  —  often  acting  the  part  at  once  of 
prosecutors,  of  judges  and  jurors,  of  sheriffs  and  constables. 
Hence  the  plain  need  that  every  Board  of  Health  should 
have  in  its  membership,  not  only  experience  and  capacity  of 


SCHOOL   AND   SANITARY   ADMINISTRATION         409 

different  kinds,  but  every  possible  guaranty  of  wisdom,  de- 
liberation, and  justice  in  its  action.  A  single  judge  is  safe, 
for  he  must  act  publicly,  must  follow  precedents,  and  must 
hear  both  sides  before  he  directs  the  execution  of  his  orders ; 
and  he  is  subject  to  appellate  authority.  But  a  single  health 
officer,  who  may  act  secretly  and  summarily,  may  easily 
become  an  effective  force  for  party  despotism,  as  was  notori- 
ously the  case  in  New  York  City  before  1866,  when  a  Board 
of  Health  of  the  kind  here  suggested  was  first  established.1 
There  is  reason  to  believe  that  in  some  American  cities 
party  managers  regularly  count  upon  the  exercise  —  or  the 
threat  of  the  exercise  —  of  the  powers  of  the  single  health 
officer  as  an  effective  force  in  partisan  warfare  for  extorting 
political  assessment  and  coercing  voters. 

3.  It  is  too  plain  for  argument  that  the  party  opinions  of 
health  officers  are  intrinsically  immaterial,  that  all  control- 
ling party  bias  or  zeal  on  their  part  are  disqualification  for 
their  duties,  and  that  every  kind  of  party  interference  in  their 
selection  and  doings  is  an  evil  against  which  the  criminal  law 
should  be  directed. 

4.  According  to  theories  quite  generally  accepted,  a  Board 
of  Health  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  body  whose  supreme  duty 
concerns  local  Home  Rule  and  safety.     This  is  a  selfish  and 
largely  untenable  view,  being  a  part  of  the  false  and  super- 
ficial system  of  Home  Rule  which  we  have  felt  compelled  to 
controvert.      Pestilence  and  contagion  regard  no   govern- 
mental lines,  but  from  villages  and  cities  sweep  over  whole 
states.     The  state  has  a  common  duty  to  protect  all  its  peo- 
ple ;  and  if  any  local  health  officers,  by  reason  of  incapacity 
or  neglect,  allow  causes  of  peril  to  the  public  health  to  be 
developed,  or  to  enter  the  state,  the  state  will  be  unfaithful 
to  its  obligations  to  the  whole  people  if  it  does  not  supply  a 
prompt  and  paramount  health  authority  which  will  super- 
sede or  coerce  the  delinquent  local  officials.     The  New  York 
state  health  officer,  the  quarantine  commissioners  at  New 
York  and  other  ports,  and  the  action  of  the  national  govern- 

i  Under  N.  Y.  Law  of  1866,  Ch.  74  and  Ch.  686.    See  Heister,  etc.  v.  Board  of 
Health,  etc.,  37  N.  Y.  Rep.  661,  and  70  do.  536. 


410  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

ment  for  the  protection  of  health  under  the  power  to  regulate 
commerce  are  but  broader  examples  of  the  same  paramount 
function  and  duty  —  a  duty  utterly  incompatible  with  the 
alleged  right  of  a  municipality  to  do  as  it  pleases  in  reference 
to  sanitary  affairs. 

5.  It  was  such  views  as  to  the  duty  of  the  state  which 
gave  form  to  the  New  York  health  law  of  1866  to  which  we 
have  referred.     It  is  a  law  peculiar  in  theory,  framework, 
and  administrative  methods,  and  it  has  produced  results  so 
beneficial  as  to  deserve  some  notice,  though  many  facts  of 
importance  can  be  allowed  space  only  in  notes.1 

6.  It  was  deemed  desirable  to  bring  within  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  this  Board  various  matters  which  —  being  regarded 
as  nuisances  —  had  generally  been  supposed  to  entitle  the 
offender  proceeded  against  to  a  trial  by  jury — a  trial  likely 
to  disastrously  affect  the  salutary  efficiency  of  the  Board. 
The  attempt  was  therefore  made  by  this  law,  and  by  the 
ordinances  and  regulations  for  carrying  it  into  effect,  to  give 


1  Previous  to  its  enactment  the  sanitary  condition  of  New  York  City  had  been 
as  alarming  as  it  was  corrupt  and  despotic ;  the  single  health  officer  —  subordinate 
to  the  mayor  whom  the  dominant  city  party  elected  —  had  habitually  prostituted 
his  authority  for  carrying  the  elections  and  extorting  assessments  in  aid  of  his 
party.  There  had  recently  been  a  non-partisan  uprising  in  favor  of  sanitary 
reform.  There  had  begun  to  be  distrust  of  party-elected  mayors,  and  doubt 
had  begun  to  show  itself  on  the  part  of  the  most  intelligent  citizens  as  to  the 
wisdom  of  the  theory  of  achieving  sanitary  reform  "  by  giving  all  power  to  the 
mayor  and  holding  him  responsible.*'  A  law  based  on  a  different  theory  was 
demanded  and  enacted.  It  was  to  be  made  applicable  not  only  to  the  cities  of 
New  York  and  Brooklyn,  but  to  considerable  outlying  districts,  being  nearly 
coextensive  with  the  district  which  is  now  included  under  the  law  of  1897  creating 
the  Greater  New  York. 

A  bill  creating  a  Board  of  Health  was  framed  substantially  upon  the  theory 
which  we  have  set  forth.  The  successors  of  the  first  four  commissioners  named 
—  whose  terms  were  so  classified  that  one  of  them  would  retire  each  year —  were 
to  hold  office  for  four  years.  No  mayor  and  no  popular  election  were  to  have  any 
part  in  filling  the  offices  or  controlling  the  administration  under  the  law. 

While  the  law  gave  much  larger  powers  to  the  Health  Board  than  any  other 
Health  Board  in  this  country  had  ever  possessed,  or,  perhaps,  yet  possesses,  the 
exercise  of  it  was  so  justly  regulated  that  the  Board  practically  had  less  oppor- 
tunity for  arbitrary,  secret,  or  corrupt  action  than  was  possessed  by  most  health 
authorities  in  American  cities.  The  Board  was  given  the  whole  ordinance-making 
power  pertaining  to  matters  within  its  jurisdiction  —  for  there  was  no  competent 
or  non-partisan  city  council.  The  Board  was  given  even  a  power  of  making 
arrests.  Laws  of  New  York,  1882,  Ch.  410,  Sec.  623. 


SCHOOL  AND  SANITARY  ADMINISTRATION        411 

the  Board  the  extensive  powers  it  needed,  and  consequently 
to  practically  so  restrict  the  false  and  pretended  right  of 
trial  by  jury,  that  it  could  not  longer  be  used  effectively  in 
aid  of  partisan  and  demagogical  influence  for  the  purposes 
of  obstruction  and  impunity.  That  quite  original  attempt 
was  very  successful,  and  no  provision  of  the  law  has  been 
more  useful. 

The  salutary  power  of  the  Board  thus  constituted  was  con- 
spicuous from  the  outset.  Under  the  law — the  fundamental 
provisions  of  which  are  still  enforced  —  many  thousands  of 
cases  of  nuisances  of  the  most  varied  kinds  have  been  justly 
and  speedily  dealt  with  by  the  Board  without  any  jury  trial, 
and  thus  the  sanitary  condition  of  New  York  has  been  greatly 
improved.1 

7.  It  was  a  part  of  the  theory  upon  which  this  law  was 
based  —  the  same  theory  which  has  largely  given  form  and 
character  to  the  city  council  herein  proposed  —  that  good 
sanitary  administration  can  be  best  secured  by  appealing  to 
public  opinion  rather  than  to  party  opinion,  and  through  a 
continuous  sanitary  body,  the  control  of  which  no  party  can 
grasp  as  the  prize  of  a  victory  in  a  single  election,  yet 
a  body  the  members  of  which  shall  at  all  times  be  fitly 
responsive  to  public  sentiment. 

It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  Board  of  Health  thus 
created  has  been  the  most  just,  powerful,  and  useful  body 
for  sanitary  administration  which  has  ever  existed  in  the 
United  States.  It  has  found  a  great  source  of  its  strength 
in  the  provision  for  giving  the  persons  to  be  affected  by  its 
proposed  action  a  fair  opportunity,  in  all  important  proceed- 
ings, for  appearing  before  the  Board  and  presenting  evidence 
in  their  own  defence  before  final  action  should  be  taken ; 
but  it  allowed  prompt  and  summary  proceedings  in  other 
cases.2 

1  As  the  writer  drafted  this  law  and  the  Code  of  Sanitary  Ordinances  under  it, 
and  was  for  several  years  the  legal  adviser  of  the  Board,  he  is  able  to  speak  defi- 
nitely of  its  practical  effects. 

2  Sec.  14  of  the  act.    The  justice  and  utility  of  the  proceedings  under  this 
Board  were  such  that,  after  the  Tweed  faction  had  triumphed  in  1870,  it  did  not 
venture  to  repeal  its  fundamental  methods  which  still  survive,  though  for  party 


412  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF   MUNICIPALITIES 

The  following  significant  facts  illustrate  the  non-partisan 
character,  the  moral  tone,  and  the  stability  of  administration 
which  such  a  law  has  secured :  no  case  of  fraud  or  corrup- 
tion has  yet  (1897)  been  proved  against  the  Board  of  Health 
or  any  one  of  its  officers ;  the  investigations  of  New  York 
City  affairs  in  1895  —  in  which  fraud  and  extortion  were 
proved  against  various  officers  and  departments  of  the  city 
government  —  disclosed  nothing  of  the  kind  against  the 
Board  of  Health,  and  left  its  officers  undisturbed ;  the  same 
person  who  was  first  appointed  to  the  important  office  of 
secretary  of  the  Board  of  Health  in  1866  now  holds  the 
same  office  which  he  has  filled  continuously  for  more  than 
thirty-three  years.1 

8.  Next  in  importance  to  a  well-constituted  Board  of 
Health,  and  competent  members  to  fill  it,  is  a  code  of  good 
sanitary  laws  for  the  state,  appropriately  applicable  to  every 
city  within  its  borders.  Neither  New  York  nor  hardly  any 
American  state  has  such  a  piece  of  legislation.  Yet  the 
health  laws  and  ordinances  applicable  to  the  city  of  New 
York  contain  most  of  the  provisions  needed  for  such  a  code, 
and  they  have  the  great  advantage  of  having  been  thoroughly 
tested  by  practice. 

The  importance,  in  the  interests  both  of  justice  and  safety, 
of  having  the  powers  and  duties  of  all  the  Boards  of  Health 
in  a  state  clearly  defined,  is  manifest.  All  uncertainty  on 
these  points  facilitates  despotism  and  neglect  of  duty  on  the 
part  of  health  authorities,  tends  to  the  prostitution  of  their 
powers  for  partisan  purposes,  and  causes  excessive  litigation 
and  needless  peril  to  the  public  health.  Such  a  code  should 
clearly  set  forth  not  only  what  powers  the  Boards  of  Health 
—  allowed  the  largest  authority  —  may  exercise,  but  also 
what  parts  of  these  powers  are  allowed  to  Boards  of  a  more 

advantages  New  York  City  was  made  a  separate  sanitary  district,  and  the  mayor 
was  given  the  appointing  power.  The  Board  now  (1897)  consists  of  four  members, 
of  which  the  Health  Officer  of  the  Port  of  New  York  and  the  President  of  the  Board 
•of  Police  are  two. 

1  It  would  have  been  a  great  detriment  to  the  public  interests  to  have  had  a 
succession  of  short-term  secretaries  according  to  the  party  method  of  electing 
.them. 


SCHOOL   AND   SANITARY   ADMINISTRATION        413 

limited  jurisdiction  and  authority.  Upon  the  granting  of  a 
new  city  charter,  a  brief  reference  to  this  code  would  define 
the  powers  conferred  on  the  subject  of  public  health  ;  every 
decision  of  the  courts  on  sanitary  subjects  would  apply 
to  every  city ;  the  duties  of  health  officers  would  be  better 
defined,  and  the  rights  and  safety  of  the  citizen  would  be 
better  protected. 

The  state  Board  of  Health  should  be  allowed  adequate 
powers  for  superseding  for  the  time  any  local  Board  of 
Health  which,  by  its  neglect,  has  allowed  the  common  safety 
of  the  state  to  be  imperilled.1 

9.  It  is  an  unfortunate  incident  to  the  advantages  of  our 
national  system  that  we  must  have,  in  the  main,  independent 
health  administration  in  each  state;  but  to  make  this  evil 
worse  by  allowing  every  city  and  town  to  be  independent  in 
this  regard,  seems  little  short  of  connivance  at  our  own  peril. 
Is  it  too  much  to  hope  that  some  state  will  soon  be  wise 
enough  to  prepare  a  model  state  sanitary  code  which  the 
other  states  can  in  the  main  adopt  ?  2 

The  state  of  New  York  has  done  much  in  the  way  of 

1  See  precedents  on  this  subject  in  Ch.  II. 

2  It  is  not  very  auspicious  for  an  early  result  of  this  kind  that  the  constitution 
of  New  York,  as  amended  in  1894,  divided  its  cities  into  three  classes :  (1)  those 
having  a  population  of  250,000  or  more ;  (2)  those  having  a  less  population,  but  not 
less  than  50,000;  and  (3)  all  the  other  cities  —  of  which  latter  class  there  are 
thirty.    Two  boards  of  commissioners  were  appointed  by  the  governor  in  1895,  — 
one  to  draft  a  model  charter  for  cities  of  the  second  class,  the  other  to  draft  such 
a  charter  for  those  of  the  third  class.    The  draft  of  charters  thence  resulting  are 
not  only  in  principle  and  detailed  provisions  widely  dissimilar,  but  provide  very 
different  powers  for  Boards  of  Health, —  two  distinct  systems  in  fact,  —  their  authors 
apparently  failing  to  see  the  advantages  of  a  state  sanitary  code.    Apparently, 
still  another  system  remains  to  be  devised  for  the  larger  cities  of  the  first  class, 
though  no  good  reasons  appear  why  one  system,  with  appropriate  adaptations, 
and  the  same  non-partisan  methods,  should  not  be  enforced,  as  we  have  explained, 
in  all  the  cities  of  the  state.    There  seems  no  good  reason  why  a  Health  Board  in  a 
city  of  20,000  or  30,000  people  should  not  —  like  judges,  sheriffs,  and  constables 
there  —  have  as  large  powers  as  such  a  Board  and  officers  in  a  city  of  40,000, 
60,000,  or  250,000  people,  though  it  may  have  less  frequent  occasions  for  using 
them.    Such  diverse  systems  of  health  laws  must  lead  to  much  confusion  and 
needless  litigation.    Apparently,  when,  under  such  different  systems,  a  city  of  the 
third  class  shall  come  to  have  50,000  inhabitants,  or  a  city  of  the  second  class 
shall  come  to  have  250,000,  it  will  suddenly  and  rather  grotesquely  pass  from  one 
code  of  local  laws  and  ordinances  directly  under  another,  with,  perhaps,  rather 
embarrassing  consequences. 


414  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

demonstrating  the  advantage  of  a  state  Board  of  Health 
having  adequate  powers  over  the  local  Health  Hoards  to  be 
exercised  whenever  the  action  of  the  Boards  is  inadequate. 
Mr.  Fairlie  has  set  forth  interesting  facts  on  the  subject 
which  deserve  the  attention  of  legislators.1 

i  Cent,  of  Administration  in  New  York,  pp.  136-H7. 


CONCERNING  POLICE   ADMINISTRATION  415 


CHAPTER   XVI.  —  CONCERNING   POLICE   ADMINISTRATION 

Nature  of  the  duties  of  policemen.  Need  that  they  should  not  be  partisans. 
Must  treat  members  of  all  parties  alike.  Theory  and  effect  of  hi-partisan  police 
commissions.  Such  commissions  demoralize  policemen  and  cause  corruption. 
Parties  create  bi-partisau  commissions  in  order  to  secure  a  monopoly  of  patron- 
age and  spoils.  Vicious  Massachusetts  laws  on  the  subject.  A  still  worse 
police  law  of  New  York.  The  best  citizens  for  policemen  declared  incompetent, 
in  order  to  give  the  partisans  of  Albany  a  monopoly.  Whether  policemen  are 
state  or  are  mere  municipal  officers  they  should  regard  the  rights  and  interests 
of  the  whole  people.  They  should  be  impartial  as  between  state  and  the  city. 

Reasons  why  the  state  should  pay  part  of  the  cost  of  maintaining  police  in 
cities.  Practice  on  the  subject  in  European  countries,  and  its  utility.  Some 
state  officer  should  inspect  local  police.  Such  inspection  would  be  highly  useful. 
Police  system  of  Great  Britain.  Kind  of  state  inspection  American  policemen 
need.  Policemen  will  soon  be  needed  outside  of  cities.  The  effect  of  the  state  in- 
spections we  now  have  justifies  its  extension  to  the  police.  Why  policemen  should 
sometimes  be  used  instead  of  militia  to  suppress  mobs  and  riots  outside  cities. 
Great  need  and  utility  of  a  state  police  code  generally  applicable  to  all  munici- 
palities. What  the  code  should  provide.  Easier  service  should  be  provided  for 
the  older  policemen.  Retiring  allowances.  Whether  there  should  be  a  "single 
head  of  the  police,"  and  the  meaning  of  this  phrase.  Why  the  mayor  should  not 
be  head  of  the  police.  What  power  the  council  should  have  in  regard  to  it.  Why 
impossible  that  any  single  officer  should  control  all  police  matters. 

WE  have  referred  to  several  problems  of  police  adminis- 
tration, but  the  subject  requires  further  notice.  It  is  essen- 
tial that  policemen  should  not  be  partisans,  or  seek  to  promote 
the  interests  of  any  party,  sect,  or  faction.  They  should  be 
impartial  and  just  alike  toward  all  the  people  —  their  pro- 
tectors regardless  of  their  political  or  religious  opinions. 
They  should  be  selected  and  governed  irrespective  of  po- 
litical or  religious  views  or  affiliations,  and  should  be  so 
disciplined  and  instructed  as  to  develop  and  sustain  a  non- 
partisan  spirit.  Just  in  the  degree  that  any  policeman,  or 
officer  of  the  police  force,  has  a  controlling  bias  of  mind 
for  or  against  any  party,  faction,  or  sect,  he  is  unfit  for 
his  position. 

1.  There  is,  legitimately,  no  republican  way  and  no  demo- 
cratic way  of  being  a  good  police  officer ;  but  one  non-parti- 


416  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

san,  patriotic,  and  impartial  way,  which  should  be  the  same 
in  every  part  of  the  state.  Every  police  officer  ought  to 
strive  to  be  an  impartial  servant  of  the  whole  people  for  the 
execution  of  the  laws  and  the  lawful  commands  of  superior 
authority.  A  community  incapable  of  thus  regarding  its 
policemen  cannot  have,  and  can  hardly  deserve  to  have,  a 
good  city  government. 

The  policeman's  position  is  largely  that  of  the  soldier, 
though  the  policeman  has  more  liberty  and  may  be  held 
to  a  greater  individual  responsibility  than  the  soldier. 

There  is  nothing  in  the  functions  or  legitimate  discipline 
of  policemen  which  tends  to  make  them  either  partisans  or 
electioneerers.  If  not  tempted  or  coerced  by  politicians  and 
party  managers,  policemen  would,  as  regularly  as  soldiers, 
attend  to  their  duties  and  become  true  servants  of  the 
people.  The  greatest  difficulties  of  policemen,  as  well  as 
the  most  vicious  influences  which  they  encounter,  arise  from 
the  interference  of  parties  and  their  managers.  Under  a 
well-devised  and  well-managed  municipal  system  parties 
would  not  be  allowed  to  have,  nor  would  patriotic  and 
legitimate  parties  seek  to  gain,  any  more  control  of  the 
police  administration  than  of  that  of  the  army  and  the  navy. 
We  can  have  a  good  non-partisan  police  force,  which  will 
treat  all  the  people  fairly,  as  soon  as  we  place  it  under  laws 
and  regulations  which  disregard  all  mere  party  and  sectarian 
interests,  and  give  its  members  a  real  liberty  and  power  to 
properly  discharge  their  functions. 

2.  It  is  obviously  the  duty  not  only  of  all  citizens,  but  of 
all  parties  and  factions,  to  do  nothing  inconsistent  with  the 
non-partisan  discharge  of  the  duties  of  policemen.  But 
parties  and  politicians  generally  take  a  very  different  view 
of  these  matters.  They  insist  on  a  party  test  for  entering 
the  police  force ;  they  claim  that  active  party  men  are  the 
best  policemen  ;  they  declare  that  such  men  have  the  highest 
claims  upon  the  offices  under  police  departments. 

If  that  theory  be  true,  every  party  should  insist  on  filling 
with  its  most  active  adherents  not  only  every  place  on  a 
police  commission,  but  every  position  under  it.  This  has 


CONCERNING  POLICE  ADMINISTRATION  417 

been  the  half-civilized  theory  upon  which  Tammany,  most 
politicians,  and  many  American  cities  have  habitually  acted, 
save  as  coerced  by  the  civil  service  reform  laws. 

Experience  has  so  far  shown  the  disastrous  effects  of 
enforcing  this  theory  that  public  opinion,  in  many  parts  of 
the  country,  has  become  too  enlightened  for  its  safe  avowal 
by  parties.  They  dare  not  longer  openly  insist  on  a  police 
force,  or  even  a  police  commission,  being  composed  of  the 
adherents  of  a  single  party  or  sect. 

3.  Candor,  consistency,  and  truth  require  them  to  admit, 
as  a  consequence,  that  neither  mere  partisans  nor  politicians, 
but  only  such  fair-minded  men  as  we  have  described,  are  fit 
to  be  made  either  policemen  or  police  commissioners.  But 
city  parties  have  not  patriotism  enough  for  this.  It  would 
suppress  much  party  patronage  and  spoils,  and  would  in 
principle  condemn  the  whole  party  system  for  governing 
cities.  They  therefore  insist  —  and  so,  very  thoughtlessly, 
do  many  more  worthy  men  —  that  representatives  from  each 
party  shall  be  balanced  on  police  commissions.  Under  this 
system  one  unfit  man  is  to  be  employed  to  compel  another 
unfit  man  to  do  his  duty.  This  is  the  origin  and  theory 
of  bi-partisan  commissions. 

It  is  really  a  party  device  for  securing  a  party  monopoly  of 
patronage  and  spoils,  and  for  dividing  them  between  the 
managers  of  the  great  parties  —  often  conspiring  together. 

Bi-partisan  commissions  would  seem  grotesquely  absurd 
were  it  not  for  the  glamour  of  justice  with  which  party 
illusion  and  ambition  clothe  them.  They  involve  the  con- 
fession that  partisan  zeal  and  activity,  in  city -party  politics, 
generally  disqualify  men  for  doing  justice  and  being  honest 
where  party  interests  are  concerned.  Why  not  then  make 
police  commissioners,  as  we  make  generals  and  admirals,  out 
of  non-partisan,  fair-minded,  independent  men  who  desire, 
and  are  able,  to  treat  all  citizens  with  common  justice  re- 
gardless of  party.  This  is  a  too  disinterested  and  patriotic 
policy  for  mere  politicians;  and  until  we  are  enlightened 
enough  as  a  people  to  do  this,  it  is  very  likely  that  bi- 
partisan commissions,  bad  as  they  are,  may  be  better  than 
2E 


418  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

commissions  composed  wholly  of  politicians  from  the  same 
party. 

4.  The  theory  that  police  commissioners  are  to  be  selected 
not  because  they  are  most  fit  for  the  police  service,  but 
because  they  are  party  favorites,  has  far-reaching  and  dis- 
astrous consequences.  Parties  and  their  managers  would 
be  indifferent  as  to  their  party  affiliations,  if  police  officers 
were  not  expected  to  use  their  official  power  effectively 
for  party  advantage.  The  police  commissioners  represent- 
ing a  party  are  regarded  by  its  managers  as  having  a 
duty  to  gain  for  it  all  possible  patronage,  to  aid  its  elec- 
tioneering leaders  and  captains,  and  to  supply  its  treasury 
with  money  extorted  by  policemen  through  fear  of  their 
power.  It  is  a  flagitious  doctrine  disgraceful  to  any  en- 
lightened community.  What  more  natural  than  that  such 
commissioners  should  choose  unscrupulous,  partisan  police- 
men ready  to  serve  their  party  in  all  possible  ways  ?  What 
more  natural  than  that  such  policemen  should  become  the 
vassals  of  party  managers  —  as  ready  to  extort  blackmail  as 
they  to  levy  party  assessments  ? 

As  every  bargain  between  these  commissioners  to  bring 
active,  party  electioneerers,  rather  than  conscientious,  non- 
partisan  citizens,  upon  the  police  force  inures  equally  to  the 
advantage  of  the  leaders  and  bosses  of  both  parties,  is  it 
any  wonder  that  they  are  so  often  found  in  conspiracy  with 
each  other  ?  Republican  electioneering  bullies  and  manipu- 
lators are  made  policemen,  and  are  allowed  to  go  unpunished 
for  their  offences,  by  the  votes  of  democratic  commissioners, 
on  the  condition  that  democratic  desperadoes,  bribers,  and 
blackmailers  on  the  police  force  are  saved  from  punishment 
by  the  votes  of  Republican  commissioners.  The  bi-partisan 
system  strongly  tempts  the  commissioners  to  combine  against 
the  public  interests  for  party  gain,  and  to  reject  the  most 
worthy  applicants  for  places  as  policemen.  They  divide 
patronage  between  them,  and  become  its  active  purveyors ; 
they  are  naturally  more  anxious  to  secure  effective  agents 
for  their  party  than  impartial  police  officers  for  the  people  — 
officers  who  will  be  the  minions  of  neither  a  party  nor  a  boss. 


CONCERNING  POLICE  ADMINISTRATION  419 

5.  These  influences  impel  bi-partisan  commissions  to  a 
constant,  indecent,  and  degrading  competition  for  party  ad- 
vantage, and  strongly  tend  to  bring  upon  the  police  force 
the  most  astute  partisans  and  most  unscrupulous  electioneer- 
ers  whom  the  respective  party  commissioners  can  secure. 
They  know  that  the  city-party  managers  generally  prefer 
such  policemen  to  those  who  will  attempt  nothing  for  mere 
party  gain.     Hence  the  hate  of  these  managers  toward  non- 
partisan   commissioners ;    hence   the    natural    fear   of   non- 
partisan  policemen  to  fully  discharge  their  duties.1 

6.  Men  thus  made  policemen  naturally  see  their  advantage 
in  imitating  the  commissioners,  and  in   servility  to   their 
party  and  its  boss.     If  a  policeman  may  use  his  power  to 
serve  a  party,  why  may  he  not  use  it  to  serve  himself,  —  to 
levy  blackmail,  and  aid  the  party  leaders?     If  policemen 
may  be  appointed  and  promoted  for  party  advantage,  why 
may  they  not  for  party  advantage  arrest  a  party  opponent, 
or  refuse  to  arrest  a  criminal  party  associate?     Thus  our 
party  police  system  may  almost  be  said  to  suggest  and  jus- 
tify the  worst  practices  incident  to  our  police  degradation. 

7.  It  seems  impossible  to  acquit  parties  of  a  deliberate 
purpose  to  create  —  through  the  bi-partisan  system  —  a  mo- 
nopoly of  police  patronage  and  power  for  themselves,  and  to 
exclude  from  the  police  service  that  class  of  independent, 
non-partisan,  and  conscientious  citizens  who  are  really  most 
fit  for  it.     Even  in  Massachusetts,  in  which  the  spoils  system 
has  been  less  despotic  than  in  most  states,  the  police  laws 
disclose  this  purpose.     For  example,  the  laws  relating  to  the 
cities  of   Boston   and   Fall  River  use  this  language,  "The 
governor,  with  the  advice  of  the  council,  shall  appoint  from 
the  two  principal  political  parties  three  legal  voters  who  shall 
constitute  the  board  of  police  for  said  city.  .  .  ."2 

The  commissioners  composing  this  Board  make  all  ap- 
pointments to  the  police  force,  all  removals  from  it,  and 

1  We  hardly  need  say  that  we  have  been  speaking  of  the  party  police  system 
as  unaffected  by  the  civil  service  examinations,  which  in  several  cities  have  put 
considerable  checks  upon  the  evils  we  have  characterized. 

2  Mass.  Laws,  1885,  Ch.  323;  Laws,  1894,  Ch.  351. 


420  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

control  the  whole  police  administration.  They  naturally 
conform  to  the  despotic  party  test  thus  imposed  on  the  gov- 
ernor. As  the  party  in  power  in  the  state  selects  two  com- 
missioners from  its  own  ranks,  and  allows  only  one  to  the 
other,  the  hope  of  gaining  the  larger  share  of  this  vicious 
patronage,  under  such  a  law,  is  a  constant  stimulus  to  igno- 
ble and  degrading  party  contention  and  proscription.  What 
moral  right  has  the  noble  state  of  Massachusetts  —  what  legal 
right  compatible  with  justice  or  the  welfare  of  her  citizens  — 
to  thus  establish  a  party  test  for  the  police  service  —  to  say 
that  no  man  shall  be  a  police  commissioner  —  or  by  implica- 
tion a  policeman  —  unless  he  is  a  member  of  one  of  her  "  two 
principal  political  parties  "  ?  Why  not  as  justly  enforce  the 
same  test  for  entering  the  army  or  the  militia  ? 1 

8.  A  recent  law  of  New  York  still  more  strikingly  illus- 
trates both  the  aim  of  bi-partisan  commissions,  and  the  ca- 
pacity of  her  party  leaders  for  using  them  for  despotic  and 
illegal  purposes.2  The  law  creates  a  police  commission  for 
the  city  of  Albany.  Every  public  interest  and  duty  of  jus- 
tice and  patriotism  required  that  the  police  force,  at  the  state 
capital,  should  be  as  independent  as  possible  of  mere  partisan 
politics.  The  law  provides  for  a  police  commission  to  con- 
sist of  four  members,  only  two  of  whom  are  to  be  members 
of  the  same  political  party.  They  are  to  be  elected  by  the 
common  council  of  Albany.  No  member  of  this  body  can 
vote  for  more  than  two  of  them.  Neither  the  mayor  nor  the 
governor  are  to  have  anything  to  do  with  the  matter.  The 
commissioners  are  not  to  be  classified,  and  hence  will  all  go 
out  of  office  at  once.  Their  terms  are  only  two  years,  and 
there  will,  therefore,  be  a  partisan  battle  over  the  police  force 
every  alternate  year.  The  classified,  five-year  terms  of  the 
police  commissioners  for  Boston  apparently  give  more  sta- 
bility to  police  administration  and  put  more  restraints  upon 
vicious  party  strife  than  the  legislators  at  Albany  desired. 

i  The  case  of  Rathbone  v.  Wirth,  etc.,  150  N.  Y.  Rep.,  459,  suggests  that  the 
constitutionality  of  these  Massachusetts  laws  is  hardly  more  defensible  than 
their  policy.  This  party  test  for  her  police  force  seems  utterly  incompatible  with 
her  civil  service  reform  laws. 

9  N.  Y.  Laws,  1896,  Ch.  427,  Sec.  3. 


CONCERNING  POLICE  ADMINISTRATION  421 

They  obviously  wanted  a  party  contest  and  a  new  party  deal 
every  two  years  —  thus  insuring  a  rapid  succession  of  parti- 
san commissioners  and  servile  party  henchmen  on  the  police 
force.  To  further  make  sure  of  this,  they  put  these  unprece- 
dented and  disgraceful  words  into  the  law,  "No  person  is 
eligible  to  the  office  of  police  commissioner  unless,  at  the 
time  of  his  election,  he  is  a  member  of  the  political  party 
or  organization1  having  the  highest  or  the  next  highest 
representation  in  the  common  council." 

Thus  all  citizens  of  Albany  not  belonging  to  one  of  the 
two  favored  parties  or  factions  —  no  matter  how  superior 
their  qualifications  for  a  police  commissioner  —  are  declared 
ineligible,  are  practically  branded  as  incompetent,  for 
the  office.  Party  and  faction  monopoly  is  encouraged  by 
law  —  by  a  law  which,  in  substance,  says  to  every  resident 
of  the  state  capital,  "  If  you  would  be  a  police  commissioner, 
—  practically  if  you  would  be  a  policeman,  —  be  servile  to 
the  parties  and  factions  in  majority  in  the  city  council ; 
make  it  plain  to  them  that  as  a  policeman  you  would  use 
your  power  to  increase  their  votes,  fill  their  treasuries,  and 
screen  their  frauds — at  whatever  cost  to  the  people."  It 
tells  the  people  that  the  good  policeman  is  not  the  officer 
who  treats  all  citizens  fairly  and  alike,  but  is  he  who  dis- 
criminates for  party  advantage  ;  that  the  police  force  at  the 
state  capital  should  be  composed  exclusively  of  such  expert, 
unscrupulous  politicians  and  partisans  as  commissioners  thus 
selected  will  be  sure  to  place  upon  it.  It  is  not  too  much 
to  say  that  this  law  dishonored  the  political  civilization  of 
the  state  of  New  York — that  it  is  fit  only  for  a  half -civilized 
city  or  a  mediaeval  age.  It  will  stand  on  the  statute  book 
both  as  an  ominous  warning  and  an  infamous  avowal  of  the 
motives  and  purposes  of  those  besotted  partisans  who  are 
incompetent  to  deal  with  our  municipal  affairs  in  reference 
to  the  public  interest  but  constantly  seek  to  prostitute 
municipal  power  for  personal  and  party  advantage. 

1  The  use  of  the  word  "  organization  "  makes  it  possible  for  mere  factions  to 
claim  the  right  to  have  two  police  commissioners,  thus  stimulating  and  reward- 
ing the  growth  of  patronage-mongering  factions  to  the  utmost. 


422  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF   MUNICIPALITIES 

But,  happily,  as  these  pages  are  being  written,1  the  high- 
est court  of  the  state  of  New  York  has  declared  the  law 
unconstitutional  and  void,  because  it  brands  every  other 
citizen,  except  those  who  are  members  of  the  two  parties,  as 
ineligible  to  hold  the  office  of  police  commissioner,  curtails 
the  constitutional  right  of  Home  Rule,  sets  up  illegal  party 
tests  for  office,  and  violates  "  the  fundamental  principles  of 
free  governments."8 

II 

1.  The  question  whether  police  commissioners  and  police- 
men should  be  regarded  as  municipal  officers  or  as  state  offi- 
cers, has  both  a  theoretical  and  a  practical  importance.  If 
we  concede  their  functions  to  be  wholly  municipal,  the  state 
should  not  interfere  with  their  exercise.  But,  if  they  are  in 
part  state  functions,  then  the  state  has  a  constant  duty  as  to 
their  performance.  In  a  mere  technical  sense,  the  language 
of  the  state  constitution  and  laws  may  decide  this  question 
—  as  it  does  in  the  state  of  New  York  —  by  classing  them 
as  municipal  officers.  But  in  several  states  police  commis- 
sioners are  appointed  as  state  officers,  and  have  been  adjudged 
to  be  such  by  the  courts.8 

It  will  be  useful  to  inquire  how  far,  in  point  of  fact,  the 
functions  of  such  officers  are  merely  municipal.  The  resi- 
dents of  cities  have  certainly  the  most  direct  interest  in  that 
part  of  the  police  administration  which  consists  in  promoting 
civic  convenience  and  in  enforcing  city  ordinances.  It  is 
just  and  wise,  as  well  as  in  the  spirit  of  American  constitu- 
tions, to  allow  city  residents  large  powers  over  the  selection 
and  control  of  police  officers.  But  these  residents  are  far 
from  being  the  only  persons  interested  in  the  functions  re- 
ferred to,  and  city  functions  are  by  no  means  the  most 
important  which  policemen  have  to  perform. 

i  October,  1896. 

a  See  Rathbone  v.  Wirth,  etc.,  150  N.  Y.  Rep.,  469.  There  are  laws  in  several 
states  which  the  reasoning  of  this  decision  condemns  as  unconstitutional. 

8  Professor  Goodnow  has  referred  to  the  conflicting  cases  on  the  subject,  and 
has  clearly  stated  the  legal  principles  involved.  Mun.  Home  Rule,  pp.  133-141, 
239,  240;  Pol.  Sci.  Quarterly,  March,  1896,  p.  16. 


CONCERNING  POLICE   ADMINISTRATION  423 

Policemen  are  representatives  of  the  state  for  the  enforce- 
ment of  her  general  laws  and  for  the  protection  of  all  her 
citizens.  We  have  contrasted  the  great  mass  and  variety  of 
the  state  laws  of  paramount  importance  —  all  those  relating 
to  religion,  to  liberty,  to  social  and  family  relations,  to  jus- 
tice, to  the  rights  of  persons  and  property,  to  corporations, 
to  land  titles,  to  commerce,  to  international  relations,  to 
crimes  which  have  a  common  application  to  the  city  and  the 
country  —  with  the  limited  laws  and  ordinances  which  are 
especially  provided  for  municipalities.1  The  state  provides 
for  punishing  those  guilty  of  all  the  highest  crimes,  and  they 
apply  alike  to  the  city  and  the  country.  It  has  a  duty  to 
make  them  uniform,  and  to  see  that  they  are  uniformly 
enforced,  whether  in  municipalities  or  country  districts. 
Policemen  act  for  the  state  in  the  enforcement  of  these  laws, 
and  no  city  has  a  legal  right  —  or  should  be  conceded  to 
have  a  moral  right  —  to  control  the  policy  of  the  state,  or  to 
interfere  with  the  duty  of  police  officers,  in  regard  to  the 
execution  of  general  laws.  If  a  city  should  resist  the  state 
as  to  these  matters,  it  would  be  the  duty  of  the  latter  to 
appeal  to  military  force  ;  and  it  may  invoke  even  the  aid  of 
the  national  government.2  If  these  statements  are  the  mere- 
est  truisms,  it  is  the  false  and  pernicious  claims  made  in  the 
name  of  absolute  Home  Rule  which  makes  them  necessary. 

2.  In  respect  to  the  enforcement  of  general  laws,  police- 
men are,  in  a  legal  sense,  executive  officers  of  the  state,  and 
have  a  duty  to  consider  its  aggregate  interests.  So  profound 
is  the  interest  of  the  rural  residents  of  a  state  in  having  good 
police  administration  in  its  cities,  that  they  would  be  wise 
to  pay  its  whole  cost  if  the  cities  could  not  be  compelled  to 
do  so. 

All  the  reasons  which  require  that  the  laws  on  the  great 
subjects  referred  to  should  be  the  same  in  the  country  and  in 
the  city  —  and  be  uniformly  interpreted  by  the  courts  —  also 
require  that  they  should  be  uniformly  executed  by  policemen. 

1  See  Ch.  II.  pp.  32-35. 

2  The  state  of  New  York  called  out  the  militia  to  bring  Mayor  Wood  of  New 
York  City  to  obedience,  when  he  used  the  city  police  to  resist  a  police  law  of  1857. 


424  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

This  should  be  done  under  a  pervading  sense  of  duty  to 
serve  the  state  supremely,  and  not  merely  a  particular  city  or 
village.  Police  officers  should  be  taught  to  recognize  the 
paramount  authority  of  the  state,  and  to  regard  their  obliga- 
tions to  it  and  its  whole  people  as  superior  to  the  duty  they 
owe  to  any  local  division  of  either.  A  city  policeman  has 
no  more  right  to  execute  the  laws,  than  a  city  judge  has  to 
construe  them,  for  the  special  advantage  of  his  city. 

We  must  make  the  state  worthy  of  its  ideal  and  competent 
for  its  duties.  We  must  not  rebel  against  its  essential  power 
merely  because  our  vicious  party  methods  and  our  neglect 
of  our  civic  duties  have  degraded  it  in  our  estimation.  To 
teach  policemen  that  they  are  mere  city  officials  having  a 
right  to  take  sides  with  the  city  against  the  state,  or  to  con- 
sider themselves  as  the  representatives  of  a  mayor  or  of  a 
city  party,  is  unjustifiable,  false,  and  demoralizing  ,  and  so 
it  is  also  to  cause  them  to  think  that  they  may  act  on  the 
theory  that  the  interests  of  the  state  and  those  of  its  cities 
are  hostile,  or  on  the  assumption  that  the  state  alone  is 
responsible  for  bad  city  administration.  False  teaching  on 
these  points  has  done  much  to  cause  the  police  force  of 
American  cities  to  become  the  active  and  corrupt  agents 
of  city  parties  and  bosses. 

Ill 

1.  Another  view  of  the  relations  of  the  state  to  the  police 
force  of  cities  must  not  be  overlooked.  The  duties  and  the 
cost  of  the  city  police  are  much  greater  by  reason  of  the 
immense  amounts  of  property  and  the  vast  numbers  of 
people  from  the  rural  parts  of  the  state  which  it  must 
guard.  This  cost  in  many  cities  is  much  greater  by  reason 
of  their  commercial  relations.  It  seems  reasonable  that  the 
state  itself  should  pay  some  part  of  this  increased  cost.  Is 
it  not  also  a  duty  of  the  state  to  bear  some  part  of  the 
expense  of  supporting  policemen  who,  as  we  have  seen,  act 
largely  as  agents  and  officers  of  the  state  itself?  The  older 
nations  have  recognized  and  discharged  such  a  duty.  Eng- 


CONCERNING  POLICE  ADMINISTRATION  425 

land  pays  about  one-half  of  the  expense  of  supporting  the 
municipal  force  within  her  cities.1  France  seems  to  con- 
tribute about  one-third  of  the  cost  of  her  local  police  force, 
and  Germany  a  still  larger  proportion.  It  is  quite  likely 
that,  in  Germany  and  France  in  earlier  times,  this  practice 
was  connected  with  a  purpose  of  using  the  force  for  dynastic 
ends.  Such,  of  course,  cannot  now  be  the  case  in  France ; 
and  in  England  this  payment  is  in  no  wise  connected  with 
any  party  or  class  interests,  or  any  purpose  of  centralizing 
power,  but  is  based  on  considerations  of  justice  and  sound 
policy  which  are  as  applicable  in  the  United  States  as  in 
England. 

We  have  shown  that  the  cities  of  England  have  a  much 
larger  liberty  than  those  of  the  United  States  to  select  and 
manage  their  police  force  in  reference  to  the  municipal  wel- 
fare, unrestrained  by  party  action  or  special  laws.2 

2.  Whatever  may  be  the  conclusion  as  to  the  justice  and 
wisdom  of  the  state  paying  a  portion  of  the  cost  of  the  city 
police,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  conditions  attached 
to  such  payments,  especially  in  England,  have  been  highly 
salutary.  The  English  government  not  only  requires  reports 
from  cities  concerning  their  police  force,  but  causes  it  to  be 
inspected  by  national  officials,  and  insists  on  its  coming  up 
to  required  standards  before  such  payments  are  made  toward 
its  cost.  This  practice  by  bringing  into  comparison  the  rel- 
ative cost,  discipline,  and  efficiency  of  the  police  forces  of 
different  cities,  and  by  promoting  salutary  rivalry  between 
them,  greatly  aids  good  administration.  It  also  facilitates 
the  exposure  of  irregularities,  neglects,  and  extravagance. 

1  Shaw's  Mun.  Oov.  G.  S.,  pp.  67,  111. 

2  See  Ch.  XII.  on  this  subject.    The  policemen  of  London  are  selected  and 
controlled  by  a  department  of  the  national  government,  but  by  methods  which 
exclude  discrimination  on  party  grounds.    It  is  not  thought  wise  to  commit  the 
great  departments  of  the  nation  —  its  records  and  treasury  —  to  the  protection  of 
police  officers  selected  by  a  single  city.    The  possible  moods  and  ambition  of  the 
population  of  a  vast  metropolis  must  be  considered.    The  framers  of  our  national 
government  seem  to  have  reasoned  in  the  same  way  when  they  gave  Congress 
the  exclusive  power  to  make  laws  and  to  provide  officers  for  the  federal  district 
of  Columbia.    The  police  force  of  the  city  of  Washington  is  in  the  charge  of  com- 
missioners selected  by  the  President.    The  nation  pays  half  its  cost. 


426  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

Such  inspection  no  more  impairs  the  useful  independence  of 
the  police  in  the  control  of  cities  than  our  state  inspection 
of  banks,  insurance  companies,  and  schools  by  state  officers 
impairs  the  just  independence  of  those  institutions.  We 
cannot  doubt  that  if  the  state  were  to  pay  a  portion,  even 
if  no  more  than  five  per  cent,  of  the  cost  of  the  police  of 
its  cities,  on  the  condition  of  their  discipline  and  economy 
coming  up  to  a  high  standard,  a  great  public  gain  would 
ensue.1 

3.  The  police  experience  of  Great  Britain  deserves  our 
thoughtful  attention  in  some  other  particulars.  The  earliest 
advance  of  importance  in  police  management  in  this  country 

—  that  made  in  New  York  City  soon  after  1857  —  was  in 
the   main  based  on  the  police   methods  then  enforced  in 
London.     Since  that  time  these  methods  —  made  more  and 
more   independent  of  party  politics   and  in  various  ways 
greatly  improved  in  England  —  have  in  the  United  States 
continued  largely  under  the  control  of  parties.     In  recent 
years  the  police  force  of  American  cities  has  been  more  and 
more  regulated  by  numerous  special  laws,  —  often  restrictive 
of  true  Home  Rule,  and  not  infrequently  intended  for  party 
advantage,  —  while  in  Great  Britain  the  sphere  and  liberty 
of  Home  Rule  have  been  enlarged,  and  the  police  laws  — 
a  sort  of  police  code  —  have  been  made  generally  applicable 

1  The  state  of  Massachusetts,  often  in  the  lead  of  wise  legislation,  has  much 
improved  its  school  administration  by  applying  the  principle  here  commended, — 
that  of  the  state  making  contributions  to  the  expenses  of  local  schools  only  when 
they  come  up  to  certain  conditions  laid  down  by  the  state.  But  the  state  has 
gone  yet  further,  in  the  spirit  of  the  suggestion  made  in  the  text,  as  to  the  police, 

—  not  so  much  by  the  way  of  the  use  of  the  police  officers  of  one  place  in  others 
where  they  may  be  needed,  as  in  the  way  of  creating  a  small  number  of  state 
policemen  who  may  be  ordered,  by  the  proper  state  officers,  to  any  place  where 
they  may  be  needed  in  a  crisis.    This  small  body  of  state  officers  has  been  found 
highly  useful,  especially  where  local  feeling  has  been  aroused  and  violence  or 
riots  have  been  threatened.    Yet  such  a  duplicate  police  force  seems  hardly 
necessary,  and  might  be  embarrassing.     The  method  to  be  proposed  in  this 
chapter  of  transferring  policemen  from  one  place  to  another  would  seem  to 
put  a  much  larger  number  at  the  command  of  the  state  in  exigencies  when 
they  may  be  greatly  needed.      Whitten's    Public   Administration  in   Mass., 
pp.  29,  30,  and  80-93.     Mr.  Conkling  has  been  impressed  with  the  advantages 
of  state  inspection,  for  which  he  thinks  American  states  should  provide.    City 
Oov.,  p.  83. 


CONCERNING  POLICE  ADMINISTRATION  427 

to  all  cities,  save  in  so  far  as  London  is  in  some  measure  an 
exception.1 

4.  The  kind  of  state  inspection  which  the  police  of 
American  cities  need  could  perhaps  be  made  under  a  single 
state  officer,  who  should  be  an  experienced  ex-police  official, 
and  be  connected  with  one  of  the  state  departments  or  with 
a  new  municipal  bureau  in  the  state  government.  He  should 
be  required  from  time  to  time  to  examine  into  the  condition 
of  the  local  police  administrations  in  the  state,  to  receive  and 
preserve  reports  to  be  made  by  them,  and  to  annually  lay 
before  the  governor  and  the  legislature  a  general  exposition 
and  comparative  report  of  the  police  administration  in  each 
city,  setting  forth  all  the  facts  necessary  for  a  judgment  con- 
cerning both  their  actual  and  their  comparative  merits  and 
cost.2 

Such  a  bureau  or  department  would  be  able  to  supply  the 
facts  needed  for  enlightened  legislation  on  police  and  other 
municipal  affairs.  It  would  be  an  admonition  to  corrupt 
and  partisan  city  officials.  Its  action  would  not  diminish 
the  sphere  or  the  liberty  for  Home  Rule,  save  of  that  corrupt, 
partisan  kind  which  fears  publicity.  On  the  contrary,  much 
larger  powers  for  local  control  could  be  safely  intrusted  to 
cities  under  such  guarantees  for  their  legitimate  exercise. 
Tammany  and  every  other  party  machine  and  its  boss  would 
of  course  be  the  inveterate  enemies  of  such  a  system. 

1  See  Ch.  XII.    Few  matters  in  our  city  affairs  more  strikingly  illustrate  our 
neglect  than  the  fact  that,  while  so  much  has  been  said  of  late  about  police 
abuses,  no  state  or  city  of  the  Union  —  and  no  reform  organization  so  far  as  we 
know  —  has  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  American  people  that  admirable 
English  police  system  upon  which  nearly  all  that  is  good  in  our  own  is  based, 
and  which  can  still  teach  us  valuable  lessons.    If  a  tenth  part  as  much  money 
and  effort  had  been  used  by  our  governments,  or  by  our  rich  men,  to  teach  the 
American  people  these  lessons,  as  has  been  used  by  these  men  and  our  sporting 
classes  to  introduce  English  methods  of  rowing  and  golf  playing,  English  breeds 
of  cattle  and  hogs,  and  English  aristocratic  fashions  and  forms,  our  municipal 
debasement  might  not  now  so  much  disgrace  us. 

2  The  two  New  York  state  commissions,  to  which  we  have  referred,  for  pre- 
paring charters  for  second  and  third  class  cities  united  —  largely  we  believe  by 
reason  of  the  efforts  of  Hon.  F.  W.  Holls  —  in  presenting  to  the  legislature  of 
New  York  in  1896  a  bill  providing  for  a  state  municipal  bureau. 


428  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

IV 

1.  The  time  is  probably  near  at  hand  when,  in  parts  of 
the  densely  populated  states,  policemen  will  be  required  out- 
side of  cities  —  as  they  now  are  in  European  countries.      It 
would  result  in  embarrassing  complications  and  needless  ex- 
pense to  have  distinct  police  forces,  subject  to  diverse  control, 
for  each  city  soon  to  be  developed  along  our  railroads  and 
waterways.     It  will  be  necessary  to  have  considerable  dis- 
tricts under  uniform  police  laws  and  administration,  or  else 
to  adopt  some  plan  analogous  to  the  European  police  systems. 
The  police  is  soon  to  become  a  far  more  important  force  than 
it  has  yet  been. 

It  is  desirable  to  maintain  that  principle  of  local  indepen- 
dence which  is  fundamental  under  American  government, 
yet  it  cannot  be  too  emphatically  stated  that  provisions  must 
soon  be  made  for  uniform  police  administration  and  com- 
parative statements  of  its  cost  throughout  the  state.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  the  failure  to  make  the  state  inspec- 
tions of  the  police  which  we  need,  greatly  facilitated  the  bold 
malversations  and  corruptions  recently  disclosed  in  the  police 
force  of  New  York  City.  Why  should  not  the  state  inspect 
and  investigate  the  police  as  well  as  the  militia  ? 

We  have  seen  that  the  constitution  and  laws  of  New  York 
and  of  other  states  provide  not  only  for  examinations  by  state 
officers  of  banks,  trust  companies,  and  insurance  companies, 
but  of  prisons,  schools,  and  asylums,  and  require  reports  from 
their  managers  to  state  departments.  Even  the  quality  of 
butter,  gas,  and  milk  must  be  thus  inspected.  Is  it  needful 
for  the  state  to  thus  deal  with  these  relatively  private 
interests,  and  not  needful  for  it  to  take  equal  care  as  to 
the  use  of  the  mighty  police  authority  on  the  exercise  of 
which  the  prosperity  and  safety  of  the  great  cities  largely 
depend  ? 

2.  Another  matter  bearing  upon  the  wisdom  and  justice 
of  the  state  paying  a  portion  of  the  cost  of  police  administra- 
tion deserves  notice.     Is  it  too  much  to  hope  that  in  no  re- 
mote future  the  state  will  —  with  the  cheerful  consent  of 


CONCERNING  POLICE  ADMINISTRATION  429 

cities  and  districts  —  draw  together  detachments  from  their 
police  forces  for  the  prompt  suppression  of  riots,  mobs,  and 
other  local  disturbances  —  a  service  for  which  policemen  would 
be  peculiarly  well  qualified  —  instead  of  being  always  com- 
pelled to  rely  solely  upon  the  slow,  less  competent,  more 
expensive,  more  unmanageable,  yet  far  less  prompt  and 
effective  —  force  of  the  militia  ?  Properly  disciplined  po- 
licemen have  all  the  military  drill  needed  for  such  a  duty, 
and  are  more  likely  than  the  militia  to  be  discreet  and  just. 
They  would  arouse  far  less  dangerous  passions. 

American  states,  being  without  a  regular  army,  have  more 
need  than  European  nations  for  such  a  service  .at  the  hands 
of  the  police.  New  York  City  sent  policemen  in  aid  of  the 
army  during  the  Civil  War.  A  moderate  payment  by  the 
state  toward  the  cost  of  the  local  police  would  be  a  just  basis 
for  invoking  its  aid,  not  only  in  the  cases  suggested,  but  in 
any  cases  where  a  great  crime  has  been  committed,  or  serious 
disorder  or  danger  is  threatened,  especially  where  there  are  no 
local  policemen.1  Who  can  doubt  that  the  discharge  of  such 
functions  would  dignify  the  police  force  in  its  own  estimation, 
and  cause  it  to  be  more  highly  respected  by  the  people  ? 


1.  Most  of  the  reasons  we  have  given  in  the  last  chapter 
for  a  uniform  code  of  health  laws  for  the  state  also  require 
a  uniform  code  of  police  laws  applicable,  with  proper  adap- 
tations, to  all  its  cities  and  villages.  This  code  would 
supersede  our  multifarious  and  conflicting  police  laws,  and 
would  save  much  needless  litigation.  Much  partisan  schem- 
ing and  corruption  would  be  prevented.  The  keeping  of 
comparable  and  highly  useful  accounts  and  statistics  would 
be  made  possible.  A  great  amount  of  painful  uncertainty 

1  Who  that  has  seen  firemen  from  one  city  rushing  to  the  rescue  of  another 
can  fail  to  see  how  salutary  would  be  a  provision,  in  the  state  police  and  fire- 
men's code,  which  would  bring  to  the  rescue  of  a  city  or  village  in  the  hands 
of  a  mob  or  in  flames  some  of  the  policemen  of  neighboring  cities  —  bring 
them  there  in  less  time  than  the  unskilled  militiamen  could  be  got  ready  for 
a  start? 


430          THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

would  be  avoided.  Every  decision  of  the  courts  would 
interpret  the  police  law  for  every  municipality. 

Accounts  and  statistics,  even  if  adequately  kept  for  any 
purpose,  are  generally  according  to  different  methods  in 
different  cities  which  make  them  of  little  value  either  for 
showing  comparative  cost  or  abuses.1 

2.  We  cannot  enter  into  details,  but  these  general  pro- 
visions in  a  state  police  code  seem  desirable :  (1)  it  should 
determine  all  the  questions  we  have  considered  concerning 
police  administration ;  (2)  it  should  supersede  all  other  laws 
on  the  subject;  (3)  it  should  provide  for  the  fixing  of  the 
salaries  of  the  members  of  the  force  by  the  city  councils , 
(4)  it  should  forbid  these  members  from  applying  to  the  gov- 
ernor or  legislature  on  the  subject  of  salaries ;  (5)  it  should 
provide  for  the  keeping  of  police  accounts,  expenses,  statis- 
tics of  crime,  in  every  city  and  police  jurisdiction,  in  such  a 
full,  clear,  and  uniform  manner,  and  for  the  making  of  such 
reports  to  the  state  concerning  the  same,  as  will  make  it  easy 
to  compare  the  police  administration  in  each  city  and  dis- 
trict with  that  of  every  other;  (6)  it  should  confer  upon 
the  councils  of  cities  such  general  powers  as  they  may  require 
in  connection  with  the  framing  and  enforcing  of  the  rules 
and  regulations  needed  for  carrying  the  provisions  of  the 
code  into  effect ; 2  (7)  it  should  make  it  a  criminal  offence 
to  apply  any  party  or  sectarian  tests  for  the  selection  of  any 
person  for  examination  for  the  police  service ;  or  to  appoint, 
promote,  remove,  or  degrade  any  one  in  this  service  for  any 
sectarian  or  partisan  purpose  ;  (8)  it  should  prohibit  any 
member  of  the  police  force  accepting  a  nomination  for  a 
political  office ;  being  a  member  of  any  political  club,  caucus, 
or  convention;  engaging  in  the  public  discussion  of  party 
issues ;  paying  or  having  any  part  in  collecting  political  as- 

1  When  the  United  States  needed  systematic  provisions  for  the  government  of 
its  armies,  it  employed,  not  semi-military  politicians  or  mere  partisans,  but  the 
celebrated  Dr.  Francis  Lieber,  to  draft  them,  and  the  invaluable  Articles  of  War 
were  the  result. 

2  Such  provisions  would  profoundly  affect  city  morals,  politics,  safety,  and 
comfort.    Those  for  New  York  City  (18%) —defective  and  inadequate  as  they 
were  —  are  628  in  number  and  fill  a  considerable  volume. 


CONCERNING  POLICE  ADMINISTRATION  431 

sessments ;  or  acting  as  a  representative,  agent,  or  manager 
of  any  political  party  or  faction  or  candidate.1 

3.  If  the  police  force  in  American  cities  were  really  non- 
partisan,  and  were  managed  only  in  the  public  interests,  its 
partly  superannuated  and  partially  disabled  members  —  in- 
stead of  being  frequently  retired  to  pensioned  idleness  for 
partisan  and  other  indefensible  reasons  —  would,  as  a  rule, 
be  given  preference  —  perhaps  with  reduced  salaries  —  for 
various  positions  in  which  their  experience  and  character 
would  be  valuable  —  such,  for  example,  as  those  of  court  offi- 
cers, doorkeepers,  parkkeepers,  and  custodians,  which  are 
easy  and  honorable.  Under  our  party  system  these  places 
are  quite  generally  given  to  the  favorites  and  electioneering 
henchmen  of  great  politicians,  officials,  and  party  managers, 
for  whom  they  often  act  the  part  of  feudal  vassals.  The 
whole  matter  of  retiring  allowances  for  our  disabled  and 
superannuated  policemen,  firemen,  and  some  other  officers 
needs  attention,  and  should  be  placed  upon  a  more  just  and 
economical  basis.  The  experience  of  the  older  nations  on 
this  subject  is  highly  instructive,  and  deserves  the  study  of 
American  legislators.  We  may,  perhaps,  provide  these  al- 
lowances without  much  —  if  at  all  —  increasing  the  cost, 
though  adding  to  the  efficiency,  of  the  public  service.2 

VI 

1.  The  question  whether  there  should  be  a  single  head 
of  the  police  force  deserves  some  further  notice.  There  has 
apparently  been  much  confusion  from  the  lack  of  a  definite 
conception  of  what  is  meant  by  the  "head  of  the  force." 
It  seems  as  if  the  acceptance  of  the  unfortunate  doctrine  of 


1  See  Boston  Ordinances,  p.  173.     The  New  York  rules  referred  to  forbid 
members  of  the  "police  force"  being  members  of  any  political  convention  for 
making  nomination  to  any  political  offices ;  but  they  do  not  forbid  the  bi-partisan 
commissioners,  who  control  the  police  force,  being  themselves  scandalous  party 
leaders,  who  shamelessly  engage  in  prostituting  their  official  power  for  party  pur- 
poses, even  causing  the  police  force  itself  to  become  a  mere  partisan  body  under 
their  leadership. 

2  See  Eaton's  Civil  Service  in  Great  Britain,  pp.  130,  141,  142,  215. 


432  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

an  autocratic  mayor  had  impaired  the  capacity  to  reason 
soundly  on  other  municipal  subjects.  Many  people  seem  to 
have  no  definite  conception  of  what  they  mean  by  "  a  single 
head  of  the  police." 

A  single  police  superintendent,  —  or  executive  officer,  — 
like  a  single  general  for  an  army  in  the  field,  is  needed  for 
direct  command  and  the  carrying  of  orders  into  effect.  But 
who  is  to  originate  and  guide  the  policy  in  which  orders  have 
their  origin?  Who  is  to  hold  individual  commanders  re- 
sponsible for  the  proper  execution  of  this  policy  and  the 
orders?  Is  the  superintendent  really  the  paramount  head 
of  the  force,  under  obligation  to  no  local  authority  ?  Is  he, 
like  the  mayor,  to  be  an  autocrat,  directly  responsible  to  the 
legislature  and  the  state  ?  The  president  is  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  army,  to  whom  each  general  is  responsible ;  but 
the  president  is  largely  responsible  to  Congress,  which  con- 
trols the  expenditures  and  —  in  the  main — the  national 
policy.  Congress  can,  in  substance,  impeach  and  try  the 
president.  The  champions  of  an  autocratic  chief  of  police 
seem  to  insist  that  he  is  to  act  directly  under  the  police 
laws,  as  he  may  interpret  them,  and  that  there  is  to  be  no 
superior  police  authority  in  the  city  which  shall  have  power 
for  directing  his  general  management,  or  calling  him  to 
account.  Consequently,  they  must  hold  —  if  he  is  not  to  be 
an  absolute  despot  —  that  in  every  difficulty  and  in  reference 
to  every  question  the  appeal  must  be  to  the  legislature  or  to 
the  governor.  This  is  repugnant  to  all  sound  theories  of 
Home  Rule,  and  would  be  fatal  to  reasonable  municipal  inde- 
pendence. Numerous  special  statutes,  state-party  domina- 
tion, and  constant  state  intermeddling  in  city  affairs  would 
be  made  inevitable. 

If  the  ideal  head  of  the  police  is  not  to  be  a  despot  so  far 
as  the  city  is  concerned,  or  directly  and  solely  responsible  to 
the  state,  he  must  be  responsible  to  some  other  city  author- 
ity. What  authority  is  it  to  be  ?  We  have  shown  why  it 
should  be  the  council,  and  not  the  mayor.  The  council  would 
exercise  its  paramount  authority  mainly  through  its  delib- 
erately made  ordinances  —  in  conformity  to  the  police  code. 


CONCERNING  POLICE  ADMINISTRATION  433 

The  council  would  have  a  standing  committee  on  the  police 
department,  which  would  keep  it  constantly  informed  as  to 
the  manner  in  which  the  police  superintendent  discharges  his 
functions.  The  council  could  compel  him  to  submit  to  in- 
vestigations, and  there  should  be  provisions  for  his  trial  in 
the  nature  of  a  court  martial  in  the  army.1 

In  a  certain  sense  this  theory  of  the  matter  would  provide 
for  a  single  head  of  the  police  force  for  direct  command,  yet 
to  regard  him  as  such,  in  a  literal  sense,  is  a  superficial, 
vicious,  and  misleading  view  of  the  subject.2 

2.  The  moment  we  supersede  commissions,  and  refuse  to 
create  autocratic  mayors,  the  need  of  a  local  police  authority 
to  discharge  various  police  duties,  and  especially  to  hold  our 
single  police  superintendent,  or  commander  in  the  field,  to 
an  essential  responsibility,  is  both  apparent  and  imperative. 
Who  is  to  appoint  him?  Who  is  to  remove  him?  Who  is 
to  investigate  his  official  conduct  ?  Who  is  to  call  him  to 
account  for  the  neglect  of  his  duty,  or  the  usurpation  of 
power?  Who  is  to  define  the  duties  of  the  various  grades 
of  police  officials  ?  Who  is  to  frame  the  police  ordinances  ? 
Who  is  to  hold  the  vast  number  of  trials  of  delinquent 
policemen  whom  the  superintendent  must  present  for 
judgment  ?  3 


1  It  might  be  provided  that  this  police  court  martial,  in  cases  of  important 
charges  against  the  police  superintendent,  could  be  held  before  a  judge,  aided 
by  expert  police  officers,  the  trial  taking  place  after  the  standing  committee  of 
the  council  had  considered  the  charges.    There  could  be  effective  provisions  for 
causing  these  investigations  and  trials  to  be  promptly  conducted.    The  council 
might  be  authorized  to  thereafter  remove  the  head  of  the  police  by  a  three-fourths 
vote,  or  the  mayor  might  be  authorized  to  remove  him,  provided  the  council  did 
not  by  a  three-fourths  vote  nullify  the  removal  within  five  days.    We  think  these 
methods  would  be  preferable  to  political  removals  by  mayors  or  governors,  and 
far  more  prompt  than  court  trials  for  making  such  removals. 

2  So  long  as  police  power  is  vested  in  a  commission,  it  is  inevitable  that  the 
superintendent  of  police  should  be  its  subordinate.    It  has  generally  been  the 
antagonisms  of  bi-partisan  commissioners  which  have  prevented  his  being  allowed 
adequate  authority,  though  it  is  a  curious  fact  that  the  most  scandalous  case 
of  conflict  of  police  authority  under  commissions  —  that  in  New  York  City  in 
1897  —  was  one  in  which  one  democrat  and  one  republican  commissioner  gen- 
erally acted  together  against  the  two  other  commissioners,  one  of  them  a  demo- 
crat and  the  other  a  republican. 

3  The  police  force  of  New  York  City,  even  before  the  Greater  New  York  was 

2* 


484  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

In  view  of  the  facts  stated  in  the  note  shall  the  super- 
intendent be  not  only  the  complainant,  but  the  judge  and 
the  executioner  in  all  cases  of  police  offences?  Who  is 
to  administer  the  police  pension  fund  —  the  police  pen- 
sion system  being  one  of  great  complication?  Who  is  to 
fix  the  salaries  of  the  police  officers  ?  Who  is  to  prescribe 
the  general  policy  of  the  police  department?  Who  is  to 
determine  the  grade  of  punishment  for  the  malfeasances  of 
policemen  ?  Who  is  to  regulate  superannuation  allowances  ? 
Who  is  to  purchase  the  police  supplies  ?  Who  is  to  build 
the  police  station-houses  ?  Who  is  to  determine  the  amount 
of  police  expenditures,  and  audit  the  vast  accounts  of  the 
police  department?  Is  the  head  of  the  police  to  do  all  this  ? 
Is  he  alone  to  make  the  police  reports  to  the  state  concerning 
his  own  doings  ? 

If  we  are  not  to  constantly  appeal  to  the  legislature  as  to 
all  these  matters,  is  not  a  local  authority  superior  in  many 
matters  to  the  single,  technical  commander  of  the  police 
force  —  and  having  a  large  discretionary  authority  —  plainly 
indispensable?  We  can  no  more  endure  an  autocratic  police 
superintendent  than  we  can  an  autocratic  mayor.  Can  there 
be  any  more  fit  authority  for  such  purposes  than  such  a  con- 
tinuous council  as  we  have  described,  before  which  all  these 
matters  can  be  discussed,  and  by  which  authoritative  and 
intelligent  decisions  can  be  made  ? 

created,  contained  five  thousand  policemen.  There  were  each  week  about  one 
hundred  delinquents,  or  offenders, —  more  than  five  thousand  a  year, — against  law, 
or  police  rules,  who  had  to  be  tried  by  the  police  commissioners,  each  taking  his 
turn  at  the  trials.  These  trials  afford  dangerous  opportunities  for  both  personal 
and  partisan  favoritism,  and  many  of  them  require  a  clear  comprehension  of  legal 
principles.  A  consistent  and  systematic  enforcement  of  justice  and  the  police 
regulations  are  essential  to  good  police  administration.  The  whole  time  of  a 
commissioner  would  not  be  sufficient  for  conducting  these  trials,  even  if  it  were 
safe  to  trust  one  of  the  commissioners  —  who  are  selected  as  party  representatives 
—  with  the  sole  power  of  exercising  such  judicial  functions.  A  police-trial  justice, 
having  a  stable  tenure  of  office,  and  skilled  in  the  law,  should  always  sit  with 
a  commissioner,  and  there  should  be  an  appeal  to  another  trial  —  when  they  fail 
to  agree  —  at  which  an  additional  commissioner  should  sit.  Not  only  might  ex- 
pensive and  embarrassing  reversals  by  the  courts,  of  judgments  on  police  trials, 
be  thus  avoided,  but  much  injustice  to  policemen  might  be  prevented.  Of  course 
the  mere  party  managers  would  object  to  so  just  a  system,  which  would  greatly 
diminish  their  chance  for  spoils. 


CONCERNING  POLICE  ADMINISTRATION  435 

We  can  no  more  endure  a  police  boss  than  we  can  endure 
a  party  boss  or  a  mayoralty  despot.  We  must  have  a  city 
council  competent  for  the  management  of  our  city  affairs 
or  we  must  hand  them  over  to  the  state  —  and  surrender 
all  hopes  of  true  Home  Rule,  and  non-partisan  city  govern- 
ment. 

Since  this  chapter  was  in  print,  a  scheme  for  a  state-police 
system  has  been  presented  in  the  legislature  of  New  York, 
which  we  have  considered  in  the  APPENDIX. 


486  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 


CHAPTER   XVII.  —  CONCERNING  JUDICIAL  ADMINISTRATION 
IN   MUNICIPALITIES 

The  original  constitutions  provided  for  appointing  judicial  officers.  The 
causes  which  have  made  them  elective.  The  vicious  New  York  Council  of  Ap- 
pointment developed  a  spoils  system  which  led  to  short  judicial  terms.  The  New 
York  constitution  of  1846  made  a  revolution  in  favor  of  judicial  elections.  Why 
this  constitution  was  soon  condemned.  Longer  terms  and  more  appointments 
demanded  and  secured.  Partisan  New  York  City  justices  in  1870.  Their  vast 
and  vicious  power.  Justices  made  appointive  for  terms  of  ten  years  in  1873. 
Great  improvement  the  result.  But  mayor's  use  of  appointing  power  degraded 
the  justice  courts.  Their  prostitution  for  party  advantage.  New  York  consti- 
tution of  1894  allows  justices  to  be  appointed  and  the  courts  to  remove  them. 
Why  the  courts  should  appoint  as  well  as  remove  justices.  Why  such  appoint- 
ments would  give  better  justices.  The  other  officers  to  which  this  reasoning 
extends.  Precedents  for  judges  appointing  justices,  etc.  United  States  Commis- 
sioners have  shown  the  advantages  of  such  appointments.  A  method  of  avoiding 
the  only  objection  to  judges  making  appointments.  How  to  select  the  appoint- 
ing judges  by  lot.  Regulations  for  making  these  appointments.  Effects  of  such 
appointments  upon  the  Bar.  Whether  there  are  any  good  objections  to  the  lot  for 
this  purpose.  Probable  effects  of  judges  appointing  district  attorneys,  sheriffs, 
coroners,  county  clerks,  and  registers.  The  grave  need  of  longer  terms  of 
office  and  of  fewer  judicial  elections.  Vicious  New  York  laws  of  1895  and  1896 
for  increasing  such  elections  considered.  Appointments  and  a  firmer  tenure  of 
office  an  essential  part  of  municipal  reform.  The  objection  that  we  would  allow 
too  few  elections  answered. 

THE  original  state  constitutions  provide  that  judges  and 
judicial  officers,  generally,  shall  be  appointed.  The  theory 
of  an  appointed  judiciary  is  broadly  embodied  in  the  consti- 
tution of  the  United  States,  which  declares  that  the  president 
shall  nominate  the  judges  subject  to  confirmation  by  the  Sen- 
ate ;  and  such,  with  infinite  advantage  to  the  nation,  has 
been  the  constant  practice.  It  is  hardly  imaginable  that  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  or  even  the  federal  Cir- 
cuit and  District  Courts,  could  have  so  nobly  discharged 
their  functions  had  their  members  been  elected  by  popular 
vote.  No  statesman  could  see  these  judicial  officers  made 
thus  elective  without  grave  anxiety  for  the  safety  of  the 
nation.  The  method  of  choosing  judicial  officers  by  appoint- 
ment has  been  continued  in  Massachusetts,  where  the  admin- 


CONCERNING  JUDICIAL  ADMINISTRATION         437 

istration  of  justice  has  been  of  the  highest  order  ;  but,  in 
most  of  the  states,  the  excessive  development  of  party  power 
has  been  a  chief  cause  of  these  officers  being  made  elective 
by  the  people.1 

The  causes  of  the  abandonment  of  judicial  appointments 
in  most  of  the  states,  and  their  results,  have  an  important 
bearing  upon  the  suggestions  we  are  about  to  make,  but  we 
have  space  for  explaining  them  only  in  reference  to  a  single 
state,  and  no  state  is  so  rich  in  instructive  facts  as  New  York. 

Unfortunately  her  first  constitution  conferred  the  appoint- 
ing power  jointly  upon  the  governor  and  certain  senators  — 
together  constituting  "  the  Council  of  Appointment,"  which 
soon  degenerated  into  a  partisan  body,  that  helped  to  develop 
an  original  American  spoils  system.  A  natural  result  was 
that  the  New  York  amended  constitution  of  1821  provided 
that  the  special  and  assistant  justices  of  New  York  City  — 
together  having  the  powers  of  justices  of  peace  —  should  be 
appointed  by  its  common  council  —  these  justices  as  well  as 
the  judges  having  been  before  appointed  by  the  Council  of 
Appointment.  This  spoils  system  and  the  partisan  exercise 
of  the  appointing  power  naturally  enough  caused  great  dis- 
satisfaction among  the  people. 

2.  As  a  natural  outcome  of  the  situation,  the  constitution 
of  1846  made  state  and  county  judges  as  well  as  all  judicial 
officers  for  municipalities  for  the  first  time  elective.  The 
state  was  divided  into  eight  judicial  districts  for  electing  the 
judges  of  the  two  highest  courts  for  terms  of  only  eight  years. 
The  counties  were  respectively  authorized  to  elect  county 
judges  for  a  term  of  only  four  years.  Sheriffs  and  clerks  of 
counties  were  made  elective  as  the  legislature  should  direct. 
The  dominant  party  was  therefore  enabled  to  cause  city  offi- 
cers to  be  elected  from  its  own  ranks  in  very  small  districts 
and  for  very  short  terms. 

Here  was  a  great  revolution,  which  divided,  localized,  and 

1  The  first  constitutions  of  New  York  and  Maryland,  like  that  of  Massachu- 
setts, made  justices  as  well  as  judges  appointive  by  the  governor  and  council,  but 
that  of  Pennsylvania  allowed  the  voters  of  cities  to  vote  for  a  considerable  num- 
ber of  persons  for  justices,  from  among  whom  the  governor  (called  president) 
and  the  council  made  the  appointments. 


438  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

enfeebled  the  judiciary  —  practically  declaring  it  could  fitly 
be  made  dependent  upon  party  majorities  and  that  its  officers 
could  be  properly  made  the  prizes  of  local  party  victories. 
The  great  parties,  under  this  system,  speedily  become  more 
and  more  centralized  and  despotic,  dominating  local  elections 
and  enforcing  party  tests  for  judicial  offices. 

Party  managers  and  professional  politicians  naturally  fa- 
vored this  great  increase  of  the  number  of  elections.  State 
after  state  imitated  this  new  elective  system  of  New  York. 

3.  It  was,  however,  soon  perceived  that  these  numerous 
elections,  short  terms,  small  districts,  and  partisan  tests  had 
introduced  a  new  class  of  evils  into  both  city  and  state  poli- 
tics, making  parties  more  despotic  and  the  judiciary  less  inde- 
pendent, capable,  and  trustworthy.    Especially  minor  judicial 
officers  in  cities  became  more  servile  to  party  managers,  and 
more  corrupt. 

As  a  natural  consequence,  a  reactionary  movement  soon 
began.  A  significant  result  of  this  appears  in  the  amended 
New  York  constitution  of  1870,  which,  with  certain  excep- 
tions, provides  that  judicial  officers  in  cities  may  be  either 
elected  or  appointed  —  a  provision  reaffirmed  in  the  amended 
constitution  of  1894.  Several  of  the  authors  of  this  small- 
district,  short-term,  elective  judiciary  system  of  1846  lived  to 
see  their  eight  state  judicial  districts  reduced  to  four,  their 
eight-year  terms  for  judges  extended  to  fourteen  years,  and 
the  New  York  City  police  justices,  whom  they  had  made 
elective  for  brief  terms,  again  made  appointive,  in  1873,  for 
a  term  of  ten  years. 

4.  A  consideration  of  some  of  the  reasons  which  caused 
this  reaction  and  compelled  these  extensions  of  terms  will 
lead  to  —  and  we  hope  will,  in  the  reader's  view,  justify  — 
the  novel  suggestions  with  which  we  shall  conclude   this 
chapter. 

The  degradation  of  the  higher  courts  in  the  city  of  New 
York,  which  was  a  natural  consequence  of  the  popular  elec- 
tion of  judges  for  short  terms  of  office,  —  as  disclosed  by  the 
investigations  of  1870,  which  led  to  the  impeachment  and 
removal  of  the  notorious  Judge  Barnard,  and  to  the  resigna- 


CONCERNING  JUDICIAL  ADMINISTRATION         439 

tions  of  other  judges  to  escape  a  like  fate, — is  too  well 
known  to  require  further  notice.  The  city-party  managers 
at  that  time  —  of  whom  the  notorious  Tweed  was  the  boss 

—  and  the  judicial  officers  of  lower  grades  were  quite  as 
corrupt  as  those  judges.     In  fact,  the  evils  of  the  elective 
system  for  choosing  judicial  officers  have  been  even  greater 
in  the  lower  courts  —  and  in  connection  with  marshals,  con- 
stables, coroners,  and  sheriffs  —  than  in  the  choice  of  judges. 
For,  in  the  elections  of  these  minor  officers,  the  higher  public 
opinion  has  been  little  felt,  and  the  better  class  of  citizens 
have  taken  little  part,  while  the  criminal,  immoral,  and  mer- 
cenary classes  —  most  directly  affected  by  the  action  of  the 
criminal  courts  and  officers  —  have  been  both  active   and 
potential.     An  election  of  judges  arrests  the  attention  of 
the  public  press,  and  seems  to  involve  the  safety  of  property 

—  thus  inviting  to  the  polls  citizens  who  habitually  neglect 
the  elections  of  the  justices. 

5.  In  1870  there  were  technically  no  justices  of  the  peace 
in  New  York  City,  the  civil  jurisdiction  of  these  officers  be- 
longing to  the  district  court  justices,  and  their  criminal 
jurisdiction  to  the  police  justices.  There  were  eight  separate 
districts  in  the  city  for  the  election  of  these  justices,  one  of 
each  class  being  elective  from  each  district  for  the  term  of 
four  years.  It  will  be  seen,  therefore,  that  this  elective 
system  for  these  justices  alone  required  the  holding,  on  an 
average,  of  four  judicial  elections  every  year — about  the 
equivalent  of  one  every  ninety  days.  For  making  the  nomi- 
nations and  managing  the  elections  of  so  many  candidates, 
the  whole  corrupt  party  machinery  —  controlled  by  unscru- 
pulous party  leaders  and  bosses  —  was  put  in  motion,  and 
caused  almost  constant  manipulation,  bribery,  and  corrup- 
tion. The  vilest  voters  supported  the  basest  candidates. 
Both  classes  of  these  justices  were  regarded  by  the  party 
managers  as  among  the  most  effective  forces  for  carrying 
elections.  Their  judicial  powers  were  habitually  prostituted 
for  party  ends. 

It  is  almost  too  obvious  for  mention  that  such  frequent 
elections  greatly  increased  the  despotic  and  corrupt  power  of 


440  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

party  managers,  brought  great  sums  of  money  into  the  party 
treasuries,  made  the  trade  of  city  politics  profitable,  and  dis- 
gusted, repelled,  and  fatigued  the  most  competent  voters. 
These  elections  gave  ignorant  and  unscrupulous  politicians 
seats  in  the  justice  courts —  in  fact,  hardly  allowing  any  well- 
educated  and  competent  men  of  independence  places  there. 
Hardly  one  in  four  of  the  police  justices  were  then  lawyers 
at  all,  but  most  of  them  were  expert  and  unscrupulous  poli- 
ticians and  partisans,  lamentably  ignorant  of  the  law  they 
were  to  administer. 

The  inevitable  results  were  a  steady  degeneration  of  these 
courts,  the  loss  of  public  confidence  in  them,  the  criminal 
class  greatly  emboldened,  lamentable  and  manifold  injustices 
to  such  of  the  poor  and  humble  as  had  no  party  influence 
behind  them.  Every  man  who  aspired  to  a  seat  as  a  police 
justice  saw  the  need  not  so  much  of  standing  well  with  the 
judges  or  the  better  class  of  voters,  as  of  conciliating  the  poli- 
ticians, and  of  convincing  the  grog-shop  keepers,  the  gam- 
blers, the  bawdy-house  keepers,  and  all  the  criminal  and 
immoral  classes,  that  they  had  little  to  fear  from  him  if  made 
a  magistrate. 

6.  These  officers  preside  at  the  gates  of  primary  justice, 
interpret  to  the  common  people  the  spirit  of  the  law  and  the 
moral  tone  of  the  government  —  thus  doing  much  to  form 
their  opinion  of   both.     As  many  as  seventy-five  thousand 
persons  were  annually,  at  that  period,  brought  under  arrest 
before  the  police  justices  to  be  dealt  with  largely  in  their 
discretion.     The  enormous  amount  of  wrong  annually  done 
—  or  allowed  —  in  the  name  of  justices  by  those  partisan 
and    incompetent    officials,    and    the    corrupting    influence 
they  had  on  city  politics,  were  appalling  to  contemplate. 
No  adequate  conception  of  the  grave  problem  of  municipal 
government  in  American  cities  is  possible  without  a  careful 
study  of  the  ominous  facts  connected  with  the  neglects  and 
the  doings  of  their  lower  courts. 

7.  An  adequate  municipal  reform   is  impossible   in   the 
United  States  until  these  courts  have  been  made  indej>en- 
dent  of  party  politics.     There  never  has  been  —  and  we  think. 


CONCERNING  JUDICIAL  ADMINISTRATION         441 

there  never  can  be  —  a  well-governed  city  in  which  its  jus- 
tices are  elected  for  short  terms  by  a  popular  vote.1  There 
were  small  chances  of  removing  even  the  worst  justices  ;  for 
the  dominant  party  which  elected  them  gains  most  by  their 
malversations  and  their  electioneering  activity.  Thoughtful 
men  read  with  anxiety  those  pages  of  the  history  of  the  Ital- 
ian republics  which  tell  us  how,  in  Florence  under  partisan 
judges  chosen  for  short  terms,  the  courts  became  so  corrupt 
and  despotic  that  the  people  would  no  longer  allow  any  of 
their  own  fellow-citizens  to  sit  in  their  seats  of  justice,  but 
selected  their  judges  and  other  judicial  officers  from  some 
foreign  state  and  brought  them  to  Florence  to  hold  her 
courts  —  as  the  only  means  of  securing  just  decisions. 

8.  Such  was  the  intolerable  and  ominous  condition  when, 
in  1873,  a  law  was  enacted  providing  for  the  appointment  of 
the  police  justices  by  the  mayor  from  the  city  at  large,  for  a 
term  of  ten  years,  subject  to  confirmation  by  the  aldermen. 
It  made  the  justices  removable  by  the  judges  of  one  of  the 
city  courts.  Here  was  a  condemnation  of  the  little-district, 
short-term,  party  system,  and  the  establishment  of  some  new 
principles  of  great  importance.2 

The  enforcement  of  this  law  resulted  in  a  greatly  improved 
administration  in  the  police  courts  of  New  York  City,  so 
that  when  in  1895,  after  the  reform  sentiment  had  triumphed, 
there  was  a  reorganization  of  the  police  courts,  it  was  made 
under  a  law3  which  was  in  its  main  provisions  little  more 
than  a  reproduction  of  the  law  of  1873  ;  except  that  the 
mayor  —  according  to  the  unfortunate  theory  of  making  that 

1  Ex-Mayor  Hewitt  of  New  York,  in  his  message  of  Jan.  7, 1888,  truly  declared 
that  the  position  of  a  police  justice  "  is  more  important  to  the  community  than 
that  of  a  judge  of  the  Court  of  Appeals"  —  the  highest  court  of  the  state.    He 
declares  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  these  justices  to  "  oblige  political  friends  " 
to  be  dangerous,  and  says  he  cannot  express  his  indignation  at  cases  of  its  exer- 
cise when  he  was  mayor. 

2  Law  1873,  Ch.  538.    As  the  draft  of  this  law  — as  presented  to  the  legislature 
—  was  made  by  the  writer,  he  is  able  to  say  that  it  required  that  police  justices 
should  be  lawyers  who  had  practised  their  profession  for  at  least  five  years,  and 
the  confirmation  of  their  nominations  to  be  made  by  a  court  instead  of  the  alder- 
men.   But  as  these  provisions  would  curtail  party  power,  the  politicians  caused 
them  to  be  stricken  from  the  bill. 

s  Ch.  601  of  Laws  1895. 


442  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

officer  autocratic  which  then  prevailed  —  was  given  an  abso- 
lute power  of  appointing  the  justices.1  This  salutary  pro- 
vision for  the  removal  of  minor  judicial  officers  for  cause  and 
by  the  higher  courts — first  giving  them  an  opportunity  to  be 
heard  in  self-defence  —  was  affirmed  by  the  amended  New 
York  constitution  of  1894,  which  says  that  such  removal 
shall  be  made  "  by  such  courts  as  are,  or  may  be,  prescribed 
by  law,"  and  the  authority  for  appointing  judicial  officers  in 
cities  was  at  the  same  time  enlarged.2 


II 

1.  Despite  the  great  advantages  of  being  relieved,  by  the 
law  of  1873,  of  small  districts,  short  terms  of  office,  and  the 
degrading  influence  of  popular  elections  for  police  justices, 
the  vicious  method  of  having  these  officers  appointed  by  the 
mayor  involved  their  selection  in  party  politics.8     Unscru- 
pulous party  managers,  the  criminal  classes,  and  all  those 
interested  in  unlawful  kinds  of  business  were  quick  to  see 
how  they  could  effectively  condition  their  support  of  a  can- 
didate for  the  mayoralty  upon  his  assurance  that  he  would 
give  them  the  kind  of  police  justices  they  desired.     They 
did  so.* 

2.  It  became  clear,  therefore,  to  all  well-informed  persons 
that  the  appointment  of  satisfactory  police  and  other  justices 

1  But  the  original  principles  in  the  draft  of  the  law  of  1873  giving  a  court  the 
power  of  removal  and  requiring  the  justices  to  be  lawyers  were  reaffirmed.  But 
it  is  much  to  be  regretted  that  the  requirement  of  annual  reports  of  criminal 
statistics,  etc.,  from  the  police  justices,  which  was  contained  in  the  law  of  1873, 
and  which  resulted  in  placing  useful  information  before  the  public  was  by  ap- 
parent inadvertence  omitted  from  the  law  of  1896.  Yet  the  justices  of  the  courts, 
under  this  law,  have  wisely  and  patriotically  continued  the  reports. 

»  Art.  26,  Sec.  17. 

8  It  is  but  justice  to  Mayor  Strong  —  who  was  not  elected  by  a  mere  party  vote 
—  to  say  that  the  police  justices  he  appointed  were  not  all  of  one  party,  that  they 
were  lawyers  of  ability  and  good  character,  and  that  the  police  administration 
has  been  greatly  improved  by  them. 

*  In  the  city  of  Brooklyn,  —  under  the  charter  we  have  referred  to,  —  apparently 
to  get  rid  of  such  evils,  the  appointment  of  police  justices  was  given  to  a  board 
consisting  of  the  mayor,  comptroller,  and  auditor.  But  this  board  acted  as  a  par- 
tisan body ;  it  made  spoils  of  the  appointments,  which  its  members  seem  to  have 
apportioned  among  themselves. 


CONCERNING  JUDICIAL  ADMINISTRATION          443 

could  not  be  secured — save  when  some  great  reform  move- 
ment should  triumph  —  so  long  as  they  should  be  connected 
with  contests  for  the  mayoralty.  Indeed,  the  very  worst  of 
these  justices  —  even  those  whose  indefensible  appointment 
aroused  the  reform  movement  which  elected  Mayor  Strong 
—  were  appointed  by  autocratic,  party-elected  mayors  with 
the  approval  of  their  party. 

Nevertheless,  many  good  people  still  seem  to  think  —  as 
Tammany  and  the  whole  horde  of  mere  politicians  and  par- 
tisans in  both  parties  declare  —  that  such  mayors  are  an 
essential  agency  for  achieving  municipal  reform. 

3.  We  think  it  may  be  said  that  every  mayor  of  New 
York,  within  the  last  fifteen  years,  —  save  Mayor  Hewitt  and 
Mayor  Strong, — has  used  his  power  of  appointing  justices  to 
aid  his  party. 

Naturally  enough,  therefore,  the  state  of  New  York  has, 
of  late,  shown  an  increasing  tendency  in  favor  of  vesting 
more  control  over  the  minor  judicial  officers  in  the  higher 
courts.  Her  amended  constitution  of  1894  declares  that 
"Justices  of  the  peace  and  judges  or  justices  of  inferior 
courts  not  of  record,  and  their  clerks,  may  be  removed  for 
cause,  after  due  notice  and  an  opportunity  of  being  heard, 
by  such  courts  as  are  or  may  be  prescribed  by  law ;  "  and 
the  same  section  of  the  constitution  further  provides  that 
all  judicial  officers  in  cities,  "  save  justices  of  the  peace  and 
district  court  justices,  whose  choice  is  not  otherwise  pro- 
vided for,  may  be  appointed  by  some  local  city  authority"  — 
a  provision  equally  significant  both  as  favoring  judicial  ap- 
pointments and  as  showing  distrust  of  judicial  elections. 
These  provisions  express  a  distrust  of  popular  elections  for 
choosing  minor  judicial  officers;  they  in  substance  tell  us 
that  a  court  is  less  likely  than  a  political  officer,  or  a  politi- 
cal body  of  any  sort,  to  be  influenced  by  party  spirit  in  making 
such  removals ;  they,  in  substance,  say  that  mayors  should 
not  be  allowed  to  be  so  autocratic  as  they  have  been  in  the 
judicial  sphere  —  apparently  taking  notice  of  the  facts  that 
while  mayors  have  appointed  many  bad  justices  they  have 
never  removed  one  of  them,  or  even  condemned  their  gross- 


444  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

est  malfeasance.  They  declare  that  courts  are  better  quali- 
fied than  executive  officers  to  judge  whether  a  justice  ought 
to  be  removed. 

4.  It  has  doubtless  occurred  to  the  reader,  while  accept- 
ing these  reasons  in  favor  of  the  removals  of  inferior  judicial 
officers,  by  the  courts,  that  such  reasons  apply  with  equal 
force  in  favor  of  their  appointment  being  also  made  by  the 
courts.  The  duty  of  appointment  and  that  of  removal 
require  the  same  qualifications  and  involve  the  same  prin- 
ciples. It  seems  very  clear  that  the  higher  courts  are  the 
most  competent  and  independent  authority  for  saying  what 
lawyers  are  worthy  to  hold  seats  in  the  lower,  whether  the 
question  arises  in  a  case  of  an  appointment  or  in  a  case  of 
removal.  The  effect  upon  the  court  itself  of  exercising  such 
a  power  would  seem  to  be  the  same  whether  it  relate  to  an 
appointment  or  a  removal. 

When  the  power  of  removing  justices  shall  be  vested  in 
the  courts  —  so  that  the  politicians  and  bosses  will  no  longer 
have  a  partisan  interest  in  their  having  short  terms  —  we 
may  well  believe  that  these  terms  will  not  be  less  than  ten 
years,  or,  better  still,  that  they  will  be  during  good  behavior 
and  continuing  efficiency,  of  which  the  courts  will  be  the 
judges.  Then  it  will  be  seen  that  the  question  of  removal 
and  the  question  of  appointment  will,  in  most  cases,  be  in 
substance  the  same, — being  in  fact  only  the  question  whether 
a  particular  person  is  fit  to  be  a  justice. 

Ill 

1.  We  have  now  reached  the  important  and  far-reaching 
question  whether  the  justices  and  minor  judicial  officers 
should  not  be  appointed  by  some  of  the  higher  courts. 
Several  points  bearing  on  the  question  are  very  clear. 

(1)  Many  conservative  persons  will  at  first  condemn  such 
appointments  simply  by  reason  of  their  assumed  novelty. 
(2)  This  opposition  will  be  reenforced  by  the  party  mana- 
gers, and  the  whole  horde  of  politicians  and  spoilsmen  who 
desire  the  patronage  and  profits  of  many  judicial  elections 


CONCERNING  JUDICIAL  ADMINISTRATION         445 

in  many  little,  judicial  districts.  (3)  The  criminal  classes, 
the  many  corrupt  interests  which  we  have  shown  to  be  most 
active  and  effective  in  police  justice  elections,  the  unscrupu- 
lous party  leaders,  and  all  the  vile  voters  they  hustle  and 
bribe  to  go  to  the  polls  will  surely  lament  and  bitterly  op- 
pose such  appointments.  (4)  The  managers  of  the  partisan 
primaries  for  nominating  inferior  judicial  officers  would 
suffer  a  great  loss  of  business  and  profits  if  these  officers 
should  be  appointed  by  the  higher  courts. 

2.  On  the  other  hand,  there  does  not  seem  to  be  any 
interest  of  morality,  of  business,  or  of  good  administration 
which  is  likely  to  suffer  from  such  appointments,  unless  it 
be  by  reason  of  their  effect  upon  the  courts  which  shall  make 
them,  —  an  important  matter,  which  we  shall  not  neglect. 
What  other   persons  can  be  so  competent  as  experienced 
judges   to   decide  what   lawyers   are   most  fit  to  be  made 
justices,  or  minor  judges?     Day  by  day  in  the  courts  they 
see  what  are  the  capacity,  sense  of  justice,  and  the  temper 
of  the  members  of  the  Bar.     Nor,  apparently,  can  any  person 
be  more  independent  than  the  judges  for  making  selections 
in  the  public  interest  rather  than  for  party  reasons. 

If  judges  are  most  competent  —  as  the  state  of  New  York 
has  decided  after  various  experiments — for  making  removals, 
why  are  they  not  for  making  appointments?  Few  men,  we 
must  think,  capable  of  freeing  themselves  from  party  bias 
and  traditional  prepossessions,  will  claim  that  a  party-elected, 
executive  officer,  whether  mayor  or  any  other,  knowing  little 
of  judicial  duties  and  of  the  capacity  of  lawyers  for  dis- 
charging them,  is  likely  to  select  so  fit  persons  for  justices 
as  could  be  —  and  probably  would  be  —  selected  by  superior 
court  judges.  All  such  judges  —  inasmuch  as  their  labors 
are  increased  by  the  blunders  and  wrong-doing  of  ignorant 
and  unfaithful  justices  —  have  a  more  direct  interest  than 
any  other  class  of  citizens  in  their  competency  and  fidelity, 
and  a  more  natural  pride  in  having  the  judiciary  in  all  its 
grades  reputable  and  well  qualified. 

3.  It  seems  almost  too  obvious  for  comment  that,  when 
appointed  by  a  permanent,  non-partisan  court,  the  justices 


446  THE   GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

themselves  would  be  far  more  independent  and  courageous 
for  the  fit  discharge  of  their  duties,  especially  in  dealing 
with  bosses,  politicians,  grog-shop  keepers,  gamblers,  and 
corrupt  interests  generally,  than  they  would  if  they  were 
appointed  by  mayors  whom  a  party  vote  has  elected  for  a 
term  of  only  two  or  three  years,  —  a  vote  which  these  classes 
greatly  influence.  These  justices  need  to  be  independent 
and  fearless  enough  to  condemn  the  most  desperate  party 
bullies  and  electioneerers  whom  the  worst  mayoralty  candi- 
date may  have  employed  to  aid  his  own  election.  Think 
of  having  all  of  the  criminal  justices  in  a  vast  city  the 
appointees  of  a  partisan  mayor,  as  might  be  the  case  now 
in  the  Greater  New  York  if  the  Tammany  mayor  could 
remove  as  well  as  appoint  them. 

4.  Who  can  fail  to  see  that  it  would  have  a  salutary  effect 
upon  the  Bar  to  have  all  its  members  feel  that  if  they  would 
gain  seats  in  the  minor  courts,  the  essential  condition  is  not 
that  they  secure  the  favor  of  the  supreme  boss,  of  basest  inter- 
ests, or  of  the  vilest  voters,  but  that  they  command  the  con- 
fidence of  the  judges  of  the  higher  courts — in  short,  that 
they  look  up  and  not  down  for  strength  and  promotion  ? 1 

It  should  be  stated  here  that  we  are  not  speaking  of  police 
justices  merely,  but  of  civil  justices,  justices  of  the  peace, 
and  other  officers  more  or  less  judicial — especially  in  munici- 
palities.2 

IV 

1.  Turning  now  to  the  question  of  precedent,  we  shall 
find  the  appointment  of  inferior  judicial  officers  by  the  higher 

1  Ex-Mayor  Hewitt  of  New  York  was  so  impressed  with  the  superior  fitness 
of  the  higher  courts  for  choosing  police  justices,  and  the  advantage  of  having 
them  do  so,  that  in  his  message  of  Jan.  17,  1888,  he  recommended  that  no  one 
nominated  for  such  justice  be  allowed  to  take  office  until  a  majority  of  the  jus- 
tices of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  district  should  certify  to  his  good  standing  and 
competency  for  the  office. 

2  The  same  methods,  which  we  shall  explain,  may,  with  some  modifications, 
also  be  applied  to  the  selection  of  city  (and  county)  clerks,  registers,  and  various 
other  officers  —  such  as  sheriffs,  district  attorneys,  coroners,  and  constables — 
connected  with  the  administration  of  justice.    Whether  some  of  the  judges  of  the 
Inferior  courts  of  record  should  be  appointed  in  the  same  manner  can  be  de- 
cided after  adequate  experience  in  a  more  limited  sphere. 


CONCERNING  JUDICIAL   ADMINISTRATION          447 

judges — or  by  the  courts  —  to  be  by  no  means  the  novelty 
which  some  people  seem  to  suppose.  The  constitution  of 
the  United  States  authorizes  Congress  to  confer  an  appoint- 
ing power  upon  the  courts  of  law  —  a  power  which  has  been 
conferred  and  exercised,  as  we  shall  soon  see,  with  salutary 
results  from  early  days  of  the  government.  The  power 
which  state  constitutions  confer  on  the  courts  to  appoint  and 
remove  the  clerks  and  other  officers  who  serve  under  them 
goes  far  toward  being  a  precedent  for  extending  this  power 
to  the  appointment  of  justices  ;  for  justices  must  conform 
to  the  judgments  of  these  courts,  accept  their  construction  of 
the  law,  and  are,  therefore,  in  an  important  sense  their  subor- 
dinates. It  would  obviously  greatly  tend  to  harmony  and 
vigor  in  the  whole  judicial  system,  if  the  higher  judicial  offi- 
cers should  appoint  the  lower.  Those  who  insist  that  the 
mayor  should  appoint  all  the  lower  executive  officers  in  a 
city  in  order  to  secure  harmony,  ought  to  be  able  to  see  that 
harmony  is  at  least  as  much  needed  in  the  judicial  department 
as  in  the  executive  department. 

We  have  seen  that  the  reasons  which  make  it  proper  for 
courts  to  remove  justices  and  other  minor  judicial  officers,  in 
principle  apply  in  favor  of  such  courts  appointing  them  — 
a  view  which  the  New  York  constitution  of  1894  seems  to 
approve.  It  is  impossible  to  hold  that  to  remove  justices  is  a 
judicial  function,  but  that  to  appoint  them  is  not.  It  seems 
almost  absurd  to  claim  that  a  court  competent  for  removing 
a  justice  is  not  competent  to  name  his  successor.  There  is 
something  grotesque  in  insisting  that  the  vacancy  caused  by 
the  act  of  a  court  should  fall  to  a  partisan  primary  or  a  party- 
elected  mayor  to  be  filled. 


1.  The  substance  of  the  objections  that  can  be  made 
against  appointments  by  the  courts  seems  to  be  these  : 
(1)  that  such  appointments  are  not  within  the  legitimate 
functions  of  such  tribunals ;  (2)  that  they  are  contrary  to 
American  constitutional  and  republican  principles  and  prece- 
dents ;  (3)  that  they  would  tend  to  involve  the  judges  in 


448  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

political  contention,  and  to  impair  the  independence  of  the 
courts ;  (4)  that  there  is  too  much  danger  of  vicious  practi- 
cal results  following  such  appointments,  to  warrant  even  a 
trial  of  them. 

Let  us  consider  these  objections.  In  the  early  develop- 
ment of  governments  the  appointing  power  was  a  prerogative 
of  kings,  and  extended  to  civil,  military,  and  ecclesiastical 
affairs.  He  made  appointments  at  pleasure,  alike  in  the 
executive  and  judicial  sphere  —  if  we  should  not  rather  say 
these  spheres  were  one  and  undivided.  Many  of  his  ap- 
pointees —  like  the  king  himself  —  were  both  executive  and 
judicial  officers.  One  of  the  great  advances  of  liberty  and 
justice  has  consisted  of  the  differentiation  of  the  executive 
and  judicial  departments  from  each  other  —  which  no  form 
of  government  so  early  and  plainly  declared,  or  so  largely 
effected,  as  the  constitution  of  the  United  States.  Hence, 
we  have  so  earnestly  insisted  that  the  creation  of  autocratic, 
or  kingly,  mayors  is  anti-republican  and  a  retrogression 
toward  despotic  times  and  royal  principles  and  methods. 

2.  When  the  framers  of  this  constitution  came  to  deal  with 
the  appointing  power,  they  dissented  widely  from  the  auto- 
cratic and  kingly  theory  on  the  subject.  They  required  all 
the  most  important  nominations  to  be  made  not  "  at  pleas- 
ure," as  under  recent  autocratic  mayors,  but  subject  to  the 
confirmation  of  the  Senate  —  a  great  limitation  of  executive 
power,  and  a  great  extension  of  legislative  power.  They 
further  provided  for  limiting  the  old  kingly  power  in  two 
other  important  particulars.  Congress  was  authorized  to 
vest  the  appointment  of  such  inferior  officers  as  they  should 
think  proper,  (1)  in  the  heads  of  departments,  and  (2)  in 
the  "courts  of  law."1  Here  seems  to  be  a  decision  of  the 
main  questions  we  are  considering,  —  a  decision  by  what  we 
may  fairly  call  the  highest  authority  on  the  subject  of  repub- 
lican principles  —  the  constitution  of  the  United  States.  It 
declares,  in  substance,  that  the  appointment  of  inferior  judi- 
cial officers  is  not  an  executive  function  fit  for  an  executive 
officer  to  monopolize,  but  is  a  judicial  function  fit  for  the 

i  See  U.S.  Const.,  Art.  2,  Sec.  2. 


CONCERNING  JUDICIAL   ADMINISTRATION          449 

courts  to  possess  and  exercise.  There  were,  before,  no  impor- 
tant precedents,  save  those .  of  royalty,  as  to  what  power  of 
appointment  courts  should  have,  or  as  to  what  functions  are 
legitimately  judicial.  No  precedent  since  is  entitled  to  equal 
weight  in  a  republic. 

3.  The  authority  to  vest  this  appointing  power  in  the 
national  courts  was  exercised  by  Congress  in  the  early  days 
of  the  republic.  Appointments  under  it  have  been  made  by  the 
courts  ever  since,  on  a  large  scale  and  with  admirable  results. 
We  have  space  for  illustrations  of  these  results  only  in  regard 
to  a  single  class  of  officers,  but  they  are  so  exactly  applicable 
and  decisive  as  to  be  all  we  need.  The  United  States  com- 
missioners, for  acting  as  magistrates,  who  throughout  the 
country  are  appointed  by  the  Circuit  Courts  of  the  United 
States,1  have  not  only,  in  substance,  all  the  powers  of  both  the 
police  justices  and  justices  of  the  peace,  as  connected  with 
crime,  but  much  larger  and  more  varied  powers  than  those 
officers  possess.  They  exercise  them  in  all  the  states  and  cities 
of  the  Union.  They  may  cause  offenders  against  the  laws  of 
the  United  States  to  be  arrested,  held  to  bail,  and,  in  proper 
cases,  imprisoned  on  their  warrant  —  their  power  covering 
substantially  the  whole  sphere  of  the  primary  judicial  admin- 
istration of  the  nation.  The  judicial  appointment  of  these 
commissioners  began  soon  after  the  organization  of  the  gov- 
ernment, and  they  have  so  well  discharged  their  functions 
that  their  powers  have  been  several  times  enlarged.2  We  are 
not  aware  that  it  has  ever  been  even  charged  that  the  circuit 
judges,  or  district  judges  sitting  in  the  circuits,  have  been 
less  useful  or  trustworthy  by  reason  of  having  this  appoint- 
ing power,  or  that  any  competent  judges  have  thought  it 
would  be  better  to  have  these  commissioners  elected  by 
popular  vote  or  appointed  by  a  mayor.  On  the  contrary, 
the  uniform  intelligence,  fidelity,  and  justice  with  which  these 
commissioners,  even  in  great  cities,  have  discharged  their  man- 
ifold functions  have  been  generally  in  such  striking  contrast 

1  The  district  judges  of  the  United  States  were  also  early  authorized  to  appoint 
very  different  classes  of  commissioners.     U.  S.  Laws,  1794,  Ch.  64. 

2  U.  S.  Rev.  Stat.,  pp.  627,  727,  1014,  1042. 

2o 


450  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

with  the  doings  of  the  elected,  city  justices  as  to  make  it  a 
fit  object  of  wonder  that  even  party  spirit  could  have  caused 
our  cities  to  continue  their  vicious  methods. 

We  are  unable  to  learn  that  within  the  more  than  three 
generations  since  there  have  been  such  commissioners  at  New 
York  City  there  has  been  any  noticeable  case  of  malfeasance 
on  the  part  of  any  one  of  them.1  We  cannot  expect  that 
these  facts  will  much  affect  the  party  bosses  and  mercenary 
leaders  who  thrive  on  the  prostitution  of  judicial  power  in 
American  cities.  But  we  may  trust  that  they  will  make  it 
clear  to  disinterested  and  patriotic  minds  what  direction  mu- 
nicipal reform  should  take  in  the  judicial  sphere.  It  seems 
to  be  about  equally  evident  that  to  appoint  minor  judicial 
officers  is  a  judicial  function  fit  for  courts  to  exercise,  and 
that  it  is  greatly  in  the  public  interest  to  have  them  do  so. 
The  vicious  power  of  party  machines  and  party  managers 
would  thereby  be  greatly  diminished;  many  demoralizing  and 
needless  elections  would  be  suppressed  ;  the  prostitution  of 
criminal  administration  for  party  ends  would  be  far  more 
difficult. 

VI 

1.  While  it  thus  seems  quite  clear  that  a  court  may  exer- 
cise an  appointing  power  without  damage  to  itself,  and  with- 
out impairing  public  confidence,  it  is  obvious  that  such  evils 
would  be  most  likely  to  arise  when  the  power  is  constantly 

1  A  judge  —  Judge  Brown  of  the  United  States  District  Court  —who  has  for 
more  than  fifteen  years  been  in  the  habit  of  sharing  in  the  appointment  of  these 
commissioners,  and  of  holding  circuit  courts  in  New  York  City,  has  declared  in  a 
letter  to  the  author  that  there  have  not  been  any  difficulties  growing  out  of  any  of 
these  appointments.  He  says,  "I  do  not  know  of  any  instance  in  which  any 
complaint  of  improper  conduct  has  been  made  concerning  any  one  of  the  commis- 
sioners." 

Hon.  Hoyt  H.  Wheeler,  for  many  years  the  Judge  of  the  United  States  District 
Court  for  Vermont,  has  kindly  read  this  chapter.  He  has  authorized  the  writer 
to  say  that  he  has  found  the  appointment  of  commissioners  by  judges  to  be  salu- 
tary, and  that  he  thinks  the  method  of  appointment  proposed  in  the  text  could 
have  no  injurious  effect  upon  the  judges  who  should  make  such  appointments.  It 
may  be  said  that  state  judges,  whose  terms  are  not  very  long,  would  be  more  in- 
fluenced than  United  States  judges,  by  party  interests.  If  this  be  in  a  strict 
•ense  true,  we  cannot  think  that  influence  would  be  at  all  important  under  con- 
ditions of  making  appointments  we  shall  proceed  to  set  lurtu. 


CONCERNING  JUDICIAL   ADMINISTRATION          451 

vested  in  the  same  courts,  and  is  to  be  so  exercised  that  the 
office-seekers  and  party  manipulators  can  at  all  times  know 
what  judges  are  to  wield  it,  and  consequently  who  can  be 
most  usefully  solicited.  It  would,  therefore,  be  a  great  gain 
if  we  can  by  some  method  —  as  by  the  lot,  in  a  way  analo- 
gous to  the  use  of  the  lot  in  drawing  of  jurors  —  make  it 
impossible  to  know  in  advance  what  judges  will  make  the 
appointments. 

Now,  it  is  quite  feasible  to  do  this,  and  thus  have  the 
judges  wholly  unaffected  until  almost  the  hour  of  exercising 
the  function  of  appointment.  Difficulties  which  attend  the 
drawing  of  jurors  would  not  exist,  for  in  drawing  judges 
we  know  that  every  one  is  competent  before  he  is  drawn. 
No  one  can  object  to  his  serving  on  a  Board  of  Judicial 
Appointment  and  Removal,  nor  can  he  decline  to  do  so.1 

2.  The  method  we  propose,  taking  New  York  City  for  an 
illustration,  can  be  briefly  stated.  There  are,  we  believe, 
twenty-two  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court  whose  place  of 
service  is  the  City  of  New  York,  and  their  term  of  office  is 
fourteen  years.  Whenever  there  is  an  occasion  for  making 
an  appointment  of  a  justice  or  for  a  removal,  let  the  names 
of  these  judges 2  be  placed  in  a  box  by  the  proper  officer,  — 
as  the  names  of  the  jurymen  would  be  before  a  trial  in  the 
ordinary  course,  —  and  from  these  names  let  the  names  of 
three  judges  be  publicly  drawn.  The  judges  so  selected  are 
to  constitute  a  Board  of  Judicial  Appointment  and  Removal 
—  for  the  occasion.  Every  new  Board  which  may  from 
time  to  time  be  required  can  be  promptly  selected  in  the 
same  way.  Every  such  Board  should  proceed,  only  in  open 
public  session,  to  hold  its  meetings ;  it  should  make  the 
appointments  or  removals  required  with  all  practicable 
despatch. 

There  should  be  public  records  of  its  proceedings  ;  all 
papers  considered  by  the  Board  or  any  judge  should  be 

1  And  here  we  may  say  that  there  is  as  much  need  for  selecting  judges  by  lot 
for  making  removals  as  there  is  for  making  appointments. 

2  The  judges  of  any  other  convenient  and  appropriate  court  could  he  selected. 
They  need  not  all  be  from  the  same  court.    Their  number  should  be  four  or  five 
times  greater  than  the  number  of  judges  to  be  drawn. 


452  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

treated  as  part  thereof  ;  the  vote  given  by  every  judge  on 
the  Hoard  should  be  shown  in  such  records.  The  first  meeting 
of  the  Board  should  be  held  within,  say,  five  days  or  earlier 
after  its  creation,  and  its  appointments  should  be  completed 
within  five  days  thereafter.  Its  formal  certificate,  signed  by 
two  or  more  of  its  members,  should  be  effective  as  a  valid 
appointment  of  the  person  therein  named  to  the  office  therein 
designated.  The  Board  should  cease  to  exist  upon  the  com- 
pletion of  the  required  appointments  or  removals.1 

3.  There  seems  to  be  no  opportunity  for  any  partisan, 
or  other  vicious,  combination  to  be  made  effective  for  in- 
fluencing the  judges  before  their  names  are  drawn  for  the 
Boards ;  and  we  are  unable  to  see  how  the  judges  who  may 
compose  it  can  be  in  any  way  demoralized  by  the  public  dis- 
charge of  functions  so  honorable,  public,  and  responsible. 
Every  judge  in  his  ordinary  experience  is  exposed  to  far 
greater  temptations   and  intimidations  —  than  would  arise 
under  these  Boards  —  at  the  hands  of  desperate  criminals, 
great  politicians,  and  rich  litigants  before  him  —  and  so  are 
jurymen.     Cannot  our  judges  be  trusted  to  resist  as  much 
temptation   as  besets  every  man   who   serves   on   a  jury? 
From  the  moment  of  the  selection  of  the  members  of  the 
Board,  the  scrutiny  of  the  public  press  will  be  upon  them. 
Unlike  mayors,  they  can  have  no  recent  election  pledges  to 
redeem;   and  nothing  but  disgrace  can  be  expected  from 
infidelity  in  the  choice  of  justices. 

4.  On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  probable  that  every  lawyer 
who  seeks  a  justiceship  or  other  office  through  such  a  method 
of  appointment,  will  feel  the  salutary  need  of  showing  a  ca- 
pacity and  of  establishing  a  reputation  which  the  high  officers 
of  justice  can  approve  and  reward,  instead  of  a  need  of  win- 
ning the  favor  of  corrupt  interests  or  machine  politicians. 
It  is  for  the  reader  to  decide  whether  justices  thus  appointed 

1  As  most  of  the  judges  would  have  been  elected  several  years  before  any  one 
of  them  would  be  called  to  serve  on  such  a  Board,  it  cannot  be  said  that  their 
elections  would  be  effected  by  such  a  possibility.  Yet  to  exclude  all  possible 
influence  of  the  kind,  it  may  be  provided  that  the  name  of  no  judge  shall  be  placed 
in  the  box  for  the  drawing  who  has  not  been  at  least  one  year  in  office,  or  whose 
official  term  — if  he  is  eligible  for  a  reelection  —  will  expire  within  one  year. 


CONCERNING  JUDICIAL   ADMINISTRATION          453 

are  not  likely  to  be  far  more  independent  for  the  fit  discharge 
of  their  duties  than  justices  who  have  gained  their  places 
through  a  primary  nomination,  the  favor  of  a  mayor,  or  the 
vote  of  a  party.1 

VII 

1.  It  may  be  objected  that  the  lot  is  too  mechanical  or 
undignified  a  proceeding  for  the  use  proposed;  but  let  us 

1  There  are  various  points  of  importance  connected  with  these  Boards  which  we 
have  no  space  to  consider  save  in  a  note.  (1)  The  law  should  carefully  define 
what  judges  or  other  officers  or  class  of  persons  should  be  among  those  whose 
names  should  go  into  the  box  from  which  the  drawings  should  be  made.  Their 
numbers  should  be  obviously  several  times  greater  than  the  number  to  be  drawn. 
The  judges  need  not  all  be  members  of  the  same  court  or  all  be  residents  of  the 
same  district  as  the  officer  to  be  appointed  or  removed.  It  should  be  provided 
that  no  mere  irregularity  or  matter  of  form  should  invalidate  any  proceeding, 
and  perhaps  that  no  proceedings  should  be  taken  to  question  the  title  of  any 
officer  so  appointed  after  he  has  entered  upon  his  office  or  after  ten  days  suc- 
ceeding his  appointment;  (2)  five  judges  instead  of  three  may  be  drawn  for  a 
Board,  though  we  think  it  undesirable,  as  it  would  weaken  the  individual  sense 
of  responsibility ;  (3)  in  case  of  relatively  unimportant  appointments  or  removals 
—  as  of  city  constables  and  marshals — a  single  judge  may  be  made  the  appoint- 
ing power  or  a  Board  may  be  drawn  from  among  the  police  justices ;  (4)  in  cases 
when  certain  officers  not  strictly,  or  in  fact,  judicial  are  to  be  appointed,  —  as,  for 
example,  sheriffs  and  county  clerks,  — a  part  of  the  members  of  the  Board  may  be 
drawn  from  among  the  members  of  the  city  council  who  have  been  at  least  three 
years  in  office ;  (5)  if  it  should  be  thought  desirable,  it  would  be  possible  to  pro- 
vide for  stated  sessions  of  such  Boards;  (6)  perhaps  for  the  choice  of  certain 
police  officers  or  fire  department  officers,  an  appointing  Board  might  be  drawn  by 
lot — wholly,  or  in  part  —  from  among  the  officers  of  those  departments;  (7)  it 
is  obvious  that  in  the  case  of  such  officers  as  coroners  and  surgeons  of  police,  a 
Board  may  be  selected  jointly  from  among  members  of  the  council,  and  from  phy- 
sicians serving  public  institutions ;  (8)  it  may  be  a  question  whether  the  Board 
should  refuse  to  take  notice  of  nominations  for  the  offices  they  are  to  fill,  or 
should,  on  the  other  hand,  give  an  opportunity  for  a  very  brief  hearing  or  state- 
ments in  writing  for  and  against  the  merits  of  the  nominees.  We  think  it  should 
notice  nominations,  if  the  conditions  of  doing  so  shall  be  carefully  defined,  and 
provided  the  nominations  are  not  made  by  or  on  behalf  of  any  party.  Nomina- 
tions should  be  required  to  be  made  by  certificates  in  writing  substantially  in 
the  form  suggested  for  free  nominations  in  municipal  elections.  Final  action 
should  be  taken  on  any  nomination  within  three  days  after  it  is  made.  But  the 
Boards  should  have  a  full  authority  to  make  appointments  outside  of  any  nomi- 
nations; (9)  all  papers  placed  before  the  Board,  or  considered  in  reference  to 
any  appointment,  should  be  regarded  as  public  records;  (10)  every  member  of 
the  Board  should  be  required  to  vote  on  every  nomination ;  (11)  it  should  be 
understood  that  the  prohibitions  hereinbefore  advised  against  making  municipal 
appointments  or  removals  for  party  reasons  are  applicable  to  those  we  are  now 
considering. 


454  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

not  forget  its  glorious  associations  with  justice  and  the  courts 
wherever  trial  by  jury  has  been  the  bulwark  of  liberty.  The 
lot  is  in  fact  almost  an  ideal  remedy  where  unscrupulous 
politicians,  under  the  pretence  of  serving  the  people  or  of 
devotion  to  party  principles,  really  conspire  with  each  other 
for  the  corrupt  control  of  the  elections.  The  history  of  the 
Grecian  and  Italian  republics  contain  instructive  lessons  on 
this  subject.1  But  we  need  not  go  beyond  our  own  experi- 
ence, in  times  before  party  rule  had  degraded  our  municipal 
governments,  to  find  dignified  precedents  for  what  we  sug- 
gest as  to  the  use  of  the  lot.  The  ninth  of  the  Articles  of 
Confederation  provided,  as  to  the  selection  of  judges  or 
commissioners  for  settling  disputes  between  states,  that 
where  a  choice  could  not  be  reached  by  agreement,  the  selec- 
tion of  the  judges  and  commissioners  should  be  made  by  lot, 
in  the  way  which  is  clearly  set  forth.  It  was  provided  in 
the  first  constitution  of  Maryland,  adopted  in  1776,  that 
when  candidates  for  governor  or  for  the  Senate  should  have 
an  equal  number  of  votes,  after  two  ballots,  the  choice 
between  them  should  be  decided  by  lot.  The  party  zealots 
of  our  time  would  very  likely  prefer  —  to  such  a  decision  — 
that  a  corrupting  partisan  contest  should  continue  through 
an  entire  session,  though  the  state  should  be  without  its 
needed  officers  for  a  whole  year.2  One  of  the  commissioners 
provided  for  in  each  of  two  different  articles  of  the  Jay 
Treaty  with  England  was  selected  by  lot,  and  so  was  one  of 
the  arbitrators  in  a  controversy  between  the  United  States 

1  Of  all  the  mediaeval  republics  that  of  Venice  showed  the  most  sagacity  in 
government,  and  consequently  longest  avoided  falling  a  prey  to  corruption  and 
party  despotism.    Her  use  of  the  lot  in  selecting  the  members  of  the  commission 
who  elected  the  doge,  or  mayor,  is  interesting.    The  commission  first  drawn  by 
lot  named  another ;  this  was  reduced  by  lot  to  one-fourth ;  and  this  named  a  third ; 
and  by  such  alternate  operations  of  lot  and  election  there  was  at  length  secured 
a  last  commission  of  forty-one  members,  who  could  elect  a  doge  by  a  majority  of 
twenty-five  suffrages.    Sismondi,  Italian  Rep.,  pp.  109, 110.    Mr.  Adams  seems  to 
make  the  process  even  more  complicated.    1  Adams's  DP/.  Const.,  pp.  62,  63. 

2  To  bring  about  the  original  classification  of  the  members  of  the  United  States 
Senate,  provided  for  by  the  national  constitution  (Art.  1,  Sec.  3),  these  members, 
though  elected  for  the  full  term  of  six  years,  were — and  so  have  senators  from 
new  states  since  been  —  required  to  submit  to  a  decision  by  lot  as  to  whether  their 
terms  shall  be,  in  fact,  six  years,  four  years,  or  only  two  yean. 


CONCERNING  JUDICIAL  ADMINISTRATION         455 

and  England  under  the  Treaty  of  Ghent.1  A  law  of  Penn- 
sylvania, enacted  in  1872,  after  providing  for  choosing  in  the 
ordinary  way  six  members  of  a  committee  on  a  contested 
election  case  in  the  state  Senate,  declares  that  the  seventh 
shall  be  chosen  through  the  agency  of  the  lot  from  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Senate,  but  under  provisions  too  complicated  to 
be  stated  here.2 

It  is  not,  perhaps,  too  much  too  hope  that  when  a  desire  to 
promote  the  public  interests  by  suppressing  needless  party 
contention  shall  become  stronger  than  a  desire  for  mere  party 
gain,  a  much  larger  use  than  heretofore  will  be  made  of  the 
lot,  and  with  great  public  advantage. 

VIII 

1.  It  seems  as  if  the   method  proposed  for   appointing 
justices  might  be  peculiarly  beneficial  for  the  selection  of 
such  officers  as  district  attorneys,  sheriffs,  coroners,  county 
clerks,   and  registers  of  conveyances.     Every  one  of  these 
officers  is  unfit  for  his  place   in  the   degree  that  he  is  a 
partisan,  or  seeks  to  favor  one  party  or  faction  rather  than 
another.     The  facts  are  familiar  that  the  elections  of  these 
officers  are  not  only  needless,  but  are  generally  demoraliz- 
ing rather  than  elevating.     They  rarely  involve  principles, 
but  are  generally  decisive  as  to  much  patronage  and  party 
influence. 

2.  The  criminal  and  depraved  classes  are  very  directly 
and  effectively  interested  in  the  election  of  district  attor- 
neys and  sheriffs,  while  the  conscious  interest  of  the  better 
class  of  voters  in   them   is   only   indirect  and  remote  —  a 
condition  highly  unfavorable  to  good  results  from  popular 
elections. 

Hardly  any  method  of  choosing  a  district  attorney  could 
be  worse  than  those  popular  elections  which  strongly  tempt 
the  candidates  to  solicit  the  votes  of  the  criminal  and  de- 


1  International  Arbitration  Papers,  1896,  pp.  3,  26,  28,  33. 

2  Perm.  Law,  February,  1872 ;  Buckalew's  Pro.  Rep.,  p.  243.    A  New  York  law 
of  1897,  Ch.  414,  Sec.  57,  also  appeals  to  the  lot  for  a  decision. 


456  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

praved  classes,  which  such  officers  have  a  duty  to  restrain, 
and  cause  these  classes  to  make  the  utmost  efforts  for  plac- 
ing the  candidates  under  obligations  to  themselves.  Who 
can  tell  how  many  prosecutions  are  dropped,  or  how  often 
evidence  is  allowed  to  be  defective,  by  district  attorneys, 
pursuant  to  preelection  pledges  made  to  secure  the  ballots 
of  the  vilest  voters?  Who  can  fail  to  see  how  much  more 
independent  and  courageous  for  their  duties  these  officers 
would  be  if  they  received  their  appointments  from  the  higher 
courts?  So  long  as  district  attorneys  in  great  cities  are 
elected  for  short  terms  by  popular  vote,  we  may  almost  dis- 
trust the  capacity  of  their  people  for  local  self-government, 
and  feel  certain  they  cannot  have  that  which  is  really 
good. 

Next  to  the  election  of  these  officers  by  popular  vote,  per- 
haps the  worst  possible  method  for  choosing  them  is  through 
an  appointment  by  the  mayor.  This  method  stimulates  the 
vile,  corrupt,  and  criminal  classes  to  the  utmost  activity  for 
that  mayoralty  candidate  who  will  promise  them  the  sort  of 
prosecuting  officer  they  desire.  It  is  too  plain  for  argument 
that  no  persons  can  be  more  competent  or  independent  for 
selecting  a  district  attorney,  or  removing  him,  than  the  judges 
of  the  courts  in  whose  presence  his  most  serious  functions 
are  discharged.  Who  can  doubt  that  a  district  attorney, 
selected  as  we  have  proposed,  would  be  far  more  dreaded  by 
the  criminal  classes  in  our  cities  than  any  elected  attorney 
has  ever  been?  We  need  not  stop  to  show  that  most  of 
these  considerations  are  as  applicable  to  the  choice  of  sheriffs 
as  they  are  to  the  choice  of  district  attorneys. 

3.  A  coroner,  if  not  in  a  very  strict  sense  a  judicial  officer, 
certainly  has  functions  of  a  judicial  nature,  which  require  a 
non-partisan  spirit,  a  judicial  frame  of  mind,  and  considerable 
knowledge  of  law  for  their  fit  performance.  It  hardly  need 
be  said  that  his  political  opinions  and  party  affiliations  are 
utterly  immaterial  for  the  proper  discharge  of  his  duties,  or 
that  so  far  as  he  is  a  politician  he  is  unfit  for  his  position. 
For  securing  those  qualities,  or  that  knowledge  of  surgery 
and  medicine  which  is  needed  in  the  office  of  coroner, 


CONCERNING  JUDICIAL  ADMINISTRATION         457 

hardly  any  method  of  choosing  him  could  be  more  unsuitable 
than  a  popular  election,  and  hardly  any  could  be  better  than 
some  appointing  Board  of  the  kind  we  have  suggested.  Our 
elective  method  for  choosing  coroners  seems  almost  to  imply 
a  paramount  intent  to  screen  the  guilt  of  partisan  bullies, 
and  to  use  the  power  of  political  doctors  in  the  coroner's 
office  for  party  advantage.1  It  is  important,  in  aid  of  jus- 
tice and  sound  legal  procedure,  that  one  of  the  police  justices, 
or  some  judge,  should  be  associated  with  the  coroners  in 
holding  of  inquests,  especially  in  cases  of  a  suspicious  char- 
acter, or  involving  legal  questions.  Proceedings  connected 
with  the  coroner's  inquest  are  often  disgraceful. 

4.  Since  the  foregoing  was  written,  the  New  York  legis- 
latures of  1895  and  1896  —  bodies  remarkable  for  the  domi- 
nation of  party  spirit  and  their  subserviency  to  the  despotic 
and  demoralizing  leadership  of  a  partisan  boss  —  have  pro- 
vided for  thirteen  local  districts  for  courts  of  minor  civil 
jurisdiction  in  New  York  City,  whose  thirteen  justices  are 
made  elective  —  one  in  each  district  —  for  the  term  of  only 
six  years,  the  law  lamentably  failing  to  provide  for  any 
common  or  just  rules  of  procedure  in  the  holding  courts  on 
the  part  of  these  justices,  thus  allowing  the  continuance  of 
abuses  which  have  long  been  discreditable  to  these  tribunals 
and  unjust  to  poor  suitors. 

And  worse  still,  these  legislatures  provided  for  the  election 
of  coroners,  county  clerks,  comptrollers,  district  attorneys, 
registers,  and  sheriffs,  in  New  York  City,  for  the  term  of 
only  two  years  —  shorter  terms  even  than  some  of  these  offi- 
cers had  previously.  Thus  the  ruling  party  and  faction  of 
the  state  of  New  York  seems  resolved  to  extend  the  party, 
short-term  system,  and  make  it  easy  to  increase  party  des- 


1  So  intolerably  incompetent  and  unfaithful  were  some  of  the  partisan  doctors 
whom  the  ruling  city  party  elected  to  be  coroners  when  the  writer  was  counsel  to 
the  New  York  Board  of  Health  (1866-70),  that  he  was  called  upon  to  prepare 
an  ordinance  which  largely  subordinated  the  coroners  to  that  body, — thus  impos- 
ing a  salutary  restraint,  —  which  remained  in  force  until  the  constitution  of  1894 
repealed  the  provision  requiring  coroners  to  be  elected  by  popular  vote.  The 
legislature  has  now  authority  to  require  them  to  be  appointed  for  long  terms  by 
some  such  methods  as  we  have  suggested. 


458  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

potisrn  and  to  revive  several  of  the  gravest  abuses  we  have 
considered.1 

5.  We  have  seen  how  utterly  unfit  it  is  to  elect  any  one  of 
the  six  officers  last  mentioned,  —  save  perhaps  the  comp- 
troller, —  how  much  the  public  interest  requires  that  their 
terms  of  office  should  be  during  efficiency  and  good  behavior, 
and  how  clear  it  is  that  their  political  opinions  are  immaterial. 
Yet,  here  are  provisions  intended  —  and  sure  —  to  lead  to  mere 
party  contests  over  their  selection  every  two  years.  Nearly 
half  a  million  voters  are  to  be  called  to  the  polls  to  elect 
these  officers,  whose  nomination  will  be  dictated  by  party 
managers,  or  sold  by  a  party  boss.  Until  it  shall  be  im- 
possible to  enact  such  laws  for  New  York  City,  it  will  be 
impossible  for  it  to  have  a  good  city  government.  The  law 
providing  for  these  two-year  terms  ought  to  be  entitled,  "  An 
Act  for  making  City-Party  management  profitable,  and  for 
removing  city  officers  as  soon  as  they  become  competent  for 
their  duties."  2 

IX 

1.  As  every  popular  election  which  involves  no  political 
principles,  or  only  seeks  to  put  administrative  capacity  into 
office,  not  merely  causes  great  and  needless  expense  for  a 
city,  and  much  trouble  on  the  part  of  the  voters,  but  in- 
creases the  power  and  profits  of  vicious  party  managers,  it 
is  doubly  important  to  supersede  them  by  better  methods  of 
choice.  We  may  find  conspicuous  instances  of  such  evils  in 
the  popular  elections  of  city  and  county  clerks  and  of  regis- 
ters of  conveyances.  Their  duties  require  no  kind  of  poli- 
tics, but  merely  the  character  and  capacity  to  be  found  in  the 
administrative  positions  of  almost  every  large  business  firm 
and  corporation.  A  long  term  for  these  officers  and  absten- 
tion from  party  management  are  essential  for  serving  the 


1  Laws,  1895,  Ch.  826;  Laws,  1896,  Ch.  715. 

2  In  presence  of  such  ominous  tendencies,  we  may  recall  the  facts  that  party 
rule  in  Florence  reduced  the  terms  of  the  officers  of  her  chief  magistracy  not 
merely  to  two  years  but  to  two  months,  and  that  in  Athens  it  caused  senators  to 
serve  for  only  the  tenth  of  a  year,  and  generals  for  only  a  single  day  continuously. 


CONCERNING  JUDICIAL  ADMINISTRATION         459 

people  most  usefully.  Under  sound  municipal  conditions, 
these  officers  would  have  no  active  relation  with  party  poli- 
tics. It  is  only  through  a  perversion  of  their  official  func- 
tions that  they  can  be  made  an  advantage  to  any  party. 
The  existing  practices  as  to  these  matters  not  only  dis- 
honor the  creative  genius  of  the  American  people,  but  are  a 
grotesque  example  of  partisan  infatuation  and  blindness.1 
All  the  secret  and  corrupt  methods  of  our  party,  primary, 
and  election  system  are  at  great  expense  needlessly  put  into 
operation,  when  perhaps  two  hundred  thousand  or  more 
voters  go  to  the  polls  in  New  York  City  to  elect  even 
clerical  officers.  The  very  methods  of  their  choice  exclude 
the  most  worthy  men  who  would  gladly  serve  the  people,  and 
deprive  those  selected  of  much  of  the  business  independence 
essential  for  the  best  discharge  of  their  functions.  If  there 
could  be  any  doubt  that  it  would  be  most  salutary  to  fill 
these  offices  exclusively  by  civil  service  promotions  from 
among  those  in  subordinate  positions,  it  would  seem  to  be 
pretty  clear  that  they  should  be  filled  by  appointments  to 
be  made  by  some  Board  selected  in  the  manner  we  have 
explained. 

2.  If  it  be  objected  that  the  methods  we  have  proposed 
would  not  leave  sufficient  elections  for  city  residents  to  en- 
able them  to  conform  their  government  to  their  will  and 
highest  interests,  the  answer  is  not  difficult.  First,  the  pro- 
posed methods  of  appointment  will  most  facilitate  the  con- 
trol of  city  affairs  by  the  highest  public  opinion.  It  has  been 
an  excessive  number  of  elections  which  has  done  much  to 
disgust  and  discourage  our  patriotic  citizens,  while  making 
the  basest  voters  the  most  active,  and  the  trade  of  corrupt 
political  management  profitable.  Second,  there  would  re- 
main abundant  elections  at  which  city  residents  could  vote, 
and  in  which  all  their  local,  as  well  as  all  their  highest,  in- 
terests will  be  involved:  (1)  elections  of  presidents  and  vice 
presidents;  (2)  elections  of  members  of  Congress;  (3)  elec- 

1  The  state  of  Kentucky  seems  to  be  now  (1897)  holding  a  state  election  for 
the  single  purpose  of  choosing  a  clerk  of  a  court  of  justice  —  one  of  the  most 
absurd  perversions  of  the  party-election  system  yet  exhibited. 


460  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF   MUNICIPALITIES 

tions  of  governors  and  lieutenant  governors;  (4)  elections 
of  judges;  (5)  elections  of  state  senators  and  assemblymen; 
(6)  elections  of  members  of  city  councils  who  control  city 
policy  and  make  all  city  ordinances;  (7)  elections  of  mem- 
bers of  constitutional  conventions.  Therefore  all  officers 
would  remain  elective  who  frame  or  amend  constitutions ; 
who  direct  political  policy ;  who  make,  interpret,  or  repeal 
the  laws ;  who  adopt  city  ordinances ;  who  control  taxa- 
tion ;  or  who  direct  the  expenditure  of  money.  The  great 
loss  of  power  would  not  be  on  the  part  of  the  people,  but  on 
the  part  of  the  despotic  city  parties  or  factions,  their  bosses 
and  leaders  —  who  would  be  deprived  of  most  of  their  unjust 
and  demoralizing  patronage  and  income,  and  consequently  of 
much  of  their  despotic  power  for  perverting  and  prostituting 
municipal  authority. 


THE  CHARTER  OF  THE  GREATER  NEW  YORK     461 


CHAPTER  XVIH.  —  THE  CHARTER  OF  THE  GREATER  NEW 
YORK  AS  AN  ADMONITION  IN  CITY  EXTENSION  AND  A 
LESSON  IN  CITY-PARTY  GOVERNMENT 

Grounds  of  public  interest  in  the  charter  and  the  questions  we  are  to  consider. 
The  public  and  party  interests  it  involved.  The  charter  might  have  been  a  much 
simpler  instrument.  What  the  charter  should  have  provided  in  the  public  inter- 
est. The  party  interests  involved  in  the  charter,  and  why  they  triumphed.  The 
ruling  Republican  faction  in  the  state  of  New  York  was  in  great  peril.  This  party 
was  divided.  The  nature  of  the  division  explained.  Danger  that  non-partisan 
charter  would  soon  be  adopted  if  a  partisan  charter  should  not  be  quickly  imposed 
on  the  new  city.  Partisan  charter  suddenly  resolved  upon  in  order  to  suppress 
independent  sentiment  and  non-partisan  government  in  old  New  York  and 
Brooklyn.  A  very  inadequate  time  allowed  for  preparing  charter.  The  com- 
mission for  framing  it  a  partisan  body,  unwisely  selected  for  its  functions.  But 
for  a  purpose  of  gaining  a  party  advantage,  a  much  better  commission  could  and 
would  have  been  chosen.  The  most  competent  men  on  the  commission  condemned 
much  of  or  the  whole  charter.  Whether  it  was  the  duty  of  the  best  men  on  com- 
mission to  insist  on  more  time  for  making  the  charter,  or  to  resign  and  defeat  it. 
Unfortunate  theory  of  ruling  majority  of  the  commission.  They  did  not  seek 
light  from  best-governed  cities  of  the  world,  but  seemed  to  yield  to  the  parti- 
san purpose  which  imposed  the  charter.  The  best  municipal  sentiment  of  the 
Republicans  of  the  Greater  New  York  demanded  a  non-partisan  charter,  while 
Tammany  demanded  city-party  rule.  The  vote  of  the  various  elements  of  the 
city  population.  The  charter  represents  Tammany,  and  not  the  people  or  the 
higher  intelligence  of  the  Greater  New  York.  The  Republican  party  majority 
needlessly  and  disastrously  refused  to  provide  minority  representation.  The 
state  party  that  ordered  the  New  York  charter  seemed  to  prefer  a  victory  by 
Tammany  to  a  victory  by  the  independents  who  voted  for  Mr.  Low  for  mayor. 
This  purpose  handed  over  the  new  city  to  Tammany  rule.  The  new  so-called 
charter  is  only  a  crude  compilation,  though  it  has  some  good  provisions.  Its  vast 
bulk  and  great  confusion  mainly  the  result  of  haste  and  lack  of  time.  The  charter 
is  a  serious  invasion  of  just  Home  Rule.  It  will  increase  special  legislation,  and 
more  and  more  involve  city  affairs  in  party  politics.  The  charter  establishes 
despotic  city-party  government  favorable  to  the  continuous  domination  of  Tam- 
many. It  gives  the  mayor  autocratic  power,  which  Tammany  most  desires  for 
him .  How  this  power  has  been  exercised.  The  mayor  dominates  the  city  assembly. 
The  city  has  no  adequate  ordinance-making  power.  The  Municipal  Assembly  is  an 
utterly  inadequate  city  council.  Why  failure  to  elect  members-at-large  of  the 
assembly  is  a  misfortune.  Tammany  elected  nearly  all  city  officers.  It  receives 
large  sums  for  nominations  and  dispenses  charity  through  its  partisan  leaders. 
The  state  party  which  imposed  charter  used  national  and  state  party  influence  to 
carry  first  election  under  it.  Tammany  never  so  strongly  intrenched  as  under 
this  charter.  Charter  has  remedied  none  of  the  greatest  evils.  Dr.  Albert 
Shaw's  condemnation  of  the  charter.  New  York  City  Bar  Association  condemns 
it.  Proceedings  of  legislature  on  its  passage  discreditable.  How  Tammany 


462  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

attempted  to  elect  its  Greater  New  York  mayor  to  be  governor  of  New  York. 
The  unjust  interference  of  state  party  managers  with  true  Home  Rule  in  towns 
and  counties.  The  danger  of  cities  ruling  the  rural  population. 

IT  is  but  natural  that  a  new  charter  for  the  largest  city  of 
the  nation,  framed  at  a  time  when  the  American  people  feel 
a  deep  interest  in  all  questions  concerning  municipal  gov- 
ernment, should  attract  general  attention.  Such  an  instru- 
ment, and  the  government  established  under  it,  according  to 
the  estimate  which  may  be  accepted  of  them,  are  likely 
to  profoundly  affect  for  good  or  for  evil  the  municipal 
legislation  of  the  country.  It  is  important,  therefore,  that 
they  should  be  correctly  understood.1 

The  questions  of  general  interest  concerning  this  char- 
ter, to  which  we  shall  confine  our  attention,  are  these : 
(1)  Were  its  purpose,  preparation,  and  enactment  of  such  a 
character  that  they  may  be  accepted  as  models  for  other  city 
enlargements  ?  (2)  Are  the  general  principles  and  theories 
of  the  charter  such  as  can  be  commended?  (3)  Are  the 
practical  methods  which  it  provides  for  city  elections  and 
administration  intrinsically  good,  or  likely  to  result  in  good 
government  ?  (4)  If  not,  can  the  charter  be  made  satisfac- 
tory by  amendments,  or  should  it  be  condemned  in  its 
fundamental  theories  and  framework  ? 

I 

1.  It  may  be  said  that  the  purpose  and  method  of  prepar- 
ing the  charter  are  hardly  material,  provided  its  provisions 
are  in  the  main  intrinsically  good.  This  is  plausible,  and  in 
a  strict  and  narrow  sense  it  is  true.  Yet  the  question  of 
motive  and  method  will  be  found  to  involve  matters  of  great 
practical  importance. 

1  This  charter  is  Ch.  378  of  the  Laws  of  New  York,  and  was  enacted  May  4, 
1897.  The  first  election  under  it,  in  the  Greater  New  York  which  it  created,  was 
held  in  November  of  the  same  year,  and  the  new  city  government  thus  established 
came  into  control  of  the  city  on  January  1,  1898.  At  this  time  the  previous  chap- 
ters of  this  work  had  been  drafted.  In  the  interest  of  symmetry  and  brevity,  we 
may  regret  that  this  charter  was  not  earlier  at  hand,  but  it  has  not  caused  any 
wish  to  modify  the  theories  or  methods  commended  in  what  we  had  written, 
though  it  has  greatly  increased  our  sense  of  the  need  of  establishing  and  enforcing 
them  in  American  cities. 


THE  CHARTER  OF  THE  GREATER  NEW  YORK  463 

We  have  shown  that  national  party  issues  and  party  tests 
for  city  offices  should  not  be  regarded  in  city  administration 
or  in  the  election  of  city  officers.  No  city  charter,  therefore, 
should  be  undertaken  or  framed  to  gain  a  party  advantage, 
or  to  defeat  a  non-partisan  movement  for  municipal  reform. 
If  it  should  come  to  be  regarded  as  justifiable  on  the  part 
of  a  party  to  use  its  authority  —  either  directly  or  through 
the  party  majorities  of  commissions  it  shall  appoint  —  to 
frame  and  enact  new  city  charters  for  the  purpose  of  per- 
petuating its  power,  or  of  otherwise  promoting  its  own 
advantage,  the  evils  connected  with  our  municipal  affairs 
would  be  greatly  increased. 

2.  The  making  of  a  charter  for  a  great  city  is,  in  a  sense, 
the  making  of  a  city  constitution  —  an  act  which  should  be 
justly  and  deliberately  undertaken  and  performed,  in  conform- 
ity to  much  the  same  provisions  for  a  full  representation  of  all 
the  people  to  be  affected  which  are  provided  for  in  state  con- 
stitutions in  reference  to  the  amendment  of  such  instruments. 

Justice  to  the  facts  will  compel  us  to  show  not  only 
that  this  Greater  New  York  charter  was  suddenly  decided 
upon,  hastily  framed,  and  hurried  through  the  legislature  to 
gain  a  party  advantage,  but  that  it  had  for  one  of  its 
purposes  the  suppression  of  a  rising,  non-partisan  public 
sentiment  and  majority,  which  were  opposed  to  city-party 
domination.  The  lesson  these  truths  can  teach  must  not  be 
lost,  much  as  we  should  prefer  to  confine  ourselves  to  the 
provisions  of  the  charter  itself. 

II 

To  understand  this  lesson,  or  even  the  significance  of  the 
leading  provisions  of  the  charter,  —  we  must  refer  to  some 
public  interests  and  to  certain  party  interests  and  prospects 
likely  to  be  greatly  affected  by  its  enactment. 

1.  Let  us  first  glance  at  the  public  interests  involved. 
There  was  no  serious  need  or  earnest  demand  for  a  new  char- 
ter when  this  one  was  suddenly  provided  for  by  law.1  The 

1  N.  Y.  Law,  May  11, 1896  —  a  law  which  appears  as  a  measure  of  the  dominant 
state  party  and  provides  for  the  very  hasty  preparation  of  a  new  charter. 


464  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

need  and  utility  of  before  long  bringing,  under  a  single 
appropriate  municipal  government,  the  region  and  political 
divisions  about  the  harbor  of  New  York  were  unquestionable; 
but  there  was  ample  time,  without  injury  to  any  public 
interest,  for  considering  the  best  order  and  methods  of 
forming  this  union,  and  the  municipal  principles  upon  which 
it  should  be  based.  The  advantages,  for  example,  of  soon 
having  a  general  sanitary,  police,  judicial,  and  excise  ad- 
ministration, and  a  comprehensive  system  for  bridges,  docks, 
and  transportation  for  the  whole  vicinity,  were  manifest. 
But  in  many  particulars,  and  especially  in  all  the  more 
rural  sections  of  the  new  city  —  which  includes  a  whole  rural 
county  besides  several  towns  —  there  were  no  reasons,  aside 
from  party  politics  and  selfish  interests,  why  the  new  charter 
should,  at  the  outset,  supersede  the  existing  local  adminis- 
tration. It  would  have  been  entirely  practicable,  while 
bringing  all  the  territory  conditionally  into  the  new  city, 
to  have  framed  a  charter  which  would  have  actually  brought 
under  the  new  administration,  at  the  outset,  only  the  larger 
subjects  suggested,  —  perhaps  one-third  of  the  matters  cov- 
ered by  it,1  —  the  charter  having  appropriate  provisions  for 
the  gradual  extension  of  the  new  administration  to  other 
sections  and  matters  as  experience  and  convenience  should 
make  it  desirable.  By  acting  on  such  a  policy  —  if  the 
authors  of  the  charter  had  considered  only  the  public  in- 
terests —  the  framing  of  the  new  charter  and  the  transition 
from  the  old  to  the  new  conditions  would  have  been  much 
more  easy  and  simple. 

This  manner  of  dealing  with  the  matter  —  which  may  be 
an  instructive  precedent  in  making  enlargements  in  other 
cities  —  would  have  avoided  not  only  a  large  part  of  the 
confusion,  conflicts,  and  other  evils  of  dealing  with  so  many 
things  at  once,  but  would  have  greatly  facilitated  the  reten- 

1  The  practicability  of  bringing  only  such  subjects  at  first  under  the  new  char- 
ter and  government  had  been  demonstrated.  More  than  thirty  years  earlier,  the 
writer  had  acted  as  counsel  for  a  Board  of  Health,  a  Board  of  Excise,  and  a  Board 
of  Police,  whose  jurisdictions  were  almost  coterminous  with  the  limits  of  the 
Greater  New  York  City.  There  had  been  no  embarrassment*  in  the  administra- 
tion. 


THE  CHARTER  OF  THE  GREATER  NEW  YORK   465 

tion  of  many  able  and  admirable  officers  in  the  city  service 
whom  the  sweeping  and  partisan  methods  adopted  excluded 
from  office.1 

2.  The  cities  of  New  York  and  Brooklyn  —  five-sixths  of 
the  now  Greater  New  York  —  at  the  time  the  new  charter 
scheme  was  suddenly  proposed  were  being  better  governed 
than  they  had  been  for  many  years  under  former  mayors. 
The  administration  under  Mayor  Strong  was,  to  a  large  ex- 
tent, non-partisan,  —  good  men  belonging  to  different  parties 
holding  the  leading  offices,  and  the  merit  system  and  the  civil 
service  examinations  being  more  fully  and  fairly  enforced 
than  ever  before  or  since. 

3.  The   greater  necessities   for   radical    changes    in    the 
government  of  the  city  —  which  needed  to  be  made  with 
convenient  despatch — were  these:  (1)  for  a  city  government 
based  on  non-partisan  principles;  (2)  for  a  non-partisan  city 
council,  with  permanent  authority,  which  would  insure  Home 
Rule  in  the  government  of  the  new  city;   (3)  for  a  repre- 
sentation of  the  minority  as  well  as  of  the  party  majority, 
as  essential  for  the  creation  of  such  a  council;  (4)  for  Free 
Nominations  and  Free  Voting  as  indispensable  conditions  of 
true  minority  representation;  (5)  for  the  election  of  the  mayor 
by  the  council,  and  not  by  the  dominant  party  majority,  so 
that  he  should  represent  the  city,  and  not  a  single  party; 

(6)  for  the  enforcement  of  the  merit  system,  and  of  impartial, 
non-partisan  examinations,  and  the  registration  of  laborers, 
for  entering  the  minor  official  and  labor  service  of  the  city ; 

(7)  for  the  absolute  suppression  of  all  political  assessments; 

(8)  for  the  rejection  of  all  party  monopoly  or  advantage  in 
the  structure  of  the  city  government.     The  new  charter  does 
not  accomplish  —  or  attempt  to  accomplish,  save  in  fatally 
defective  manner  as  to  the  merit  system  —  a  single  one  of 
these  results. 

1  Among  these  officers  thus  excluded  were  General  Green  in  the  Dock  Depart- 
ment and  Mr.  Wilson,  president  of  the  Health  Department,  —  whose  retention  was 
of  public  importance,  —  and  especially  Colonel  Waring,  the  head  of  the  Street 
Cleaning  Department,  whose  loss  was  in  a  measure  a  national  misfortune. 

2H 


466  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

III 

Let  us  now  look  at  the  party  interest  and  some  significant 
facts  involved  in  the  question  of  a  new  charter. 

(1)  In  1896,  before  the  law  had  been  prepared  for  creating 
the  commission  for  framing  the  new  charter,  the  Republican 
party  was  dominant  in  the  state  of  New  York,  having  the 
governor  and  a  majority  in  both  houses  of  the  legislature; 
and  Mr.  Strong,  a  Republican,  was  mayor  of  New  York  City. 
Tammany  was  discredited  and  enfeebled  by  reason  of  the 
recent  exposures  of  its  maladministration.     It  was  further 
at  a  disadvantage  by  reason  of  the  greatly  improved  city 
administration  of  New  York  under  Mayor  Strong,  who  had 
demonstrated   the   practicability    and    superiority   of   non- 
partisan  city  government. 

(2)  The   Republican   state  boss   and  party  managers,  as 
well  as  the  Tammany  boss  and  managers,  had  consequently 
lost  most  of   their  city  patronage  and  the  income  it  had 
given  them.     They  were  mutually  disappointed  and  angry; 
they  were   naturally  sympathetic   toward   each   other,  and 
hostile  toward  the  supporters  of  Mr.  Strong,  whose  admin- 
istration they  had  constantly  obstructed.1 

(3)  According  to  superficial  observation,  the  Republican 
state  majority  when  the  legislative  session  of  1896  opened 
at   Albany  had  good   reasons  to   expect  a  continuance  in 
power;  but  a  full  view  of  the  facts  shows  its  position  to  have 
been  one  of  great  anxiety  and  peril.     The  more  non-partisan 
and  independent  voters,  especially  in  New  York  City  and 
Brooklyn,  had  been  rapidly  gaining  strength  as   compared 
with  the  voters  who  sustained  that  majority.2 

1  It  is  quite  true  that  the  Republicans  —  led  by  Mr.  Platt  as  state  boss  —  united 
with  the  Independents  in  electing  Mayor  Strong.  But  would  they  have  done  so 
if  they  had  thought  he  would  abide  by  the  Independent  platform,  or  withstand 
their  pressure  for  office  and  patronage  ? 

8  Mr.  Edward  M.  Shepard  shows  (Atlantic  Monthly,  Jan.  1898)  that  in  1885 
the  Independents  commanded  13,600  votes  in  Brooklyn,  say  4600  Democrats  and 
9000  Republicans ;  that,  in  1895,  these  4600  Democratic  votes  had  increased  to  more 
than  9500;  and  that  in  1897  the  Independent  candidates  in  that  city  were  sup- 
ported by  more  than  65,000  voters.  We  have  seen  that  Mr.  Strong's  nomination 
for  mayor  of  New  York  was  practically  dictated  by  the  independent,  non-partisan 


THE  CHARTER  OF  THE  GREATER  NEW  YORK  467 

(4)  The  internal  condition  both  of  the  ruling  faction  and 
party  in  the  state  were  hardly  more  satisfactory  in  1896  than 
the  votes  in  the  two  great  cities  as  shown  in  the  last  note. 
The  party  was  divided  into  two  irreconcilable  divisions  by 
very  distinctive  theories  and  methods.      The  adherents  of 
one  division,  embracing  most  of  the  noblest  members  of  the 
party,  and  the  leading   journals  and  periodicals   in   those 
cities,  were  consistent  supporters  of  Republican  principles. 
They  were  hostile  to  bosses,  and  opposed  to  making  party 
machinery  either  mercenary  or  despotic.     They  were   sup- 
porters of  civil  service  reform,  ballot  reform,  primary  elec- 
tion reform,  corrupt  practice  reform,  and  municipal  reform, 
— and  they  became  supporters  of  Mr.  Low  for  mayor. 

The  other  division  of  the  party,  of  which  the  state  boss  was 
the  leader,  was  not  only  in  general  hostile  to  these  reforms, 
but  enforced  a  peculiar  and  despotic  theory  of  party  manage- 
ment. It  held  that  municipal  affairs  should  be  managed 
in  the  interest  of  state  and  national  parties,  and  that  party 
tests  should  be  enforced  for  city  offices.  It  dominated 
the  legislature  of  New  York.  A  large  proportion  of  its 
Republican  members  had  apparently  gained  their  election 
through  servility  to  the  despotic  state  party  system  and  its 
boss,  which  largely  disqualified  them  for  the  highest  duties 
of  legislators.  They  were  ready  to  impose  upon  New  York 
city  almost  any  charter  which  they  might  think  would 
benefit  their  faction.1 

(5)  There   was   another   matter  which   was   a  source  of 

city  vote  of  1894.  His  good  administration  increased  that  vote.  When,  in  Novem- 
ber, 1897,  the  voters  of  New  York  City  came  to  vote  under  the  new  charter, 
151,000  of  them  voted  for  Mr.  Low,  the  non-partisan  candidate,  and  only  100,000 
voted  for  Mr.  Tracy,  the  partisan  candidate  of  the  Platt  faction,  —  showing  that 
the  assumed  majority  in  the  legislature  of  1896,  which  hastily  ordered  the  charter 
to  be  prepared,  had  become  a  minority  in  New  York  City.  We  therefore  use  the 
phrase  "  ruling  faction"  to  designate  this  minority,  merely  for  convenience.  It 
was  a  minority  and  in  a  sense  a  faction  in  New  York  City,  though  it  was  the 
majority  —  and  in  a  sense  it  was  the  Republican  party  —  in  the  state  at  large. 

1  It  is  not  assumed  that  a  majority  of  these  Republicans  were  regardless  of  the 
welfare  of  the  city  or  were  without  patriotism ;  but  like  the  devotees  of  Tam- 
many, whom  they  liked  far  better  than  they  did  the  members  of  the  other 
divisions  of  their  own  party,  they  assumed  partisan  control  by  their  faction  to 
be  essential  to  all  municipal  improvement. 


468  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

anxiety  to  the  promoters  of  the  new  charter.  There  was 
imminent  danger,  if  they  did  not  speedily  enact  a  charter 
according  to  the  party  theory,  that  their  opponents  might 
soon  secure  the  adoption  of  a  non-partisan  government  for 
New  York  City.  Mr.  Andrew  H.  Green l  had  proposed  the 
creation  of  a  Greater  New  York  as  early  as  1868,  and  his 
effective  and  non-partisan  discussion  of  the  subject  had 
before  1890  developed  a  strong  sentiment  in  its  support. 
In  that  year  a  bill  on  the  subject  which  he  drafted  became  a 
law.2  It  provided  for  a  state  commission  of  twelve,  of 
which  Mr.  Green  was  made  president,  for  considering  the 
question  of  consolidating  the  jurisdictions  which  now  con- 
stitute the  Greater  New  York.  There  was  apparently  no 
party  politics  in  the  movement,  which  was  based  on  public 
needs  and  business  principles.  The  commission  was  to  act 
deliberately,  being  unlimited  as  to  time  for  doing  its  work. 
It  was  to  report  from  time  to  time  to  the  legislature,  and 
was  to  present  bills  and  the  reasons  for  offering  them.  The 
advance  toward  a  new  charter  was  to  be  gradual  and  well 
considered.  Here  is  a  plan  for  city  enlargements  which 
deserves  the  thoughtful  attention  of  American  cities  con- 
templating such  measures. 

Much  had  been  done  by  this  commission,  and  more  was 
about  to  be  undertaken,  when  the  law  of  May  11,  1896,  — 
which  provided  for  the  new  commission  which  framed  the 
charter  we  are  considering,  —  was  suddenly  enacted  by  the 
ruling  faction  near  the  end  of  the  legislative  session,  without 
consulting  the  cities  to  be  affected,  or  any  application  from 
them. 

Obviously  the  authors  of  this  law  felt  that  something 
must  be  speedily  done  to  change  the  municipal  situation  in 
New  York  City  and  Brooklyn,  or  the  dominant  faction  of 
the  Republican  party  might  be  overthrown  in  these  cities 
by  their  non-partisan  vote  at  the  next  election.  Party 
managers  thus  situated,  and  who  believe  in  party  govern- 

1  To  whom  the  people  of  N«w  York  City  were  indebted  for  valuable  services 
as  one  of  its  officers. 

2  N.  Y.  Laws,  1890,  Ch.  311. 


THE  CHARTER  OF  THE  GREATER  NEW  YORK  469 

ment  for  cities,  are  not  necessarily  either  corrupt  or  unpatri- 
otic merely  because  they  are  ready  for  hasty  and  desperate 
legislation  which  may  give  their  party  control  of  a  vast  city 
—  and  possibly  long  domination  in  a  great  state.  Neverthe- 
less, it  requires  very  rare  party  virtues  to  act  fairly  or  wisely 
under  such  conditions. 

IV 

1.  Such  were  the  dangers,  temptations,  and  possibilities  in 
May,  1896,  when  the  legislature  was  about  to  close  its  session. 
These  were  the  great  questions  :  — 

Could  not  Mr.  Green  and  his  threatening  charter,  and 
the  detested  example  of  successful  non-partisan  city  gov- 
ernment in  New  York  and  Brooklyn,  be  at  the  same  time 
suppressed?  Could  not  the  independent  voters  of  these 
cities  be  rebuked  and  overwhelmed  by  a  new  charter  based 
on  rigid  party  theories,  —  a  charter  which  should  apply 
party  tests  to  city  offices,  give  the  city  patronage  and 
spoils  to  party  managers,  and  require  all  city  administration 
to  be  subordinate  to  state  party  interests?  The  new  city 
contemplated  would  at  once  have  about  three  and  a  quarter 
millions  of  people;  it  would  yearly  disburse  perhaps  $60,- 
000,000  of  public  money. 

To  secure  the  utmost,  several  essential  conditions  must 
be  supplied:  (1)  Mr.  Green's  commission  must  be  sup- 
pressed ; *  (2)  the  new  commission  must  be  at  once  created 
before  any  new  election  —  such  as  the  defeat  of  Mr.  Tracy 
or  the  triumph  of  Mr.  Roosevelt — should  show  the  fatal 
weakness  of  the  boss  faction ;  (3)  the  commission  must  be 
so  made  up  that  the  ruling  faction  could  always  control  it; 
(4)  there  must  be  facilities  for  arrangements  with  Tammany 
of  the  kind  with  which  our  readers  are  familiar ; 2  (5)  this 

1  He  was  put  upon  the   new  commission,  where,  against  its  majority,  he 
could  accomplish  nothing,  even  had  not  his  bad  health  prevented  his  attempting 
anything. 

2  See  p.  126,  also  Harper's  Weekly  (July  16,  1898),  which  uses  this  language  in 
its  editorial  columns :  "  The  present  bi-partisan  police  board  of  the  city  was  estab- 
lished through  a  deal  between  Tammany  and  the   Republican   machine  .  .  . 
for  the  purpose  of  giving  .  .  .  part  of  the  patronage  of  the  police  force  of 


470  THE   GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

faction  must  carry  the  first  election  under  the  charter,  or  the 
whole  scheme  for  its  creation  might  be  a  municipal  disaster, 
as  well  as  a  disgrace  to  its  authors. 

2.  The  law   of   May  11,  1896,  providing   for  the   com- 
mission for  framing  the  new  charter,  with  the  action  of  the 
governor  under  it,  supplied  most  of  those  conditions.     The 
method  of  a  gradual  extension,  in  the  public  interest,  of  the 
new  city's  administration  —  as  we  have  just  explained  it  — 
was  rejected  as  incompatible  with  the  party  scheme.     The 
ruling  or  boss  faction,  feeling  sure  of  carrying  the  first  elec- 
tion under  the  charter,  was  resolved  to  have  all  the  territory, 
all   the   patronage,   and   all    the   spoils   possible,  —  and   at 
once. 

3.  Under    such    conditions,   the    law   needlessly  —  save 
for  mere   party  reasons  —  and   disastrously   provided   that 
the   commissioners   should  be  secured,  and  the  new   char- 
ter and  various  incidental  laws  should  be  devised,  perfected, 
and  reported  complete  by  the  commission  to  the  legislature 
on  or  before  the  first  day  of  February,  1897,  and  that  the 
commission  itself  "  should  cease  to  exist "  one  month  later. 
The  mystery  of  this  strange  haste  would  seem  inexplicable  — 
mere  madness  —  but  for  the  explanations  we   have  given. 
The  time  allowed  was  utterly  inadequate  for  the  vast  work 
required  of  the  commission.1 

After  the  time  required  for  filling  the  membership  of  the 
commission,  hardly  seven  months  were  left  in  which  to 
accomplish  the  immense  work  undertaken,  —  one  so  vast 
and  difficult  that  the  best  men  the  state  could  have  supplied 

the  metropolis,  while,  in  return,  Tammany  was  to  have  Republican  aid  in  securing 
legislation  which  it  needed  for  its  own  corrupt  purposes."  We  may  add  that, 
owing  to  the  hasty  and  faulty  manner,  to  say  the  least,  in  which  authority 
over  the  police  was  conferred  by  the  commission,  this  faction  has  found  it  neces- 
sary to  call  an  extra  session  of  the  legislature  to  prevent  Tammany  having, 
under  the  charter,  a  dangerous  police  control  of  the  city  elections,  in  New  York, 
and,  as  this  note  is  being  written  (July,  1898)  this  session  is  being  held. 

1  The  so-called  charter  reported  by  the  commission  and  enacted  by  the 
legislature  May  4,  1897,  fills  559  official  pages  aside  from  58  pages  of  index, 
and  is  divided  into  1620  sections,  —  the  monstrous  instrument  being  more  bulky, 
perhaps,  than  would  be  the  combined  charters  of  any  other  twenty  cities  of  the 
Union,  —  longer  than  the  charter  provisions  united  of  all  the  more  than  three  hun- 
dred cities  in  England. 


THE   CHARTER  OF  THE   GREATER  NEW  YORK     471 

would  hardly  have  been  able  to  perform  it  satisfactorily  in 
two  years. 

4.  For  the  proper  comprehension  of  the  lesson  which  this 
piece  of  legislation  should  teach  the  American  people,  it 
should  be  understood  that  the  monstrous  bulk  and  crude  and 
confused  provisions  of  this  charter  must  be  mainly  attributed 
to  this  needless  restriction  of  time,  which  should  be  charac- 
terized as  a  grave  offence  against  municipal  civilization  and 
justice  in  the  United  States. 


1.  The  membership  of  the  commission  is  significant  in 
reference  to  the  motive  and  purpose  of  the  charter,  and 
has  involved  very  unfortunate  consequences.  It  was  com- 
posed of  fourteen  members,  of  whom  nine  were  Republicans 
and  five  were  Democrats.  Two  of  them  were  state  officers 
residing  in  Albany,  or  in  remote  parts  of  the  state,  as  sure 
apparently  to  support  the  partisan  purpose  of  the  char- 
ter as  they  were  to  do  no  work  upon  it.  Another  commis- 
sioner was  the  mayor  of  a  scandalous,  petty  municipality; 
but  he  could  cast  a  vote  with  the  ruling  faction.  Save  as 
elsewhere  explained,  there  was  not  upon  the  commission  a 
single  active  supporter  of  the  developed,  municipal  reform 
sentiment  of  New  York  or  Brooklyn,  —  nor  hardly  any  man 
who  had  shown  a  non-partisan  purpose  to  fearlessly  deal  with 
the  great  problems  of  municipal  government  —  though  many 
such  men  were  at  hand.1 

l  Neither  Mr.  James  C.  Carter,  the  leader  of  the  New  York  Bar  and  the 
president  of  the  National  Municipal  League,  who  had  previously  been  a  commis- 
sioner for  framing  a  charter;  nor  Mr.  Olney,  who  had  just  served  usefully  as  an 
official  commissioner  in  the  codification  of  the  New  York  City  laws;  nor  Mr. 
Goodnow,  Professor  of  Municipal  Law  in  Columbia  University  and  a  leading  and 
able  writer  on  municipal  government ;  nor  Horace  E.  Doming,  an  effective  and 
experienced  supporter  of  municipal  reform ;  nor  Simon  Sterne,  a  student  of  city 
affairs,  who  had  served  on  a  New  York  municipal  commission ;  nor  Colonel 
George  E.  Waring,  whose  aid  would  have  been  invaluable;  nor  Dr.  Albert 
Shaw,  the  accomplished  and  enlightened  student  of  municipal  science,  whose 
works  we  have  often  quoted  —  though  all  residents  of  New  York  City  —  nor  Pro- 
.-fessor  Commons,  a  thoughtful  writer  concerning  city  problems  —  was  given  any 
place  upon  the  commission.  But  Ex-Mayor  Gilroy,  the  last  Tammany  mayor  of 
New  York,  was  one  of  its  most  active  members  — and  apparently  to  no  one  was 


472  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

2.  The  mayor  of  New  York  and  Ex-Mayor  Low  were 
almost  of  necessity  made  members  of  the  commission,  but 
they  were  in  a  minority  by  themselves  among  the  Republi- 
cans upon  it.  Mayor  Strong  vetoed  the  whole  charter  when 
it  came  to  him  from  the  legislature  for  approval,  and  Mr. 
Low  opposed  several  of  its  leading  provisions.1 

VI 

1.  The  reader  has  perhaps  been  saying  that  good  citizens 
should  have  refused  to  serve  upon  such  a  commission  having 
such  a  purpose  and  no  adequate  time  for  its  work.  Much 
could  be  said  in  favor  of  this  view.  It  has  a  great  impor- 
tance—  involving,  as  it  does,  the  moral  obligations  of  com- 
missioners in  all  similar  cases.  But  there  are  two  sides  to  the 
question  raised.  If  the  best  men  selected  had  declined  to 
serve  as  commissioners,  the  others  might  have  prepared 
the  preordained  charter  with  provisions  still  worse  than  those 
approved.  Besides,  it  might  have  been  expected  that  some 
of  the  leading  party  men,  among  the  majority  upon  the 
commission,  would  make  a  stand  for  sound  municipal  princi- 
ples and  for  adequate  time  for  making  a  good  charter  for  the 
new  city  —  even  if  party  managers  and  the  state  boss  should 
be  offended  —  rather  than  hand  the  city  over  to  Tammany,  as 

the  charter  more  highly  satisfactory  than  to  him.  But  neither  Ex-Mayor  Hewitt, 
of  large  ability  and  experience  in  city  affairs,  nor  Mr.  Charles  8.  Smith,  ex-presi- 
dent of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  New  York  City,  who  had  made  effective 
efforts  to  improve  its  government,  nor  any  similar  reformer  was  put  upon  the 
commission,  —  though  petty,  rural  Staten  Island  was  given  a  place  among  its 
members.  It  hardly  need  be  added  that  a  fine  opportunity  for  the  salutary  dis- 
charge of  a  high  executive  duty  in  appointing  this  commission  was  not  very  fully 
improved.  Such  a  commission  can  hardly  be  said  to  represent  municipal  senti- 
ment in  the  Greater  New  York. 

1  The  placing  of  Ex-Mayor  Low  upon  the  commission  was  an  act  of  adroit 
sagacity —  if  not  of  moral  compulsion.  He  was  a  student  of  municipal  science  of 
distinguished  reputation  and  experience.  He  had  been  the  first  mayor  of  an 
American  city  to  enforce  the  merit  system  and  civil  service  examinations,  for  the 
selection  of  city  officials.  His  presence  upon  the  commission  might  do  much  to  • 
prevent  suspicion  and  criticism  on  the  part  of  the  friends  of  reform.  The  facts  J 
that  Mr.  Low  became  the  candidate  of  the  non-partisan  and  independent  voters 
for  mayor  of  the  city  in  the  first  election  under  the  new  charter,  and  that  Mr. 
Tracy  —  the  chairman  of  the  commission  —  was  the  candidate  of  the  ruling  fac-- 
tion  for  that  office,  clearly  illustrate  the  widely  antagonistic  elements  which 
they  represented. 


THE  CHARTER  OF  THE   GREATER  NEW  YORK     473 

they  did,  at  the  first  election.  It  was  perhaps  not  too  much 
to  hope  that  some  of  them  would  study  the  best  American 
precedents  and  the  rich  municipal  experience  of  Europe,  and, 
as  a  natural  result,  be  ready  to  adopt  some  of  their  salutary 
and  well-tested  methods,  rather  than  reproduce  in  the  new 
charter,  as  they  did,  the  old,  partisan  devices  which  New 
York  and  Brooklyn  had  long  since  condemned  as  hopelessly 
mischievous  and  intolerable.1 

These  hopes  were  disappointed.  We  should  here  note 
that  when  it  was  seen  that  no  adequate  time  was  to  be 
allowed  for  framing  a  good  charter,  that  partisan  motives 
were  prevailing,  and  that  the  needed  investigations  of  munici- 
pal experience  were  not  to  be  made,  the  question  again  arose 
whether  there  was  not  —  from  these  facts  —  a  duty  to  retire 
from  the  commission  and  to  defeat  the  charter  rather  than 
allow  it  to  be  made  a  crude  and  partisan  instrument.  Impor- 
tant as  this  question  certainly  is,  we  have  no  space  for  con- 
sidering it.  It  is  a  question  as  to  which  the  opinions  of 
thoughtful  men  —  we  believe  —  are  not  in  harmony.  Future 
commissions  may  find  similar  questions  as  to  their  duties 
to  be  of  grave,  practical  importance. 

2.  The  ruling  majority  of  the  members  of  the  commission, 
apparently,  accepted  a  view  of  the  purposes  and  functions 
of  the  body  similar  to  that  which  dictated  their  appointment. 
The  duties  of  the  citizen  seem  to  have  been  to  some  extent 
regarded  as  superseded  by  the  engagement  of  the  com- 
missioner. This  conclusion  predetermined  the  kind  of  a 
charter  we  have  and  the  victory  of  Tammany  in  the  city  elec- 
tion of  1897.2 


1  It  is  but  just  to  Mr.  Low  to  say  that  he  had  no  time  for  such  investigations, 
for,  as  president  of  Columbia  University,  he  was  in  the  stress  of  the  serious  work 
of  its  removal  from  its  old  site  to  a  new  one ;  and  Mayor  Strong  had  on  his  hands 
the  very  absorbing  duties  of  mayor  of  New  York  City.    We  may  express  our 
regret  and  surprise  at  the  failure  of  the  ruling  majority  of  this  commission  to 
make  any  adequate  investigations  of  the  kind  we  have  suggested. 

2  The  official  report  of  the  commission  went  very  far  toward  the  avowal  of 
this  strange  theory,  for  it  declared  that  "  the  commission  has  not  been  charged 
with  the  duty  of  preparing  a  city  charter  at  large,"  —  a  very  unwarranted  view 
of  the  matter  we  must  think —  and  it  then  goes  on  to  show  that  the  purpose  was 
much  narrower.    What  was  that  purpose  ? 


474  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

8.    The  facts  thus  set  forth  should  prepare  us  for  a  very  de- 
fective and  crude  instrument  at  the  hands  of  this  commission. 
/  The  reader  will  hardly  be  surprised  when  we  say  that  the 
/  so-called  charter  it  prepared  can  in  no  true  sense  be  desig- 
I  nated  a  charter  ;  it  is  only  an  ill-digested  compilation.     Yet 
it  is  but  just  to  several  members  of  the  commission,  who 
labored   under  very  great   embarrassments,  to   say  that  it 
contains  some  excellent  provisions  due  to  them,  the  most 
important  of  which  are  referred  to  in  notes  to  previous  chap- 
ters ;  that  —  as  we  believe — much  patriotic  and  conscientious 
labor  was  given  to  their  preparation ;    and  that  the  most 
objectionable  provisions  of  the  instrument  are  mainly  the 
results  of  a  blinding,  misleading  party  bias,  and  a  false  theory 
of  city  government  and  of  duty  to  one's  party. 

4.  Nevertheless,  it  must  be  said  that  the  majority  of  the 
commission,  not  very  long  after  its  labors  were  begun,  became 
aware  that  the  time  allowed  for  its  work  was  utterly  inade- 
quate, so  that  the  only  alternatives  must  be,  (1)  a  crude, 
defective,  and  intolerable,  so-called  charter ;  (2)  a  firm  de- 
mand by  the  commission  upon  the  legislature  for  more  time  ; 
or  (3)  a  resignation  of  their  offices  by  the  commissioners. 
We  think  that  to  make  such  a  demand  and  to  refuse  to 
go  on  unless  it  should  be  allowed  was  a  duty  which  the 
commission  owed  alike  to  itself,  and  to  the  people  of  New 
York  City — a  duty  the  discharge  of  which,  with  a  con- 
demnation of  the  partisan  purpose  of  the  charter,  would 
have  been  a  noble  contribution  to  the  cause  of  municipal 
reform  in  the  United  States.  Whether  the  minority  — 
the  more  enlightened  members  of  the  commission  —  should 
have  then  resigned,  leaving  the  others  to  accomplish  the 
partisan  purpose  of  the  commission  all  the  more  easily  and 
completely,  is  a  question  which  every  reader  must  answer  for 
himself.  One  result  of  such  a  resignation  of  the  commission 
would  have  been  that  no  new  charter  would  have  been 
adopted,  —  that  Tammany  would  not  now  be  intrenched 
more  strongly  than  before  in  the  Greater  New  York  for 
four  years  under  the  most  despotic  and  partisan  charter 
ever  imposed  upon  an  enlightened  city. 


THE  CHARTER  OF  THE  GREATER  NEW  YORK     475 

VII 

1.  It  would  be  beyond  the  sphere  of  our  undertaking  to 
consider  matters  of  mere  wisdom  or  policy  on  the  part  of 
party  managers,  yet  it  seems  very  clear  that  they  should 
comprehend   and   defer  to   the  wishes  of  the   majority  of 
their  own  party.     This  they  utterly  failed  to  do.     While 
the  commissioners  were  compiling  the  charter,  the  citizens 
of  the  proposed  Greater  New  York  were  preparing  for  an 
election  to  be  held  in  November,  1897,  in  which  they  were 
to  express  their  judgment  as  to  the  principles  upon  which 
the  charter  should  be  based,  and  were  to  elect  officers  to 
serve  under  it.     Let  us  anticipate  some  facts  of  this  elec- 
tion.    Mr.  Tracy  and  Mr.  Low  were  the  opposing  republi- 
can candidates,  and  Mr.   Van  Wyck  was  the  candidate  of 
the   Tammany  Democracy.     The   supporters  of   Mr.   Low 
were  pledged  by  their  platform  in  favor  of  non-partisan  city 
government  and  Civil  Service  reform,  and  hence  against  the 
main  theories  of  the  ruling  faction,  which  had  ordered  the 
charter. 

Speaking  in  round  numbers,  we  may  say  the  Tammany 
candidate  received  234,000  votes;  Mr.  Low,  151,000  votes; 
and  Mr.  Tracy,  100,000  votes;  while  Mr.  Henry  George 
—  really  a  non-partisan  candidate  —  received  22,000  votes. 
Therefore,  of  the  more  than  500,000  votes  cast,  Mr.  Tracy, 
the  president  of  the  commission,  received  less  than  one-fifth 
of  them,  and  more  than  50,000  less  votes  than  the  number 
cast  for  Mr.  Low.  Though  Tammany  succeeded,  its  candi- 
date had  the  approval  of  many  thousands  less  than  a  major- 
ity of  the  voters.  The  charter,  therefore,  does  not  represent 
the  people  of  the  city  of  New  York  or  even  its  Republican  voters, 
but  Tammany  J- 

2.  It  can  hardly  be  doubted  by  well-informed  persons  that 
the  supporters  of  Mr.  Low  included  a  proportion  of  voters  of 
superior  intelligence  and  character  quite  unparalleled  in  the 

1  Quite  a  number  of  Democratic  votes  were  cast  for  Mr.  Low  —  a  fact  which 
further  illustrates  the  pervading  non-partisan  sentiment  of  the  city,  as  well  as 
the  desperate  infatuation  of  the  boss  faction. 


476  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

other  groups.  Nearly  every  reputable  political  and  religious 
journal  in  the  new  city,  every  periodical  in  the  metropolis  in 
which  the  higher  moral  and  political  sentiment  of  its  people 
find  their  best  expression,  and  nearly  every  one  of  the 
numerous  organizations  for  municipal  reform  appear  to  have 
supported  Mr.  Low. 

3.  We  cannot  therefore  characterize  this  attempt  of  the 
boss  faction  to  impose  a  mere  partisan  charter  upon  such  a 
community  as  anything  less,  on  the  part  of  the  leaders,  than 
an  example  of  audacious  assurance,  blindness,  and  partisan 
desperation, — unless,  indeed,  they  had  such  relations  with 
Tammany  that  they  could  expect  more  from  its  victory  than 
they  could  hope  to  gain  from  the  triumph  of  the  supporters 
of  Mr.  Low.  An  ingeniously  devised,  despotic  form  of 
government,  through  which  they  expected  to  reduce  into  a 
sort  of  feudal  subjection  to  themselves  the  most  numerous 
and  worthy  of  the  intelligent  voters  of  the  new  city,  was 
captured  by  Tammany.  But  the  election  since  of  such  a 
governor  as  Mr.  Roosevelt  has  shown  that  there  are,  never- 
theless, surviving  virtues,  from  which  good  government  may 
yet  be  developed. 

VIII 

From  the  admonitions  to  be  drawn  from  the  motive  and 
making  of  this  charter,  we  may  turn  to  the  lesson  taught  by 
its  omissions  and  provisions.  We  have  shown  how  essential 
it  is  to  good  government  that  the  minority  shall  be  repre- 
sented in  city  councils  and  state  legislatures ;  and  that  the 
Republican  party  —  many  years  ago,  when  its  moral  tone 
was  higher  —  had  committed  itself  to  the  support  of  such 
representation,  to  which  Tammany  then  declared  itself 
hostile.1 

When  the  new  charter  was  being  framed  there  was  an  easy 
opportunity  available  for  establishing  such  representation  — 
the  ruling  faction  controlling  every  branch  of  the  government. 
The  need  for  such  representation  had  greatly  increased  with 
the  size  of  the  city,  —  the  unrepresented  minorities  having 

*  For  the  facts,  see  Ch.  IX.  and  pp.  237,  238. 


THE  CHARTER  OF  THE   GREATER  NEW  YORK     477 

become  immense.  Only  the  boss  faction  among  the  Re- 
publicans, and  Tammany,  opposed  it  —  the  supporters  of  Mr. 
Low  favoring  such  representation. 

The  fact  that  no  provision  was  made  in  the  law  creating 
the  commission,  or  after  the  commission's  report,  for  such 
representation  seems  to  prove  that  the  ruling  faction  was 
hostile  to  it,  —  disclosing  its  paramount  purpose  to  have  been 
to  increase  its  own  power  rather  than  that  of  the  Republican 
party.  The  151,000  voters  who  supported  Mr.  Low  were  to 
have  no  representation  in  the  city  council  or  the  legislature, 
save  as  they  could  gain  it  under  the  party  system  in  the 
small  electoral  districts  which  the  Tammany  faction  and  the 
boss  faction  alike  favored.  We  have  seen  how  easily  such  a 
representation  may  be,  in  substance,  if  not  utterly,  defeated 
under  the  party  system.1 

2.  If  the  boss  faction  desired  no  Republican  members  from 
the  new  city  at  Albany,  and  none  in  the  city  council  except 
those  it  could  control, — or  if  it  regarded  Tammany  members 
as  less  dangerous  to  its  charter  schemes  than  representatives 
of  the  independent  and  non-partisan  voters  of  the  city  would 
be,  —  it  is  easy  to  account  for  the  defeat  of  minority  repre- 
sentation. The  bosses  and  managers  of  the  parties  and 
factions  —  which  would  alone  be  represented  —  could,  per- 
haps, easily  agree  under  the  new  charter.  The  governor, 
under  it,  can  remove  the  mayor.  Both  state  and  city  govern- 
ment could,  apparently,  be  made  a  matter  of  secret  arrange- 
ment between  a  very  few  persons. 

1  See  pp.  241-244.  It  is  but  justice  to  the  commission  to  say  that  a  majority  of 
its  members,  at  least  ostensibly,  favored  minority  representation, — perhaps  at 
first  supposing  the  ruling  faction  would  allow  it.  The  commission  reported  a  pro- 
vision favoring  it,  despite  the  opposition  of  the  Tammany  members.  This 
provision  mysteriously  and  needlessly  advised  an  amendment  of  the  state  con- 
stitution to  make  it  valid.  Judge  Dillon,  a  very  able  lawyer,  who  was  a  member 
of  the  commission,  gave  it  a  written  opinion  —  in  which  it  would  seem  that  Mr. 
Tracy  concurred  —  that  minority  representation  could  be  legally  established  under 
the  present  New  York  constitution.  (Albany  Law  Journal,  Nov.,  1896,  p.  347.) 
The  boss  faction  failed  to  support,  if  it  did  not  oppose,  that  provision — appar- 
ently like  Tammany  preferring  to  have  only  parties  represented  in  the  city 
council  and  all  non-partisan  voters  practically  disfranchised.  We  are  sorry  to 
have  to  add  that,  after  the  hostile  attitude  of  the  ruling  faction  became  known, 
the  majority  of  the  commission  seems  to  have  made  no  effort  to  sustain  its  pro- 
vision for  minority  representation. 


478  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

8.  We  repeat  that  in  no  just  sense  can  the  instrument 
prepared  by  the  commission  be  designated  a  charter.  It  is  a 
compilation  —  if  we  should  not  say  a  conglomeration  —  of 
provisions  in  a  limited  part  fit  for  a  charter ;  in  larger  pro- 
portions merely  suitable  for  general  laws ;  in  its  main  bulk 
mostly  appropriate  only  for  city  ordinances. 

A  charter,  or  city  constitution,  should  be  a  clear,  concise 
statement  of  the  general  powers  which  the  state  confers 
upon  a  city,  duly  defining  its  fundamental  organization  and 
the  authority  of  its  great  departments  and  officers ;  — 
but  allowing  the  city  to  freely  exercise  these  powers 
through  the  making  of  its  ordinances.  The  part  of  the 
five  hundred  and  fifty-nine  pages  of  this  so-called  charter 
appropriate  for  such  an  instrument  would  not  have  greatly 
exceeded  in  length  the  fifty-eight  pages  of  its  index, — about 
the  length  of  the  great  municipal  codes  of  England.  If  this 
unwieldy  bulk,  and  these  departures  from  all  the  best  prece- 
dents and  principles,  affected  merely  style,  convenience,  and 
perspicuity,  we  could  pass  them  without  notice ;  but  the 
consequences  are  far  more  serious.  They  obscure  all  just 
distinctions  between  general  laws,  charters,  and  ordinances ; 
they  strongly  tend  to  false  and  vicious  theories,  to  confusion 
of  thought,  to  arbitrary  special  laws,  to  excessive  and  need- 
less litigation,  to  the  suppression  of  municipal  Home  Rule. 

4.  This  so-called  charter  is,  we  think,  the  most  serious  in- 
vasion and  denial  of  just  municipal  freedom,  or  Home  Rule, 
which  any  enlightened  state  of  this  generation  has  sanctioned. 
No  other  law  of  New  York  has  made  any  other  city  so  depend- 
ent as  the  Greater  New  York  upon  state  legislation  in  the 
details  of  its  local  affairs.  By  sweeping  all  provisions  into 
the  charter,  —  not  only  all  laws  applicable  to  any  part  of  the 
new  city,  but  the  details  of  ordinances,  and  sometimes  of 
even  regulations  or  rules,  —  they  have  been  stereotyped  in  the 
form  and  rigidity  of  law,  and  have  been  placed  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  state  legislature.  Hardly  any  change  can  be  made 
save  by  the  consent  of  that  body.  The  exercise  of  the  ordi- 
nance-making power  is,  therefore,  in  the  main,  denied  to  the 
new  city.  Page  after  page  of  appropriations  and  expendi- 


THE  CHARTER  OF  THE   GREATER  NEW  YORK     479 

tures  have  been  by  this  so-called  charter  imposed  upon  the 
city,  as  to  which  it  should  have  complete  discretion.1 

IX 

1.  The  gravest  objection  to  the  charter  is  that  it  has 
provided  for  a  party  government  in  the  new  city  of  the 
most  radical  and  despotic  kind,  —  save  in  so  far  as  the  state 
constitution  has  made  the  methods  of  Civil  Service  reform 
imperative  within  certain  limits.  That  both  the  boss  fac- 
tion and  Tammany  desired  such  a  government,  with  party 
tests  for  city  offices,  is  too  clear  for  doubt.  We  have  so 
fully  set  forth  the  evils  incident  to  such  a  city  govern- 
ment that  nothing  further  need  be  said,  save  to  point 
out  some  evils  of  the  kind  which  this  charter  will  aggra- 
vate. 

|  2.  Party  government  in  cities  requires  despotic  power  in 
'  the  mayor,  —  that  he  should  be  an  autocrat  elected  by  the 
party  majority.  This  charter  provides  for  such  a  mayor. 
The  city-party  system  requires  the  mayor  to  have  an  abso- 
lute power  of  appointment,  without  any  need  of  confirma- 
tions. This  charter  creates  such  a  mayor.  This  system 
requires  the  mayor  to  be  absolute  for  making  removals. 
This  charter  provides  for  such  a  mayor.  As  Tammany  casts 
more  votes  than  any  other  organization  in  the  city,  such  a 
mayor  is  precisely  the  mayor  which  Tammany  most  wishes  and 
needs  for  its  continuous  and  absolute  supremacy.  To  bring 
the  whole  city  administration  to  the  test  of  the  largest 
numerical  vote,  to  make  that  vote  decisive  of  all  patronage 
and  control,  and  to  suppress  the  minority,  was  the  supreme 

1  See  Section  230  of  the  charter.  One  can  hardly  read  page  after  page  of 
the  names  of  institutions  which  secured  appropriations  through  the  charter  with- 
out a  feeling  that  the  support  of  these  institutions  might  have  been  thus  facili- 
tated. If  it  shall  be  said  that  there  were  fewer  laws  affecting  the  city  enacted  at 
the  session  of  the  legislature  next  following  the  passage  of  the  charter  than  for- 
merly, the  answer  is  that  the  ruling  faction  had  become  alarmed  and  disgusted 
by  the  public  condemnation  of  the  instrument,  and  Tammany's  capture  of  the 
city.  The  proposed  amendments  of  the  charter  were  very  numerous,  but  to  have 
even  discussed  them  would  have  overwhelmed  with  obloquy  the  men  most 
responsible  for  it. 


480  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

desire  and  interest  of  Tammany.  All  this  is  precisely  what 
this  charter  does.  The  mayor  under  it  has  authority  to  till 
all  the  highest  places  —  the  heads  of  all  the  departments 
and  commissions,  nearly  seventy  in  number,  —  at  his  mere 
pleasure,  or  that  of  the  party  boss,  —  even  for  mere  party 
reasons,  as  he  or  the  boss  pleases.1  The  man  in  nomination 
for  mayor  may  bargain  for  filling  them  secretly  and  auto- 
cratically, according  to  arrangements  made  with  the  boss 
and  managers  of  his  party,  or  solely  to  gain  votes  for  his  own 
election.  A  royal  despot  could  hardly  have  a  power  more 
absolute  or  demoralizing.  These  appointments  involve,  and 
practically  decide,  the  choice  of  numerous  heads  of  bureaus 
and  divisions.  The  merits  of  these  appointments  are  not 
required  to  be  anywhere  explained  or  publicly  discussed. 
Orders  at  meetings  in  the  secret  chambers  of  the  party  or 
its  boss  may  settle  all  these  things  under  this  charter. 

If  Tammany  had  asked  for  a  law,  in  these  regards,  most 
favorable  to  its  instant  success,  and  most  sure  to  perpetuate 
its  old  supremacy  and  party  system,  it  could  hardly  have 
proposed  anything  better  for  such  purposes  than  the  pro- 
visions of  this  charter.2 

3.  If  we  had  space  for  details  as  to  the  mayor's  general 
authority,  his  tremendous  power  for  serving  his  party  and 
defeating  all  non-partisan  movements  would,  we  think,  im- 
press the  reader.  The  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportion- 
ment, for  example,  —  with  its  vast  powers  somewhat  modified, 
—  is  retained  by  the  charter.  Of  the  five  members  of  this 
Board,  the  mayor  is  one;  he  appoints  two  others,  giving  him 
control  of  a  majority;  the  remaining  two  members  are  to  be 
elected  —  and  almost  certainly  by  the  same  party  majority 
which  elected  the  mayor.  No  other  organization  of  the 
people  can,  apparently,  have  any  chance  of  a  representation 
upon  the  Board. 

1  There  are  a  very  few  exceptions  to  the  general  authority  for  mere  arbitrary 
appointment  —  mostly  noted  elsewhere. 

2  There  was  no  reason  for  surprise  when  it  appeared  that  no  member  of  the 
commission  was  more  delighted  with  the  charter  than  an  ex-mayor  of  Tammany, 
who  well  knew  what  could  be  done  under  it.    The  boss  faction  of  the  Republicans 
was  equally  delighted,  for  it  was  madly  sure  of  electing  the  first  mayor. 


THE   CHARTER  OF  THE   GREATER  NEW  YORK      481 

There  are  seventeen  other  executive  departments,  or  com- 
missions, besides  the  Board  of  Education,  nearly  all  of  them 
having  more  than  one  head,  or  commissioner,  and  most  of 
them  from  three  to  five.  The  head  of  one  of  these  depart- 
ments is  the  comptroller,  who  is  to  be  elected  by  the  people 
—  practically  by  the  dominant  party.1  The  members  of  the 
other  fifteen  commissions  are  to  be  appointed  by  the  mayor, 
and  among  them  are  the  commissioners  of  Police,  Health, 
Charity,  Docks,  Buildings,  and  the  Fire  Department  —  obvi- 
ously involving  vast  patronage  and  power.  So  far  as  we 
can  learn,  every  person  appointed  by  the  mayor  under  these 
powers  has  been  a  supporter  of  Tammany,  thus  practically 
making  an  acceptance  of  its  party  opinions  and  policy  a  test 
for  every  city  office,  save  where  the  Civil  Service  laws  have 
compelled  appointments  for  merit. 

4.  The  theory  of  making  party  opinions  a  condition  of 
holding  office  under  the  new  charter  —  and  to  promote  its 
partisan  purpose  —  has  been  applied  to  judicial  offices  as 
well  as  to  all  others.  We  have  seen  that  Mayor  Strong  had 
both  brought  into  office,  and  allowed  to  remain  there,  many 
officers,  both  judicial  and  executive,  whose  party  opin- 
ions differed  from  his  own.  Under  the  new  charter  a 
descent  was  at  once  made  from  this  enlightened  policy  to 
one  of  half -civilized,  partisan  proscription  —  even  in  the 
judicial  sphere.  Every  one  of  the  several  justices  appointed 
by  the  mayor  of  the  new  city  has  been,  so  far  as  we  can 
learn,  a  supporter  of  Tammany.  At  the  last  election  a  great 
scandal  was  caused,  and  many  Democratic  voters  were  alien- 
ated, by  a  refusal  of  Tammany,  for  mere  partisan  or  more 
selfish  reasons,  to  renominate  an  admirable  judge.2 

1  How  far  the  comptroller  regarded  himself  as  a  party  representative  is  ap- 
parently shown  by  the  fact  that  he  paid,  as  part  of  his  election  expenses,  $5000  to 
the  Tammany  or  New  York  General  County  Committee ;  $5000  to  the  Democratic 
Committee  of  Kings  County ;  and  $200  to  that  of  Richmond  County,  —  all  such 
expenses,  according  to  his  statement,  amounting  to  more  than  $12,500. 

2  Tammany  seems  not  to  have  forgotten  its  practice  of  gaining  money  in  con- 
nection with  judicial  nominations.    Of  the  two  Tammany  judges  last  (1898) 
elected  in  the  city,  one  of  them  states  that  he  paid  $5775,  and  the  other  that  he 
paid  $5100,  as  election  expenses,  and  more  than  $10,000  of  this  sum  appears  to 
have  gone  to  the  Treasurer  or  Committee  of  Tammany.    The  persons  last  elected 

2i 


i 


482  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

5.  We  shall  fail  to  appreciate  the  despotic  party  power 
of  the  mayor  under  this  charter  if  we  do  not  see  how  far  it 
extends  in  the  sphere  of  legislation.  On  a  superficial  view 
the  charter  seems  to  confer  considerable  legislative  powers 
upon  the  Municipal  Assembly,  but  they  are  in  large  measure 
delusive.  We  have  just  shown  how  seriously  they  are  im- 
paired by  including  ordinances  and  rules  as  a  part  of  the 
charter.  They  are  much  further  reduced  by  giving  to  the 
mayor  practical  control  of  all  the  largest  matters  of  legislation. 
Every  legislative  act  of  the  Assembly  must  be  exercised  by 
ordinance  or  resolution,  as  to  which  the  mayor  has  the  ordi- 
nary veto  power.  But  the  charter  further  provides  that  if 
the  ordinance  or  resolution  "  involves  the  expenditure  of 
money,  the  creation  of  a  debt,  the  laying  of  an  assessment, 
or  the  grant  of  a  franchise,"  it  shall,  in  the  first  place,  "  re- 
quire a  three-fourths  vote  of  all  the  members  elected  to  each 
house  of  the  city  assembly"  to  pass  it;  and,  secondly,  if 
the  mayor  vetoes  such  an  ordinance  or  resolution,  "  it  shall 
require  a  vote  of  five-sixths  of  all  the  members  of  each 
House  to  pass  it  over  the  mayor's  veto."  l  It  is  obvious  that 
the  ordinances  and  resolutions  embraced  in  the  category  to 
which  this  veto  power  extends  include  not  only  all  those  of 
large  importance,  or  involving  the  general  policy  or  expendi- 
tures of  the  city,  but  would,  literally  construed,  limit  the 
assembly's  purchase  of  the  chairs  or  even  the  stationery 
needed  for  its  own  use. 

The  mayor  is  thus,  for  most  practical  purposes,  made 
supreme  in  the  sphere  of  city  legislation.  The  assembly  is 
in  substance  branded  as  an  inferior,  untrustworthy  body, 

as  Sheriff  and  Register  state,  one  that  he  paid  $2850,  and  the  other  that  he  paid 
86750.48,  as  such  expenses.  If  these  sums  are  less  than  we  have  shown  Tammany 
candidates  formerly  paid  (see  Chs.  IV.  and  V.),  it  should  be  remembered  that 
the  public  now  prints  and  supplies  the  votes,  so  that  the  sums  now  paid  to 
Tammany  have  quite  as  little  basis  in  justice  or  propriety  as  the  larger  payments 
have  ever  had.  There  is  a  plain  need  and  duty  of  suppressing  this  evil  by  law  — 
which  would  deprive  Tammany  of  vast  sums  that  now  constitute  a  main  element 
of  its  power  for  despotism  and  corruption  —  made  all  the  greater  by  the  new 
charter  which  has  vastly  extended  the  sphere  of  its  domination.  The  English  law 
forbids  such  needless  expenses.  See  p.  321. 
i  Charter,  Sees.  39  and  40,  and  see  Sec.  226. 


THE  CHARTER  OF  THE  GREATER  NEW  YORK  483 

practically  subordinate  to  the  mayor  and  undeserving  of 
public  confidence  or  respect.  The  greatest  of  all  city  prob- 
lems —  that  of  creating  a  responsible  City  Council  competent 
to  exercise  the  ordinance-making  powers  in  city  affairs  —  is, 
therefore,  not  only  unsolved  by  the  charter,  but  is  apparently 
unappreciated  —  in  the  very  sphere  of  its  essential  existence 
— being  encumbered  and  subordinated  in  order  to  make  a 
greater  realm  for  a  despotic,  party-elected  mayor. 

6.  The  mayor  is  in  substance  declared  to  know  better  — 
to  be  more  trustworthy  as  to  what  money  needs  to  be  ex- 
pended —  in  every  district  of  the  city  than  the  members  who 
represent  it  in  the  assembly.  If  100  out  of  any  121  mem- 
bers sitting  at  any  time  in  the  assembly  favor  any  purchase 
or  measure  that  costs  money,  the  mayor  with  the  other  21 
members  can  defeat  it  —  despite  the  unanimous  vote  of  the 
100  other  members,  —  the  wishes  and  judgment  of  the 
mayor  counting  more  under  this  charter  than  the  wishes 
and  judgment  of  79  members  of  the  assembly.  Such  a  city 
assembly  is  not  so  much  a  representative  body  as  a  parody  of 
it,  and  is  liable,  therefore,  to  become  a  fit  object  for  contempt. 
The  charter  makes  it  certain  that  the  men  most  worthy 
to  legislate  for  a  great  metropolis  will  never  enter  its  assem- 
bly. It  can  never  have  debates  which  will  be  an  adequate 
check  upon  party  corruption  or  administrative  extravagance 
and  despotism  under  a  partisan  mayor. 

We  need  not  stop  to  inquire  whether  only  mere  petty 
authority  was  conferred  upon  the  assembly  in  order  to  make 
the  mayor  more  conspicuously  autocratic,  or  because  the 
constitution  of  the  body  was  conceded  to  be  so  bad  that  it 
could  be  trusted  with  nothing  of  real  importance.1 

1  There  are  provisions  in  the  charter  for  a  limited  kind  of  local  authority  being 
exercised  in  the  five  several  boroughs  into  which  the  city  is  divided.  Each  is  to 
elect  a  borough  president — all  but  two  of  them  having  an  annual  salary  of  $5000 
each.  These  high-sounding,  but  we  must  think  needless,  officers  are  speciously 
justified  on  the  theory  of  a  need  of  more  local  official  knowledge  and  control. 
We  have  no  space  for  justice  to  the  subject.  There  is  a  gross  inconsistency 
between  such  an  estimate  of  these  borough  officers'  local  knowledge,  and  those 
provisions  of  the  charter  which  enable  the  assumed  omnipresent  mayor,  in  every 
quarter  of  the  city,  to  overrule  any  majority  of  the  local  representatives  of  the 
people,  less  than  five-sixths,  upon  every  question  of  local  expenditure  or  informa- 


484  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 


1.  If,  from  the  mayoralty,  we  turn  to  the  city  assembly,  we 
shall  find  further  evidence  of  a  purpose  not  only  of  making 
the  mayor  a  party  autocrat,  but  of  success  in  establishing  a 
city-party  government  of  the  strictest  kind. 

The  legislative  body  created  by  the  charter  is  designated 
the  "Municipal  Assembly."  It  is  composed  of  two  houses. 
The  higher  is  called  the  Council,  which  is  composed  of  twenty- 
nine  members,  elected  —  except  the  president  —  from  newly 
created  districts  for  the  term  of  four  years. 

The  other  house  of  the  assembly  is  called  the  Board  of 
Aldermen,  and  it  is  to  be  composed  of  one  member  elected 
for  a  term  of  two  years  from  each  assembly  district  of  the 
city  —  an  arrangement  well  calculated  to  perpetuate  the  old 
party  machinery  and  vicious  leader  system  in  these  districts 
under  Tammany  rule.1 

2.  We  should  take  notice  here  that  there  is  no  classification 
of  the  members  of  either  house  of  this  assembly,  the  charter 
in  this  particular,  as  in  so  many  others,  rejecting  the  prece- 
dents of  all  the  best-governed  cities  of  the  world.     As  the 
purpose  was  to  create  a  partisan  assembly,  care  was  taken  to 
exclude  all  minority  representation  —  to  embarrass  all  repre- 
sentatives of  any  persons  whatever  save  those  who  should 
appear  and  vote  as  members  of  a  party.     The  151,000  voters 
who  supported  Mr.  Low  cannot  be  represented  —  or  even 
make  a  nomination — unless  they  conform  to  the  needless, 

tion.  The  theory  of  one  set  of  these  provisions  is  confuted  by  the  other.  These 
borough  presidents  are  certain  to  have  little  official  work  to  do,  but  they  are 
likely  to  be  all  the  more  efficient  as  electioneerers  for  their  party.  They  have 
been  regarded  by  Tammany  as  party  officers,  and  every  one  of  those  elected  were 
Tammany  men.  They  ought,  in  all  propriety,  not  to  be  active  in  party  politics, 
yet  one  of  them  was  the  chairman  of  the  general  committee  of  Tammany. 
Another,  who  says  he  expended  $3090  for  his  election  expenses,  paid  £1080  of 
that  sum  to  a  Tammany  committee.  Can  we  wonder  that  Tammany  favored 
such  needless  local  officers  ? 

1  It  is  worth  while  to  notice  the  inappropriate  and  misleading  names  for  these 
bodies.  By  common  understanding  the  city  council  means  the  whole  city  legisla- 
ture, but  in  this  charter  it  means  only  one  branch  of  it ;  the  aldermen,  according 
to  familiar  usage,  mean  the  highest  members  of  the  council,  but  under  this  charter 
they  are  the  lowest ;  the  assembly  generally  means  the  inferior  branch  of  a  state 
legislature,  but  in  this  charter  it  means  both  branches  of  a  city  council. 


THE  CHARTER  OF  THE  GREATER  NEW  YORK  485 

burdensome,  and  expensive  conditions  imposed  by  the  parti- 
san New  York  election  laws  we  have  cited.1 

No  possibility  of  Free  Nomination  or  Free  Voting  is  allowed 
by  the  charter.  It  assumes  it  to  be  undesirable  to  have  any 
experienced  members  of  the  assembly  hold  over  any  city 
election,  or  any  member  in  that  body  who  does  not  represent 
the  last  victorious  party.  As  every  victorious  party,  faction, 
and  boss  naturally  desire  to  capture  all  the  legislative  seats  at 
every  city  election,  this  charter  is  kindly  framed  to  facilitate 
such  results. 

3.  We  have  set  forth  the  reasons  why  it  is  very  undesir- 
able and  needless  to  have  two  houses  in  a  city  council,  and 
have  shown  that  in  all  the  best-governed  cities  of  the  world 
—  as  well  as  in  a  great  and  increasing  majority  of  American 
cities  —  the    city   council    is    a    single    body.2     The   retro- 
gression of  the  charter  to  a  discarded,  double-chambered 
body  is  as  characteristic  as  it  is  unfortunate ;   yet,  if  the 
paramount  purpose  was  to  make  the  mayor  supreme,  or  to 
govern  the  city  through  a  boss  or  any  central  party  power, 
who  can  deny  that  the  chances  of  being  able  to  do  so  will 
be  much  increased  by  two  houses,  and  compelling  them  to 
concur  by  a  five-sixths  vote  in  order  to  defeat  any  party 
purpose  against  the  will  of  the  mayor  or  the  boss? 

4.  Those  who  propose  to  control  city  governments  through 
parties  believe  in  large  combinations.     They  combine  from 
all  parts  of  the  city  in  managing  their  party  affairs.     They 
act  centrally  through  the  boss,  the  central  committees,  or 
the  mayor,  who,  in  a  party  sense,  represent  and  speak  for 
the  whole  city.     This  charter  facilitates  the  party  use  of 
such  combined  power  for  dictating  nominations  and  con- 
centrating exertions  upon  every  separate  district  in  which 
the  non-partisan  voters  attempt  to  achieve  a  success.     The 
greater  the  city,  the  more  oppressive  and  irresistible  this 
combined  power  becomes.     The  authors  of  this  charter,  well 
knowing  all  this,  refused  all  provisions  for  Free  Nominations, 
Free  Voting,  or  any  sort  of  combined  action  on  the  part  of 
non-partisan  voters. 

1  See  pp.  215-217.  »  See  pp.  30^306. 


486  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

5.  The  failure  of  the  authors  of  the  charter  to  provide  for 
the  election  of  any  members  of  the  assembly,  save  its  president 
or  speaker,  from  the  city  at  large,  is  very  remarkable  —  is 
indeed  almost  grotesque.     The  need  for  a  common  charter 
and  government  at  all  for  the  region  about  New  York  har- 
bor rested  on  the  ground,  as  it  was  justly  declared,  that 
its  affairs  should  be  managed  in  reference  to  the  common 
interest  of  the  region  by  men  who  represented  it  as  a  whole, 
and  who  would  be  authorized  to  speak  and  act  for  it  in  the 
large  spirit  of  its  aggregate  interests  and  duties.     The  result 
has  been  that  every  member  —  save  one  —  in  each  house  of 
assembly  is  to  be  elected  from  a  mere  local  district  —  stands 
for  a  geographical  subdivision,  and,  according  to  the  theory 
of  the  charter,  owes  a  first  duty  to  a  narrow  section.     No 
member  can  be  nominated  or  elected  by  the  high  and  pervad- 
ing convictions  that  sweep  over  the  whole  city,  or  can  de- 
clare its  common  aspirations,  needs,  or  duties.     No  members 
can  claim  the  right   or  dignity  of  representing  the  whole 
municipality  or  any  truly  metropolitan  policy.     Every  mem- 
ber can  be  called  to  account  by  his  own  narrow  locality. 
All  this  degrades  the  assembly.     It  may  make  the  mayor, 
the  boss,  and  the  central  party  managers  appear  relatively 
more  dignified  and  irresistible,  but  at  the  expense  of  the 
assembly.     Their  voice  will  all  the  more  seem  that  of  the 
great  metropolis  and  its  millions  of  people,  while  anything 
the  members  of  the  assembly  may  say  will  appear  only  as 
the  selfish,  discordant  pipings  and  mutterings  of  little,  local 
interests. 

6.  It  seems  at  first  almost  impossible  that  there  should 
be  any  earnest   struggles  for   seats  in  so  undignified  and 
debased  an  assembly.      Yet  to   sit   even   in  such   a  body 
can  give  an   added  consequence  to  a  certain  class  of  peo- 
ple.    Under  the  Tammany  party  system  there  are  advan- 
tages of  some  kind,  more  or   less   mysterious,  in   holding 
little   offices  —  advantages   which    citizens    of    high    moral 
standards,  and  not  very  familiar  with  the  possibilities  of 
city-party   politics,   find   it   difficult   to    understand.      The 
facts  are  indisputable  nevertheless;  and  Tammany  men  have 


THE  CHARTER  OF  THE  GREATER  NEW  YORK     487 

been  willing  to  pay  large  sums  of  money  in  aid  of  secur- 
ing seats  even  in  such  an  assembly.1 

7.  We  have  shown  elsewhere 2  how  easily  a  centralized 
party  system,  acting  through  many  elections  in  small  dis- 
tricts, gains  a  power  which  can  largely  suppress  the  inde- 
pendent, non-partisan  vote.  This  lesson  is  taught  —  as  well 
as  the  utter  inadequacy  of  mere  small  district  elections  for 
giving  representation  to  the  minority  —  by  the  results  of  the 
first  elections  of  members  of  the  municipal  assembly  and  of  the 
legislature  under  the  new  charter.  We  may  remember  that 
the  vote  in  the  whole  new  city  was,  for  Low  151,000,  for 
Tracy  100,000,  and  for  Tammany  234,000,  besides  the  vote  for 
Mr.  George.  Considering  the  vote  in  old  New  York  alone, 
and  disregarding  fractions  of  a  thousand,  the  proportion  of 
votes  between  the  candidates  was  nearly  the  same  —  Van 
Wyck  received  133,000  votes,  Tracy  55,000,  and  Low 
77,000;  yet  of  the  fifteen  members  of  the  new  city  council, 
chosen  within  the  limits  of  the  old  city  at  the  same  time, 
Tammany  elected  every  one.  Of  the  members  of  the  board 
of  Aldermen,  chosen  at  the  same  time,  Tammany  elected 
all  but  four  or  five — the  latter  being  supporters  of  Mr.  Low 
or  Republicans.  There  seems  to  have  been  only  one  regular 
Republican  elected  to  the  new  city  assembly.  Of  the  five 
presidents  of  boroughs  provided  for  by  this  charter  Tam- 
many elected  every  one.  Of  the  members  of  the  state 
legislature,  chosen  at  the  same  time,  Tammany  seems  to 

1  For  example,  one  candidate  for  the  assembly  under  the  present  charter  paid 
$1349.60  as  the  expenses  of  his  election ;  another  paid  $3067.63;  and  a  third  paid 
$7270.30.    Of  these  sums  over  $7000  seem  to  have  been  paid  by  these  three  mem- 
bers to  the  Tammany  committee.  These  facts,  so  illustrative  of  the  old  Tammany 
system,  will  help  to  account  for  the  large  sums  of  money  which  Tammany  was 
able  to  disburse  near  the  time  of  the  city  elections  of  November,  1897  —  the  first 
under  the  charter.    According  to  the  public  journals,  Tammany  near  that  time 
voted  at  a  single  session  to  give  away  $40,000  in  charity  within  the  city  (see  New 
fork  Times,  Dec.  11,  1897) ,  the  same  to  be  disbursed  through  its  party  leaders  in 
the  several  assembly  districts.    This  is  certainly  better  than  to  have  used  the 
whole  of  it  either  in  buying  votes  or  in  the  bribing  of  citizens  not  to  vote  at  all. 
The  transaction  is  entitled  to  all  the  praise  that  can  fairly  be  accorded  to  using 
the  money,  thus  gained  from  candidates  for  office,  for  making  the  necessitous  city 
poor  mindful  of  the  advantages  of  standing  well  with  Tammany  and  its  assembly 
district  leaders. 

2  See  Ch.  IX. 


488  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

have  elected  ten  senators,  and  the  Republicans  two  from 
the  old  city;  and  of  the  members  of  the  state  assembly, 
Tammany  seems  to  have  elected  twenty-seven,  and  the  Re- 
publicans and  the  supporters  of  Mr.  Low  together  only 
eight;  and  only  one  of  these  voted  for  Mr.  Low  for  mayor. 
Thus,  instead  of  the  charter  conferring  any  form  of  mi- 
nority representation  —  which  would  have  much  increased 
both  the  Republican  and  the  Independent  vote  —  it  sub- 
stantially suppressed  both. 

XI 

1.  It  will  hardly  be  denied  that  among  the  worst  evils 
connected  with  American  city  governments  have  been  these  : 
the  power  of  partisan  organizations  has  become  despotic  and 
demoralizing  ;    a  lucrative  and  vicious  trade  in  city-party 
politics  has  been  established  ;  the  spoils  system  has  become 
intolerable  ;  the  just  representation  of  the  minority  has  been 
defeated;   a  despotic,  debasing,   partisan,  self-perpetuating 
boss  system  has  been  developed ;  the  government  of  cities 
by  parties  rather  than  by  the  people  has  been  the  inevitable 
result.     Now,  the  new  charter  for  New  York  has  not  even 
attempted  to  remedy  any  one  of  these  evils,  but  has  ex- 
tended and  intensified  all  of  them.1 

2.  Tammany  was  never  so  strongly  intrenched  by  law  as 
now,  nor  has  she  ever  before  had  so  effective  powers  for 
resisting  assaults  as  under  this  charter.     It  enables  her  to 


1  The  charter  contains  some  excellent  provisions  relating  to  civil  service 
reform,  but  the  courts  in  the  city  have  held  that  it  has  also  deprived  the  state 
offices  of  the  most  essential  power  for  preventing  the  Tammany  government  from 
prostituting  the  civil  service  law  and  administration  for  its  own  party  purposes  — 
•  prostitution  which  has  been  systematic  and  debasing  under  the  new  charter. 
The  charter  contains  some  badly  framed  clauses  for  a  city  Bureau  of  Statistics 
which  might  have  been  made  a  much  more  useful  agency  had  not  mayoralty 
domination  been  favored.  There  are  charter  provisions,  sound  in  theory,  enabling 
ex-mayors,  etc.,  to  have  seats  in  the  city  assembly,  but  we  most  think  that  no 
such  officers  will  ever  take  a  seat  in  a  legislative  body  so  destitute  of  authority  for 
important  or  dignified  services  as  that  which  the  charter  creates.  There  are  also 
various  other  provisions  in  the  charter  which  are  desirable  perhaps  to  prevent 
abuses  sore  to  arise  under  a  very  badly  constituted  city  government  like  this,  but 
which  would,  in  large  part,  be  both  needless  and  mischievous  under  a  charter 
based  on  sound  principles  or  which  provides  for  reasonable  Home  Rule. 


THE  CHARTER  OF  THE  GREATER  NEW  YORK   489 

secretly  exact  her  price  for  all  nominations  and  elections, 
and  she  can  compel  party  services  at  the  hands  of  all  officers 
and  city  laborers,  as  she  chooses,  —  the  charter  making  no 
effective  prohibitions.  This  charter  says  to  Tammany,  and 
her  leaders  say  to  her  supporters,  "All  the  offices  and  all 
the  spoils  belong  to  those  who  furnish  the  voters  and 
manage  the  party.  There  is  an  abiding  tie  of  self-interest 
between  them." 

3.  Tammany  would  be  apparently  justified  by  the  example 
of  the  supporters  of  Mr.  Tracy  in  using  all  external  party 
forces  to  keep   itself  in  power,   for  the  Republican  state 
boss,  in  the  city  election  of   1897,  is  believed  to  have  re- 
quested the  President  to  take  part  in  the  contest;  and  he 
seems  to  have  induced  several  United  States  Senators  to 
invade  the  independence  of  the  new  city  by  delivering  par- 
tisan speeches,  seeking  to  influence  its  voters  in  city  elections 
by  mere  party  considerations. 

4.  This  charter,  therefore,  both  by  its  provisions  and  by 
the  interpretation  put  upon  them  by  its  authors,  will  strongly 
favor  partisan  city  government,  which  will  continually  invite 
state  and  national  party  intermeddling.     More  and  more  the 
charter  will  involve  city  affairs  in  state  and  national  politics 
and  stimulate  the  great  parties  to  supreme  exertions  for  their 
control  as  essential  to  the  control  of  the  state  of  New  York. 

5.  It  is  obvious,  therefore,  that  we  can  never  take  the 
government  of  the  city  of  New  York  out  of  partisan  politics 
until  the  leading  provisions  of  this  charter  shall  be  repealed, 
and  we  shall  provide  the  city  with  a  charter  under  which  the 
minority  and  the  independent  voters,  as  well  as  mere  party 
men,  shall  be  fairly  represented.1     As  a  whole,  the  defeat 
resulting  to  those  responsible  for  this  charter  was  the  most 
discreditable  and  disastrous  known  to  our  municipal  history. 

1  This  view  of  the  new  city  government  must  be  incomplete  without  consider- 
ing the  merits  of  the  officers  whom  Tammany  has  elected  or  appointed  for  the 
new  city.  But  we  have  no  space  for  this.  It  must  suffice  to  say  that  very  few  of 
them  are  well-known  citizens ;  that  —  so  far  as  we  can  learn  —  none  of  them  had 
any  recognized  part  in  the  great  movements  of  recent  years  for  improving  the 
government  of  the  city  of  New  York;  that  all  of  them  are  supporters  of  the 
party  system  of  Tammany  —  save  the  few  who  have  secured  their  places  under 


490  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 


XII 

Lest  the  view  of  the  charter  here  presented  may  be  thought 
peculiar  or  unfair,  the  author  wishes  to  cite  the  highest 
authorities  on  the  subject  known  to  him. 

1.  Dr.  Albert  Shaw  —  the  eminent  writer  on  municipal  af- 
fairs often  quoted  in  these  pages  —  has  elaborately  considered 
this  charter.1  The  writer  finds  nothing  in  Dr.  Shaw's  article 
from  which  he  dissents  save  the  opinion  expressed  by  him 
that  the  majority  of  the  commission  really  desired  minority 
representation.  Dr.  Shaw  recognizes  the  dominating  author- 
ity of  the  mayor  under  the  charter.  He  sees  the  utter  in- 
capacity of  the  municipal  assembly  for  its  functions,  showing 
that  this  body  has  no  adequate  powers  for  making  ordinances. 
He  says  the  mayor's  veto  power  will  enable  him  to  defeat 
any  doings  of  the  assembly  concerning  the  budget  —  or  ex- 
penditures of  the  city  —  and  that  the  action  of  the  municipal 
assembly  in  this  regard  "becomes  merely  a  grand  farce." 

Dr.  Shaw  says  that  under  such  a  charter  state  intermed- 
dling in  city  affairs  will  continue,  and  that  there  can  be  no 
adequate  power  for  resisting  it.  While  declaring  —  as  we 
also  think  —  that  the  charter  has  various  sound  provisions  as 
to  franchises,  docks,  ferries,  and  public  assets,  he  says,  of  the 

the  emasculated  Civil  Service  Examinations,  or  are  influential  members  of  the  boss 
faction  which  forced  the  charter  upon  New  York  City ;  that  they  all  believe  in 
enforcing  party  tests  for  city  offices,  and  in  so  managing  city  government  as  to 
make  it  serviceable  to  state  and  national  parties.  The  Atlantic  Monthly  says 
that  the  supporters  of  Tammany  insisted  that  the  "  new  municipality  would,  and 
ought  to  be,  used  for  the  benefit  of  its  organization,"  and  that  the  new  officers 
"  were  chosen  from  among  .  .  .  the  men  counted  upon  to  do  absolutely  .  .  . 
the  will  of  the  powerful  politicians  who,  with  no  official  responsibility,  nominated 
them.  .  .  ."  Atlantic  Monthly,  Jan.,  1898,  p.  107. 

The  notorious  partisan  dealings  of  Tammany  with  one  or  more  of  the  judges 
in  connection  with  the  last  city  elections,  which  aroused  general  indignation ;  the 
recent  resignation  of  a  high  judicial  officer  elected  by  Tammany  while  an  investi- 
gation was  being  made  into  the  affairs  of  his  office ;  the  recent  scandalous  and 
unprecedented  controversies  between  the  criminal  judges  and  the  prosecuting 
attorney ;  the  investigation  of  New  York  City  abuses  by  a  legislative  committee 
now  just  begun  — these  are  some  illustrations  of  the  various  official  scandals, 
under  Tammany  rule,  which  are  ominous  of  future  city  government  under  the 
new  charter.  Since  this  was  written  a  legislative  committee  has  been  appointed 
—to  investigate  Tammany  abuses  —  which  is  now  in  session.  See  Appendix. 

1  Atlantic  Monthly,  June,  1897,  pp.  733-748. 


THE  CHARTER  OF  THE  GREATER  NEW  YORK   491 

instrument  as  a  whole,  that  "the  country  must  look  else- 
where, if  it  seeks  instruction  in  the  framing  of  charters." 
We  are  aware  of  no  writer — not  concerned  in  the  making  of 
this  charter  —  who  has  taken  a  more  favorable  view  of  its 
provisions. 

2.  The  Association  of  the  Bar  of  the  City  of  New  York — 
among  whose  more  than  1500  members  are  to  be  found  a 
large  majority  of  the  ablest  and  most  respected  members  of 
the  legal  profession  there  —  gave  the  reported  form  of  the 
charter  a  careful  consideration  before  it  had  been  enacted. 
The  association  appointed  a  committee,  whose  elaborate  re- 
port upon  the  subject  was,  after  a  full  discussion,  adopted.1 

To  state  the  objections  to  the  charter  made  by  this  report 
would  be  to  repeat  much  that  has  been  said  in  this  chapter. 
The  report  says  that  "the  proposed  charter  ...  is  not  a 
charter  in  any  proper  sense  ;  ...  it  is  an  imperfect  com- 
pilation .  .  .  ;  loose  and  defective  workmanship  abound  in 
almost  every  part  .  .  .  ;  the  marks  of  extreme  haste  are 
everywhere  visible  ;  by  far  the  larger  portion  of  all  local 
legislation,  as  to  matters  of  importance,  is  to  be  transacted 
or  controlled  not  by  the  assembly  but  by  ...  heads  of 
departments  who  are  appointees  of  the  mayor."2 

The  Bar  Association  expressed  its  final  opinion  of  the 
charter  in  these  comprehensive  and  unequivocal  words : 
"  that  in  the  judgment  of  this  association  the  enactment  of 
the  proposed  body  of  law  contained  in  that  charter  would 
give  rise  to  mischiefs  far  outweighing  any  benefits  which 
may  reasonably  be  expected  to  flow  from  it." 


1  This  committee  —  whose   report  was  printed  —  was  one   of   distinguished 
ability,  character,  and  experience.    Adherents  of  both  parties  were  among  its 
members;  its  chairman  had  been  nominated  for  a  justice  of  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court ;  another  of  its  members,  the  leader  of  the  New  York  City  Bar, 
was  president  of  the  National  Municipal  League ;  two  others  of  its  members  had 
been  upon  state  commissions  for  improving  the  government  of  New  York  City. 
It  was  a  committee  eminently  competent  for  making  a  good  charter  for  the  new 
city. 

2  The  report  says  it  would  seem  that  the  commission,  at  an  early  period  of 
their  work,  became  convinced  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  adequately  execute 
its  task  without  a  large  extension  of  time,  and  says  it  is  "deplorable  that  the 
commission  did  not  insist  on  having  such  extension." 


492          THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

XIII 

1.  Nothing  could  arrest  the  partisan  and  suicidal  purpose 
of  the  boss  faction  to  impose  such  a  charter  upon  the  Greater 
New  York.     It  was  without  effect  that  Mr.  Low  and  Mayor 
Strong  formally  objected,  in  writing,  to  several  of  its  bad  pro- 
visions, and  that  the  latter  vetoed  the  whole  instrument. 

The  proceedings  of  the  state  legislature  in  connection 
with  its  enactment  —  quite  in  the  spirit  of  its  origin  and 
aims  —  were  not  creditable  to  New  York.  It  would  seem 
that  not  more  than  four  or  five  hours  of  its  sessions 
were  given  to  debates  concerning  the  provisions  of  the 
charter.  Not  a  twentieth  part  of  these  provisions  appear 
to  have  been  read  before  either  house  of  the  legislature. 
Several  of  its  members,  after  declaring  the  charter  to  be 
indefensible,  —  and  sure  to  be  disastrous  to  the  Republican 
party,  —  nevertheless  declared  an  intention  to  vote  for  it,  be- 
cause, as  they  said,  the  party  majority  demanded  it  —  and,  we 
may  add,  because  they  feared  their  favorite  local  bills  would 
be  defeated  at  the  hands  of  the  adherents  of  the  boss  faction 
if  those  members  should  refuse  obedience  to  its  commands 
that  they  support  the  charter.  There  was  a  lamentable 
scene  of  partisan  despotism  and  servility  in  the  legislature. 

2.  Thus  a  despotic  party  faction,  by  indefensible  means, 
needlessly  and  disastrously  imposed  upon  the  new  city  at 
its  birth,  and  against  the  best  intelligence  and  virtue  of  its 
people,  an  intolerable,  antiquated,  partisan  municipal  system 
—  sure  to  cause  discontentment  and  conflict  until  it  shall  be 

(overthrown.     It  has  made  it  certain  that  the  question  of  a  fit 
government  for  the  city  of  New  York  must  be  one  of  the 
)aramount  issues  in  New  York  state  politics  until  the  new 
Uty  shall  secure  a  government  based  on  sound  principles  and 
framed  in  the  light  of  the  best  municipal  experience  of  the 
Id. 

XIV 

A  single  point  of  importance  remains,  —  one  which  concerns 
the  essential  conditions  of  municipal  reform.  We  mean 


THE  CHARTER  OF  THE  GREATER  NEW  YORK   493 

the  proper  relation  of  state  parties,  not  merely  to  city  and 
village  governments,  but  to  the  governments  of  towns  and 
counties  as  well.  The  subject  requires  a  whole  chapter,  but 
we  can  consider  only  two  points, — first,  the  effects  of  a  con- 
stant interference  with  such  bodies,  in  a  limited  way,  by  the 
central  party  and  the  boss,  which  has  been  increasing  for 
years  ;  and,  second,  the  despotic  invasion  and  capture  of 
one  or  more  such  bodies  with  a  purpose  of  making  them  an 
active  agency  for  party  aggrandizement.  The  imposition  of 
the  Greater  New  York  charter  was  an  unprecedented  case 
of  the  latter  kind. 

1.  We  have  seen  that  when  this  charter  came  before 
the  legislature,  members  who  disapproved  it  feared  to  ex- 
press their  opposition  lest  the  party  majority  should  wreak 
their  revenge  upon  them  by  defeating  their  own  local 
bills.  Here  we  have  illustrations  of  the  effects  of  a  party 
majority  despotism  in  state  party  action  of  the  first,  or 
limited  kind,  yet  sufficient  to  greatly  obstruct  the  chances 
of  just  legislation,  —  or  reasonable  Home  Rule,  —  not  only  in 
cities  and  villages,  but  in  towns  and  counties.  This  kind 
of  limited  despotism  has  been  established  —  mainly  through 
the  action  of  the  state  party  boss  —  by  a  constant  interfer- 
ence with  the  just  liberty  of  local  nominations  and  elections. 
He  and  the  party  managers  dictate,  if  they  do  not  bribe,  the 
local  nominations  and  elections.  The  boss  can  get  money 
for  his  party,  and  his  supporters,  —  at  least,  —  by  aiding  or 
opposing  local  candidates.  Central  party  influence  is  used 
to  make  legislators  subservient,  and  to  control  local  adminis- 
tration. National  party  tests,  which  are  immaterial  for  local 
officers,  are  enforced  by  the  coercion  of  the  state  party  boss 
and  managers.  This  system  makes  the  state  boss  possible, 
and  true  Home  Rule  impossible. 

XV 

Candid  readers  can  hardly  reflect  upon  the  facts  consid- 
ered, relative  to  municipal  or  other  local  affairs,  without 
feeling  that  political  parties  have  usurped  a  centralized  and 
despotic  control  which  has  seriously  impaired  that  just,  local 


494  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

independence  essential  to  good  government,  —  and  which  our 
state  constitutions  contemplate.  In  doing  this,  the  central 
party  authorities  have  made  their  favor  and  support  of 
their  platforms  —  if  not  the  favor  of  the  state  boss  —  con- 
ditions of  holding  local  offices.  The  New  York  Constitu- 
tional Convention  of  1894  condemned  such  practices  in 
those  provisions  which  make  superiority  shown  by  com- 
petitive examinations  —  irrespective  of  party  opinions  or 
the  favor  of  the  boss — essential  to  entering  or  gaining  pro- 
motion in  the  civil  service  of  the  state.1  The  purpose  of 
the  constitution  would  hardly  have  been  more  definite  had 
it  declared  that,  whereas  party  opinions  and  favor  are  unim- 
portant for  filling  the  great  body  of  offices  to  which  the 
examinations  extend,  therefore  appointments  and  promotions 
therein  shall  be  made  for  personal  merit  and  fitness  to  be 
fairly  tested  regardless  of  party  affiliations. 

This  was  a  noble  improvement.  But  the  same  constitution 
unfortunately  contains  another  original  provision  of  a  very 
different  character,  which  looks  as  if  extorted  by  the  party 
machine  as  a  compensation  for  its  loss  by  reason  of  the  sec- 
tion first  quoted.  This  additional  and  dangerous  provision2 
declares  that  the  laws  may  provide  for  boards  of  "officers 
charged  with  the  duty  of  registering  votes,  .  .  .  distributing 
ballots  .  .  .  and  receiving,  recording,  or  counting  votes  at 
elections,  which  .  .  .  shall  secure  equal  representation  of 
the  two  political  parties  which  have  cast  the  highest  and 
next  highest  number  of  votes  .  .  . ;  "  and  that  the  members 
of  these  boards  and  officers  "  shall  be  appointed  or  elected  in 
such  manner,  upon  the  nomination  of  such  representatives 
of  said  parties  respectively,  as  the  legislature  may  direct." 

These  provisions  are  open  to  very  grave  objections: 
(1)  they  are  utterly  repugnant  to  the  other  provisions  just 
cited,  the  former  declaring  that  the  "  whole  civil  service  of 
the  state  "  shall  be  open  to  all  the  people  alike,  on  the  basis 
of  "  merit  and  fitness  "  to  be  tested  by  free  competition ;  but 
the  last  provisions  declare  that  a  particular  class  of  offices 

1  See  N.  Y.  Const.,  Art.  V.,  Sec.  9,  quoted  ante,  p.  176. 
•Const.,  Art.  2,  Sec.  6. 


THE  CHARTER  OF  THE  GREATER  NEW  YORK   495 

shall  be  the  monopoly  of  the  two  largest  parties ;  (2)  these 
monopolists  are  to  be  nominated  by  the  representatives  of 
such  parties,  and  no  test  of  merit  or  fitness,  or  even  of  pub- 
licity, is  required ;  (3)  while  one  class  of  these  provisions 
practically  declares  that  party  power  and  privilege  are 
excessive  and  dangerous,  and  therefore  restrains  them,  the 
other  greatly  increases  these  very  evils;  (4)  the  provisions 
last  cited  despotically  established  a  party  test  for  officers ; 
they  unjustly  declare  all  the  people  incompetent  to  hold 
them  unless  they  are  adherents  of  one  of  the  two  largest 
parties ;  they  make  the  nominees  of  these  parties  the  exclu- 
sive judges  in  their  own  cases;  (5)  the  independents  and 
the  members  of  small  parties,  who  are  thus  disabled,  are  the 
very  citizens  who  most  need  protection  through  representa- 
tives on  the  election  boards  in  cities,  we  having  shown  that 
mere  party-selected  election  officers  are  ready  to  conspire 
with  each  other  for  party  domination.1  (6)  This  new 
system  of  monopoly  and  exclusion  will  more  and  more  tend 
to  bring  all  city  and  other  local  elections  under  the  control 
of  adroit  and  unscrupulous  partisan  officials,  whereas  the 
public  interests  require  us  to  strive  to  secure  just-minded 
and  non-partisan  election  officers  —  instead  of  pairs  of  un- 
trustworthy party  manipulators  —  each  member  of  whom 
can  be  justified  only  on  the  ground  that  the  other  cannot  be 
trusted.  The  theory  of  this  latest  constitutional  provision 
would  justify  the  appointment  of  judges  in  pairs  upon  party 
nomination,  on  the  ground  that  no  single  judge  can  be 
trusted. 

XVI 

1.  We  have  said  2  that  a  state  party  and  its  boss  may  go 
beyond  this  limited  kind  of  local  intermeddling.  They  may 
strive  to  make  a  great  city  —  captured  through  the  imposi- 
tion of  a  partisan  charter  by  state  party  action  —  the  means 
of  their  own  aggrandizement  and  continuing  supremacy  in  the 
state.  Such,  we  repeat,  were  the  purpose  and  significance  of 
the  effort  to  impose  a  partisan  charter  upon  the  Greater  New 

i  See  pp.  126, 127,  211.  *  p.  493. 


496  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

York,  —  the  first  important  scheme  of  the  kind  in  our  mu- 
nicipal history.  A  party  can  do  this  only  at  the  peril  of  divid- 
ing its  own  ranks  and  of  giving  its  party  opponents  a  chance 
for  a  great  victory  —  and  this  was  what  was  done  in  the  case 
before  us.  The  result  of  this  victory  enables  us  to  draw 
another  lesson  concerning  city-party  government  from  the 
action  of  Tammany.  We  have  before  called  attention  to  its 
intimidating  methods,  through  sending  great,  semi-military 
bodies  of  its  followers  to  attend  political  conventions.  We 
have  shown  how  natural  it  was  that  autocratic  mayors  and 
party  government  in  great  cities  should  strongly  tend  to  make 
these  methods  more  effective  and  dangerous.  We  have  also 
asked  attention  to  the  probability  that  the  city-party  system 
would  soon,  owing  to  the  rapid  growth  of  cities,  make  the 
mayor  of  New  York  a  party  rival  of  the  governor  of  New 
York.1  What  was  before  but  anticipation  has  now  become 
reality.  As  the  time  approached  for  holding  the  New  York 
Democratic  State  Convention  for  nominating  a  governor  at 
Syracuse,2  it  became  manifest  that  Tammany  proposed  to  use 
its  new  power  for  securing  the  nomination,  for  governor  of 
New  York,  of  Mr.  Van  Wyck,  its  mayor  of  the  Greater  New 
York  City.  But  the  Democrats  residing  outside  the  city  had 
begun  to  comprehend  the  new  municipal  power  which  was 
threatening  their  subjugation.  They  seem  to  have  largely 
united  upon  Ex-Governor  Hill  as  an  anti-Tammany  candi- 
date —  and  none  too  soon.  Tammany  resorted  to  its  old,  in- 
timidating, semi-military  tactics  on  a  larger  scale  than  ever 
before.  According  to  the  journals,3  it  gathered,  in  addition 
to  its  regular  delegates,  and  sent  from  New  York  City  to  Syra- 
cuse, nearly  fifteen  hundred  of  its  peculiar  representatives, 

—  "  braves  "  with  "  high  hats  and  canes,"  as  the  journals  say, 

—  in  four  separate  trains  —  "  forty-two  cars,  exclusive  of 
baggage  vans."     According  to  the  best  information  obtain- 
able, nearly  a  thousand  of  the  members  of  this  expedition 
were  officers  in  the  municipal  service  of  the  city  of   New 
York  —  men  who,  under  the  ordinances  of  Boston4  or  the 

1  See  some  interesting  facts  on  these  points,  pp.  140-142. 

5  In  September,  1898.      <  New  York  Times,  September  28, 1898.      *  See  p.  173. 


THE  CHARTER  OF  THE  GREATER  NEW  YORK  497 

usages  of  any  well-governed  city  of  the  world,  would  have 
been  dishonored,  if  not  removed,  for  such  breaches  of  official 
propriety  and  duty.  With  these  trains  and  controlling  them, 
according  to  the  journals,  were  many  city  commissioners  and 
other  high  city  officers,  and  also  the  party  leaders  and  man- 
agers under  the  Tammany  system.  Besides,  according  to 
the  journals,  there  was  a  Kings  County  delegation,  headed 
by  the  president  of  the  Board  of  Police  of  the  Greater  New 
York,  "  consisting  of  sixty-five  delegates  and  two  hundred  or 
more  shouters." 

All  this  is  certainly  a  unique  and  significant  illustration  of 
the  relations  between  the  police  and  the  people  —  and  of  the 
kind  of  government  which  has  been  established  under  the 
new  charter  of  New  York.  How  can  we  hope  for  non- 
partisan  city  administration  so  long  as  high  city  officers  and 
their  official  dependents  leave  their  places  of  duty  to  go 
upon  trains  filled  with  partisan  electioneerers  apparently 
sent  to  control  political  conventions? 

2.  Tammany  barely  failed  to  force  the  nomination  of  its 
mayor   for   governor ;    but   at   its   suggestion   the   mayor's 
brother  was  nominated  as  a  compromise  candidate,  and  was 
accepted  by  his  party.     A  majority  of  a  very  few  thousand 
for  a  reform  candidate  for  governor  of  New  York  defeated 
that  brother's  election  and  prevented  Tammany  capturing 
the  state  by  reason  of  having  captured  the  city. 

3.  This  unique  and  monstrous  Tammany  expedition,  and 
especially  all  these  city  officials  who  should  never  have  left 
New    York    City    for    such    a    purpose,    returned   to   New 
York,  probably  with   more   confidence  than  ever  before  in 
the  Tammany  theory   of   city   government.      They  doubt- 
less   explained    to    the    officials    left    behind    the    peculiar 
advantage   of   this   Tammany   military    and    financial    sys- 
tem, and  the  duty  of  all  Tammany  officials  to  support  it 
liberally  and  vigorously,  —  especially  if  they  desire  to  con- 
tinue in  office. 

If  so  much  can  be  done  in  eight  months  toward  capturing 
a  state  through  the  control  of  a  great  city  under  a  partisan 
charter,  —  and  especially  if  effective  restrictions  upon  city- 
2x 


498  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  MUNICIPALITIES 

party  government  shall  not  be  speedily  made  by  such  methods 
as  we  have  suggested,  or  those  which  are  better,  —  it  cannot, 
apparently,  be  long  of  much  importance  what  the  people 
of  rural  New  York  may  desire  in  regard  to  their  government, 
for  it  will  be  controlled  by  one  or  more  of  her  great  cities. 
And  the  city  domination,  now  imminent  in  the  state  of  New 
York,  cannot  be  very  remote  in  several  other  states. 

Thus  the  experience  of  New  York  has  enabled  us  to  see 
that  the  question  of  party  rule  in  cities  not  only  vitally 
concerns  their  good  government  and  the  liberty  and  safety 
of  their  best  citizens,  but,  hardly  less,  the  power,  the  political 
independence,  and  the  morality  of  the  whole  rural  popu- 
lation of  states. 


APPENDIX 


APPENDIX.  —  THE  NEGLECTED  NEED  OP  MINOEITY  REP- 
RESENTATION, AND  THE  THREATENED  DANGER  OP  STATE 
POLICE  DESPOTISM,  IN  NEW  YORK 

1.  Breach  of  Republican  party  managers  with  Tammany.    Its  city  adminis- 
tration being  investigated  by  the  legislature.     Yet,  independent  voters  denied 
all  opportunity  of  Free  Voting,  and  party  tests  are  enforced  against  them. 
Minority  representation  strangely  neglected. 

2.  Republican  party  scheme  for  a  state  police  in  Democratic  cities.    Its  sud- 
den presentation  at  end  of  a  session.    Its  despotic  and  revolutionary  character. 
Its  incompatibility  with  our  Republican  institutions.    It  would  defeat  true  Home 
Rule  and  essential  municipal  activity.    It  would  prevent  effectual  inspection  of 
police  administration. 

3.  The  need  of  a  police  state-school  —  analogous  to  those  at  West  Point  and 
Annapolis  —  for  the  education  and  discipline  of  those  seeking  to  be  officers  over 
policemen. 

I.  SINCE  the  foregoing  chapters  went  to  the  printer,  pro- 
ceedings and  omissions  on  the  part  of  the  ruling  party  of 
the  state  of  New  York  have  occurred  which  require  some  notice 
here.  Experience  under  the  charter,  when  the  last  chapter  was 
written,  had  been  too  brief  to  justify  more  than  ominous  antici- 
pations.1 But  facts  of  evil  significance  as  to  Tammany  adminis- 
tration have  of  late  more  and  more  come  before  the  public.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  moral  tone  of  the  administration  of  Governor 
Roosevelt  has  facilitated  a  spirit  of  patriotic  scrutiny  which  has 
led  to  some  alarming  disclosures.  In  the  meantime,  the  despotic 
power  of  Tammany  has  emboldened  her  officials  for  acts  of  rash 
indiscretion. 

It  has  now  apparently  become  impossible  for  the  partisan 
leaders  and  boss  of  the  republicans  to  maintain  their  old  friendly 
relations  with  Tammany.  As  a  consequence,  the  more  indepen- 
dent and  non-partisan  elements  in  the  republican  ranks  were 
able  to  compel  the  passage  (April,  1899)  of  a  new  and  admirable 
Civil  Service  Reform  law, —  such  a  law  as  the  boss  and  partisans 
of  both  parties  have  long  opposed,  —  and  also  to  repeal  the 
vicious  old  law,  which  Tammany  has  been  easily  able  to  defy 
and  pervert  to  its  own  advantage.  This  old  law  was  in  the  spirit 
of  the  Greater  New  York  charter,  and  the  two  had  a  common 
origin  and  purpose. 

i  See  pp.  489,  490,  and  notes. 

1 


APPENDIX 

A  breach  between  the  managers  of  the  two  parties  was,  there- 
fore, unavoidable.  The  managers  of  the  republican  party,  not 
daring  to  justify  the  evil  doings  of  Tammany,  found  themselves 
compelled  to  investigate  them.1  The  republican  leaders,  who, 
eighteen  months  before,  had  forced  a  partisan,  despotic  charter 
upon  the  Greater  New  York,  —  expecting  to  capture  it  at  the  first 
election,  —  were  now  ready  to  join  hands  with  the  independents 
in  resorting  to  an  investigation  for  arresting  the  very  evils,  under 
it,  which  the  independents  had  told  them  from  the  beginning  were 
inevitable. 

II.  Though  some  of  these  leaders  at  the  outset  supported  the 
investigation  with  fear  and  reluctance,  its  first  disclosures  estab- 
lished its  wisdom,  supplying  direct  and  conclusive  evidence  of 
some  of  the  worst  evils  of  the  Tammany  system  which  we  have 
set  forth.     We  cannot  take  the  space  needed  for  even  briefly 
summarizing  this  evidence.     It  must  suffice  to  say  that  it  re- 
quires no  retractions,  but  makes  us  desire  to  emphasize  the  con- 
clusions we  had  reached.     The  state  assembly,  in  view  of  the 
evidence  taken,  has  greatly  broadened  the  original  sphere  of 
its  committee's  inquiries,  and  has  extended  its  term  until  the 
legislative  session  of  next  year.     We  cannot  doubt  that  salutary 
results  may  be  expected  from  the  action  of  this  committee  — re- 
sults to  which  the  new  Civil  Service  Keform  law,  which  much 
restricts  Tammany's  vicious  discretion,  will  largely  contribute. 

III.  Taking  only  this  law  and  investigation  into  the  account, 
we  should  feel  quite  sure  that  the  republican  party  managers  had 
decided  to  no  longer  imitate  Tammany  methods  in  dealing  with 
cities ;  —  even  that  it  had  decided  that  the  interests  of  the  people, 
rather  than  those  of  the  party,  should  be  treated  as  paramount. 
But  we  are  sorry  to  have  to  say  other  facts  convey  a  different 
suggestion.     We  have  seen  that  minority  representation  was 
needlessly  disallowed  by  the  Greater  New  York  charter,8  appar- 
ently because  the  members  of  the  faction  which  imposed  that 
charter  were  hostile  to  such  representation. 

They  preferred  that  Tammany,  rather  than  the  supporters  of 
Mr.  Low,  should  triumph.  Expecting  to  themselves  rule  the 
new  city,  they  desired  no  independents  or  non-partisans  either 
in  the  city  council  or  in  the  state  legislature.  Facts  thus  far 
seem  to  show  that  they  find  it  easier  to  accept  a  true  Civil  Service 
Reform  law,  than  to  accept  a  law  which  will  give  a  real  repre- 

i  See  p.  4<JO.  >  See  pp.  476,  477. 

2 


APPENDIX 

sentation  to  the  151,000  voters  of  New  York  City  who  supported 
Mr.  Low  for  mayor.1 

It  seems  too  plain  for  argument  that  to  no  source  of 
strength  in  city  elections  could  the  worthy  leaders  of  a  party 
turn  so  naturally  or  hopefully  as  to  this  class  of  voters,  who  are 
supporters  of  the  principles  of  their  party  in  state  and  national 
politics.  Yet  the  voting  of  all  of  them  is  obstructed,  if  they 
are  not  practically  disfranchised,  by  restrictions  imposed  upon 
them  by  partisan  laws  designed  to  give  party  managers  the 
control  of  elections  and  the  monopoly  of  offices  in  cities.2 

Unless  there  are  in  the  dominant  party  of  the  state  of  New 
York  powerful  leaders  who  still  favor  the  partisan  monopoly  to 
which  the  Tammany  system  tends,  why  has  nearly  a  year  and  a 
half  passed  since  Tammanys  triumphed,  without  an  effort  made 
in  the  state  legislature  to  establish  any  form  of  minority  repre- 
sentation? We  have  seen  that  the  republican  party  of  New  York 
has  been  long  committed  to  the  principle  of  such  representation, 
and  that  it  might  be  established  by  a  law,  which  the  legislature 
is  now  competent  to  enact.3  Are  the  vast  body  of  republican 
voters  in  the  Greater  New  York,  and  the  many  independent 
democrats  that  have  voted  with  them, —  all  of  whom  demand 
such  representation,  —  to  understand  that  the  republican  leaders 
prefer  a  few  compliant  partisans  in  the  city  council  and  in  the 
legislature,  whom  they  secure  under  the  party  system,  rather 
than  have  such  a  full  representation  of  the  people  as  true 
minority  representation  would  give?  Are  the  independent  non- 
partisan  voters  to  be  permanently  excluded  from  all  partici- 
pation in  the  counting  of  the  votes,  by  laws  enacted  by  parties 
to  secure  their  own  monopoly  and  the  aggrandizement  of  their 
managers?4  Can  a  governor  who  has  nobly  championed  a 
Civil  Service  Reform  policy  which  aims  to  ensure  to  young 
men  and  women  of  superior  merit  —  irrespective  of  party  affilia- 
tions, favor,  or  opinions  —  all  the  places  in  the  official  service  of 

1  There  is  good  reason  for  believing  not  only  that  the  evil  influences  of  the 
new  charter,  but  general  causes  have  materially  increased  the  numbers  of  the 
independent  and  non-partisan  voters  of  New  York  and  other  cities  during  the  past 
year.    There  seems  to  be  an  increasing  opposition  to  party  monopoly  and  des- 
potism, especially  in  cities.    The  last  elections  in  Chicago,  Minneapolis,  Detroit, 
Toledo,  Cleveland,  and  San  Francisco  indicate  this.    Review  of  Reviews,  May, 
1899,  pp.  516-521,  570. 

2  For  facts  on  the  subject,  see  pp.  214-217,  294,  295,  487. 
8  See  pp.  237,  and  477,  note. 

4  For  facts  on  the  subject,  see  pp.  494,  495. 

3 


APPENDIX 

the  city  and  the  state,  long  fail  to  condemn  an  election  system 
which,  in  the  interest  of  partisan  monopoly,  not  only  largely  ex- 
cludes their  fathers  and  brothers  from  nearly  all  legislative  offices 
in  cities,  but  actually  brands  them  as  unworthy  to  aid  in  receiving 
or  counting  votes  anywhere  —  unless  they  belong  to  one  of  the 
two  greatest  parties?  Would  a  mere  party  test  for  office  be  any 
more  indefensible,  if  applied  to  clerks  who  are  to  count  the  money 
in  the  city  treasury,  than  it  is  when  applied  to  the  clerks  who  are 
to  count  the  votes  in  the  city  ballot  boxes? 1  It  seems  to  be  more 
and  more  the  case,  in  the  state  of  New  York,  that  Home  Rule  in 
cities  is,  by  the  politicians,  held  to  be,  —  and  strongly  tends,  under 
city-party  rule,  to  become,  —  not  Home  Rule  by  the  city  people, 
but  Home  Rule  by  the  majority  of  the  largest  party. 

IV.  A  STATE  POLICE.  The  other  subject  which  should  have 
some  notice  here  is  that  of  the  exercise  of  police  power  —  the  con- 
trol of  the  police  administration  —  as  to  which  a  new  and  seduc- 
tive policy  has  been  suddenly  announced  by  the  managers  of  the 
dominant  party  in  the  New  York  legislature.  This  policy  appears 
in  a  bill  introduced  in  the  New  York  Senate  near  the  end  of  its 
session,  April  13,  1899.  The  bill  was  defeated;  but  it  is  under- 
stood that  a  persistent  effort  is  to  be  made  to  establish  the  theory 
which  it  embodies,  to  which  the  leaders  of  the  republican  party 
seem  to  have  committed  themselves.  We  have  space  for  only  a 
very  brief  outline  of  its  leading  provisions,  and  a  very  inadequate 
consideration  of  the  principles  and  theories  which  it  enunciates. 

The  matter  of  city  government  is  unfortunately  much  compli- 
cated and  embarrassed  in  the  state  of  New  York 2  by  having  her 
cities  divided  into  three  classes,  of  which  the  first  and  second 
together  include  the  six  largest  cities,  to  which  alone  this  bill 
at  first  extends.  But  the  other  cities,  according  to  its  provisions, 
are  to  come  under  it,  and  the  new  state  police  system  it  estab- 
lishes, as  soon  as  their  population  shall  reach  the  required  number 

1  See  pp.  494  and  495,  as  to  this  test.  The  New  York  Law  of  1895,  Ch.  1035, 
shows  the  manner  in  which  the  two  great  parties,  through  the  action  of  their 
managers,  secure  the  monopoly  of  poll  clerks,  ballot  clerks,  and  inspectors, — 
whom  they  are  to  nominate  in  all  the  election  districts  of  cities.  May  we  not 
hope  the  time  will  soon  come  when  we  shall  directly  seek  and  secure  fair-minded, 
reliable  men  for  such  places,  as  we  do  for  all  other  positions  of  high  trust, 
rather  than  mere  pairs  of  crafty  and  unscrupulous  partisans  ready  to  cheat  when- 
ever they  can  ?  Why  should  not  ex-policemen  be  required  to  serve  as  election 
officers  ?  They  are  not  likely  to  be  mere  partisans. 

*  See  p.  413,  note. 

4 


APPENDIX 

for  being  in  such  classes.  The  purpose,  therefore,  is  to  substitute 
a  new  state  police  system  —  provided  for  in  the  bill  —  in  place 
of  the  former  city  police  system,  which  has  prevailed  in  the  state 
of  New  York,  and  we  believe,  with  moderate  modification,  in  all 
the  states  of  the  Union,  from  the  time  that  policemen  first  existed 
in  the  United  States.  The  important  question,  therefore,  is 
whether  a  new  police  system  should  be  established. 

1.  The  new  state  police  system,  which  the  bill,  if  made  a 
law,  would  create,  provides  for  an  original  state  police  de- 
partment, extending  at  the  outset  to  the  six  cities.  This 
department  is  to  have  all  the  police  powers,  authority,  func- 
tions, and  duties  which  now  belong  to  or  pertain  by  law  to 
the  six  cities;  and  not  only  these  powers,  but,  generally,  the 
new  state  department  is  also  to  have  the  property  and  income 
of  these  city  police  departments,  which  are  to  be  suppressed  by 
their  absorption  or  consolidation  into  the  new  state  department. 
This  new  state  department  is  to  have  its  central  office  at  Albany, 
the  capital  of  the  state.  The  local  city  police  organizations  and 
activities  are  to  be  discontinued.  2.  The  head  of  this  state 
police  department  is  to  be  a  single  "commissioner  of  state 
police,"  upon  whom  all  state  police  power  is  to  be  concentrated. 
He  is  to  be  appointed  by  the  governor  and  confirmed  by  the  Senate 
for  the  term  of  six  years.  It  is  not  provided  that  this  commis- 
sioner shall  have  any  advisers  or  assistants,  his  authority  being 
possessed  by  him  as  absolutely  as  any  acknowledged  despot  could 
possess  his  powers.  But  he  is  required  "to  appoint,  and  at  pleas- 
ure remove,  a  deputy  commissioner  of  state  police  and  a  secretary 
of  state  police."  These  three  officers  —  one  supreme  and  his  two 
subordinates  —  are  to  have  all  the  police  powers  of  the  six  cities, 
with  others  given  by  the  bill.  The  commissioner  has  also  the 
vast  power  of  appointing  and  removing  a  police  treasurer  in  each 
city,  who  is  to  be  the  purchasing  agent  of  the  police  department. 
There  are  no  conditions  that  such  appointments  by  the  governor 
or  the  state  commissioner  shall  be  made  in  reference  to  any  ex- 
perience, capacity,  or  other  standard  of  qualifications ;  on  the 
contrary,  this  appointing  power  of  the  latter  is  declared  to 
be  exercisable  "at  pleasure,"  and  therefore  may  be  exercised 
according  to  the  theory  —  as  it  is  conferred  in  the  language  — 
of  the  party  spoils  system.  The  governor's  appointing  and 
removing  power  is  not  less  absolute. 

3.  It  is  not  by  inference  merely,  but  by  the  express  provi- 

5 


APPENDIX 

sions  of  the  bill,  or  new  state  police  system,  that  the  vast 
police  powers  of  cities  to  be  thus  transferred  are  to  go  to  him  as 
a  single  state  officer,  to  be  possessed  so  absolutely  by  him  that  he 
may  at  pleasure  transfer  any  part  of  his  power,  authority,  func- 
tions, and  duties  to  the  "  police  chiefs  "  of  the  cities,  who  are  to 
be  appointed  by  him.  These  chiefs  are  to  detail  policemen  to  the 
election  polls  of  the  cities,  obviously  a  great  political  power. 
All  paramount  police  authority,  therefore,  is  centred  absolutely 
in  one  state  police  commissioner,  save  as  he  may  temporarily 
delegate  fragments  of  it  to  his  appointees,  the  police  chiefs  of 
cities.  It  is  further  declared  the  state  commissioner  "  may  make, 
adopt,  and  enforce  such  rules,  orders,  and  regulations,  and  do  such 
otJier  acts  as  may  be  reasonably  necessary  (of  course  in  his  view) 
for  the  exercise  of  his  powers."  He  is,  therefore,  to  be  equally 
a  despot  in  the  legislative  and  in  the  executive  spheres  over  the 
whole  domain  of  our  police  affairs.  Both  the  commissioner  and 
the  city  chiefs  have  the  vast  political  power  of  appointing  an  un- 
limited number  of  special  state  policemen,  practically  at  their 
discretion.1 

The  state  police  commissioner,  with  slight  exceptions,  is  also 
the  ultimate  executive  authority  to  whom  appeals  must  be  made 
as  to  every  question  of  police  administration,  duty,  or  discretion 
which  can  arise  in  the  cities,  and  his  decision  is  to  be  final. 

4.  The  proposed  law  would  obviously  suppress  all  legislative 
action  in  cities,  and  also  all  local  officials,  so  far  as  they  have 
any  function  or  duty  of  inquiry  or  discussion  concerning  police 
matters.  Local,  city  authority,  therefore,  for  making  ordi- 
nances, so  far  as  police  affairs  are  concerned,  would  be  sup- 
pressed. Not  only  would  all  Home  Rule  officers  be  practically 
extinguished,  but  the  very  sphere  for  Home  Rule  action  in  the 
police  domain  would  itself  be  abolished.  The  state  power, 
exercised  by  a  single,  absolute  state  police  commissioner,  would 
consequently  be  omnipresent  and  supreme  in  every  city,  in  every 
detail  of  city  affairs,  and  as  to  the  duties  of  every  police  officer 
who  may  patrol  its  streets,  so  far  as  police  action  is  concerned; 
and  this  police  authority  is  the  most  important,  potential,  multi- 
farious, and  pervading  of  all  authority  known  in  municipal  life. 

1  We  have  no  space  —  nor  is  there  any  need  —  to  consider  the  provisions  of  the 
bill  as  to  the  rights  and  duties  of  ordinary  policemen.  They  are,  in  substance, 
the  provisions  of  existing  laws,  so  compiled  as  to  be  almost  certain  to  lead  to 
much  needless  uncertainty,  confusion,  and  litigation. 

0 


APPENDIX 

5.  We  cannot  go  further  into  the  details  of  the  official 
machinery  of  the  new  scheme,  most  of  which  is  highly  central- 
ized and  despotic.  Such  a  bill,  if  made  a  law,  would  not  only 
declare  the  people  of  a  city  should  have  no  part  in  the  police  ad- 
ministration they  must  accept,  but  that  no  local  executive  officer 
or  legislative  council  should  possess  either  authority,  duty,  or 
liberty  as  to  making  or  enforcing  the  ordinances  under  which 
they  must  live,  regulating  the  streets  which  they  must  travel, 
or  compelling  obedience  to  the  moral  standards  to  which  they 
may  conform.  Such  a  law  would  reverse  the  whole  police  — 
and  a  large  part  of  the  municipal  —  policy  which  has  pre- 
vailed in  every  state  of  the  Union  and  in  all  the  most  en- 
lightened cities  of  the  world.  Tested  by  American  constitutions 
and  precedents,  it  is  the  most  un-American  and  anti-repub- 
lican scheme  ever  proposed.  It  proclaims  city  residents  to 
be  unworthy  of  having  the  least  direct  police  authority  as  to 
matters  at  their  own  doors.  It  condemns  the  elementary  prin- 
ciples of  the  American  government.  In  spirit,  it  declares  the 
theory  of  local  Home  Rule  —  whether  in  cities,  villages,  coun- 
ties, or  towns  —  to  be  a  mistake,  and  that  the  great  effort  should 
be  to  make  state  rule  supreme  and  exclusive,  by  absorbing  all 
local  jurisdictions ;  and  why  should  not  the  nation  make  simi- 
lar claims  against  the  states  by  giving  us  a  national  police 
commissioner  and  making  us  a  republican  Eussia?  Such  a 
law  would  establish  a  police  system  more  centralized  and  des- 
potic than  that  existing  in  any  leading  nation  of  modern  times 
except  Russia,  and  perhaps  Germany.  It  would  preclude  the 
possibility  of  that  excellent  police  system  of  England,  —  the  best 
which  has  ever  existed  for  a  free  state,  —  and  from  which  nearly 
all  that  is  most  valuable  in  our  police  system  has  been  borrowed. 

More  than  this,  it  would  so  weaken  the  forces  of  local  govern- 
ment, and  so  much  augment  the  central  powers  of  the  state,  as  to 
seriously  impair  the  counterpoise  between  them,  upon  which  the 
constitutional  and  legal  systems  of  American  states  repose. 

We  have  no  space  for  adequately  illustrating  the  extent  to  which 
this  state  police  scheme  would  diminish  the  sphere  of  legitimate 
city  activity  and  protection  and  enlarge  those  of  the  state.  Every 
power  given  to  the  state  police  by  this  bill,  as  to  mere  city  affairs, 
is  a  part  of  the  measure  of  this  diminution  —  a  declaration  of  the 
incompetency  of  city  residents  to  deal  with  their  own  affairs. 
We  can  mention  here  only  two  examples,  startling  in  themselves : 

7 


APPENDIX 

(1)  absolute  state  control  in  the  future  of  the  purchase,  location, 
and  ownership  of  all  police  station-houses,  and  other  erections 
and  equipments,  for  which  the  city  must  pay,  without  any  chance 
for  a  hearing  as  to  their  cost  or  location;  (2)  the  fixing  of  all 
police  salaries  and  other  police  expenditures,  for  which  the  city 
must  provide  the  money,  also  without  a  hearing  as  to  their  amount. 
But  in  the  note  we  give  a  few  examples  of  the  subjects  as  to 
which,  according  to  this  bill,  the  state  police  control  would 
deny  the  city  any  authority,  grasping  the  whole  of  it  arbitrarily,  and 
exercising  it  exclusively  by  its  own  officers,  thus  accomplishing  a 
great  revolution, l  and  making  fearless,  non-partisan,  or  effective 
debates  in  cities  over  city  affairs  impossible.  This  scheme, 
in  principle,  declares  that  we  need  no  municipal  government; 
that  city  councils  and  all  local  control  are  useless;  that  only 

1  The  bill  declares,  "  It  is  hereby  made  the  duty  of  the  state  police  in  the 
cities  ...  to  regulate  the  movement  of  teams  and  vehicles  in  streets,  bridges, 
squares,  parks,  and  public  places,  and  remove  all  nuisances  in  the  public 
streets,  .  .  .  inspect  all  places  of  public  amusement,  all  places  of  business,  all 
places  having  excise  or  other  licenses  to  carry  on  any  business ;  all  houses  of  ill- 
fame  or  prostitution,  ...  all  lottery  offices,  ...  all  gambling  houses,  cock-pits, 
rat-pits,  and  public  common  dance-houses,  .  .  .  enforce  and  prevent  the  violation 
of  all  laws  and  ordinances  in  force  in  such  cities,  .  .  .  possess  powers  of  general 
police  supervision  and  inspection  over  all  licensed  or  unlicensed  pawnbrokers, 
venders,  junk-shop  keepers,  junk-boatmen,  cartmen,  dealers  in  second-hand 
merchandise  .  .  .  and  auctioneers,  .  .  .  premises,  .  .  .  dealers  in  second-hand 
merchandise.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  (state)  city  chiefs,  each  in  his  city, 
to  provide  and  cause  to  be  enforced  .  .  .  rules  and  regulations  for  excursion 
steamers,  yachts,  and  all  crafts  taking  part  in  regattas  or  races,  .  .  . 

"  Each  city  chief  shall  in  his  respective  city  from  time  to  time,  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  (state)  commissioner,  establish,  provide,  and  furnish  stations  and 
station  houses,  or  sub-stations  and  sub-station  houses,  .  .  .  Each  city  chief  is 
hereby  authorized  and  empowered  to  furnish  horses  and  wagons,  to  be  known  as 
precinct  wagons  .  .  .  The  board  of  estimate  and  apportionment  .  .  .  are  directed 
to  appropriate  a  sufficient  sum  of  money  in  each  and  every  year  . . .  for  the  purpose 
of  furnishing  such  horses,  wagons,  and  apparatus  connected  therewith,  and  .  .  . 

"  the  number  and  boundaries  of  precincts  in  any  city  shall  be  fixed  by  the 
(state)  city  chief  in  said  city.  The  commissioner  shall  have  power  to  erect,  oper- 
ate, supply,  and  maintain  .  .  .  lines  of  telegraph  and  telephone  .  .  . 

"  The  state  police  may  .  .  .  procure  and  use  and  employ  such  rowboats,  steam- 
boats, and  boats  propelled  by  other  power  as  shall  be  deemed  necessary  and 
proper.  It  shall  be  a  misdemeanor  for  any  person  not  being  a  regular  member 
of  the  state  police  established  in  any  city  of  this  state  ...  to  serve  any  criminal 
process  within  the  cities  affected  by  the  provisions  of  this  act.  The  commissioner 
of  state  police  shall  have  power  to  apportion  any  general  expense  incurred  for  the 
general  conduct,  maintenance,  or  equipment  of  the  state  police  .  .  .  salaries  and 
expenses  of  any  officers,  members,  or  employees  ...  It  is  the  intent  of  this  act 
to  give  to  the  commissioner  of  state  police  cognizance  and  control  of  the  state 
police  throughout  the  cities  affected  by  this  act." 

8 


APPENDIX 

central,  irresistible,  omnipresent,  executive  state  force  is  neces- 
sary, before  which  city  people  must  bow,  stagnate,  and  be  servile 
and  silent.  It  is  a  striking  fact  that  the  whole  course  of  our 
study  has  shown  that  the  tendency  and  progress  in  good  city 
government,  even  under  a  police  system  so  despotic  as  that  in 
Berlin,  have  been  made  through  increasing  Home  Rule  and  bring- 
ing unofficial  citizens  more  and  more  into  participation  in  the 
management  of  their  local  administration,  but  this  despotic  bill 
and  scheme  of  a  state  police,  in  a  republic,  would  reverse  this 
tendency,  and  substitute  those  methods  of  centralization  and  state 
autocracy  which  all  enlightened  monarchies  are  abandoning  as 
dangerous  and  indefensible. 

6.  If  the  state  may  thus  appropriate  and  exercise  all  local 
police  powers,  why  may  it  not  do  the  same  thing  with  all  local 
sanitary  powers,  with  all  local  authority  over  schools,  taxation, 
transportation,   and  other  matters,  until  real  Home  Eule,  and 
consequently  effective  local  activities,  which  are  the  peculiarity 
and  strength  of  republican  governments,  shall  substantially  cease 
to  exist,  and  state  domination  shall  become  alike  universal  and 
absolute? 

It  is  obvious  that  without  a  right  and  duty  on  the  part  of  city 
officers  to  take  an  active  and  responsible  part  in  governmental 
affairs  at  their  own  doors,  of  which  police  matters  are  among  the 
largest  and  most  essential,  the  vitality  and  utility  of  local  gov- 
ernment cannot  be  preserved,  nor  can  a  debasing  subserviency  to 
central  despotism  be  avoided.  Central  party  tyranny  has,  as  we 
have  shown,1  already  become  despotic  and  debasing,  especially 
in  cities;  and  this  police  scheme  is  a  desperate  demand  for  a 
sort  of  tyrant  in  the  police  sphere  —  a  demand  which  naturally 
arises  when  the  legitimate  forces  of  government  have  been  per- 
verted, and  party  despotism  has  become  unendurable.  Such  a 
tyrant  would  make  true  city  councils  —  that  is,  representative 
government  in  cities  —  impossible. 

7.  But  we  have  seen  —  modern  municipal  experience  shows  — 
that  one  of  our  greatest  municipal  needs  is  city  councils,  rep- 
resenting   not    parties,   but    the  people,    competent   to   frame 
municipal  ordinances,  and  especially  police  ordinances  —  bodies 
that  shall  be  fearless  and  potential  enough  to  keep  the  whole 
police  department  upon  its  good  behavior  and  to  be  great  forces 
in  leading  the  benevolence  and  civilization  of  the  age.     With 

i  See  pp.  493-495. 
9 


APPENDIX 

such  councils,  mere  state  police  domination  would  be  impossible 
—  almost  unthinkable. 

We  have  also  shown  how,  through  a  uniform  police  code,  the 
payment  of  a  part  of  police  expenses  by  the  state,  and  inspections 
by  state  officers,  the  state  may  easily  secure  proper  subordination 
and  discipline  on  the  part  of  the  local  police  without  resorting  to 
revolutionary  measures.1  Nothing  of  this  kind  is  proposed  by 
this  bill.  The  state,  under  it,  proposes  to  take  all  the  police 
property  of  the  cities,  to  suppress  all  police  activity  by  their 
people,  and  to  fix  the  measure  of  their  police  expenditures, 
without  paying  any  portion  of  police  expenses. 

8.  It  seems  to  be  an  unanswerable  objection  to  this  scheme  of 
state  police  despotism  that  it  provides  —  and  in  fact  permits  — 
no  adequate  method  of  police  inspection  by  the  state,  such  as  we 
have,  in  the  second  chapter,  shown  to  be  useful  and  essential. 
A  state  bureau  or  officer  which  does  not  actually  carry  on  the 
local  police  administration  is  independent  to  deal  with  it.     He 
is  naturally  inclined  to  inspect  and  report  upon  it  severely.     He 
will  fearlessly  compare  the  results  in  cost  and  method  in  each 
city  with  those  in  the  others,  with  excellent  results,  as  we  have 
shown,  especially  from  the  English  practice.     City  councils  and 
other  city  officers  —  if  made  competent  as  we  have  proposed  —  will 
also  contribute  their  useful  criticisms. 

But  the  moment  —  local  councils  and  local  police  activity 
being  suppressed  —  a  single  state  officer  shall  be  made  supreme 
and  universal  in  his  control  of  local  police  affairs,  there  will  be 
no  competent  authority  to  expose  his  wrongdoing  or  make  any 
form  of  fearless  or  effective  inspection.  This  state  police  despot 
will  not  expose  his  own  maladministration;  nor  will  he  show  his 
own  incapacity  by  comparing  results  in  one  city  with  those  in 
another  of  his  police  realm.  He  will  always  declare  it  well 
governed.  He  will  not  dare  act  in  opposition  to  the  wishes  of 
the  party-elected  governor.  The  governor,  his  only  superior 
officer,  will  not  order  inspections,  unless,  indeed,  he  is  seeking 
for  grounds  for  a  removal,  most  likely  for  party  reasons.  Do  we 
desire  that  the  legislature  should  be  made  an  inspecting  body  for 
cities,  and  as  such  have  additional  reasons  for  interfering  with 
reasonable  Home  Rule  in  every  city? 

9.  We  must  not  wholly  ignore  the  party  interests  and  possi- 
bilities which  such  a  state  police  scheme  involves,  nor  the  very 

i  See  Chs.  II.  and  XVI. 
10 


APPENDIX 

unsatisfactory  manner  and  time  of  bringing  it  before  the  public. 
The  majority  of  voters  in  the  six  cities  to  be  at  first  subjected 
to  the  new  law  belong  to  a  party  with  which  the  authors  of  the 
state  police  scheme  expect  an  anxious  gubernatorial  contest  a  few 
months  hence.  Who  can  doubt  that  the  vast  political  influence 
this  scheme  would  put  in  the  hands  of  the  party  in  power  would 
greatly  increase  its  chances  in  this  election,  —  unless,  indeed,  a 
disastrous  revolution  within  its  own  ranks  should  occur,  similar 
to  that  which  happened  when  the  apparent  promoters  of  this 
scheme  attempted  to  ensure  their  domination  by  imposing  a 
partisan  charter  upon  the  Greater  New  York? 

The  last  scheme,  like  the  first,  seems  to  have  been  secretly 
matured  in  the  councils  of  the  leaders,  and  to  have  been  brought 
forward,  as  a  party  measure,  just  at  the  end  of  a  session,  thus 
precluding  —  whether  by  design  or  not  —  that  fair  and  intelligent 
consideration  which  so  great  a  revolution  in  our  police  system  re- 
quires. It  is,  therefore,  a  just  cause  for  congratulation  that, 
contrary  to  the  facts  when  that  charter  was  pending,  there  were 
a  few  men  in  the  Senate  who  had  the  statesmanship  and  moral 
courage  to  resist  the  party  demand  for  servile  obedience. 

10.  The  duties  of  statesmanship  —  we  might,  perhaps,  say  of 
ordinary  justice  and  discretion  —  in  dealing  with  so  grave  a  sub- 
ject are  very  plain.  Even  if  no  more  than  superficial  methods 
were  intended,  the  people  of  the  cities  directly  affected  should 
have  been  first  consulted,  and  a  bill  and  report  should  have  been 
brought  in  at  the  beginning  of  a  session.  The  bill  should  not  be 
a  conglomeration  —  like  that  before  us  —  of  all  the  laws  applica- 
ble to  any  of  the  six  cities,  but  should  be  in  the  nature  of  a 
systematic  state  police  code,  which  should  supersede  the  whole 
of  these  laws,  and  tend  to  order  and  definite  authority,  rather 
than  to  the  confusion,  distressing  doubts,  and  needless  litigations 
which  this  crude  and  hasty  bill  suggests.  An  adequate  bill 
would,  of  course,  be  drawn  in  the  direct  and  paramount  inter- 
est of  the  people  both  of  the  cities  and  the  state,  without  any 
reference  to  mere  party  advantage.  If  the  public  interests  in 
regard  to  the  subject  were  adequately  conceived,  the  governor 
would  be  authorized  to  appoint  a  commission,  having  a  police 
expert  and  a  statesman  upon  it,  to  first  examine  and  report  upon 
the  best  police  systems  of  Europe, —  those  of  England,  France, 
and  Germany,  whose  long  and  varied  police  experience  can 
give  us  much  information  which  we  greatly  need.  A  police  bill 

11 


APPENDIX 

drafted  and  enacted  in  the  light  of  such  information  —  like  that 
which  Sir  Robert  Peel  championed  —  might  be  an  honor  to  all 
concerned  in  its  production. 

11.  If,  from  such  objections  to  this  police  scheme,  we  turn  to 
the  reasons  given  for  it,  these  most  deserve  notice :  (1)  It  is  said 
it  will  tend  to  simple  methods  and  vigor  of  administration.  A 
despotism  always  does  this,  and  the  local  government  essential 
for  a  free  people  can  hardly  be  as  simple  as  a  centralized  tyranny. 
(2)  It  is  said  it  will  relieve  us  of  bi-partisan  commissions.  We 
have  dealt  with  the  objections  to  such  commissions  elsewhere, 
and  have  concluded  that,  bad  as  they  are,  they  are  preferable  to 
police  domination  by  a  single  party,  which  this  new  scheme  will 
facilitate.  (3)  We  are  told  it  will  give  us  a  single  head  of  the 
police,  which  is  claimed  to  be  a  great  advantage  in  the  way  of 
simplicity  and  vigor.  This  is  the  old  argument  of  despotism.  It 
is  the  justification  of  the  Russian  police  system  and  of  the  worst 
parts  of  that  of  Germany.  We  have  shown  how  much  confusion 
of  thought  and  how  many  fallacies  there  are,  connected  with  a  cer- 
tain measure  of  truth,  in  the  seductive  and  superficial  theory  of 
a  single  head  of  the  police.  It  has  been  made  plain  that  a  single 
head,  such  as  the  new  scheme  provides  for  New  York  City,  could 
not  properly  dispose  of  police  trials  alone,  even  if  he  did  deal 
with  anything  else.1 

(4)  But  the  chief  reason  given  for  the  new  scheme  is  a  claim 
that  it  will  take  police  administration  out  of  party  politics  — 
a  most  desirable  result,  certainly.  We  must  think  this  claim  to 
be  utterly  unwarranted,  and  that  the  new  scheme  would  make 
the  police  power  a  more  potent  party  force  than  it  ever  has  been 

—  in  both  state  and  city  politics.8    The  politicians  in  both  parties 

—  like  the  independents  —  regard  the  bill  as  a  party  measure 
for  party  advantage.     Are  they  all  mistaken? 

We  have  seen  that  the  state  commissioner,  who  has  all  con- 
trolling power,  is  to  be  appointed  and  removed  by  the  governor 

—  the  political  head  of  a  party  —  "at  pleasure,"  subject  to  con- 
firmation by  the  Senate,  and  that  the  commissioner  appoints  and 
removes  city  chiefs  of  police  practically  in  his  discretion,  —  abso- 
lutely "at  his  pleasure,"  during  the  first  year  of  his  term.     It  is 

1  See  pp.  431-434. 

2  The  bill  referred  to  contains  some  commendable  provisions  —  most  of  which 
of  any  value  are  taken  from  existing  laws  — against  policemen  interfering  in 
party  politics. 

12 


APPENDIX 

only  down  in  the  common  ranks  of  mere  policemen,  who  must 
absolutely  obey,  where  non-partisan  provisions  are  to  prevail. 
Those  high  police  officers  who  wield  paramount  power  may  be 
mere  political  representatives  of  the  state  executive  and  the 
Senate,  —  doing  as  they  please,  as  to  their  appointments  and 
removals.  Here,  apparently,  we  see  the  reasons  why  no  non- 
partisan  or  adequate  qualifications  are  required  on  the  part  of 
nominees  of  the  governor  or  of  the  state  commissioner.  If  it 
can  be  said  with  truth  that  the  present  governor  is  not  likely 
to  freely  nominate  an  active,  partisan  republican  for  state  com- 
missioner, it  may  be  answered  that  the  present  Senate  would 
confirm  no  other.  Does  any  one  doubt  the  party  purpose  of 
the  republican  senatorial  leaders  in  urging  this  bill?  Does 
any  one  believe  they  do  not  expect  great  gain  from  state  con- 
trol of  the  police?  Does  any  one  think  they  would  support  a 
law  which  declared  that  the  state  commissioner  should  be  a  grad- 
uate of  West  Point,  or  a  non-partisan  of  long  police  experience? 
Besides,  the  next  governor  may  be  an  extreme  politician.  Would 
he  and  his  party  hesitate  to  retaliate  for  this  partisan  attempt 
to  control  the  police  in  democratic  cities?  Can  any  well- 
informed  man  fail  to  see  that  state  police  scheme  has  already 
made  the  police  question  more  than  ever  before  a  party  issue? 
In  every  city  to  which  it  extends,  this  question  has  already 
become  an  absorbing  political  issue.  Can  one  doubt  that  party 
contest  for  the  election  of  members  of  the  next  state  Senate  will 
be  more  bitter,  partisan,  and  intense  by  reason  of  the  control  of 
the  state  police  having  been  made  a  party  question?  If  the  con- 
trol of  election  machinery  has,  in  one  particular,  been  taken 
away  from  the  police,  it  has  been  handed  over  to  officers  whom  the 
two  great  parties  nominate  and  practically  appoint,  thus  making 
elections  in  some  respects  more  partisan  than  ever  before.1 

V.  We  think  the  reader  must  have  been  impressed  with  the 
need  of  there  being  more  men  than  we  now  have  who  are  well 
instructed  for  the  discharge  of  the  higher  police  functions,  —  for 
the  duties  of  commissioners,  police  chiefs,  inspectors,  and  cap- 
tains. The  number  of  policemen  must  rapidly  increase  in  our 
cities  and  villages.  The  duties  of  police  officers  not  only  in  their 
legal  aspects,  but  in  their  administrative  complications,  are  fast 
becoming  more  difficult.  It  is  essential  not  only  that  there 
should  be  more  complete  theoretical  instruction,  but  more  prac- 

i  See  pp.  494,  495. 
13 


APPENDIX 

tical  experience  for  such  positions.  Above  all,  it  is  necessary 
that  we  should  reenforce  every  means  through  which  the  needed 
competency  can  be  attained,  while  at  the  same  time  increasing 
the  facilities  for  gaining  the  chief  offices  in  the  police  force  with- 
out coming  under  debasing  obligations  to  parties,  their  managers, 
or  the  boss.  We  must  also  strengthen  the  feeling  that  to  be  a 
true  policeman  requires  independence  of  all  mere  party  passion. 

It  is  being  more  and  more  clearly  seen  that  in  various  ways  the 
qualifications,  duties,  and  proprieties  of  police  life  are  analogous 
to  those  of  military  and  naval  life.  More  and  more  the  people 
are  recognizing  the  facts  that  the  thorough  instruction  of  our 
officers  of  the  army  and  navy  are  of  inestimable  public  advantage, 
not  merely  in  providing  more  competent  officers,  but  in  raising 
these  two  branches  of  the  public  service  above  the  low  stand- 
ards and  interests  of  partisan  politics.  That  these  results  have 
been  mainly  due  to  the  discipline,  technical  instruction,  and 
character-forming  influences  of  the  technical  schools  at  West 
Point  and  Annapolis,  is  the  common  conviction  of  all  competent 
judges.  What  would  our  army  and  navy  now  be  but  for  those 
schools? 

Why  should  we  not  have  similar  schools  for  training  young  men 
for  holding  police  offices?  Why  should  not  the  state  of  New  York 
take  the  lead  by  establishing  such  a  school,  to  which  other  states 
would,  perhaps,  send  students?  Its  graduation  standard  should 
be  high  enough  for  admission  to  the  position  of  officer  over  police- 
men, but  there  should  be,  of  course,  an  opportunity  —  as  there  is 
in  the  army  —  for  official  elevation  from  the  police  ranks.  We 
believe  such  a  school  would  soon  develop  a  patriotic,  honorable, 
and  non-partisan  spirit,  which  would  do  much  to  elevate  police 
administration,  and  prevent  a  monopoly  of  office  in  it  by  mere 
politicians.  The  school  could  also  be  made  to  largely  supply 
such  instruction  and  discipline  as  would  better  qualify  young 
men  for  officers  in  the  military  service  of  the  state  and  in  its 
penal  and  other  institutions.1 

1  There  is  an  increasing  appreciation  of  the  need  and  utility  of  snch  instruction 
and  discipline.  Several  of  the  public  institutions  of  the  state  of  New  York  now 
support  schools  for  training  those  who  are  to  take  part  in  their  administration. 
Mr.  Bonner,  the  worthy  ex-Chief  of  the  New  York  City  Fire  Department,  is  now 
exerting  himself  in  behalf  of  the  establishment  of  a  school  be  hopes  to  have, 
aided  by  the  city,  for  the  better  instruction  of  those  who  are  intending  to  become 
firemen. 

14 


INDEX 


Aldermen,  see  Council. 

Aldermen  (English) ,  their  mode  of  elec- 
tion and  character,  312-317,  and  see 
London  City  Council  and  English  City 
Government. 

Appointed  Aldermen,  292,  and  see  Coun- 
cil. 

Appointments,  see  Power  of  Appoint- 
ment and  Mayor. 

Assembly  District  Leaders,  117,  and  see 
Leaders. 

Assessment  extortions,  105-112. 

"  At  pleasure,"  as  a  rule  of  appointment 
and  removal,  see  Removals  and  Mayor. 

Austria,  cities  in,  351,  352,  and  see  Aus- 
trian City  Government. 

Austrian  City  Government,  351,  352; 
members  of  the  city  council  of  Vienna 
have  classified  terms  of  six  years  and 
elect  the  mayor,  351 ;  city  council  of 
Vienna  the  dominant  city  authority, 
352. 

Autocratic  Mayor,  152 ;  origin  and 
nature  of,  14,  15,  and  see  Mayor;  his 
relations  to  the  boss,  14,  15,  255,  256, 
258;  why  politicians  and  partisans 
favor  him,  253 ;  source  and  results  of 
theory  and  practice  concerning,  254, 
255,  259,  260;  extreme  views  of  sup- 
porters of,  255,  256 ;  theory  of  making 
him  a  despot  and  holding  him  respon- 
sible, 255,  256;  dangerous  power  of 
appointment  given  him  in  New  York, 
257,  259;  causes  which  led  to  his 
creation,  257,  259,  260;  commissions 
designed  to  check  him,  372,  373  ; 
favored  by  Tammany,  373. 

Belgian  City  Government,  city  councils 
tinder,  the  controlling  city  authority, 
from  whose  members  the  king  ap- 
points mayors,  353;  members  of  its 
city  councils  have  classified  terms  of 
six  years,  and  the  appointing  power, 
353. 

Belgium,  city  government  in,  352-354. 

Berlin,  see  German  City  Government. 


Berlin  City  Government,  see  German 
City  Government. 

Bi-partisan  police  system  and  commis- 
sions, their  origin  and  theory,  150- 
152 ;  commissions,  why  parties  favor- 
able to  them,  373 ;  tests  for  office,  see 
Tests. 

Bi-partisan  commissions,  the  false  theory 
and  pernicious  effects  of,  degrade  po- 
lice force,  373,  417^20,  431  note,  433 
note;  unjustifiable  and  arbitrary  ex- 
ample of  in  New  York,  420. 

Birmingham  (England),  the  character 
and  practical  results  of  its  govern- 
ment, 331,  332. 

Black,  Governor,  of  New  York,  176  note. 

Blackmailing,  104, 105, 114-116. 

Board  of  Health,  why  it  should  have 
several  members,  407-409  ;  party 
opinions  of  its  members  and  party 
interests  should  not  be  considered, 
409;  relation  of,  to  Home  Rule,  409; 
the  New  York  health  laws  of  1866  and 
their  administration,  a  valuable  lesson 
in  sanitary  affairs,  409-414;  sanitary 
condition  of  New  York  under  party 
government  before  1866,  410;  health 
laws  of  1866  framed  according  to  the 
non-partisan  system  commended  in 
this  volume,  410,  411 ;  its  power  in 
New  York  to  remove  nuisances,  411 ; 
importance  of  a  code  of  good  sanitary 
laws  extending  to  all  the  municipali- 
ties of  the  state,  412 ;  practice  of  divid- 
ing cities  into  classes,  in  reference  to 
sanitary  administration,  condemned, 
413 ;  every  charter  of  a  city  should  give 
it  the  powers  conferred  by  the  state 
sanitary  code,  413;  need  of  a  state 
board  of  inspection  of  local  health 
boards,  409,  410,  413,  414. 

Boss,  his  relation  to  autocratic  mayor, 
14,  15, 143. 

Boss,  and  the  boss  system,  117,  118, 120, 
143-149,  and  see  Tammany. 

Boston,  its  ordinances  check  party  ac- 
tion by  city  officers,  173. 


INDEX 


Brace,  Chas.  L.,  302. 

Brooklyn,  city  of,  its  vicious  charter, 

186-188. 

Brown,  Hon.  Addison,  450. 
Buckalew,  Mr.,  his  work,  228,  231. 
Bureau  of  Municipal  Affairs,  52,  54. 

California,  its  free  nomination  law, 
224. 

Certificates  of  nominations,  see  Nomina- 
tions. 

Chamber  of  Commerce  (N.  Y.)  supports 
city  reform,  113. 

Charity,  Tammany  gives,  for  party  ef- 
fect, 487  note. 

Charter  of  Greater  New  York,  see 
Greater  New  York  Charter,  461. 

Charter,  is  the  constitution  of  a  city,  8 ; 
what  it  should  contain,  8,  307,  478; 
danger  of  its  being  hastily  framed, 
8,  9,  and  see  Chap.  XVIII.,  462;  of 
Greater  New  York,  see  Greater  New 
York  Charter,  Chap.  XVIII.,  462. 

Charters  generally  framed  in  city-par- 
ties' interests,  16;  what  they  should 
contain,  9,  478. 

Cities  were  at  first  very  small  in  the 
United  States,  6, 10 ;  do  not  originate 
parties  or  party  principles,  12;  danger 
of  allowing  them  to  enlarge  them- 
selves at  pleasure,  257;  who  governs 
cities,  33,  34,  and  see  Chap.  XVIII. 

Citizens,  the  most  intelligent  are  most 
responsible  for  bad  city  government, 
82-84. 

Citizens'  Union,  66,  67,  79. 

City  administration,  see  City  Govern- 
ment. 

City  affairs  involve  no  party  principles, 
12-15,  73,  74,  and  see  City  Govern- 
ment. 

City  aldermen,  281,  and  see  Council. 

City  Club  of  New  York,  60. 

City  Council,  see  Council  (the  City). 

City  government,  no  generally  accepted 
form  of,  in  the  United  States,  5,  59, 
370;  the  earliest,  in  the  United  States 
under  English  charters,  6,  370,  371; 
true  system  of,  and  the  party  sys- 
tem mutually  repugnant,  11-13, 67-71 ; 
more  a  matter  of  business  than  of 
politics,  12-15,  73-79, 376 ;  its  methods 
should  be  analogous  to  those  of  busi- 
ness corporations,  376,  377;  in  Eng- 
land, see  English  City  Government. 

City  interests  debased  by  parties  and 
parties  debased  by  governing  cities, 
72-80. 


City  officers,  their  party  opinions  are 
unimportant,  and  to  treat  them  as 
tests  for  office  is  vicious,  80-85;  right 
to  prevent  their  being  active  in  pol- 
itics, 173-175. 

City  parties,  their  false  and  mischievous 
theories  and  teaching,  11-14,  82,  100, 
101 ;  their  relations  to  police  adminis- 
tration, 128,  129,  and  see  Policemen 
and  Police  Administration. 

City  party,  142-149,  and  see  City-party 
System ;  does  not  investigate  city 
abuses  or  correct  the  maladminis- 
tration of  its  adherents,  112,  113, 
275;  moral  tone  of,  lower  than  that 
of  national  parties,  109, 133. 

City-party  government,  11,  12,  and  see 
Party  Government ;  how  and  why  ex- 
tended to  cities,  14, 15, 59, 149. 

City-party  system  and  its  demands  ex- 
plained, 63-70,  92,  93,  149-152. 

City  problems,  what  they  include,  18, 
23;  as  affected  by  Constitutions, 
67. 

Civil  Service  Examinations,  see  Merit 
System;  when  they  began  and  their 
progress,  174,  175. 

Civil  Service  Law,  national  origin  of, 
175. 

Classification  of  cities,  objections  to, 
413  note. 

Clerk  of  Council,  see  Council. 

Clubs,  political,  the  sphere  and  just  limi- 
tations of,  135-140 ;  Tammany  system 
of,  136-140. 

Commission  of  Police,  whether  it  should 
be  single-headed,  431-435,  and  see 
Police  and  Commissioner  of  Police. 

Commissioners  (of  the  United  States, 
who  were  justices)  appointed  by  the 
courts,  their  efficiency,  448-450,  and 
see  Police  Justices. 

Commissions  designed  to  be  checks  on 
mayors,  372,  373. 

Committee,  Legislative,  see  Legislative 
Committee. 

Commons,  Professor,  his  views,  44,  48, 
228,  312. 

Competitive  Examinations  as  estab- 
lished by  New  York  constitution,  176; 
their  theory  and  practical  effects,  166- 
172,  see  Merit  System. 

Compulsory  Voting,  how  far  desirable, 
203. 

Conspiracy  between  different  parties 
and  their  leaders,  94,  95,  97,  102,  126, 
127,  211 ;  who  guilty  of,  176. 

Constitutions  as  affecting  city  govern- 


INDEX 


ments ,  67 ;  as  repugnant  to  the  city- 
party  system,  68-71. 

Constitution  of  New  York  establishes 
the  merit  system,  176,  but  gives  par- 
ties increased  powers,  490, 491,  and  see 
Tests  and  Appendix. 

Continuous  Council,  meaning  of,  247, 
274,  313,  362,  378. 

Coroners,  why  they  should  not  be  elec- 
ted by  popular  vote,  455-457,  and  see 
Police  Justices. 

Council  (the  City)  its  meaning,  246, 247 ; 
would  facilitate  Home  Rule,  54, 55,  and 
see  Home  Rule;  general  statement 
of  the  organization  of  that  proposed 
herein,  246,  247;  general  exposition 
of  that,  recommended,  Chap.  XL,  276- 
308 ;  theoretical  relation  of,  to  mayor 
and  city  government,  248 ;  its  functions 
as  illustrated  by  American  constitu- 
tions, 248-250,  251 ;  if  elected  through 
Free  Voting  would  be  a  non-partisan 
body,  252 ;  nature  of  the  issue  between 
a  predominating  mayor  and  a  predom- 
inating council,  253-256,  269,  270 ;  we 
must  decide  whether  the  mayor  or  the 
council  shall  be  paramount,  255,  256 ; 
essential  it  should  have  the  ordinance- 
making  power,  262-264;  its  relation 
to  the  enacting  of  city  laws,  264,  265; 
legislative  authority  it  should  possess, 
265-267 ;  should  be  represented  in  the 
legislature,  265;  should  consider  bills 
affecting  cities  before  they  are  acted 
upon  by  the  Legislature,  266-269; 
fundamental  distinction  between  a 
paramount  mayor  and  a  paramount 
council  and  its  consequences,  253-256, 
269,  270 ;  an  efficient  council  as  essen- 
tial to  municipal  corporations  as 
directors  to  business  corporations, 
270-273;  contrast  of  management  of 
municipal  corporations  with  that  of 
business  corporations,  270-273;  im- 
possibility of  governing  a  great  city 
without  an  efficient  council,  270-273 ; 
need  of  able  and  experienced  men  in, 
270-273;  need  of  able  men  in,  will 
increase  with  size  of  cities,  273;  im- 
portance of  a  council  being  a  con- 
tinuous body,  247,  274,  313,  362;  the 
proper  constitution  and  organization 
of,  Chap.  XL,  276-308;  general  prin- 
ciples bearing  upon,  proposed,  277- 
280;  the  mayor  and  aldermen  and 
their  terms  of  office,  as  proposed, 
281 ;  aldermen  in  part  elected  at 
large,  and  in  part  in  districts,  and 


8 


how  classified,  281-283;  how  alder- 
men are  to  be  nominated  and  elected, 
282,  283;  district  aldermen  and  city 
aldermen,  281,  282,  284,  287 ;  how  the 
manner  of  electing  members  of,  will 
encourage  the  best  voters  and  check 
party  domination  in  the  council  pro- 
posed, 285-287;  good  effects  of  this 
nature  under  this  system,  220,  221, 
324, 328, 329;  method  of  electing  coun- 
cil will  aid  in  suppressing  assembly 
district  despotism  and  party  spoils, 
288 ;  some  objections  to  mode  of  elec- 
tion considered,  289-292;  appointed 
aldermen  defined  and  the  reasons  for 
appointing  them,  292-297;  appointed 
aldermen  likely  to  be  fair  and  candid 
men,  291,  292,  294,  295;  appointed 
aldermen,  precedents  in  favor  of  their 
appointment,  292,  293,  312,  322-325, 
and  see  note  to  293 ;  honorary  aldermen 
and  the  reasons  which  require  their 
selection,  297,  303;  need  and  means 
of  choosing  honorary  aldermen,  299, 
303;  how  American  cities  repel  wor- 
thy members  of  councils  and  foreign 
cities  attract  them,  100,  295,  296,  315- 
317,  322-325,  358,  359;  what  done 
by  Boston  in  this  matter,  173,  302 
note ;  certain  members  of,  called 
appointed  aldermen,  to  be  chosen  by 
the  council  itself  and  the  reason 
therefor,  290-297;  whether  members 
of,  should  have  salaries,  303,  304 ;  the 
clerk  or  secretary  of,  his  term  and 
mode  of  his  election,  304 ;  whether  it 
should  be  a  single  or  a  bi-cameral 
body,  304,  305;  it  should  be  con- 
stituted without  regard  to  party  ad- 
vantage, 306 ;  the  constitution  pro- 
posed for  it  would  simplify  city 
government,  307 ;  its  relation  to 
mayor,  Chap.  X.,  and  see  Mayor ;  such 
as  American  cities  now  have,  incom- 
petent to  elect  mayors,  374;  com- 
petency of  the  new  councils  proposed, 
for  choosing  the  mayor,  375-378,  and 
see  Chap.  XI. ;  those  of  English  cities 
elect  the  mayor,  312,  313 ;  the  powers 
it  should  have  analogous  to  those  of 
Congress  and  the  Legislature,  381- 
383 ;  advantages  of  mayors  as  well  as 
the  council  being  responsible  for  good 
administration,  384,  385;  its  proper 
authority  as  to  removal  of  mayors, 
396,  397 ;  proper  powers  of  American 
councils  as  to  appointments,  promo- 
tions, and  removals,  385-390;  powers 


INDEX 


of  councils  in  Great  Britain  and  other 
European  countries  as  to  appoint- 
ments, promotions,  and  removals,  386, 
887;  relative  powers  of  council  and 
mayor  as  to  appointments,  promo- 
tions, and  removals  in  different 
branches  of  the  city  service,  388-390. 

Councillors  (English),  mode  of  election 
and  character,  292,  312,  317,  and  see 
Appointed  Aldermen  and  London  City 
Council. 

County  Clerks,  why  they  should  not  bo 
elected  by  popular  vote,  455-457,  and 
see  Justices. 

County  Council  (English) ,  320. 

Cumulative  Voting,  see  Free  Voting. 

Dana,  Richard  H.,  214. 

Deming,  Horace  E.,  214. 

District  Aldermen,  see  Council. 

District  Attorneys,  why  they  should  not 
be  elected  by  popular  vote,  455-457, 
and  see  Justices. 

District  of  Columbia  (city  of  Washing- 
ton) ,  the  government  of,  154-157. 

Duty  of  good  citizens  to  vote,  203,  204. 

Elected  officers,  there  are  too  many, 
and  examples  of  excessive  number  of, 
18,  180-183,  450. 

Election  expenses  in  England  and  United 
States  compared,  107-110,  111,  321, 
and  see  Chap.  XVIII. 

Election  of  Mayors,  see  Mayors. 

Elections-at-large,  utility  of,  202,  204, 
208,  and  see  Elections. 

Elections  (popular) ,  enough  left  even  if 
appointments  and  terms  are  increased 
as  herein  proposed,  459,  460. 

Employees  and  officers  of  cities  should 
have  better  protection  against  unjust 
removals,  393,  395,  396. 

England,  free  voting  in,  242,  245. 

English  cities,  Home  Rule  of,  not  im- 
paired by  inspection  and  reports,  47, 53. 

English  City  Government ,  was  partisan 
and  bad  before  1835,  310 ;  referred  to 
under  name  of  towns,  310;  how  it 
was  first  improved,  311-313;  constitu- 
tion and  authority  of  its  city  councils, 
312,  313;  councillors  and  aldermen 
defined,  312;  councillors  and  alder- 
men sit  as  one  body  and  elect  the 
mayor.  312,  313, 370,  375;  English  coun- 
cil elects  some  members  of  its  own 
body,  313;  the  mayor,  his  character 
and  authority,  313, 314 ;  its  mayoralty 
system  causes  harmony  and  vigorous 


administration,  314,  815;  its  effective- 
ness for  reform,  315,  316;  its  high 
reputation  and  non-partisan  spirit, 
315-317,  322-325 ;  how  far  experience 
under,  is  valuable  in  the  United  States, 
318, 319;  civil  service  reform  as  affect- 
ing its  improvement,  319 ;  laws  of  1882 
and  1888  (being  municipal  codes), 
enacted,  320;  municipal  franchise  in 
London,  317-319,  321;  provisions 
against  corruption  and  fraud  in  elec- 
tions, 321 ;  members  of  council  and  of 
school  boards  elected  by  free  nomina- 
tions and  free  voting,  242,  245,  326 ;  it 
promotes  the  interests  of  the  humbler 
classes  more  than  American  city  gov- 
ernments, 329;  illustrations  of  the 
practical  effects  of,  in  several  English 
cities,  329-333,  and  see  Birmingham, 
Manchester,  and  Glasgow;  relative 
cost  of  city  government  in  England 
and  the  United  States,  333;  police 
administration  in,  334,  335,  and  see 
Policemen;  Home  Rule  in,  336;  coun- 
cil makes  appointments,  313. 

English  mayor  elected  by  the  council, 
313,370,375. 

Enlargement  of  cities,  see  Cities  and 
Chap.  XVIII.,  461. 

Estimate  and  Apportionment,  Board  of, 
152-154,  157,  481. 

European  cities,  general  character  of 
their  governments,  337,  338,  and  see 
English  City  Government. 

European  municipal  experience  neg- 
lected in  the  United  States,  50. 

Evils,  see  Municipal  Evils. 

Examinations,  166,  167,  172,  and  see 
Pass  and  Competitive  Examinations. 

Expenses  of  election,  see  Election  Ex- 
penses and  Chap.  XVIII.,  461. 

Extension  of  cities,  its  importance,  see 
Greater  New  York,  Chap.  XVIII.,  461. 

Fairlie,  John  A.,  on  School  Inspection,  53. 

Firemen  in  cities  should  be  subject  to 
uniform  state  laws,  420  note. 

Forney,  Mr.  M.  N.,  235. 

France,  municipal  codes  and  system  of, 
338,  339;  authority  and  functions  of 
her  city  councils,  340,  341;  and  see 
French  City  Government. 

Franchise,  the  municipal,  in  different 
countries,  319,  32L 

Free  Cities,  theory  of,  31,  38. 

Free  Nominations,  210-224,  and  see  Nom- 
inations ;  when  they  may  be  equivalent 
to  elections  of  candidates,  220,  221. 


INDEX 


Free  Voting,  moral  basis  of,  224-226; 
party  theory  of,  225,  226 ;  true  theory 
of,  226,  227 ;  to  vote  freely  as  the  voter 
desires  is  his  right,  226, 227 ;  difference 
between  free  voting  and  limited  vot- 
ing, 227, 228 ;  its  relation  to  other  forms 
of  minority  representation,  and  more 
just  and  practical  than  any  other,  228, 
229 ;  as  proposed  in  New  York  in  1872, 
237,  238;  effects  of,  as  established  in 
Pennsylvania,  238-245;  party  man- 
agers in  Pennsylvania  oppose  it,  240, 
241 ;  striking  evils  it  would  suppress, 
241,  244;  in  England,  242,  245,  326; 
in  Glasgow  and  Manchester,  242,  243 ; 
in  the  London  School  Board,  244,  245; 
why  free  voting  would  make  it  easier 
to  secure  non-partisan  city  adminis- 
tration, 245 ;  necessary  to  secure  more 
than  mere  party  representation,  252, 
253 ;  high  elements  to  which  it  would 
give  representation,  260,  261;  has  a 
paramount  and  distinctive  purpose, 
229,  230 ;  cases  in  which  proportional 
minority,  or  cumulative  voting  are 
hardly  useful,  230;  advantages  of 
using  the  phrase  "  Free  Voting,"  230; 
can  be  made  to  secure  almost  com- 
plete minority  representation,  231, 
232;  special  advantages  of,  231-233; 
examples  of,  in  Dlinois  and  other 
states,  233-242;  as  provided  for  in 
Illinois  constitution,  233,  234;  as  to 
stock  of  corporations,  233,  234; 
practical  effects  of,  in  Illinois,  235- 
237. 

French  City  Government,  340-342;  the 
councils  elect  the  mayor,  340 ;  charac- 
ter and  composition  of  its  councils, 
340,  341 ;  compared  with  that  of  Eng- 
land, 344,  345 ;  its  municipal  prefects, 
340,  341,  343;  character  of  adminis- 
tration under,  340,  341;  civil  service 
examinations  and  police  administra- 
tion under,  341,  342,  345,  346;  school 
system  and  savings  banks  under,  342, 
343,  347 ;  concerning  the  city  govern- 
ment of  Paris,  343-347 ;  city  council  of 
Paris,  343,  344  ;  difference  between  it 
and  English  city  government,  343,  344, 
345 ;  artistic  and  scientific  instruction 
in  Paris,  345,  346;  the  market  and 
savings-bank  systems  of  Paris,  346, 
347 ;  city  council  of  Paris,  its  provi- 
sions for  public  schools  and  scientific 
instruction,  346,  347 ;  private  citizens 
aid  the  city  council  in  doing  city 
work,  346,  and  see  page  359  (as  to  the 


same  practice  in  Berlin)  ;  Paris  has 
no  mayor,  343. 

French  Mayor,  340,  341,  and  see  French 
City  Government. 

Gas  Supply,  see  Birmingham,  Manches- 
ter, Glasgow,  and  German  City  Gov- 
ernment. 

German  City  Government,  general  esti- 
mate of,  356;  the  city  council  of  Berlin 
the  controlling  authority,  and  elects 
the  mayor,  357;  city  councillors  of 
Berlin  are  elected  for  six  years  and 
have  classified  terms  of  office,  358; 
high  character  and  efficiency  of  the 
members  of  the  Berlin  city  council, 
358, 359 ;  some  members  of  the  council 
of  Berlin  analogous  to  proposed  Hon- 
orary Aldermen,  297,  358,  359;  con- 
sidered a  great  honor  to  be  a  member 
of  the  Berlin  council,  358-360;  how 
committees  of  citizens  aid  city  coun- 
cils in  administration,  359,  360,  364; 
no  party  politics  in  city  government 
of  Berlin,  360 ;  the  non-partisan 
methods  of  that  of  Berlin  eliminate 
party  spirit,  360, 362 ;  the  leading  men 
take  the  most  active  part  under  the 
government  of  Berlin,  361 ;  some  prac- 
tical results  of  that  of  Berlin,  362- 
365 ;  salutary  effects  of  a  continuous 
council  in  Berlin  by  acting  on  well- 
matured  plans,  362,  and  see  Contin- 
uous Council;  valuable  methods  of 
elementary  and  scientific  education 
in  Berlin,  363;  sanitary  and  benevo- 
lent administration  in  the  city  of 
Berlin,  and  its  savings  banks,  pawn- 
shops, and  street-cleaning,  364,  365. 

Germany,  city  government  in,  see  Ger- 
man City  Government. 

Glasgow,  free  voting  in,  242 ;  the  char- 
acter and  practical  results  of  its 
government,  332,  333. 

Goodnow,  Professor,  his  views,  48,  49, 
50,  55,  58,  235,  310. 

Greater  New  York  Charter,  9,  and  see 
Chap.  XVIII.,  461 ;  instructive  both  as 
an  admonition  in  city  extension  and  a 
lesson  in  city  government,  462;  the 
important  principles  it  involves,  462, 
463;  the  public  interests  it  affects, 

463,  464  ;  might  with  advantage  have 
been  given  a  more  limited  application, 

464,  465 ;  for  what  a  new  charter  was 
most  needed,  465 ;  the  party  interests 
and  exigencies  involved  in  creating 
this  charter,  466,  467;   the  Republi- 


INDEX 


cans  and  the  Democrats  both  hostile 
to  the  non-partisan  government  of 
Mayor  Strong  in  New  York  City,  466 ; 
the  Republican  party  divided  concern- 
ing principles  and  objects  of  the  char- 
ter, 467;  Mr.  Low's  relations  to  the 
charter,  4i>7,  472;  fear  that  a  non- 
partisan  charter  would  be  adopted  if 
party  charter  not  quickly  enacted, 
467,  468;  the  partisan  object  of  the 
Republicans  who  imposed  the  charter 
on  New  York,  468, 469 ;  the  law  which 
provided  for  framing  the  charter  al- 
lowed no  adequate  time  for  the  work, 
470;  the  majority  of  the  commissioners 
for  framing  it  not  the  best  that  could 
have  been  secured,  471 ;  whether  it 
was  the  duty  of  commissioners  to 
resign  when  they  found  they  bad  no 
adequate  time  for  their  work,  472-474 ; 
apparent  theory  of  majority  of  the 
commission,  473;  has  some  excellent 
provisions,  474,  488  note;  the  com- 
mission misconceived  the  sentiments 
and  wishes  of  the  Greater  New  York 
as  to  a  charter,  475 ;  majority  of  the 
Republican  voters  supported  Mr.  Low 
and  were  opposed  to  the  charter  which 
Mayor  Strong  vetoed,  474,  475;  to  im- 
pose this  charter  was  an  act  of  parti- 
san desperation,  475,  476;  minority 
representation  under  it  essential  to 
the  public  interest,  yet  was  not  pro- 
vided as  it  might  have  been,  476,  477  ; 
charter  by  intention  provides  only  for 
a  representation  of  party  majorities, 
476,  477 ;  the  so-called  charter  only  a 
vast,  crude  compilation,  478;  it  is  a 
serious  invasion  of  just  Home  Rule, 
which  will  increase  special  legislation, 
478;  it  favors  a  radical  and  despotic 
party  government  of  the  Tammany 
kind,  479;  it  creates  a  despotic 
mayor,  which  is  favorable  to  Tam- 
many's continuing  supremacy,  479, 
480 ;  the  vast  authority  of  the  mayor 
under  the  charter  illustrated,  480, 481 ; 
it,  and  the  action  of  the  mayor,  favor 
making  party  opinions  tests  for  all 
city  offices,  481;  examples  of  party 
contributions  by  candidates  in  connec- 
tion with  securing  party  nominations 
for  offices,  481,  484,  487;  Tammany 
distributes  money  in  form  of  charity 
through  its  party  leaders  for  party 
effect,  487  note ;  the  great  power  of 
the  mayor  in  the  sphere  of  legislation, 
which  will  debase  the  municipal  as- 


sembly, 482-486 ;  the  municipal  assem- 
bly under,  inadequate  for  its  functions 
and  not  likely  to  attract  competent 
men,  482,  483,  486;  concerning  the 
constitution  of  the  municipal  assem- 
bly, and  why  sure  to  be  a  partisan 
body,  484,  485;  allows  neither  free 
nominations  nor  free  voting,  and  as- 
sumes non-partisans  not  desirable  in 
the  assembly,  485  ;  only  one  represen- 
tative at  large  in  the  two  branches  of 
the  municipal  assembly,  486, 487 ;  how 
constitution  of  municipal  assembly 
favored  Tammany  in  first  election 
under  the  charter,  enabling  it  to  carry 
nearly  all  the  elections,  487 ;  unfortu- 
nately provides  for  two  houses  in  the 
assembly,  485 ;  failed  to  remedy  most 
important  evils,  but  intrenched  Tam- 
many more  strongly  than  ever  before, 
488,  489;  Republicans  interpret  the 
charter  favorably  to  partisan  su- 
premacy, 489 ;  has  made  party  contests 
over  city  affairs  inevitable  in  New 
York  until  it  shall  be  repealed,  489, 
492;  affected  by  conflicting  constitu- 
tional provisions,  496,  497;  views  of 
Dr.  Shaw  concerning  its  character, 
490;  views  of  the  Bar  Association 
of  New  York  City  concerning  its 
character,  491;  proceedings  of  Legis- 
lature on  its  enactment,  492,  493; 
how  Tammany  attempted  to  elect 
governor  through  use  of  semi- 
military  delegations,  and  its  power 
under  the  charter,  494,  495 ;  how  this 
charter  affects  the  liberty  and  in- 
fluence of  the  rural  population,  495, 
496. 

Green,  Andrew  H.,  468. 

Governing  of  cities,  by  whom  it  is  car- 
ried on,  32-35. 

Grog-shops  as  facilities  for  corrupt 
voting,  114. 

Hamburg,  city  government  of,  354, 
356;  constitution  and  authority  of  its 
city  council,  354,  355;  members  of 
council  under  it  elected  for  classified 
terms  of  six  years,  355 ;  council  under, 
elects  senate  which  elects  mayor  from 
its  own  members,  355 ;  high  standing 
of  mayor  under,  355;  precedents  for 
Honorary  Aldermen  in  American 
cities,  355. 

Head  of  Police,  whether  it  should  be  a 
single  officer,  431-435,  and  see  Police 
and  Appendix. 


INDEX 


Health  Administration,  see  Board  of 
Health. 

Hewitt,  Hon.  A.  S.,  ex-mayor  of  New 
York,  441,  446,  472  note. 

Hoffman,  Tammany  governor,  vetoes 
free  voting  in  New  York,  237,  238. 

Holland,  city  government  of,  354 ;  mem- 
bers of  councils  under,  are  elected  for 
six  years,  and  have  classified  terms, 
354;  city  councils  have  appointing 
power,  354. 

Holls,  F.  W.,  203. 

Home  Rule,  and  a  sound  municipal  sys- 
tem, nature  and  the  relations  of,  13- 
15 ;  its  relations  to  parties,  the  auto- 
cratic mayor  and  the  boss,  12-15,  and 
see  Chap.  H.,  and  Parties;  republi- 
can in  theory,  and  based  on  constitu- 
tional principles,  27 ;  there  should  be 
larger,  34;  its  true  theory  applies  to 
towns  and  counties,  27 ;  its  legal  and 
moral  limitations,  28-30;  false  theo- 
ries concerning,  31,  32 ;  should  not  be 
allowed  to  make  things  worse,  29-31 ; 
is  sometimes  so  presented  as  to  favor 
disintegration  and  insubordination, 
31 ;  cities'  claim  of  a  right  to  be  free 
or  to  govern  themselves  unfounded, 
31-33  ;  when  and  on  what  condi- 
tions it  may  be  safely  enlarged,  34; 
cities'  neglects  and  responsibilities  in 
regard  to,  34,  35;  what  essential  to 
true  home  rule,  36,  37;  mischief  of 
absolute  home  rule,  36 ;  sound  theory 
of,  36,  37 ;  abuse  of  home  rule  author- 
ity, 38 ;  interest  of  state  and  city  the 
same  as  to,  39;  danger  that  cities 
may  conspire  to  claim  absolute,  39; 
in  England,  49, 50, 336 ;  whether  larger 
home  rule  will  improve  government, 
40-42 ;  state  inspection  does  not  limit, 
47-53;  inspection  of  cities  by  state 
would  make  it  safe  to  enlarge  home 
rule,  50,  51;  just  grounds  for  claim- 
ing, 34,  36,  37, 160 ;  the  larger  powers 
needed  for,  are  legislative  rather  than 
executive,  251;  general  results  of 
municipal  government  upon  in  the 
continental  cities  of  Europe,  365- 
367. 

Honorary  Aldermen,  297-302,  and  see 
Council. 

Illinois  Constitution,  free  voting  under, 
233-237,  and  see  Free  Voting. 

Independent  Nominations,  see  Nomina- 
tions. 

Independents,  power  of,  9,  60,  61,  65. 


Inferior  men  in  city  offices,  22;  con- 
demn our  city  methods,  17,  22. 

Inspection  of  city  affairs  by  state,  value 
of,  44,  45,  50-53;  by  State  Board  of 
Charities,  45, 46 ;  by  civil  service  com- 
missions, 46 ;  examples  and  effects  of, 
47-50;  how  inspections  should  be 
made  by  state,  51,  52;  effect  of,  in 
England,  49-55. 

Intelligent  citizens  are  most  responsible 
for  bad  city  government,  160-162. 

Intolerance,  that  of  partisans  in  cities 
unjustifiable,  84,  85. 

Italian  City  Government,  348-350 ;  has  a 
good  municipal  code,  which  prevents 
special  legislation,  348 ;  terms  of  mem- 
bers of  city  councils  are  classified, 
349 ;  the  council  elects  the  mayor  from 
its  own  membership,  349;  good  ad- 
ministration in  the  city  of  Milan,  349; 
nominations  to  office  in  Milan  may  be 
practically  decisive  of  elections,  350, 
and  see  Nominations ;  remarkable  im- 
provements being  made  in  Naples,  350. 

Judges,  sale  of  nominations  for,  and 
effect  upon  bench  and  bar,  106-112; 
see  Chap.  XVIII.,  481;  of  United 
States  courts,  their  appointing  power, 
447-150. 

Judicial  Administration  in  Municipal- 
ities, Chap.  XVH.,  436-460,  490. 

Judicial  officers,  were  originally  ap- 
pointed under  American  constitutions, 
436,  437 ;  party  influence  caused  them 
to  be  elected,  and  judicial  terms  to 
be  shortened,  437,  438;  experience  of 
New  York  as  to  their  choice  and  ten- 
ure instructive,  437-440;  the  numer- 
ous elections  of  justices  in  New  York 
caused  by  her  party  system,  and  their 
disastrous  consequences,  439,  440 ;  po- 
lice justices,  their  functions  under  the 
New  York  system,  439. 

Jurors,  cases  of  their  election  by  ballot, 
180,  181. 

Justices,  see  Police  Justices. 

Labor  City  Service,  meaning  of,  388,  and 
see  Mayor. 

Laborer,  his  difficulties  in  securing  ser- 
vice from  the  city,  120. 

Labor  Registration,  its  methods  and  ad- 
vantages, 162-165. 

Leaders  (party),  as  police  justices,  124, 
125, 131-134,  and  see  Police  Justices. 

Leaders  (party) ,  meaning  and  functions 
of,  117-119, 121-127,  and  see  Tammany. 


INDEX 


Legislative  Committee  of  1895;  report 
of,  concerning  New  York  police,  128, 
129. 

Lieutenants  and  Aides  of  Tammany, 
118-121,  and  see  Tammany. 

Limited  Voting,  see  Free  Voting. 

Liquor  Saloons,  see  Grog-shops. 

Little  Districts,  see  Small  Districts. 

Local  Government  Act  (English)  of 
1894,  a  valuable  precedent  for  United 
States,  326,  327. 

Local  Officers,  which  are,  68. 

Lodging-houses  as  facilities  for  corrupt 
voting,  114. 

London  City  Council  and  local  govern- 
ment, 320,  321 ;  its  constitution,  repu- 
tation, and  the  character  of  its  mem- 
bers, 321-326;  elects  mayor,  makes 
appointments,  313,  320;  members 
elected  by  free  nominations,  326; 
distinguished  men  members  of,  322- 
324 ;  laborious  habits  of  its  committees, 
323,  324 ;  late  elections  in,  and  charac- 
ter of  men  elected, 323-325 ;  city  works 
carried  on  by,  and  amusements  pro- 
vided for  the  people,  325-327 ;  and  gee 
English  City  Government. 

Loom  is,  Frank  M.,  50, 378. 

Lot,  the  use  of,  450,  453-455,  and  see 
Police  Justices. 

Low,  Dr.  Seth,  188,  252. 

Lowell,  Mrs.  J.  S.,  302. 

Machine,  that  of  the  party  defined,  117. 

Major  City  Service,  meaning  of,  388, 
and  see  Mayor. 

Manchester,  free  voting  in,  243;  the 
character  and  practical  results  of  its 
government,  329-332. 

Mayor  and  Council,  their  relative  author- 
ity, see  Chap.  X.,  246,  and  Council. 

Mayor,  his  functions,  and  his  rela- 
tions to  the  council,  248-250,  374,  384 ; 
when  autocratic,  15,  482, 486 ;  analogy 
of  his  duties  to  those  of  the  Presi- 
dent, 248-250;  theory  of  an  autocratic 
mayor,  14,  15,  248,  250,  254-256,  259- 
260 ;  nature  of  the  issue  between  a  pre- 
dominating mayor  and  a  predominat- 
ing council,  253-256,  269,  270;  ten- 
dency to  make  him  a  despot,  255-259 ; 
theory  of  holding  him  responsible, 
255,  256 ;  dangerous  power  of  appoint- 
ment given  him  in  New  York,  257, 259 ; 
removals  at  pleasure  by,  258,  259; 
dangers  of  his  becoming  a  vicious 
power  in  regard  to  legislation  for 
cities,  266-269;  hearing  on  bills  be- 


8 


fore  him  should  be  prior  to  their  sub- 
mission to  the  Legislature,  267,  268; 
fundamental  distinction  between  a 
paramount  mayor  and  a  paramount 
council,  and  its  consequences,  253-256, 
269,  270 ;  his  business  relations  to  the 
council,  270-273 ;  absurdity  and  danger 
of  holding  that  a  mayor  can  govern 
the  city,  269-274;  no  man  should  be 
eligible  as  mayor  who  has  not  served 
in  the  council,  296,  297;  various 
methods  of  electing  him,  368;  Euro- 
pean and  American  mayors  compared, 

369,  370,    372;    choice    of,   in    Eng- 
land, 313,  370;    how  first  American, 
chosen,  371 ;  how  parties  sought  con- 
trol of,  10-13,  371-373;    commissions 
designed  to  check    his  powers,  372, 
373;  present  American   councils    in- 
competent to  elect  him,  374;  function 
of,  248-250,  374,  384 ;  since  elected  by 
reform  couucils  in  England  great  city 
reforms  have  been  accomplished,  375; 
method  of  electing  in  England,  313, 

370,  375 ;  competency  of  proper  coun- 
cils to  elect  him,  375-378 ;  need  of  vice- 
mayor,  and  his  function,  378  note ; 
method  of  choosing  him  by  council, 
379;   choice  of  mayor  from  and  by 

..council  will  improve  membership  of 
that  body,  379 ;  expense  and  partisan 
intrigues  avoided  by  council  electing 
mayor,  380;  election  of  mayor  by 
council  will  give  harmonious  vigor  to 
the  government,  380,  381 ;  English  ex- 
perience as  to  electing  mayor  by  coun- 
cil, 381 ;  irresponsible  powers  conferred 
on  mayor  degrade  the  council,  382,  see 
Chap.  XVIII.,  482-487 ;  why  he  should 
have  a  veto  power,  383 ;  special  func- 
tions and  duties  of,  384 ;  advantages  of 
mayors,  as  well  as  the  council,  being 
responsible  for  good  administration, 
384, 385 ;  powers  of  as  to  appointments, 
promotions,and  removals.  257,385-387; 
example  of  the  United  States  govern- 
ment, as  suggesting  his  proper  appoint- 
ing power,  387;  relative  power  of, 
and  the  council,  as  to  appointments 
and  removals  in  several  branches 
of  the  city  service,  388-390;  nature 
and  responsibilities  of  his  appointing 
power,  384,  390,  391 ;  removals  by,  in 
the  Minor  municipal  service,  388,  394 ; 
removals  by  him  in  the  Major  munic- 
ipal service,  389,  391 ;  his  duty  to  fill 
higher  places  by  promotion,  390;  his 
legitimate  power  over  removals,  393, 


INDEX 


394 ;  hia  powers  over  removals  of  offi- 
cers and  dismissal  of  laborers  despotic 
in  the  United  States,  395,  396;  how 
they  should  be  removed  or  dismissed, 
396,  397;  how  he  should  be  removed, 
396. 

Merit  system  defined,  169;  its  basis  of 
justice  and  its  methods  and  effects, 
165-175 ;  would  facilitate  non-partisan 
city  government,  172,  173;  prevents 
city  officials  being  active  politicians, 
173,  174;  established  by  New  York 
constitution,  176. 

Milan,  see  Italian  City  Government. 

Minnesota,  her  state  inspection  of  cities, 
48. 

Minor  city  service,  meaning  of,  388,  and 
see  Mayor. 

Minority,  its  power,  61 ;  how  far  practi- 
cally disfranchised  by  party  system 
of  voting,  241,  244,  493,  494;  and  see 
Free  Voting.  [and  Appendix. 

Minority  representation,  see  Free  Voting 

Missouri,  its  free  nomination  law,  223. 

Montpelier,  excessive  number  of  elec- 
tions in,  180,  181. 

Morality,  that  of  the  city  and  the  coun- 
try considered,  30,  38,  39. 

Municipal  Code  in  England,  320,  and 
see  English  City  Government. 

Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1835 
(English),  its  object  and  great  value, 
311-316 ;  reaffirmed  after  long  experi- 
ence, 320. 

Municipal  Evils,  when  they  first  arose, 
7;  general  statement  of,  20-22;  how 
far  due  to  parties,  158,  159;  better 
education  necessary  for  their  removal, 
158, 159. 

Municipal  League,  4. 

Municipal  reform,  friends  of,  disas- 
trously divided  by  parties,  160, 161. 

Municipal  system,  no  original  Ameri- 
can, 5 ;  how  that  we  have  originated, 
6 ;  and  see  City  Government. 

Naples,  its  city  improvement,  350,  and 
see  Italian  City  Government. 

Naturalization  and  registration,  of  vot- 
ers, 198-202 ;  rule  and  practice  as  to, 
in  various  states,  199,  200 ;  should  be 
provisions  requiring  them  to  be  made 
several  months  before  election,  200, 
201 ;  laws  of  Massachusetts  as  to,  201, 
202 ;  elections-at-large  would  relieve 
some  difficulties  as  to,  201,  202. 

New  Jersey,  her  law  enabling  citizens  to 
expose  abuses  through  the  courts,  195. 


9- 


New  York  City,  population  in  1790,  6. 

New  York  law  as  to  citizens  going  into 
the  courts  to  expose  abuses,  195,  196. 

Nominations,  their  function,  and  when 
parties  may  properly  make  them,  209- 
212;  their  coercion  by  parties,  211-213; 
every  citizen's  right  to  an  equal  oppor- 
tunity in  making  them,  211-213;  the 
party  monopoly  in  making  them  des- 
potic and  demoralizing,  212,  213,  493, 
494;  those  made  by  parties  often  secret 
and  corrupt,  218 ;  when  they  may  be 
said  to  be  free,  213,  214;  origin  of 
making  them  in  the  United  States  by 
certificate,  213,  214 ;  laws  and  practice 
of  Massachusetts  and  New  York  as 
to,  214-216  ;  laws  of  New  York  as  to, 
both  partisan  and  oppressive,  215, 216 ; 
all  should  be  free  and  be  made  by  cer- 
tificates, 216,  217 ;  certificates  of,  need 
but  few  signers,  217;  probable  good 
effects  from,  217-219;  why  partisans 
oppose  those  which  are  free,  217,  218 ; 
origin  of  those  which  are  free  in  Eng- 
land, and  how  made  there,  219-221; 
when  free  nominations  in  England 
supersede  the  need  of  voting  for  can- 
didates, 220,  221,  and  see  350 ;  how  free 
nominations  in  England  have  helped 
the  taking  of  cities  out  of  party  poli- 
tics, 221 ;  the  broader  the  suffrage  the 
greater  the  need  of  free  nominations, 
221 , 222 ;  English  system  of  free  nomi- 
nations available  in  the  United  States, 
221,  222;  if  free,  whether  too  many 
candidates  will  be  nominated,  and 
how  to  prevent  it,  222-224 ;  free  in 
Missouri  and  California  for  elections 
in  party  primaries,  223,  224. 

Non-partisan  city  government,  9,  14, 60, 
61,  65. 

Non-partisan  sentiment,  see  Indepen- 
dents. 

Office,  party  tests  for,  see  Tests. 
Officers  (city),  as  to  right  to  be  active 

in  party  politics,  172,  173, 174. 
Official  Action,  need  of  publicity  as  to, 

and  means  of  securing  it,  193-198,  and 

see  Publicity. 
Ordinance-making  power,  meaning  and 

importance  of,  262,  263. 
Ordinances  of   Board   of   Health   and 

Board  of  Police,  262,  263. 

Paris,  the  city  government  of,  342-347 ; 
has  no  mayor,  343;  and  see  French 
City  Government. 


INDEX 


Parties,  their  legitimate  sphere  and  their 
relations  to  cities,  9,  10,  67-72;  not 
needed  in  city  affairs,  11,  07 ;  how  far 
responsible  for  city  evils,  24, 26 ;  their 
relation  to  Home  Rule,  see  Chap.  III., 
57 ;  government  by,  in  cities,  59,  60 ; 
when  grasped  control  of  cities,  9-12, 
69,  60;  growth  of,  60,  64;  how  far 
needed  or  desirable  for  city  reform, 
60-64 ;  do  not  seek  city  reform,  63, 64 ; 
what  they  may  properly  seek  in  cities, 
63;  false  theory  of  their  relation  to 
cities,  9-12,  64;  as  affecting  Home 
Rule,  67-71;  wrongfully  obstruct 
Home  Rule,  68,  69;  insist  on  party 
test  for  city  offices,  69,  70;  oppose 
the  theories  of  our  constitutions,  70 ; 
prostitute  city  interests  for  their  own 
advantage,  72,  73;  national  parties 
purer  than  state  parties  and  state 
purer  than  city  parties,  73-75;  none 
have  grown  out  of  city  affairs,  79-80 ; 
no  just  basis  for  applying  party  prin- 
ciples or  tests  for  office  in  cities,  79-83, 
85 ;  men  often  join  them  without  re- 
gard to  principles,  81,  82;  divide 
friends  of  reform,  160;  how  they 
secured  government  of  cities,  11,  371 ; 
how  England  defeated  their  control 
of  city  government,  372;  why  not 
utterly  hostile  to  bi-partisan  commis- 
sions, 373 ;  strengthened  by  recent  con- 
stitutional provisions  in  New  York, 
490,  491 ;  how  they  unjustly  interfere 
with  both  municipal  and  rural  gov- 
ernment, 494-495. 

Partisan  voters,  how  discouraged  and 
baffled  by  English  non-partisan  sys- 
tem, 327,  328,  and  see  Voters  in  cities. 

Party,  tee  Parties. 

Party  activity  in  cities  largely  mis- 
chievous, 86,  87,  88;  does  not  ex- 
tend to  most  important  matters,  87, 
88. 

Party  government,  origin  and  nature  of, 
in  cities,  9-12, 59, 60 ;  in  cities  defined, 
63,  64 ;  more  appropriate  in  towns  and 
counties  than  in  cities,  76, 77 ;  no  basis 
for,  in  cities,  77 ;  its  managers  able  to 
dictate  in  city  elections,  77 ;  more  cor- 
rupt in  cities  than  elsewhere,  76-78; 
in  cities  allows  no  one  but  adherents 
of  ruling  party  to  have  office,  and  re- 
quires all  officers  to  electioneer  for  it, 
11,  92, 113 ;  why  it  should  be  excluded 
in  cities,  191,192. 

Party  leaders,  see  Leaders. 

Party  opinion  defined,  62. 


Party  spirit  and  its  effects,  24, 25, 93, 94, 
102, 103. 

Party  system  and  true  municipal  system 
mutually  repugnant,  11, 12, 100 ;  facili- 
tates conspiracy  between  the  leaders 
of  different  parties,  102. 

Party  tests,  see  Tests. 

Pass  examinations,  166  note. 

Pendleton  bill  (so-called),  origin  of,  175. 

Pennsylvania,  free  voting  in,  238-245, 
and  see  Free  Voting. 

Pensions,  or  retiring  allowances,  in  the 
city  service,  389  note ;  for  policemen, 
431. 

Personal  representation,  see  Free  Vot- 
ing. 

Plumping,  236,  243. 

Police,  see  Policemen ;  the,  its  relation 
to  parties  and  the  bi-partisan  system, 
149-151,  373,  417 ;  whether  the  head  of 
should  be  a  single  officer,  431-435; 
who  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  head 
of,  432-434;  need  of  larger  local 
powers  over  police  to  prevent  ex- 
cessive special  legislation,  434. 

Police  administration,  see  Chap.  XVI., 
415 ;  and  see  also  Policemen,  Commis- 
sion of  Police,  and  Appendix. 

Police  code  of  state  police  laws,  need 
and  utility  of,  and  what  it  should  con- 
tain, 429,  430. 

Police  Commission,  see  Commission  of 
Police,  and  Appendix. 

Police  Justices,  how  treated  by  Tam- 
many and  the  politicians,  130-134,  and 
see  Tammany;  their  authority  and 
practical  importance  under  the  sys- 
tem of  party  election,  438-440;  essen- 
tial to  the  public  safety  that  they 
should  not  be  controlled  by  parties, 
440 ;  practical  effects  of  their  election 
by  popular  vote,  440,  441 ;  good  effects 
of  their  being  made  appointive  by  the 
laws  of  New  York  of  1873,  441,  442; 
their  increased  length  of  term  a  great 
advantage,  441,  442 ;  their  appoint- 
ment by  the  mayor  involves  their  ac- 
tivity in  party  politics,  442,  443;  need 
that  they  should  be  good  lawyers, 
132,442,  443;  tendency  in  New  York 
to  give  the  higher  courts  power  of 
appointing  and  removing  justices,  443, 
444;  reasons  why  justices  should  be 
appointed  and  removed  by  the  higher 
courts,  441  416 ;  effect  of  such  appoint- 
ments and  removals  upon  the  bar,  445, 
446,  452 ;  precedents  under  the  United 
States  for  their  appointment  by  the 


10 


INDEX 


courts,  447-450;  United  States  com- 
missioners acting  as  justices,  effi- 
cient and  reliable,  450 ;  the  manner  in 
which  they  should  be  appointed  by  the 
judges,  450-453 ;  the  use  of  the  proper 
lot  in  connection  with  appointing  jus- 
tices, 451,  453-455;  method  proposed 
for  selecting  justices  applicable  to 
the  selection  of  various  other  officers, 
455,  456 ;  objections  to  the  election  by 
popular  vote  of  coroners,  district  at- 
torneys, and  several  other  officers, 
455-457;  a  late  New  York  law  bear- 
ing upon  the  choice  of,  indefensible, 
457-458;  popular  elections  of,  and  of 
other  officers,  where  no  political  prin- 
ciples are  involved,  sure  to  be  vicious, 
458,  459. 

Police  laws,  those  of  New  York  of  1857 
and  1870, 150, 151. 

Police  school,  need  of,  see  Appendix. 

Policemen,  their  qualifications  and  du- 
ties, 128, 149,  415-417 ;  their  relations 
to  parties,  128,  150, 151,  416,  417 ;  the 
nature  of  their  duties,  and  why  they 
should  not  be  partisans  or  politicians, 
149,  415,  416 ;  analogy  of  their  duties 
to  those  of  soldiers,  416 ;  parties  cause 
the  greatest  difficulties  in  the  dis- 
charge of  their  duties,  416, 417 ;  parti- 
san politicians  not  fit  to  be  policemen, 
417,  418 ;  unfavorably  affected  by  bi- 
partisan commissions,  417-420;  vicious 
practice  of  selecting  them  for  party 
reasons,  418,  419;  parties  —  through 
bi-partisan  commissions  and  other- 
wise —  seek  to  control  them,  418, 
419;  laws  of  Massachusetts  and  New 
York  aim  to  secure  an  unjustifi- 
able and  partisan  monopoly  of  police 
appointments,  419-421 ;  how  far 
they  are  local  officers  and  how  far 
state  officers,  422,  423 ;  should  recog- 
nize a  duty  to  the  state  as  well  as 
to  the  city,  423,  424 ;  to  teach,  police- 
men that  their  sole  duty  is  to  the 
city  is  false  and  vicious,  423,  424; 
why  the  state  should  pay  a  part  of  the 
expense  of  local  police  administration, 
424-426,  428,  429 ;  the  practice  of  Eng- 
land as  to  nation  paying  part  of  the 
expense  of  police  administration,  425, 
426;  English  police  system,  and  meth- 
ods worthy  of  study,  50,  426 ;  our  par- 
tisan police  laws  restrict  Home  Rule, 
426,  427 ;  need  and  utility  of  state  in- 
spection of  police,  426,  427 ;  whether 
there  should  be  a  state  police  force, 


426,  and  see  note;  there  should  be 
annual  reports  to  the  state  concerning 
city  police  administration,  427;  need 
of  having  policemen  go  outside  of  their 
locality  to  aid  in  the  suppression  of 
riots,  etc.,  elsewhere,  428,  429;  their 
superiority  to  the  militia  for  such 
purposes,  428,  429;  pensions  or  retir- 
ing allowances  for  those  superannu- 
ated, 389  note,  431. 

Police  trials,  their  difficulty  and  num- 
ber, 433,  434. 

Power  of  appointment  and  removal  is  a 
power  in  trust  for  the  benefit  of  the 
people  and  not  of  any  party,  191, 192, 
and  see  Mayor. 

Primary  elections,  202, 203,  and  see  Elec- 
tions. 

Principles  of  parties  not  involved  in 
cities,  9, 14,  60-65,  73,  74. 

Problems,  the  leading,  5,  17,  18,  23; 
when  municipal  arose,  7, 10 ;  munici- 
pal underrated,  8,  9. 

Property  qualifications  for  suffrage,  198. 

Proportional  representation,  see  Free 
Voting. 

Publicity  of  official  action,  need  of,  193- 
198;  as  a  remedy  for  abuses,  194; 
right  of  citizens  to  secure  it  through 
the  courts,  195,  196;  how  secured  in 
New  York  and  New  Jersey,  195-197 ; 
need  of  further  law  for  securing,  197. 

Public  opinion  defined,  62 ;  as  a  practi- 
cal force  in  cities,  85-88 ;  its  power  to 
overcome  party  forces,  85-88. 

Questions,  the   leading,  in   cities,  see 

Problems. 
Quincy,  Josiah,  302. 

Railroads  (city) ,  see  Birmingham,  Man- 
chester, Glasgow,  and  German  City 
Government. 

Reform  in  cities,  why  parties  cannot 
lead  in,  66,  67. 

Reform,  Municipal,  see  Municipal  Re- 
form. 

Reforms  begin  outside  parties,  60,  66. 

Registration  of  laborers,  see  Labor  Reg- 
istration. 

Registration  of  Voters,  199,  200,  201. 

Removals,  true  rule  as  to,  171,  172- 
174 ;  theory  of  removing  at  pleasure, 
257-259,  393,  and  see  "  At  Pleasure  "  ; 
should  be  made  publicly,  and  only 
for  reasons  stated,  391,  392;  liberty 
to  make  them  at  pleasure  can  only 
be  desired  by  a  despot  or  a  corrupt 


11 


INDEX 


officer,  258,  391;  provisions  for  cor- 
recting injustice  in  making,  395; 
provision  for  removing  mayor,  396. 

Reports  needed  from  cities  to  state,  42, 
44,  and  see  Inspection. 

Responsibility  of  representatives,  feel- 
ing of,  impaired  by  small  districts, 
204-208. 

Retiring  allowances,  or  pensions,  in  the 
city  service,  389  note,  431. 

Rural  population,  how  affected  by  city- 
party  rule,  495-498. 

Salaries,  whether  they  should  be  allowed 
to  members  of  city  council,  303. 

Sale  of  nominations,  106-112,  and  see 
Judges  and  Tammany. 

Saloons,  see  Grog-shops. 

Sanitary  Administration,  $ee  Board  of 
Health. 

School  Administration,  see  School 
Boards. 

School  Boards,  the  need  of,  399 ;  differ- 
ent views  as  to  the  true  construction 
of,  399 ;  should  be  state  inspection  of, 
399,  401 ;  should  have  no  connection 
with  party  politics,  400 ;  Free  Voting 
applied  to  election  of  members  in 
England,  242,  244,  400;  their  adminis- 
tration has  two  branches,  401 ;  what 
should  be  the  composition  of  Ameri- 
can school  boards,  and  how  their 
members  should  be  selected,  402,  403; 
their  members  should  have  classified 
terms  of  office  and  be  chosen  by  non- 
partisan  methods,  402 ;  some  members 
of,  should  be  chosen  by  city  council, 
402,  403;  might  be  allowed  to  select 
honorary  members,  404 ;  offices  under, 
should  be  filled  through  the  civil  ser- 
vice examinations,  404;  members  of, 
should  represent  not  parties,  but  the 
people,404 ;  English  law  and  practice  as 
to  their  selection,  242-244, 326;  Ameri- 
can practice  as  to  selecting  them,  244 ; 
partisan  School  Board  of  New  York 
City  under  law  of  1894  involves  school 
administration  in  party  politics  and 
strengthens  the  spoils  system,  405, 
406;  subordinate  officers  under  last 
law  selected  according  to  spoils  sys- 
tem methods,  406,  407. 

School  Commissioners,  tee  School 
Boards. 

School  Inspections,  399-401,  and  see 
School  Boards. 

School  officers,  tee  School  Boards. 

Schools,  tee  School  Boards  and  Appendix. 


Schuyler,  Louisa  Lee,  302. 

Science,    municipal,    little    in    United 

States,  5,  11,  58. 

Secretary  of  Council,  see  Council. 
Separate  city  elections,  value  of,  16,  25, 

26;  parties  may  favor  them,  26;  trial 

of  them  in  New  York,  26. 
Shaw,  Dr.  Albert,  58,  310,  322,  323,  471, 

490. 
Sheriffs,  why  they  should  not  be  elected 

by   popular   vote,    455-457,    and   tee 

Police  Justices. 

Small  districts  for  representation  vi- 
cious in  their  tendency,  204-208; 

favor  the  election  of  small  men  and 

impair  a  salutary  sense  of  responsi- 
bility, 207,  472,  486. 
Smith,  Chas.  S.,  302,  472  note. 
Spanish    City   Government,    347,    348; 

city  council   elects   the   mayor  and 

several    assistants    from    its    own 

body,  348. 
Special  city  laws  very  numerous  and 

excessive,  20. 
Special   legislation,  how  necessity  for, 

can  be  avoided,  251,  264,  265. 
Spoils  System,  origin  of,  10;   defined, 

169,  170. 

State  Board  of  Charities,  44,  45. 
State  Charities'  Aid  Association  of  New 

York,  46. 

State  Inspection  of  Cities,  see  Inspection. 
State  Municipal  Bureau,  54. 
State  Police  Scheme,  see  Appendix. 
Statesmen,  American,   have   neglected 

cities,  8,  59. 
Sterne,  Simon,  471. 
Strong,  W.  L.,  election  of,  as  mayor,  64 ; 

his  appointments,  134, 442 ;  his  official 

action,  465,  466,  472. 
Suffrage,  property  qualification  for,  198 ; 

need  of  higher  standards  for,  198, 199. 

Tammany,  its  meaning,  89 ;  reasons  for 
considering  it,  89;  its  methods  imi- 
tated by  its  opponents  90 ;  origin  and 
object  of,  90, 91 ;  transformation  from 
charity  to  politics,  91 ;  its  nomencla- 
ture, 92;  it  relies  on  party  conflicts 
for  public  virtue,  93;  insists  on  mu- 
nicipal servants  being  all  Tammany 
men,  93,  94;  the  kind  of  party  govern- 
ment it  enforces,  92;  its  adherents 
misled  by  party  spirit  but  not  neces- 
sarily unpatriotic,  49,  94,  98,  103; 
treats  city  affairs  as  a  mass  of  politics 
to  be  managed,  93 ;  makes  the  will  of 
its  majority  its  moral  law,  94;  the 


12 


INDEX 


decisive  question  concerning  it  not 
the  merits  of  its  adherents,  but  the 
character  and  effects  of  its  system, 
94,  95 ;  conflicting  aims  and  attitudes 
of,  96,  99;  habitually  sacrifices  some 
of  the  interests  it  assumes  to  repre- 
sent, 96 ;  has  become  a  state  and  na- 
tional power  in  politics,  97 ;  has  habit- 
ually opposed  civil  service  and  other 
reforms,  93,  97;  cannot  be  defended 
on  the  basis  of  principle,  97 ;  a  unique 
attempt  to  defend  its  theories,  97,  98 ; 
sometimes  openly  sacrifices  city  in- 
terests, 99, 100 ;  reasons  for  its  having 
so  many  worthy  supporters,  98,  99; 
threefold  relations  of  Tammany  con- 
sidered, 99,  100;  its  views  of  party 
demoralizing,  100;  it  supports  and 
enforces  the  spoils  system,  101;  it 
gives  official  favors  for  votes,  101;  it 
aggravates  party  animosities,  101; 
what  it  says  to  the  voters,  101,  102; 
some  of  the  effects  of  its  system,  102, 
103;  the  bond  which  holds  its  ad- 
herents together,  103,  104 ;  its  theory 
of  the  duty  of  office-holders  under  it, 
103;  its  extortion  of  political  assess- 
ments, 104,  106 ;  its  profit  from  man- 
aging city-party  politics,  105 ;  it  makes 
gains  from  granting  permits  and  li- 
censes, 104, 105 ;  its  feudal  power  over 
office-holders,  102-104 ;  practically 
sells  offices,  106,  107 ;  sales  of  judicial 
offices  demoralizing  in  their  effects 
upon  the  bench  and  bar,  107-110 ;  price 
exacted  for  nominations  for  various 
offices,  111,  112,  481,  482,  487 ;  its  deal- 
ings with  police  courts  and  the  police 
force,  and  its  profits  therefrom,  112; 
examples  of  its  dealings  with  police 
justices,  113,  114,  133,  134;  how  the 
keepers  of  lodging-houses,  grog-shops, 
gambling  dens  aid  it,  114 ;  calls  for  no 
sacrifices  of  party  interests  for  the 
public  good,  117;  to  what  the  extor- 
tions and  blackmailing  of  its  sup- 
porters extend,  114,  115;  its  great 
gains  from  controlling  legislation,  115, 
116 ;  methods  through  which  it  man- 
ages its  affairs  and  governs  cities, 
116-121 ;  its  captains,  lieutenants, 
aides,  and  other  subordinates,  118; 
its  machine,  and  what  the  term  means, 
117,  118 ;  the  power  of  its  machine  to 
influence  voters,  119;  the  hopes  and 
fears  which  stimulate  its  officers,  119 ; 
how  it  apportions  patronage  and  spoils 
to  districts,  119;  the  duties  of  its 


captains  and  aides,  118-120;  how  it 
deals  with  city  laborers,  120;  its  boss 
system  prevails  through  its  whole 
organization,  119,  120;  its  Assembly 
districts,  and  the  duties  and  functions 
of  the  leaders  of  these  districts,  117, 
118,  121-126;  pernicious  influence  of 
its  leaders,  especially  over  the  crim- 
inal classes,  122-124 ;  large  sums  paid 
these  leaders  as  public  officers,  124, 
125 ;  its  leaders  and  the  leaders  of  its 
party  opponents  punished  together, 
126,  127;  abuses  of,  investigated  by 
independent  citizens,  126, 127 ;  its  in- 
fluence and  that  of  city-party  theories 
upon  police  administration  and  the 
duties  of  policemen,  128,  129 ;  its  rela- 
tions with  and  manner  of  treating 
police  courts,  130-134;  treats  criminal 
justices  as  partisan  forces  to  be  used 
for  its  own  advantage,  131 ;  the  dan- 
ger and  injustice  of  making  police 
justices  out  of  party  leaders,  131-133 ; 
example  of  an  admirable  police  justice 
it  condemned,  133;  tendency  of  its 
system  to  partisan  despotism  and 
servility,  135;  its  vicious  partisan 
club  system,  135-140;  how  its  clubs 
are  supported,  137 ;  what  is  done  at  its 
clubs,  138,  139 ;  politician's  theory  of 
clubs,  139;  its  expenditure  of  money 
and  its  physical  demonstrations  at 
conventions,  140-143;  it  sends  many 
trains  of  semi-military  delegates  to 
conventions ;  141-143, 494-497 ;  its  boss 
and  its  boss  system,  143-149,  and  see 
Boss ;  its  methods  constantly  produce 
bosses,  143,  144 ;  what  its  system  de- 
mands in  the  boss,  145, 146 ;  the  duties 
of  its  boss,  147;  effects  of  its  boss 
system,  147,  148;  it  distributes  (so- 
called)  charity  through  its  assembly 
district  leaders,  487  note ;  how  it  tried 
to  make  its  mayor  governor,  495-497. 

Tenure,  see  Term  and  Tenure. 

Term  and  Tenure  for  municipal  office, 
what  is  reasonable,  178;  should  be 
increased,  179;  mischievous  prece- 
dents as  to,  179-182 ;  need  and  utility 
of  their  increase  as  cities  grow  larger, 
182;  examples  of  the  advantage  of 
stability  in  office,  183, 184 ;  evils  from 
their  being  too  short  and  precarious, 
189-191. 

Tests,  partisan,  for  office,  419-421,  494, 
and  see  Appendix. 

Theories  of  vicious  city  government 
illustrated  in  the  charter  of  Brook- 


13 


INDEX 


lyn,  185-188;  how  far  important  to 
have  a  sound  theory,  60,  62. 

Town  government,  67. 

Town,  name  sometimes  used  to  desig- 
nate cities  in  England,  310. 

United  States  Commissioners,  see  Com- 
missioners and  Police  Justices. 

Universal  suffrage  in  cities,  how  far 
cause  of  municipal  evils,  317-319. 

Unrepresented  voters,  number  result- 
ing from  the  city-party  system,  241. 

Veto  power,  why  mayor  should  have, 

383-385. 
Vice-Mayor,  378  note,  387-395,  and  see 

Mayor. 
Vienna,  city  government  of,  351,  352, 

and  see,  Austrian  City  Government. 
Vile  voters,  how  dissuaded  from  voting 

by  English  non-partisan  system,  66, 

327, 328;  will  be  dissuaded  by  method 


of  voting  in  the  proposed  American 
councils,  285. 

Voters,  different  classes  of,  in  cities,  and 
how  properly  described,  63, 65-67,  327, 
328 ;  the  non-partisan  or  independent 
vote,  65;  voters  in  cities,  the  party 
vote,  65;  the  partisan  vote,  65;  the 
mercenary  vote,  66 ;  the  vile  vote,  66, 
67, 122-124. 

Voting,  duty  of,  203,  204,  and  see  Free 
Voting. 

Waring,  Colonel  Qeo.  E.,  261,  471. 

Washington,  city  of,  see  District  of 
Columbia. 

Water  supply,  see  Birmingham,  Man- 
chester, Glasgow,  and  German  City 
Government. 

Wheeler,  Hon.  Hoyt  H.,  450. 

Wilcoi,  Delos  F.,  51. 

Wood,  Fernando,  his  system,  149. 


14 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  SOCIOLOGY. 

AN  ANALYSIS   OF  THE  PHENOMENA    OF  ASSOCIATION  AND   OF 
SOCIAL   ORGANIZATION. 

By  FRANKLIN  HENRY  GIDDINQS,  M.A., 

Professor  of  Sociology  in  Columbia  University,  in  the  City  of  New  York- 
(COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY   PRESS.) 

8vo.     Cloth.     $3.OO,  net. 


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present  stage  of  sociology,  and  he  has  made  a  distinct  and  valuable  contribution 
to  the  subject.  The  book  is  also  timely,  and  will  doubtless  have  wide  reading 
and  command  the  attention  of  all  students  of  the  subject,  not  only  because  of 
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ology will  give  a  hearty  welcome  to  Professor  Giddings'  book."  —  Boston  Daily 
Advertiser. 

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ject which  is  engaging  the  sustained  labors  of  our  foremost  scholars,  and  the 
attention  and  interest  of  our  publicists."  —  The  Philadelphia  Evening  Bulletin. 

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of  method.  We  feel  convinced  that  as  soon  as  it  becomes  known  it  will  be 
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early  stage  of  the  study  of  this  science,  cannot  be  exaggerated."  —  Minneapolis 
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MUNICIPAL  HOME  RULE. 

A   STUDY  IN  ADMINISTRA  TlOff 

By  FRANK  J.  GOODNOW,  A.M.,  LL.B., 

Professor  of  Administrative  Law  in  Columbia  College,  Author  of 

"  Comparative  Administrative  Law." 

12010.    Cloth.    $1.50. 


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MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS. 

By  FRANK  J.  GOODNOW,  LL.D., 

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Cloth.    i6mo.    $1.50,  net. 


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